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Abstract 
 
This thesis demonstrates how experiences of agency and health persist in spite of confining 
social and biological circumstances. I take the case of clozapine-treated schizophrenia, where 
patients are presented with both renewed hope for an independent life at the same time as 
undertaking an intensive physiological monitoring regimen that prioritises their life in the 
most immediate sense only. Clozapine patients face a high risk of chronic multi-morbidities 
that significantly lower their life expectancy, and they are not quite ‘cured’ of their mental 
disturbances pertaining to chronic schizophrenia. I demonstrate, though, how patients are 
able to experience a sense of what I term health agency, where we might otherwise imagine 
their well-being to be significantly compromised. Health agency is a feeling of control over 
one’s well-being, where well-being is defined in one’s own terms. It was remarkable to find it 
in the clinical contexts in which I was working, where very narrowly constituted definitions 
of health were ostensibly endorsed and imposed. But in the thick of life in the clozapine 
clinic, patients and institution did not occupy strict polar positions. My fine grained 
ethnographic work revealed how patients worked creatively with the clinical circuitries, 
biomedical imaginaries and temporal underpinnings of clozapine treatment to personalise 
their experiences and to exert subtle, personal power over their health and future prospects.  
 
My fieldwork was based in the UK and Australia over an 18-month period (2015-2016) 
between two clozapine clinics. Research participants included 43 people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia (termed patients, hereafter) and 16 clinical staff at the clozapine clinics (termed 
clinical caregivers, hereafter). I conducted participant observation and 130 interviews. 
Drawing on my ethnographic data, this thesis explicates how health agency was available to 
patients in four central ways. First, health agency was part of a hopeful, personal persistence 
for holistic health in spite of the ‘physical,’ ‘mental,’ and ‘social’ aspects of health appearing 
irreconcilable in terms of clinical definitions. Second, patients were able to creatively 
manipulate and complement the goals of clozapine clinic blood monitoring to actively 
participate in the aspect of their treatment that is otherwise the furthest from patient control. 
Third, patients drew on the ambiguities of clozapine and other ‘health’ consumptions or 
behaviours to negotiate how clozapine impacted their minds and bodies. Fourth, patients 
utilised the temporalities of clozapine and clinical suspending of non-biological concerns to 
abundantly “live in the present” and harness focused energies that kept their futures open, 
while ephemerally suspending clinical symptoms and clozapine side effects. I suggest that 
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patients’ self and social labour, and their quiet everyday efficacies in making their own 
health, problematise some previous anthropological and clinical conceptions about living 
with chronic schizophrenia under biomedical treatment models. I make the case for further 
ethnographic consideration for quiet expressions of agency within highly structured 
conditions. 
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Introduction 
 
In this thesis I ask: How do experiences of agency and health emerge from within the clinic 
for clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients? I argue that health agency can emerge from the 
very clinical conditions that might otherwise be seen to define it. People undertaking 
clozapine treatment for schizophrenia have, for the most part, been given a second chance at 
life while at the same time facing significantly higher morbidities and intensive biomedical 
monitoring. I show, though, that patients themselves can make clinical processes and 
imaginaries their own, in ways that speak to their own power over, and hope for, their health. 
 
In non-medical contexts, Nigel Rapport (2003) has illustrated that if we want to uncover how 
agency works, we ought to look for it within the most powerful structures. Agency is found 
not so much in forms of opposition to, nor mere compliance with, the powerful socio-
biological structure that is clozapine treatment. Rather, agency issues from within it as 
clozapine patients rework that which is ostensibly governing their bodies and minds in 
medical and institutional ways. This is a quiet process that I suggest has been passed over in 
favour of attendance to the spectacular, elusive or falsifiable-driven aspects of investigating 
schizophrenia, which I detail in what follows. 
 
Schizophrenia is characterized by a profound disruption in cognition and emotion; ‘a 
fundamental disorder of thought and feeling’ (Insel 2010:187). In its diagnostic conception, 
schizophrenia represented a degenerative biological ‘disease,’ implicating experiences of 
‘self’ and social functioning. The first clinical observations of the condition, initially labelled 
‘dementia praecox’ by German psychiatrist Emile Kraepelin at the turn of the twentieth 
century, posited that patients experienced: ‘a disease process that isolates and opposes them 
to Western selfhood’; ‘[t]he resistance to labour, present in every stage in the course of 
dementia praecox and even in its wake, is not simply a perceived neglect of or disinterest in a 
particular type of environment; it incorporates a resistance to the labour of self-improvement’ 
(Woods 2011:42).  
 
Schizophrenia has challenged both clinical and cultural theorists as a ‘subliminal’ category of 
disorder, with no clear biological determinants nor cures, and may soon cease to be clinically 
categorisable at all (Woods 2011; Murray 2016). The term itself has come into question 
because the symptoms and outcomes are not specific to any one disorder (Insel 2010). 
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Research agendas attempting to better define schizophrenia have not been corroborated, 
which has produced a ‘discontinuity history’ that further plagues theoretical efforts (Berrios, 
Loque & Villagran 2003:134). While academic debate about the term being dissolved into 
something broader, such as ‘psychotic spectrum disorder,’ has been brewing for nearly forty 
years, the term continues to dominate because ‘there is no other reality without its borders’ 
(Guloksuv & van Os 2018:238). ‘It is a term with invisible scare quotes, but no other word 
does its job,’ Luhrmann (2016:2) has summarised. I elaborate shortly on what is meant by the 
label schizophrenia, however I note in the first instance that it is highly elusive.  
 
Anthropologists have looked to humanise the conditions that comprise the term 
schizophrenia. In 1997, anthropologist Janis Jenkins described schizophrenia as a ‘moral 
struggle either to maintain or find anew one’s sense of rhythm or involvement in the flow of 
everyday activities.’ Experiences of living with schizophrenia can indeed be cast as 
‘extraordinary’ (Lucas 1999; Jenkins 2015). Jenkins (2004:30) posited that ‘people with 
schizophrenia are just like everyone else, only more so.’ Drawing on extensive ethnographic 
evidence of the role of culture and inter-subjective ‘struggles,’ Jenkins (2015:I;12) 
established an anthropological framework to consider schizophrenia as an ‘extraordinary 
condition’ that ‘emphasises the nonordinary and spectacular qualities of mental illness in 
experience and representation’; wherein ‘rather than being dismissed as marginal or 
abnormal, the extraordinary can be recognized as vital and integral.’ The extraordinary 
aspects of schizophrenia can be appreciated under conditions where everyday subjectivity 
suggests an incredible endurance in the face of fundamentally irreconcilable social 
participations – such as those of strained community connections, acute ‘suffering’ in 
neoliberal culture, homelessness or peer-led recovery centres (Lucas 1999; Estroff 1981; 
Jenkins 2015; Luhmann & Marrow 2016; Myers 2015). From a treatment perspective, the 
question still bourgeoning from Kraepelin’s first observations is how to assist patients in 
living a ‘contributing life’ (Woods 2011; Lourey, Holland & Green 2012), which is now 
likely to be significantly compromised by pharmaceutical regimens that prompt the onset of 
lifestyle barriers. 
 
Today, schizophrenia and its treatment are characterised by paradoxes and polarities in terms 
of how the disorder can be ‘controlled’ – by clinical and social treatments, or by individuals 
with the diagnosis. The search for biomarkers and improved drug treatments continues apace 
in biomedical research contexts, while social scientists endeavor to locate cultural 
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underpinnings.1 Rod Lucas (2001:97) illuminated how the expectations of reciprocal 
participation in public life alongside private ‘self management’ can be contradictory for 
people being pharmacologically treated for schizophrenia. The Recovery Movement in the 
United States of America overlooks incongruence with wider cultural expectations of what it 
means to be independent in American society (Hopper 2007; Myers 2015). Even if ‘stable’ 
on medication, patients face what Jenkins (2010:9) has identified as ‘pharmaceutical 
paradoxes of lived experience’ that can, ‘ironically create madness and suffering.’ Namely: 
‘recovery without cure’; ‘stigma despite recovery’; ‘the pervasive cultural-clinical trope that a 
wide array of problems can reductively be defined as “a biochemical imbalance,” which, 
while no one’s “fault,” enjoins the neoliberal dictum of individual responsibility for one’s 
own condition even so’; and the “side effects” of antipsychotic drugs ‘that are met with 
varying degrees of awareness or tolerance of insalubrious effects’ (Jenkins 2010:9). Further, 
there are the juxtaposed assumptions and experiences in regard to patients’ gender statuses, 
desires, social needs, along with a ‘felt need for medication in face of fears of addition, 
toxicity, and chronicity’ (Jenkins 2015:65, original emphasis). The breadth of expectations 
and experiences of psycho-pharmaceuticals indubitably implicate patients’ subjectivity.  
 
While the intention has been to situate the subjectivity of schizophrenia patients along a 
human continuum, there has been much emphasis on how psycho-pharmaceutically 
medicated patients’ agency manifests – like schizophrenia – in quite remarkable ways.  
Institutional and biochemical powers are often critiqued for what they do to the agent, 
producing ‘pharmaceutical reason’ (Lakoff 2005), ‘neurochemical selves’ (Rose 2003), a 
‘pharmaceutical self’ (Jenkins 2010) or a ‘pharmaceutical personality’ (Martin 2009). 
Meanwhile, when looking at non-psychiatric health conditions, people have been found to 
subtly and effectively take part in their clinical management (Mol 2008), in ways that may sit 
unnoticed in light of larger regimes of ‘biological citizenship’ (Petryna 2004). It is thus 
critical to think about how experiences of anti-psychotic drug regimens that downplay the 
‘extraordinary’ conditions of schizophrenia, by introducing routine non-psychiatric 
monitoring, may shape agency and health.  
 
                                                 
1 The most recent biological hypothesis at the time of writing this thesis is that schizophrenia may be a ‘multi-system 
disorder’ involving inflammation of the whole body, such that psycho-pharmaceutical ‘brain’ treatments with ‘physical’ side 
effects may not be the central contributor to co-morbidities (Pillinger et al. 2018). 
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In the biomedical treatments contexts of Australia and the UK where I conducted fieldwork, 
the antipsychotic drug clozapine offers chronic schizophrenia patients the most stability and 
hope, while at the same time requiring rigorous physiological monitoring. Clozapine is 
associated with a plethora of imminently life-threatening side effects and chronic ‘physical’ 
health conditions that shorten life expectancy. The reason for taking clozapine in the first 
place, however, is often a matter of life or death (suicidal, and sometimes homicidal, 
behaviours tend to land people in the situation of being given this ‘last resort’ but ‘wonder’ 
drug). People taking clozapine as part of their management regimen become ‘clozapine 
patients’ beyond their status of having schizophrenia. 
 
Ethnographic research has not previously attended specifically to the clinical monitoring 
experiences of those undertaking and overseeing clozapine treatment for schizophrenia, nor 
has health or subjective well-being in the clozapine context been explored beyond clinical 
measurements. Thus, the purpose of my ethnographic research was to investigate what 
clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients and their clinical caregivers make of ‘health’ during 
clozapine treatment, and to what degree a more commonplace agency can be experienced. 
Before returning to the greater context of schizophrenia and its biomedical treatment and 
what clozapine introduces to people’s lives, I elaborate on the central themes of ‘agency’ and 
‘hope’ embedded in clozapine treatment experiences. I then outline four manifestations of 
health agency that I observed, comprising the four thesis chapters that follow.  
 
Agency 
 
I draw on notions of agency as an active and relational practice; an embodying experience 
that grounds people in present activity and gives subjective meaning to the world, to the self 
and others. Subjectivity refers to how ‘actors ‘enact,’ ‘resist’ or ‘negotiate’ the world as 
given, and in doing so, ‘make’ the world’ (Ortner in Jenkins & Barrett 2004:9). Drawing on 
Gregory Bateson’s ideas about how people manage their lives around ‘negative entropy’ and 
Amos Rapoport’s observation that ‘all living things organize space’ in their own ‘personal 
space,’ Nigel Rapport (2003:224-225) suggested that individuals feel an influence over their 
environments and selectively draw from those environments, depending on their personal 
goals. I take the clozapine clinic as the central social space in which agents were operating 
and selectively making their worlds and executing personal goals, toward health, where it 
might be otherwise assumed that they have no such agency. Moreover, I take the theoretical 
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frictions between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ to be about how both concepts are ‘affectively 
interconnected, rather than diametrically opposed’ (Biehl & Moran-Thomas 2009:276). There 
are numerous theoretical frameworks about the interplay between agency and social 
structures to which my ethnographic findings speak.  
 
First, agents continually operate within permeable and changing structures that have been 
otherwise nominalised. ‘Agency refers to doing,’ wrote Giddens (1984:10). Giddens posited 
that ‘ordinary human agents’ possess ‘controlled alertness’ that gives rise ‘[t]o reflexive 
monitoring of action, in contexts of co-presence’ (1984:79).2 As Archer (2004:308) asserted 
in her social realism approach to understanding agency in context, there are ‘causal powers 
proper to agency itself.’ These powers ‘enable people to reflect upon their social context, and 
to act reflexively towards it, either individually or collectively’ (Archer 2004:308). This does 
not preclude experiences of struggle. In the context of schizophrenia, Jenkins (2015:92) 
posited ‘struggle as central to the daily and long-term experience of mental illness is intended 
as a frame to identify the quality of experience as an active process.’ Experiences of agency 
that are both threatened and endorsed by the presence of structures/others also involve the 
more elusive power of agents to imagine more for themselves.  
 
Agency may be seen as a creative process of ‘becoming’ something yet to be known. Biehl 
and Locke (2010:322) have argued for individual power over institutional power of agents, 
picking up on Delueze’s notions of ‘becoming’ – where ‘society is something that is 
constantly escaping in every direction.’ The ‘anthropology of becoming’ explores ‘the 
motions of becoming different and moments of impasse or plateaus of stabilization,’ wherein 
‘the work of becoming is inherently a work of creation’ (Biehl & Locke 2017:6;9). Similarly, 
Ingold situates humankind as ‘a singular locus of creative growth within a continually 
unfolding field of relationships’ (2011:4-5). In terms of the ‘skills’ that humans develop and 
express in their environments, he notes that ‘a mixture of improvisation and imitation’ are 
critical (Ingold 2011:401). My ethnographic data attests to both the ‘becoming’ and creative 
competence of agents. The imaginative dimensions of agency and power need to be carefully 
considered, particularly in circumstances that invite existential struggles and imaginaries.  
 
                                                 
2 Giddens (1984:16) theory of ‘structuration’ – wherein ‘structure is not “external” to individuals’ and agency is comprised 
of a ‘duality’ that ‘is always both constraining and enabling’ – was at first appealing for my analysis, until I realised the 
limitations of this theory when it came to explaining the individual and ‘existential power’ (Rapport 2003) embodied by 
clozapine patients in my research. 
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The active imagination of all human beings is part of our agency and we project ‘the 
capability, the power, to be the source and originator of acts’ (Rapport & Overing 2001:1). 
The degree of attention granted to us as individual selves and bodies within an inter-personal 
context invites different degrees of projectable agency. The deployment of what Rapport 
(2003:16) described as ‘existential power’ and a ‘self-intensity’ (‘Machtegefuhl’) is 
accessible to ‘Everyperson.’ The creativity exemplified in ‘an imaginative self is not a luxury 
but an ontology, an inevitable aspect of our embodiment’ (Rapport 2003:54), and agency 
need not be a matter of resistance to sociocultural constraints (Mahmood 2005; Jackson 
2005; Biehl 2010). Biehl, Good and Kleinman (2013:348) conceived of subjectivity in the 
context of psychiatric treatment as, ‘a continuous process of experimentation – inner, 
familial, medico-scientific, and political.’ While the ideas put forward in this thesis speak to 
individual creativities, agentic creativities also work with institutional and biochemical goals. 
To take one example, UK patient Luke, 45, told me when I asked if there was anything he 
would change about his health, that he would “improve it, make it better – that’s what I’m 
here for isn’t it … survive the schizophrenia not just, ah, you know, succumb to 
schizophrenia” (original emphasis).3 Luke imagined that it would take him another “twenty 
years” to “recover” completely, by him simply “carry[ing] on doing what I’m doing.” 
 
There is an intentionality in how both patients and clinical caregivers maximise the desirable 
effects of clozapine and minimise the undesirable side effects, such that patients can pursue 
life without suffering. The term ‘intentionality’ builds on both Foucault’s attention to 
‘governmentality’ – ‘a mode of action upon the actions of others’ through ‘the social and 
ethical contexts in which one’s will is realised’ (Jackson 2005:90), but also a more immediate 
and reflexive ‘operative intentionality’ whereby agents make meaning out of given situations 
in their immediacy (Merleau-Ponty (2005[1962]:498). Rapport (2003:225) argued that an 
individual’s ‘life project’ – afforded by embodied personalisation of circumstances – is ‘a 
practice which procures an extended environmental homeostasis: the maintenance of a set of 
life-conditions within which the self continues to flourish and has its objectives met.’ 
Although schizophrenia is largely associated with ‘social defeat’ in Western societies 
(Luhmann 2007; Luhrmann & Marrow 2016, my emphasis), I observed that the structures of 
clozapine treated schizophrenia can, to some extent, redress experiences of social defeat 
                                                 
3 Pseudonyms have been assigned to all participants: clinical caregivers and patients, and also patients’ hallucinatory 
presences when they pertain to a particular person. All emphasis used in quotes from participants in this thesis henceforth 
pertain to original emphasis. 
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because the clozapine clinic does not, in the lived experiences of patients, subject people to a 
predominantly subordinate social role. Patients can subtly exert their social agency, too.  
 
Clozapine treatment offers up social participations and may become part of a ‘life project’ of 
sorts (Rapport 2003). GH Mead (1932:194) suggested that, ‘any self is a social self, but it is 
restricted to the group whose roles it assumes, and it will never abandon this self until it finds 
itself entering in the larger society and maintaining itself there.’ On the one hand, clozapine 
patients may participate minimally in the social system of the clozapine clinic whereby their 
‘role’ is simply continuing the regimen, with varying degrees of observable engagement. For 
some, the social worlds pertaining to residual delusions may yield more prominent roles for 
them to negotiate. Other patients may more explicitly incorporate both their active roles in 
clozapine treatment and also ‘larger society’ – the social worlds beyond clozapine clinic 
visits and non-shared (hallucinatory) social experiences. In both cases, patients express their 
agency without the assumed necessity of person-centred psychotherapy.  
 
Because clozapine patients receive attention from others that is not premised primarily on 
their mental illness status, practices of agency were not confined to the disempowerment that 
may have been previously felt when talking with a clinician about their diagnosis. Critically, 
the two clozapine clinics included in my research did not involve any formal psychotherapy 
treatments; the focus was rather on the patient as one of many clozapine patients undergoing 
primarily physiological monitoring. Biomedical treatments without some provisioned 
psychodynamic therapies have been critiqued by ethnographers for their dearth of 
opportunities for personal engagement between patient and clinical caregiver (Luhrmann 
2000; Jenkins 2015). Further, Kirmayer (2007:238) has noted that the purpose of 
psychotherapies in Western culture is that ‘patient and therapist are engaged in an active 
process of moral choice’ and ‘the invocation of the ‘true self’ that is thus socially contingent.4 
Of course, ‘[w]ithout the attention of others we are nobody and nothing’; ‘[w]e have no 
social self’ (Aylwin 1985:115). As I demonstrate throughout this thesis, clozapine patients 
were nonetheless able to interact with clinical caregivers and aspects of their treatment 
monitoring to achieve socially meaningful and personally virtuous goals.  
 
                                                 
4 Kirmayer cautioned that for psychotherapy to work, the therapist must consider 1) whether the patient can ‘continue either 
the coherent construction of the private experience of self or the social interaction that sustains their self in community, and 
2) that ‘individual psychotherapy may then be in fundamental opposition to traditional socially integrated personhood’ 
(2007:243). 
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The final aspect of agency that this thesis builds upon, then, is that of socio-moral 
participations. Schizophrenia ‘patients are not just passive targets’ (Myers, Lester and Hopper 
2016:422). Neely Myers (2016:428) drew on Blacksher’s attention to accountability to others 
and Mattingly’s observation about all social settings being ‘moral laboratories’, whereby 
‘with action, humans are able to create something new’ and ‘[t]o make possible intimacy with 
others in such social spaces, a person’s actions must be recognised by others as “moral”.’ In 
the context of ‘recovery’ from schizophrenia, Myers (2016:435), continued, ‘[m]oral agency 
means having the wherewithal to aspire, and the intentions and necessary resources to 
achieve what one understands to be a ‘good life’.’ Being able ‘to be held accountable … 
makes for possible stronger connections to others’ (Myers 2016:435). Myers (2015;2016) 
suggested this moral agency to be largely dependent on participation in wider social worlds 
beyond those tied to psychiatric patient-hood. I suggest that both ‘moral struggle’ (Jenkins 
1997) as well as moral agency productively merge with much potentiality for clozapine 
patients despite patients having not, for the most part, reintegrated into a wider social world.  
 
The above aspects of agency are brought to bear on what I term health agency, which I 
sketch out in greater detail in Chapter One. In short, health agency concerns feelings of 
personal control over one’s own well-being and how one’s well-being is creatively defined in 
relation to structural forces. Another central under-pinning of it, in the context of clozapine 
treatment, is a particular but fundamentally human expedition of hope.  
 
Hope  
 
The arguments in this thesis are in many ways premised on manifestations of hope, and the 
value of exploring the fluctuations of ‘hope’ as it manifests for chronic schizophrenia patients 
and their clinical caregivers in clozapine clinics. The imagination for a fruitful life to come 
becomes more available than it has perhaps ever been for patients. As Australian nurse Zoya, 
explained to me, the clozapine regimen has “given hope to some people that don’t have 
hope.” Even when ‘improvements’ were less clear – evoking questions along the lines of 
what Australian psychiatrist Adam posited to me: “if people don’t respond to clozapine, why 
do we keep people on it?” – clozapine patients lived through the hopeful reality of not 
returning to acute psychosis and feeling an overwhelming dependence on others.  
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Patients’ imaginaries of clozapine as a drug of ‘hope’ were personal; clozapine became a 
critical part of an individual’s world beyond structural and clinical expectations.  This is not, 
therefore, just a matter of enacting Foucauldian ‘techniques of the molecular self,’ where ‘the 
capacity to modify one’s self through conscious intervention is exercised at the price of 
identifying with the gaze of the scientist’ (Rose 1999:37) (although this ‘gaze’ was a little 
less fixed in clozapine treatment). Clozapine patients worked with the structures of their 
treatment to exert more mundane forms of power. While I do loosely attend to ‘hope and its 
paradoxes’ that constitute ‘a force for personal and social change emergent in interpersonal 
events, in personal and family lives, in communities’ (Mattingly 2010:219), in the clinics 
where I was based, clinical caregivers were, no matter how dis-intimately, involved in the 
projects to stem disintegrations of hope for patients more than family members were.  
 
UK neuropsychiatrist George told me that he was drawn to clozapine-treated schizophrenia 
because, “I liked those cases, since I was a trainee, that no one was interested in anymore, 
and that they had no hope – because I’m always getting the impression that there’s something 
else that can be done”. He wanted “to look after these people that, historically, nobody … has 
been looking after them in a continuous way.” George continued, “I have plenty of cases who 
are full time working and have quite a successful life – fulfilling that, I cannot see why it 
should not be the initial goal with all the clients … in general, I have seen a lot of miracles 
with this illness.” Since taking on a combined research and clinical role in the clozapine 
clinic three years earlier, “expanding the activity” of the clozapine clinic had been George’s 
ambition. This was specially in regard to addressing clozapine’s side effects: “I think it’s a 
wonderful medication with an awful amount of side effects that we should be better at 
tackling.”  
 
“If I was psychotic,” George considered, “with all my knowledge, I would be taking 
clozapine immediately, and I would probably try to stop clozapine immediately, or to reduce 
to a… to a… nothing – 25 milligrams per day … to have that feeling of control, back to 
controlling your own life – I completely understand this.”  He would not stop taking 
clozapine entirely because, “the evidence also suggests the risk of a relapse is high.” I 
queried, “and how much of that do you think is to do with the symptomatic nature of these 
drugs, such that if you take something your chemical balance changes, so when you stop 
taking it you’re going to have withdrawals of some kind and exhibit symptoms anyway?” 
George responded, “I have no clue… basically, because we don’t even know how clozapine 
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works, I don’t know.” As Del Vecchio Good (2007:364) pointed out, ‘[e]nthusiasm for 
medicine’s possibilities arises not necessarily from products with therapeutic efficacy, but 
through the production of ideas with potential but as-yet known unproven therapeutic 
efficacy.’  
 
While the therapeutic efficacy of clozapine was evident, the ‘as-yet known unproven’ precise 
workings and quest for ideas to explore this add to what Rose and Abi-Rached (2013) outline 
as hope for a potential specific, and neuroscientific, evidence base. George elaborated, “I 
think that we will have surprises in the future as to how clozapine works, I think that there 
are many other mechanisms, that they are useful mechanisms; I think it’s much more 
complex.” He conceded that: 
 
There’re a lot of symptoms that cannot be controlled by pharmacology, so, we don’t 
know how to control cognitive symptoms … It’s the same for negative symptoms – 
the ability to communicate emotionally with others, or the ability to have motivation 
for doing activities – there is no medication for this. There’s the social – all the social 
problems associated with this, and the increasingly, brutally competitive society as 
we have, now you need to perform full time, a hundred per cent of the time, doing 
well, you know. These people … most of them, might need more support, more help, 
and there is this a lack of where to place these people, where they can be in less… 
demanding jobs … I always find that the best outcomes are the people whose family 
have a job, or a workshop, or a shop that people can just link in … it’s easier for 
them to be integrated in that more, slightly protected environment … they can engage 
in a slower pace, at least initially … that’s my old-fashioned view.  
 
George’s “old-fashioned view,” resonated with what modern anthropologists have observed 
(see Jenkins & Barret 2004; Luhrmann & Marrow 2016). Alas, George admitted, “50 percent 
of them, we know, will not respond” (to clozapine). I asked what proportion of patients were 
in the “optimal situation” he had described. He replied, “no more than ten per cent, for sure, 
which is very low.” Throughout my fieldwork, I met only a handful of people who had 
fulfilled this particular story of hope for socio-economic independence and contributions, 
whom George categorised as ‘good outcomes on clozapine patients.’ One example, included 
in this thesis, was Martin. 
 
UK patient Martin, 51, reminded me of many English males of his age. Always attending the 
clozapine clinic before his afternoon work shift, he wore neatly tucked in business shirts, had 
neatly combed grey hair, and a clean-shaven face. He was ebullient, well-spoken, with great 
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knowledge of English literature and computer programming. Martin worked nine afternoons 
a fortnight (“pretty much half part-time and half full-time”) in an administrative job that he 
had had for fourteen years. He travelled around the countryside most weekends for bridge 
and croquet tournaments, and went on occasional international holidays. Martin lived alone, 
had “not really” ever had a romantic partner, but socialised at the pub most evenings playing 
snooker and backgammon with his croquet friends. Martin was on 250 milligrams of 
clozapine, and slept for ten hours each night, about which he had no qualms. From a clinical 
point of view, the only concern was his weight gain. But Martin was not so fussed about this. 
The experience of occasionally wetting the bed troubled him more. Although he did not mind 
me observing his clinical consultations concerning such matters, his face blushed with 
embarrassment when the issue came up during one of our interview times. Martin seemed 
similarly uncomfortable when we saw each other at his (very public) workplace one day. The 
clinic was the most productive space for us to interact, so long as we talked about matters 
beyond clozapine side effects during interviews.  
 
Martin said that his job “keeps me sane,” along with the simultaneous enjoyment and 
challenge he got from his croquet and social commitments. He relished the days when it was 
“warm and sunny.” Clozapine and these activities, he said, help him to “whittle through.” 
Having financed his own flat by working and then paying off the mortgage with an 
inheritance from his father, Martin, unlike most patients, was financially secure. Martin 
enjoyed drinking beer most evenings, and ate mostly takeaway foods. Takeaway containers 
and dirty dishes were often stacked up, he explained, overwhelming him at times, along with 
many piles of unopened mail. When I asked what had changed for him since he had been 
diagnosed with schizophrenia twenty years earlier and being put on clozapine a few years 
later, he replied, “What’s changed… that’s a difficult question… I guess it must have slightly 
changed, you know, my, my perception of myself… I suppose, I mean, I’ve sort of got this 
label now… which I didn’t have before. I don’t know whether it’s a good thing or a bad 
thing; I’m not complaining!” He laughed, “I can blame the untidiness on my illness – though, 
as I said, it’s probably nothing to do with it, it’s just the way I am ... I’m the same person! … 
I’m not sure there’s necessarily a before and after.”  
 
Martin had his first ‘psychotic episode’ at the age of 31, in the middle of a croquet 
tournament. Martin had been working for his step-brother, who he spoke highly of, at a 
lucrative computer company, after a period of “failing to become an accountant” and facing 
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unemployment in his late twenties. During this time, his mother had died from Alzheimer’s 
Disease. While Martin confided he “was struggling” because his mother did not recognise 
him by the time she passed away, when I suggested, “that must have been really hard,” he 
replied, timidly and hesitantly, “yes, well, it was hard on my Dad really.” Like most patients I 
spoke with, Martin did not feel sorry for himself. Rather, he had simply “chucked in” his job 
with his step-brother because this had “coincided with my diagnosis.” Martin also once had a 
biological brother. “I think he had what I have, schizophrenia, and clozapine wasn’t around 
then, so… he died…. He was 24, probably – I was 8 or 9.” “It’s never really been discussed 
but, he… he killed himself.” When I offered my condolences, Martin said, again 
dismissively, “it didn’t really affect me, you know, in terms of my life, it didn’t really affect 
me at all, I just wondered why my mum was crying when she told me, and I didn’t really 
understand that, to be honest.” Martin understood schizophrenia to be “genetic or hereditary, 
or whatever the term is,” and “one of those things that you probably always have.” I asked if 
he “felt” different as a kid, and he replied, “I don’t think so … maybe, I mean… I was quite, 
um, I went to quite an academic school and I was quite good academically, in maths, but 
other subjects too, but maybe… emotionally, or whatever you like to call it, not so… not so 
smart.” He chuckled nervously. His cheerful manner and current social life suggested, 
conversely, that Martin had plenty of ability to connect with others. Returning to the 
possibility of finding a romantic partner, he shrugged with a both solemn and resolute smile, 
“I am where I am now, so.” Over the year or so I knew him for, his main goal for the future 
was to simply get his flat “in order” so that he could at least have his croquet friends come to 
stay with him. 
 
For the “no more than ten percent” pertaining to situations like those of Martin, clozapine had 
less ambiguously assisted in the ability to lead a socially and economically independent life. 
The large majority of clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients, however, were not in 
situations like Martin. In the Australian clinic, hopes for the ‘optimal situation’ did not 
constitute the same scenario as it did in the UK, but it nonetheless offered up a quality of life 
relative to pre-clozapine circumstances. For instance, Australian nurse Zoya reflected, 
 
I know clozapine makes them sleep for long hours, but yet, they seem to do a few 
things – function at their best line – they remember they need to go for their blood 
tests, they know they need to function within the community. Some of them have 
jobs which they have not been able to do in the past. Like, one of my clients is now 
working in an op-shop as a volunteer. He said he has not been able to gain any 
14  
meaningful employment or relate properly with people until he started clozapine, 
which is fantastic. 
 
As I explain throughout this thesis, different degrees of social participation did not preclude 
patients from everyday experiences of relatively ‘good outcomes’ and hope. As Georges 
Canguilhem posited, ‘to learn to heal is to learn the contradiction between today’s hope and 
the defeat that comes at the end – without saying no to today’s hope’ (cited in Meyers 
2013:113). Past social and current clinical relations tended to play into one another for 
patients still experiencing chronic psychotic symptoms. 
 
If we are to begin to understand the diverse range of treatment outcomes for people being 
treated for psychotic illnesses, we must acknowledge that ‘coping’ with symptoms involves 
‘the experience of self as an active agent’ via a deployment of subjectively fashioned 
‘strategies’ (Roe, Chopra & Rudnick 2004:127). These strategies, for both patients and 
clinical caregivers, cantered on hopefulness. Drawing on Lear’s (2006) concept of ‘radical 
hope,’ comprising of ‘an ability to imagine a future way of leading a good life even when a 
person or a society lacks the concepts with which to anticipate what this future will be’ 
Myers (2016:359) suggested that in the context of a peer group ‘recovery’ centre,  ‘this 
radical hope … can only continue to take root and blossom if people are willing to look 
beyond a person’s economic value and recognize another human life’ as ‘an ethical 
imperative’ (361). While it was not explored in detail, Myers (2016:372) noted that the ‘logic 
of care’ observed by AnneMarie Mol (2008) – concerning reciprocal relations between 
chronic illness patients and their clinical caregivers – may inspire the ‘radical hope that 
recovery [from schizophrenia] is possible for all.’ 
 
This thesis posits how, just as the condition of schizophrenia is both ‘ordinary’ and 
‘extraordinary’ (Jenkins 2015), hope is and is not ‘radical’ in the clozapine clinic context, 
with no explicit peer group work and only biological monitoring. I suggest that Mol’s (2008) 
‘logic of care’ can indeed be effectively applied to understanding how a more everyday hope 
for clozapine patients is made manifest. As Jenkins (2004:45), reflected, ‘[t]he occurrence 
and form in schizophrenia of positive emotions such as hope, contentment, joy, and humor, 
has received little attention.’ Clozapine treatment, as I came to understand it, was about 
choosing and hoping for life over death from moment-to-moment, but not in extreme ways 
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that denote overriding suffering. Experiences were, however, relative to what had come 
before clozapine: life with more ‘acute’ schizophrenia.  
 
On the axis of control between social and biological life 
 
Conditions of schizophrenia speak to a threshold of control between social and biological 
life. While schizophrenia is now considered to be an ‘illness’ rather than a ‘disease,’5 the 
legacy of Kraepelin’s model in psychiatry has been ‘a deeply biological vision of the subject 
and subjective experience – casting the mentally ill as a medicalized subject’ with ‘disorders 
of the will’ (Biehl, Good & Kleinman 2007:238). According to Foucault, nineteenth century 
asylums were premised on the ‘the imperative of labour’ and ‘a condemnation of idleness’ 
(1993:46). The notion of ‘madness,’ so long as it is institutionalised, ‘is imprisoned in a 
moral world’ (Foucault 1993:269). In the context of mental illness, the high moral value 
attached to self-sufficiency in Western culture now works in conjunction with an increasingly 
biological research agenda around the ‘somatic individual’ that can be improved upon (Novas 
& Rose 2000). Behaviours that do not affirm quests for self-progress may be enveloped under 
ideas of ‘uncontrollable’ biological symptoms, and/or social symptoms. 
 
Biological and social potentials for control on the part of the schizophrenia patient have 
created an impasse for clinicians and policy makers. The de-institutionalisation of the last 
thirty years, intending to expose patients to greater opportunities for social independence, is 
met with incongruity insofar as Western ‘[i]ndvidualism requires independence and 
competition, which are not conducive to recovery from schizophrenia’ (Lucas & Barrett 
1995:307). In the United States, clinicians tend to be loyal to either only a biological or a 
psychoanalytic paradigm because bio-psycho-social models are harder to conceptually 
accommodate (Luhrmann 2000). Reckoning with the term schizophrenia also threatens to 
undermine the discipline of psychiatry, wherein biology-orientated psychiatrists are the 
‘custodians’ (Bentell, Jackson & Pilgrim 1988:331). As Corin (2007:275) noted, ‘one can 
easily get the impression that the gulf is widening between the uncertain, elusive psychotic 
experience and scientific knowledge, which is increasingly objective and objectifying and is 
                                                 
5 The term ‘illness’ is both socially contingent and ‘deeply individual, expressive, and intimate’ (Meyers 2013: 13), while 
the term ‘disease’ pertains to a locatable pathology in the organism. As Kleinman (in Myers 2013: 12) put it, ‘illness 
complaints are what patients and their families bring to the practitioner … Disease, however, is what the practitioner creates 
in the recasting of illness in terms of theories of disorder.’ Further, ‘symptoms’ are ‘more than the incidental markers of 
disease’ insofar as they constitute ‘a fundamental part of people’s being and means of articulating a relationship to the 
world’ (Biehl & Moran-Thomas 2009:282).  
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rich with the flavor of certainty and the promise of control.’ Further, the biologically focused 
‘broken brain’ paradigm of the 1990s had good intentions: to supersede the psychoanalytic 
and anti-psychiatry movements of the twentieth century that had hurtfully implicated families 
(particularly mothers) and medical culture (Luhrmann 2016). Attending to the role of socio-
structural forces means to some extent shifting accountability back to the individual and their 
social worlds. This can come with undesirable consequences. Anthropologists such as 
Gregory Bateson and colleagues (1956) and Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2001[1979]) who 
posited, respectively, that a ‘double-bind’ of mixed communication styles between families 
and whole communities could explicate manifestations of schizophrenia, hit too many social 
nerves (see Scheper-Hughes 2000). Further, assigning clinical caregiver responsibility for 
outcomes is difficult to reconcile.  
 
Currently, responsibilities between primary and specialist clinical caregivers have become 
clouded by health conditions that span ‘physical’ as much as ‘mental’ metonymical domains 
(RANZCP 2015). What is perhaps most uncomfortable for psychiatrists in terms of wider 
‘health’ concerns is that intensive antipsychotic drug regimens appear to create the most 
marked neurobiological, ‘progressive changes,’ and are also likely exacerbated by ‘cannabis 
use, diabetes, and hypertension,’ while pharmaceuticals happen to generate the vast majority 
of State funding upon which psychiatry depends (Murray 2016:2; Murray et al. 2016). 
Further, antipsychotic treatments give primacy to the ‘psychotic’ symptoms that are not 
neatly ‘targetable’ as such.  
 
Biomedical treatments for schizophrenia target observations of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
symptoms, the latter of which are much harder to treat. ‘Positive’ or ‘psychotic’ symptoms 
are acquired through illness and appear to reflect an excess or distortion of normal functions, 
including hallucinations, delusions and racing thoughts (van Os & Kapur 2009). Positive 
symptoms also ‘imply the simultaneous absence of something normally present – the sense 
of ownership or intentional control’ (Sass & Parnas 2003:431). In the West, positive 
symptoms tend to be most acutely distressing for patient and caregivers and are thus the 
target of treatments (Jenkins & Barrett 2004).6 Meanwhile, negative symptoms refer to 
functions and behaviours apparently lost due to illness that may particularly compromise 
                                                 
6 A quantitative study of a recently introduced clinical scale for ‘subjective well-being’ in the UK clozapine clinic where I 
conducted my fieldwork suggested that, across all clinical measurements, managing the ‘positive symptoms’ of 
schizophrenia correlates with higher scores of ‘eudemonic’ well-being (Brown, Mezquida & Fernandez-Egea 2016). 
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socio-economic participations (Mezquida et al. 2017).  Negative symptoms include apathy 
and blunting of emotion, which may also coincide with cognitive impairment such as 
disorganized thoughts and speech, memory problems and difficulty concentrating and/or 
following instructions or completing tasks.7 Negative symptoms, which tend to first develop 
pre-morbidly, often persist in the lives of people with schizophrenia during periods of low (or 
absent) positive symptoms (Sass 2004). From a philosophical perspective, negative 
symptoms prompt consideration for how patients’ sense of self is impacted. 
 
Philosophically, the condition of schizophrenia has been viewed in terms of inter-subjective 
dimensions. RD Laing’s (1965:75) theory of schizophrenia suggested that, ‘[t]he individual 
has developed a microcosmos within himself; but, of course, this autistic, private, intra-
individual ‘world’ is not a feasible substitute for the only world there really is, the shared 
world.’ Further, ‘[i]f this were a feasible project then there would be no need for psychosis’ 
(Laing  1965:75).8 More recently, Sass and Parnas (2003) suggested that schizophrenia is a 
‘disorder of the self.’9 Sass and Parnas narrow this self-disruption down to ‘hyperreflexivity’ 
and ‘diminishment of self-affection … the implicit sense of existing as a vital and self-
possessed subject of awareness’ (2003:428).10 This thesis recognises how clozapine-treated 
schizophrenia patients can regain self-possessiveness. Further, it shows how experiences of 
biomedical treatments can help to reconstitute an individual’s sense of self, building on the 
cultural influences on schizophrenia that anthropologists have observed.  
 
Overwhelming cross-cultural ethnographic evidence suggests that, paradoxically, societies 
with less access to biomedical resources (drugs and tailored therapies) experience less 
‘severe’ symptoms and greater ‘recovery’ rates of schizophrenia (Good 1997; Jenkins & 
Barrett 2004; Hopper 2008; Luhrmann 2007; Marrow & Luhrmann 2016). Signs of 
‘psychosis’ invoke different clinical and cultural thresholds (Larøi et al. 2014). Within 
Europe and America, a recent meta-analysis estimates the prevalence of 'psychotic 
experiences' to be 17.5 per cent, wherein over three quarters of these experiences are merely 
                                                 
7 Further, ‘[a]sociality, the absence of socially orientated behavior – a key negative sign – is often accompanied by the 
presence of strange or socially inappropriate, self-directed behavior’ (Sass & Parnas 2003:431). 
8 Laing (1965) observed patients who could only feel ‘embodied’ under conditions of being ‘incognito’ (128). He proposed 
this to be because ‘[t]he body clearly occupies an ambiguous position between ‘me’ and the world’ insofar as it is the ‘core 
and centre of my world’ at the same time as being ‘an object in the world of others’ (131), and ‘object-for-others’ (130). 
9 ‘Self-disorder’ involves ‘an ipseity disturbance,’ whereby: ‘Ipseity refers to the experiential sense of being a vital and self-
coinciding subject of experience or first person perspective on the world’ (Sass & Parnas 2003:428). 
10 Self-affection here is ‘a matter of “mattering” – of constituting a lived point of orientation and the correlated pattern of 
meanings that make for a coherent and significant world’ (Sass & Parnas 2003:436). 
18  
transient rather than accumulative; they do not become recognised as clinical symptoms or 
long-term disorder (van Os et al. 2009:185). Likewise, people who are diagnosed but no 
longer seeking clinical treatment are not accounted for in the statistics (Guloksuv & van Os 
(2018:230). At least part of the cross-cultural differences in schizophrenia manifestations and 
outcomes, however, can be explained by patients in Eastern contexts not being as socially 
defined by their illness. This includes differences within primarily Western cultures too. For 
instance, when comparing Anglo-American and Mexican-descent families in the US in terms 
of the interpersonal boundaries conceived of between a person with symptoms of 
schizophrenia and their family members without symptoms, Jenkins and Karno (1992:66) 
found that suffering was minimised amongst Mexican-descent families who regarded the 
condition as ‘nervios, a common condition that in its milder form afflicts nearly everyone.’ 
When people experience a ‘community expressed emotion’ comprised of ‘widespread 
criticism and intense experience of shame and anger’ (Eliacin 2016:89), the consequences for 
cultural emigrants can be grave. The ‘risk for [being diagnosed with] schizophrenia’ amongst 
African-Caribbean immigrants in Britain is fifteen times higher than for white British people 
(Eliacin 2016:86). This has been attributed to experiences of isolation when living in white 
neighbourhoods with insecure family support and significant unemployment rates (Eliacin 
2016). People with schizophrenia cannot thrive in communities that do not accept them.  
 
While cross-cultural or inter-cultural comparisons are well beyond the scope of this thesis as 
I was based in two predominantly Anglo-centric clozapine clinic populations, I preface with 
several anecdotal remarks made by clinical caregivers in these clinics that resonate with 
previous cross-cultural findings about inconsistent diagnostics and treatments (Good 1997). 
UK Clozapine Lead Nurse Clive confided that, despite growing up as a black South African 
during Apartheid, when he arrived in England he had never felt so “sad” and “lonely” in his 
life, which he soon related to the culture and unrelenting demands on the mental health 
system in the UK.11 African-Australian nurse Zoya then told me that, in regard to 
documenting schizophrenia, “because Western governments are aware that in Third World 
countries people recover more than here, there is pressure to give schizoaffective disorder as 
                                                 
11 Until he had a family, Clive dreaded finishing work each day because he could not casually talk to strangers the way he 
could do in South Africa. He remarked how, despite the little financial wealth that people had in the area he grew up, “their 
ability to have ‘hot conversations’ with strangers, no matter where you were” – such as bus stops – meant that “people don’t 
have time to dwell on their own problems”; he observed that in England people demarcate their personal boundaries more. 
Indian-Australian clozapine assistant nurse Ramesh also told me that from what he had observed of mental illness rates in 
India compared to Australia, “if you take the ratio, there’s less” [mental illness in India]. I did not get a chance to discuss 
with Ramesh why he thought this might be the case.  
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a diagnosis instead of schizophrenia, where possible, to lower the statistics of people with 
schizophrenia.”12 Another “loophole” in regard to disguising medication “outcomes,” she 
said, involved doctors skewing the recorded clozapine dosage. She showed me one patient’s 
record that listed ‘100 x 8 tabs’ instead of simply listing ‘800mg clozapine,’ to allude to a 
lower dose for the national database that draws statistics from milligrams of clozapine rather 
than number of tablets. When I asked her more about “cultural differences in terms of 
recovery” in Africa, Zoya reflected, “it’s still an individual journey,” and that the social 
receptivity of loved ones may be changing with Western influences in regard to stigma 
around mental illnesses.13 Having spent no longer than a day in a clozapine clinic in a multi-
cultural suburb of Sydney to gain experience before starting fieldwork, I had noted that every 
patient had attended with a parent or sibling. This was not what I observed in either clinic I 
was based in for fieldwork. When I mentioned this difference to Australian clozapine 
coordinator Kerry, she replied, plainly, “That…. [name of suburb] would be European, 
Greeks – that’s what they do.” People from migrant backgrounds did not make up a 
significant proportion of patients in the clinics included in this thesis. As I suggest, though, 
family involvement in the clinic contexts I observed did not necessarily translate to more 
desirable outcomes, perhaps due the culture of shame and fatalism around mental illness in 
which these families were operating.  
 
A key issue that remains is the extent to which individuals with schizophrenia are impacted 
by their social circumstances as well as their biological predispositions. Tanya Luhrmann and 
Jocelyn Marrow (2016:197) conclude, ‘schizophrenia is not a genetic lightning bolt’; rather, 
‘[s]chizophrenia is the story of the way that poverty, violence, and being on the wrong side of 
power drive us mad.’ As alluded to above, schizophrenia has been understood as a form of 
‘social defeat,’ comprising an ‘outcome’ of unknown biological vulnerability that manifests 
when ‘the experience of defeat in a social context is felt … so profoundly that it can make the 
body ill’ (Luhrmann & Marrow 2016:198). Although people like UK patient Martin (above) 
experienced ‘good outcomes’ while endorsing a ‘genetic’ framework for his schizophrenia, 
his socioeconomic securities cannot be disentangled from these good outcomes.  
 
                                                 
12 In Chapter One, I elaborate on how diagnostic politics impacted my fieldwork methodology, too.   
13 Zoya described one African woman she knew who had “done very well on medication and because she got married,” but 
this woman had strategically not told her partner about her diagnosis “until he already loved her.” She gave another example 
of an African man who “functioned very well when taking medication and going to church”, and would “relapse” if he went 
without either. 
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While ‘poor lifestyle’ behaviours are on the rise among general population groups, they are 
more prevalent amongst marginalised groups and those with serious mental illnesses. 
Kleinman (2012:182) observed that multi-morbidities exist as part of ‘the very terrain of 
social exclusion, health disparities, and social suffering.’14 Whilst perceptions of social 
disconnect or isolation may result in multiple stressors on health and well-being (Wilkinson 
& Marmot 2003; Cacioppo & Hawkley 2009), such strains and suffering may not always be 
recognised as explicit social symptoms as much as they might reproduce broader social 
gradients in health. For people with schizophrenia in Western society, life expectancy is 
reduced by up to 32 years, largely attributable to cardiovascular disease (Lourey, Holland & 
Green 2012). Antipsychotic medication is thought to play a significant role, unhinging 
cardiovascular, metabolic and insulin regulation processes, and inducing sedation, with 
associated lifestyle factors exacerbating risks (Salzberg & Castle 2010). Diabetes is three 
times as likely to occur in those being treated for psychosis than the general population, while 
the prevalence of smoking is estimated to be up to three times higher than overall population 
estimates and tobacco has been singled out as key contributor to mortality (Murray et al. 
2016).  
 
This ‘preventable’ gap in life expectancy appears to be widening, despite efforts to assist 
targeted populations in improving health (Lawrence, Hancock & Kisely 2013; McGrath et al. 
2008). An Australian study suggested that only a third of psychosis patients presenting to 
general physicians receive advice for ‘general health’ (Morgan et al. 2011), while a UK study 
suggested that ‘physical health’ screening assistance for people with serious mental illness 
can make a significant difference to patient engagement (Eldridge, Dawber & Gray 2011). 
Moreover, while anthropologists such as Scheper-Hughes (2001[1979]) suggested it to be 
paramount to consider the ‘every day social life’ of patients beyond biomedical settings, there 
is also a need to understand how it is that more contact with clinical caregivers via the 
clozapine clinic regimen does not appear to translate to greater uptake of ‘healthier lifestyle’ 
behaviours. Clozapine epitomises biomedical treatments for schizophrenia, because it is most 
associated with enhancing life at the same time as compromising life expectancy.  
 
 
                                                 
14 The concept of ‘social suffering’ denotes how psycho-somatic manifestations become socio-somatic experiences, 
orientating individuals toward shared meanings of their ‘body-self’ (Kleinman, Das & Lock 1997; Kleinman 1997:326). 
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Clozapine: Life or death 
 
In 1992, clozapine was promoted on the cover of Time magazine as the ‘magic bullet’ for 
treating schizophrenia that ‘Brings Patients Back to Life,’ while the New York Times 
presented ‘images of film star Robert De Niro taking a new medicine suddenly going from 
comatose to superstar’ (in Jenkins 2015:23). As Jenkins (2015:26) asserted, ‘the apparently 
promising image of healing is embedded in the brutal presumption that persons with 
schizophrenia had somehow previously been “dead”.’ Part of this ‘deadness’ may have been 
observed in relation to the ‘zombie’-like states induced by previous antipsychotic regimens, 
or it may have been the ‘flatness’ of emotion apparent in the form of negative symptoms. 
Questions of livelihood are interesting in the case of chronic schizophrenia, especially if 
people become at least stabilised, if not ‘invigorated,’ in the course of clozapine treatment. 
 
The synthesis of clozapine in 1958 marked a transition to second-generation, ‘atypical’ 
antipsychotic drugs that dissociated antipsychotic efficacy and movement disorders, whereas 
the effectiveness of first generation antipsychotic drugs had been ascertained by the presence 
of motor symptoms effecting posture and muscle tone (Meltzer 2010).15 Clozapine was first 
made available in Australia and Europe in 1971, albeit retracted from clinical use during the 
1970s due to eight fatalities in Finland associated with blood and heart complications; a 
concern now addressed by frequent blood monitoring attached to clozapine’s reintroduction 
in the late 1980s (Amsler et al. 1977; Kane, Singer & Meltzer 1988). Clozapine prevails as 
the most effective antipsychotic drug at alleviating psychotic symptoms and suicidal ideation 
(Meltzer 2010). The extensive range of side effects associated with clozapine, which require 
ongoing medical attention, currently precludes its use in earlier stages of treatment. 
Clozapine is currently only prescribed in cases of medically defined ‘Treatment Refractory 
[or Resistant] Schizophrenia’ - when a person has not responded to at least two trials of 
antipsychotic medication (including both first and second-generation drugs) – between 20 
and 40 percent of schizophrenia patients will meet these criteria (Lambert 2010).  
 
                                                 
15 Clinically referred to as Extrapyramidal tract symptoms (ETS), including dystonia (twitching or tremors), akinesia 
(difficulty in initiating movement) and parkinsonism (rigidity, slow movement, tremors). While these symptoms were 
previously associated with first-generation antipsychotic efficacy, the more severe cases of ETS – tardive dyskenia (chronic 
involuntary movements) and the life-threatening neuroleptic malignant syndrome (neurological disorder marked by fever, 
visceral nervous system dysfunction and delirium) – have been consistently considered as adverse reactions to antipsychotic 
medication and also associated with non-compliance (see Meltzer 2010). 
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In Australia and the UK, clozapine is currently the ‘gold standard’ anti-psychotic treatment 
for chronic schizophrenia (Dold & Leucht 2014). Biologically speaking, clozapine is thought 
to work better than other drugs because it ‘produces lower and more transient’ dopamine 
‘receptor occupancy’ (Murray et al. 2016:363). In other words, it regulates dopamine rather 
than directly ‘blocking’ dopamine (reward) receptors, which play an ambiguous role in 
schizophrenia. Alongside clozapine’s observed efficacy, however, are a plethora of 
physiological side effects that can exacerbate an inability to easily participate in public life. 
Imminent physiological risks include agranulocytosis (disruptions to the bone marrow 
production of white blood cells), myocarditis (inflammation of the heart muscle), pulmonary 
embolism (a blood clot moving to the lung), metabolic syndromes (often culminating in 
obesity), insulin resistance, seizures, excessive salivation, chronic sedation and constipation 
(Fitzsimons et al. 2005; Salzberg & Castle 2010). In terms of chronic ‘lifestyle’ morbidities, 
clozapine is associated with significant weight gain in around 7 in 10 patients, impaired 
glucose tolerance in 1 in 10, and Type II diabetes mellitus in approximately 1 in 10, along 
with hyperlipidaemia (raised lipid levels) in 6 in 10 patients (Lambert 2007; Hägg et al. 2003; 
Henderson et al. 2000; Meyer & Koro 2004). Also of note is that clozapine, in binding to 
dopamine receptors, however ambiguously, is metabolized by the same catalytic enzyme 
induced by nicotine (Prior & Baker 2003). Smokers treated with clozapine may thus require 
twice the dose, when compared to non-smokers, to achieve similar blood levels of clozapine 
– and abrupt smoking cessation may result in ‘clozapine toxicity,’ which can be fatal (Prior & 
Baker 2003; ACSQH 2012:4). However, insofar as cognitive function restored by clozapine 
may also enhance social function, and the monitoring of physiological risks attends to 
imminent concerns, an overriding positive benefit-to-risk ratio for clozapine has been 
deduced (Meltzer, 2010). This benefit-to-risk ratio also speaks to the heavier issue at stake: 
suicide. 
 
For reasons that might become clearer if we attend to the social structures at play with 
clozapine treatment as well as apparent biochemical influences, clozapine’s benefit-to-risk 
ratio becomes easier to comprehend when we think about it in terms of life preservation. 
Regardless of the factors that threaten life while taking clozapine, clozapine is the only FDA 
approved antipsychotic drug to treat suicidal ideation (Patchan et al. 2015). For people who 
have experienced acute psychosis, suicide – attempted by approximately fifty percent of 
people with schizophrenia (Patchan et al. 2015) – comes from a place of perceivably 
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irredeemable and interpersonal anguish. It is important to acknowledge the anguish and lack 
of hope that most patients in this thesis felt prior to taking clozapine.  
 
Many representations of acute psychosis provoke the theme of fear of death tied closely to 
whether adequate ‘interventions’ or understandings from others are available. The 
experiences of people with clozapine-treated, chronic schizophrenia concern a kind of after-
life that follows acute suffering; experiences of suffering while undertaking clozapine 
treatment become more manageable. While the narrations by patients in my research often 
peeled back to recalling states of severe ‘psychosis’ precipitating their clozapine treatment, 
memories and descriptions were mostly distant. A number of people politely declined to 
participate in my research in case talking with me about schizophrenia conjured up too many 
past experiences; “I would like to help you, but I just can’t look back,” was an 
understandable response I received a number times. Moreover, previous ethnographic 
accounts have emphasised how ‘symptoms of mental illness are manifestations of a type of 
affliction shared by virtually all mankind’ (Murphy in Luhrmann 2016:16), and that 
experiences of ‘sanity’ and ‘madness’ are not mutually exclusive (Martin 2009). 
 
When participants did describe their experiences of acute psychosis and/or the meaning of 
schizophrenia, explanations were simultaneously accessible and wayward. For instance, UK 
patient Bradley, 28, said, “schizophrenia, to me, is someone who can’t talk – or who can talk, 
but they’re always in thought and they don’t… They don’t feel like they can communicate 
with any others.” Bradley quickly added that when he had searched for an “Oxford 
Dictionary” definition, however, he had found: “‘banana skins in a microwave’ – something 
like that, but it’s not in the dictionary anymore, it’s more medical.” Of course, ‘subjectivity 
… is as much about swerves and escapes as about determinations’ (Biehl 2010:72). By the 
end of fieldwork, I felt that in some ways Bradley’s recollected dictionary definition aptly 
captured the absurd, arbitrariness that he was trying to grapple with more than medical 
terminology allowed. One Australian patient participant had gone so far as to publish several 
books to make sense of his experiences of psychosis, and attempting suicide.16 UK patient 
and rap music fan Steve, 21, articulated the “poetic justice” for “police brutality” he had 
experienced while being admitted to hospital by quietly rapping to me one day: “police 
should treat everyone equal/ going mad bring on a non-lyrical sequel/ hand cut open for 
                                                 
16 To quote from this book or to specify what he said about it would be to compromise this participant’s anonymity.  
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disease/ I just told them to leave/ but my mum they did deceive/ no lift back from hospital/ I 
could not believe.” 
 
The tussle of negotiating the giving and receiving of care is perhaps the most difficult matter 
to reconcile for individuals experiencing clinical attention for psychotic illness. In her 
screenplay 4.48 Psychosis, London playwright Sarah Kane wrote, ‘[s]anity is found at the 
centre of convulsion, where madness is scorched from the bisected soul’ (2000:31). Kane, 
who had drawn on her experiences as a hospital inpatient, positioned the psychotic patient as 
a doctor’s ‘proselyte to sanity’ (2000:31;33): ‘to feed, help protect, comfort, console, support, 
nurse or heal[;] to be fed, helped, protected, comforted, consoled, supported, nursed or 
healed[;] to form mutually enjoyable, enduring, cooperating and reciprocating relationship 
with Other, with an equal.’ Kane left a note for her agent on the play manuscript: “Do with it 
what you will, just remember – writing it killed me.” Kane committed suicide shortly 
afterwards.  
 
There was something about being on clozapine treatment that alleviated the acute taunting of 
death and inadequate clinical care pre-clozapine. Most patients participating in my research 
had previously attempted to take their lives, having not yet found the socio-therapeutic 
connections Kane (2000) so expressed a longing for. Once on a clozapine regimen, however, 
patients then entered an ongoing social contract with clozapine clinical caregivers. In the 
clozapine clinics where I was based, it was unheard of for patients taking their recommended 
dose to ever again lose their appetite for living, even if interpersonal relationships were, as 
for all of us, ongoing projects.  
 
Life beyond suicide brings alternative future imaginaries. Stevenson (2014:147) posited in 
regard to the normalisation of Inuit youth suicide in the Canadian Arctic, ‘suicide answers in 
one temporality a question that cannot be posed in another: What if the future cannot redeem 
the present?’ Drawing on Foucault’s attention to suicide as ‘the ultimate mode of imagining,’ 
Stevenson reflects that, ‘suicide is sometimes invested with the desire to live differently’ 
(2014:172). Further, Jenkins (2004:45) noted in regard to people with schizophrenia who do 
not kill themselves, ‘the deep well-spring of human endurance and resilience when 
confronted with arguably the most painful and horrifying of human experience imaginable’ 
also illuminates a powerful inclination toward life beyond what suicide might have offered – 
as indeed most of my research participants were doing. This does not mean people were not 
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sometimes, unwittingly, thrown back into their past inclinations when time passages were 
conflated during dreaming states.  
 
Several clozapine patients in my study were reminded of death through their dreams. As 
Stevenson (2014) observed of what it means to live and care in a community with a suicide 
‘epidemic’, dreams could also have constituted a focus point for this thesis. Patients often 
spoke of dreams that would sometimes throw them back into their past as a marker for 
change and what could not be completely overwritten by clozapine. For instance, UK patient 
Joanne, 53, told me that “my dreams sort of sort me out sometimes.” They often tormented 
her with particular experiences from her time at university when she first became unwell. 
Joanne, who had attempted suicide prior to taking clozapine, described how one day recently 
she had a dream where, “it ended by me thinking 'the only thing I can do is kill myself,’ I've 
got to... no-no-no I don't want to!” Joanne mimicked herself panicking, palms to face, “and I 
woke up, and it was like, yeah, I didn't, and I survived and I'm here, I'm here ... the dream 
was telling me, no you didn't want to do that, and you're okay, you haven't done it.” 
Stevenson’s ethnographic participants affected by the suicide of loved ones dreamt of those 
loved ones such that, she concluded, ‘images (reckoned as visual, sonic, or linguistic) are 
what keeps us alive’ (2014:174). For patients in my study, images – both in the form of 
dreams or even residual ‘psychotic symptoms’ but involving themselves – also seemed to 
keep them alive, in conjunction with being able to exert at least some agency and hope 
through the clozapine care regimen.  
 
The expectations that come with different ‘categories’ of illness are critical to both treatment 
decisions and hope. Another paradox of antipsychotic treatment in the specific case of 
clozapine is that, although the term schizophrenia may be unhelpful because the stigma does 
not imbue hope (Guloksuv & van Os 2018:236), clozapine treatment is associated with both a 
label of ‘treatment-resistant schizophrenia’ and greater hope for alleviation of psychiatric 
symptoms than any other drug. ‘Clozapine patients,’ as I refer to them throughout this thesis, 
perhaps reclaim something by not identifying as ‘consumers/survivors/ex-patients’ of the 
Recovery Movement (Estroff 2004), but rather simply ‘patients’ of clozapine over and above 
‘treatment-resistant schizophrenia’.  
 
The clozapine clinic as an ethnographic focus 
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The tension between healing and cure … is found in the lifeworlds of individuals and 
the moral-social world of the clinic. – Meyers (2013:14, original emphasis)  
 
Previous ethnographic evidence on clozapine treatment and associated subjectivities focused 
on everyday worlds beyond a privately funded clozapine clinic in America. Jenkins’ 2015 
volume Extraordinary Conditions begins with a chapter titled, ‘Cultural Chemistry in the 
Clozapine Clinic.’ Expanding her earlier ethnographic work on subjectivity and psycho-
pharmaceuticals (Jenkins 2010), she mapped out a wider ‘cultural chemistry’ of recovery-
orientated atypical antipsychotic drugs, whereby the ‘culture’ in question involves an 
“assemblage” (Deleuze & Guattari 1988) of ‘the cultivation of biology, desire, meaning, 
social practices and institutions’ (Jenkins 2015:30). In so far as attending closely to patient 
experiences of taking clozapine as the first exemplar atypical anti-psychotic, Jenkins’ 
analysis is not specific to clozapine treatment nor does it specifically concern the clozapine 
treatment setting itself. Her analysis was directed outwards, to ‘the clinical prescribing 
patterns expanded beyond clozapine’ (Jenkins 2015:31), rather than examining experiences 
‘in’ the clozapine clinic per se.  
 
I soon learned that the publically funded clozapine clinic settings in Australia and the UK 
where I conducted fieldwork had become everyday social worlds for clozapine-treated 
schizophrenia patients. As Todd Meyers (2013:11) suggested in his ethnography with 
adolescents being treated for opioid addiction, ‘the moral-social world of the clinic’ plays a 
significant role when understanding ‘the discursive registers that hold “what is done” apart 
from “what is hoped for”.’ It is critical to understand the differences between clozapine 
imaginaries and practices in the spaces where clozapine treatment was the most intensified: at 
the clozapine clinic.  
 
In entering the clozapine treatment monitoring regimen, patients at first have their blood 
tested three times a day, tapering out to a minimum monthly clozapine clinic visit thereafter. 
Patients can be said to enter a formal social contract insofar as they put forward their blood 
and bodies for monitoring, in exchange for clozapine tablets and social interactions and 
routines to express their agency through. While the alleviation of psychotic symptoms is 
critical in biomedical cultures, the question of what well-being, wellness, health or quality of 
life continuums mean as per the lived experiences of self and social functioning and control 
in the highly structured context of clozapine treatment and ‘physiological’ morbidities, was 
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unclear to me prior to undertaking fieldwork. The purpose of my ethnographic research was 
therefore to investigate what clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients and their clinical 
caregivers do with the social structures and expectations that they are given.  
 
I argue that the clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients participating in my study 
predominantly worked actively with and alongside their clinical treatment regimen to 
experience ‘health agency.’ That is, patients experienced a sense of personal power in and 
through their health and clozapine treatment trajectories. The clozapine clinic treatment 
regimen, while ostensibly surveilling and exerting power over patient bodies equally invited 
patient quiet manipulations – even of things like blood tests.  The resultant self-command in 
an environment of apparent control contributed very significantly to patient experiences of 
well-being in modest rather than remarkable ways. Patients and clinical caregivers in my 
study were also not polarised and disconnected in the way that Estroff (2004) described of the 
inability of her American schizophrenia and clinician participants to productively understand 
each other. Rather, during their treatment monitoring patients were able to partake in 
predictable, reciprocal relations with clinical caregivers despite the seemingly reductionist 
therapies offered up by the biologically focused monitoring regimen.   
 
This thesis contributes to inter-disciplinary knowledge about how clozapine-treated 
schizophrenia patients experience their ‘health,’ and how it is that they choose life over 
death. Every patient in my study engaged in everyday behaviours, no matter how seemingly 
trivial, that they perceived to be ‘healthy’ and future-orientated. My analysis thus partly 
critiques biomedicine and partly critiques the politics of anthropology in its tendency to 
reveal the atypical conditions of the oppressed to avoid the danger of the agent with 
schizophrenia being cast as too much of an ordinary subject, lest it be seen to dial down the 
spectacular qualities or oppressive conditions under which people suffer institutional force. 
As Warin (2010) observed with anorexia patients, it can be just as fruitful to de-
spectacularise psychiatric conditions. Warin’s (2010:90) ethnographic participants situated 
themselves as ‘extraordinary,’ so as to still set themselves apart from the ‘ordinary’. 
Similarly, Jenkins (2015) suggested schizophrenia patients to exhibit expounded human 
qualities to be better appreciated. Here, I show how we can go even further in humanising 
people with schizophrenia by attending to more mundane ways in which clozapine patients 
go about making their health and their lives their own.  
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Chapter outlines 
 
I prosecute my argument through four chapters. Chapter One discloses my ethnographic 
methods and partial positioning throughout the process of fieldwork and analysis. It is a 
chapter about how it was that I, personally, came to make the claims that I do about my 
participants’ experiences. Drawing primarily on Lucas (2004) and Strathern (2005), I explain 
that, despite the bounded nature of my clinic-based fieldwork and my reflexive accounts of it, 
the experiences of containing and connecting my experiences within and beyond the clinic 
became a useful analytical tool. I set out more specifically how ‘health agency’ operated as a 
‘will-to-power’ (Nietzsche in Rapport 2003); a personal force that superseded expectations 
about what ‘health’ looks like when only certain ‘parts’ are seemingly accounted for. I 
suggest how patients reconnect ‘social’ aspects of health themselves, and in doing so live 
with hope for greater understanding and resolve. Having suggested how socially orientated 
health agency overpowers what first appear to be conditions of social disempowerment, I can 
then focus in on how the particular aspects of clozapine treatment inform health agency.  
 
Chapter Two attends to how patients express their health agency through manipulating even 
the most ‘objective’ aspect of the clozapine treatment regimen: the blood work. I explore how 
the clinical circuitries and rhythms of blood monitoring are harnessed by patients in subtle 
but productive ways to complement the ‘logic of care’ (Mol 2008) embedded in clozapine 
blood work. Patients engaged in practices that informed their blood results, and also worked 
to make up for clinical disconnections. Patients were thus found to be active contributors to 
even the flows of biologically reductionist regimens. Herein, I develop Jenkins’ (2015:63) 
brief observation that the ‘interiorization of the clinic’ was a ‘final relational quality of 
medication,’ by attending closely to the processes of blood work to show how patient 
experiences of control and social participations reflect metaphors for health while on 
clozapine.  
 
Chapter Three demonstrates how patients express health agency during clozapine treatment 
by utilising clinical ambiguities and reworking ostensible mind-body compartmentalisations 
of health. I highlight ways in which imaginaries of health are continually negotiable, along 
with ways in which apparently ‘unhealthy’ consumption choices, that contribute to clozapine-
associated weight gain and mortality risks, can also serve as experientially ‘healthy’ choices, 
too. Clinical unknowns about clozapine allowed for greater flexibility in clinical and patient 
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interpretations of how it impacts individuals. Patients and clinical caregiver openness to new 
explanations bring to the surface tensions between agency and structural determinants, in the 
neoliberal context, along with making way for new possibilities for change. I suggest how 
health can be considered as a verb, and how patients proactively move or discharge energies 
imagined in their bodies and minds in making their health as they experience challenges to it.  
Chapter Four explicates how health agency is made through the temporality of clozapine 
treatment, wherein agents utilise the clinical focusing on time in the present. I argue that 
patients compliment their clozapine regimen by formulating their own present-centred rituals 
to deal with stress and uncertainty. Whereas previous phenomenological explications of 
schizophrenia emphasise how patients suffer from fragmentations of the self, I suggest that 
clozapine-treated patients can, in spite of persistent clinical symptoms, experience embodied 
or ‘enminded’ subjectivity that anchors them in the world among others. My ethnographic 
findings contextualise experiences to align them with more general existential anxieties in 
Western culture. I explore how achieving present-state awareness translates to optimal states 
of well-being comparable to meditative pursuits, and suggest that symptoms of schizophrenia 
and side effects of clozapine are highly contextual and can be temporally evaded.  
 
In my conclusion, I decipher what my ethnographic findings mean in terms of previous 
literature on schizophrenia and its treatment as overviewed in this Introduction. Clozapine-
treated schizophrenia presents some particular cross-roads for theoreticians who underscore 
the differences rather than un-spectacular similarities between schizophrenia patients and 
those of us without schizophrenia. I iterate how personal power, a will to engage in labour of 
some sorts and everyday efficacy were evident in the lives of patients discussed in this thesis. 
My findings thus both support and diverge from previous anthropological and philosophical 
approaches to schizophrenia in Western society, and I call for future research to examine 
ordinary forms of agency and power within extraordinary and extreme, highly structured 
conditions. 
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Chapter One: Ethnographic Partialities and Locating Health Agency 
 
Ethnographic studies of mental illness not only take us deeply into the lives of 
individuals, families, and communities but constantly lead us outward, toward 
broader forms of social rupture, resisting closure and our efforts to control our data. 
- Good, Subandi & DelVecchio Good (2007:247).  
 
There are always contradictions … the only way I’ve been able to deal with these 
things is that they’re a real entity … We’re all searching for something … my ideal 
place is if we were all kind of realised … We should all be connected. But for me, this 
schizophrenia is that we’ve all been separated from each other … the residue of what 
happens when you’re opening up this connection with other people but you don’t 
have the right words, you know, to explain what’s going on, so it’s about getting 
back together … I’m striving for everyone to be on the same page.  
– Christopher, 39, UK clozapine patient  
 
Learning what I have from my ethnographic terrain involved ongoing efforts to contain or 
connect experiences, and to appreciate the ephemeral and contradictory nature of doing so. 
When I was with my participants, my ‘ethnographic engagement’ aligned with what Lucas 
(2004:161) described as ‘the task of building intersubjectivity and having patients’ difficult 
experiences mean something to me as well as to them.’ I, too, moved between “searching for 
something,” as UK patient Christopher described, and finding meanings – in the field and 
also beyond it. This chapter explains how I wound up with the term ‘health agency’ to 
describe my participants’ experiences. As Rapport (2003:114), drawing on Nietzsche, said, 
‘to recognize complexity and contradiction, to interpret (and keep reinterpreting) these into 
manageable environments calls for strong will-to-power.’ In the clozapine clinic, there was 
an abundance of will-to-power to keep making meaning.  
 
The first part of my argument makes the case for an ethnographic enterprise of partial truth-
making, which paved the way for deeper insights into my participants’ experiences. The 
second part of my argument posits the concept of health agency as the personal persistence 
and hope for holistic health – in spite of the ‘physical,’ ‘mental,’ ‘social’ compartments not 
always being experientially available at once. In relating to all my participants by way of 
learning to work within ‘compartments’ of experiences, there was a delicate line between 
empathy and the need for ‘clinical’ professionalism – an epistemological limitation 
embedded in the conditions of entry into my particular field sites. As Lucas and Barrett 
(1995:318) suggested about how our thoughts about someone translate to how we are in that 
person’s presence, ‘[w]hen this thinking concerns the ‘radical otherness’ of psychiatric 
illness, it also has consequences for how we treat people, socially, custodially and 
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therapeutically.’ The overarching incongruence between patients and clinical caregivers that I 
consciously suspended as far as possible was the notion of patients’ “lacking insight” into 
their conditions when their views did not align with those of the clinic. I instead privileged 
the insights of the company I was in from interaction-to-interaction.   
 
More than most anthropologists, those working in a field increasingly governed by clinical 
paradigms need to assert anthropology’s merit, while making practical compromises. In 
considering the future of anthropology in the ‘cognitive’ terrain, Bloch (2012) asserted that 
participant observation would only count if we fulfil the reflexive endeavour to find the 
other’s perspective through our own selves. Herein, ‘what lies behind concepts and schemas 
gets known by a process of minute, very rapid and continual mind reading’ such that 
‘understanding occurs’ (Bloch 2012:183;184). Bloch (2012:184) posited, ‘[t]he way to know 
the implicit in those one is studying is through the ethnographer’s own introspection … the 
ethnographer can claim that because interaction causes mutual colonisation a reflection on 
oneself after having been colonised is a discovery of others.’ While an intimate ‘mutual 
colonisation’ of my mind and a patient’s mind or clinician’s mind was not entirely feasible, I 
was careful to be reflexive about what I came ‘to know.’ My ethnographic experiences 
uncovered for me the ‘implicit’ importance of compartmentalising irreconcilable meanings in 
ways that my participants did. Further, what I learned could not be contained to clinical space 
– it was just more (usefully) concentrated there.  
 
From the beginning, I immersed myself in the deeply cultural and inter-subjective 
manifestations of schizophrenia (Jenkins & Barrett 2004; Jenkins 2015; Sass 2004). As 
Foucault once said, ‘only the real conflict of the conditions of existence may serve as a 
structural model for the paradoxes of the schizophrenic world’ (cited in Woods 2011:162). 
Like most anthropological enquiries into mental illnesses and subjectivity, the constant 
openings ‘toward broader forms of social rupture’ (Good, Subandi & DelVecchio Good 
2007:247) transcended for me the confines of what were, at first, ethnographically bounded 
field sites. There were multiple ‘external reference points’ (Strathern 2005:16) to sort 
through. Marilyn Strathern (2005:119) suggested that, ‘present formations are only fleeting 
concepts and present exercises but partial studies,’ whereby anthropological accounts 
‘produce infinite complexity out of complexity’ as ‘[w]e become aware of more and more 
gaps.’ For me, some of these gaps pertained to doing fieldwork in two ‘spaces’ that were 
simultaneously inside and outside of my own cultural experience.  
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One field site was in an Australian city and the other was abroad in the UK. I practiced 
‘episodic fieldwork’ (Dalsgaard & Nielsen 2013) between these two clozapine clinics over 18 
months (2015-2016). I had a total of 59 official participants: 43 patients diagnosed with 
‘treatment-resistant schizophrenia’17 and 16 clinical caregivers. Informal caregivers were not 
included in this research, which I explain below. I conducted 130 audio-recorded interviews 
and observed and participated in clinical activities when it was appropriate for me to do so. I 
got to know many verbally consenting patients in this process, who allowed me to observe 
them during clinical activities, who could not be referred to in this thesis. Likewise, 
information obtained from formal consenting participants ‘off record’ cannot go ‘on record.’ 
While such insights are not specifically presented, they contributed significantly to my 
overall understanding and analysis. Because working in the area of mental health invites a 
particular intimacy and lens for wider social life, my experiences beyond the clinic during 
fieldwork time but not ‘clinic time’ also added another permeable layer of consideration, 
resonances and critical reflexivity. I had three perspectives to account for: clozapine-treated 
schizophrenia patients, those of clinical caregivers, and those of myself as the participant 
observer in particularly sensitive and sanctioned spaces.  
 
Doing interdisciplinary fieldwork in Australia and the UK meant my position required 
constant self-attuning toward a safeguarded kind of openness, shaping my ethnographic 
receptivity and analysis. As Abu-Lughod (1986:10) purported,  
 
The nature and quality of what anthropologists learn is profoundly affected by the 
unique shape of their fieldwork; this should be spelled out … to ignore the encounter 
not only denies power of such factors as personality, social location in the 
community, intimacy of contact, and luck (not to mention theoretical orientation and 
self conscious methodology) to shape fieldwork and its product but also perpetuates 
the conventional fictions of objectivity and omniscience that mark the ethnographic 
genre. 
 
To minimise the ‘conventional fictions of objectivity’ around my analytical claims, I first 
disclose the compromising dimensions of me pursuing this particular fieldwork. The process 
of me genuinely accounting for my position amidst those of my participants was indeed how 
my ethnographic data could be processed at all. There is ‘the indivisible experience’ between 
                                                 
17 Footnote 26 discloses diagnostic details and patient participant inclusion criteria, and I expand on patient participant 
demographics shortly.   
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the ethnographer and their fieldwork (Geertz 1995:135), and I hold myself answerable to all 
ethnographic conduct, observations and interpretations that I have made.  
 
Entry points 
 
The conditions of entry into my ethnographic fields shaped the processes of ethnography that 
followed. While my formal ethnographic enquiry spanned 18 months, consisting of four 
phases of interviews and observations during ‘clinic time’ between the two clozapine clinics, 
my experiences are not this neatly bounded. My position upon entering the field was first 
coloured by the interdisciplinary collaborations and my own partialities that had hitherto been 
dormant to me.  
 
My anthropological approach was necessarily influenced by inter-disciplinary collaborations, 
set up over an 11-month consultation and ethics clearance process. My professional 
networking efforts (with psychiatrists, nurses, academics and administrators), leading to 
informal introductions to clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients and clozapine clinics (not 
included in my fieldwork), only came into formal fruition in Australia after the lead clinician 
of the UK clozapine clinic agreed to accommodate my research. It was not until I had 
completed my first phase of fieldwork in the UK that final ethics approval could be granted 
for the Australian field site. I entered the field indebted to the lead clinician in the UK, a 
neuropsychiatrist who provided necessary co-supervision, legal sponsorship of my study 
through the UK National Health Service (NHS), and allowed a junior anthropologist into a 
research field otherwise reserved for medical researchers. 
 
Interdisciplinary collaboration meant that my fieldwork occasioned both clinical and 
anthropological values and provisioning. My position as an independent researcher was 
scripted by clinical safeguarding as well as being openly experimental in terms of my 
ethnographic conduct. In regard to ethical requirements, recruitment of patient participants 
and their signing of consent forms were done via clinical caregivers; I was introduced to 
potential patient participants to explain my study only after initial patient interest had been 
verified by a third party. I recruited double the amount of patient participants in the UK than I 
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did in Australia.18 This reflected greater accommodation of my research in the UK. It also 
meant that I felt further indebted to the clinical staff who were willing to help me. 
 
I was necessarily more associated with clinical caregivers rather than patients. As an NHS 
ethics requirement, I undertook a number of staff training modules (online and in person), a 
blood test and a police check – my ‘rites of passage’ into the clinical environment. In the UK 
clinic, I was often referred to as a ‘colleague’ by clinical caregivers. In both clinics, I was 
assigned a secure workspace with other staff, separate from patients’ clinic space. I worked 
most closely with UK lead nurse Clive and Australian psychiatrist Adam, who both took me 
on as their ‘student,’ teaching me about the pharmacology of clozapine and often giving me 
‘homework.’ In the UK clinic, I was soon called upon to explain the entailments of clozapine 
treatment to newcomer clinical trainees. While continually pointing out my non-clinical 
position to the newcomers I seemed to be inducting, it was a way for me to reciprocate 
Clive’s assistance to me in recruiting participants. To UK patients, I became “the clozapine 
lady.” Although the nature of my field sites and my place in them quickly provoked 
Foucauldian considerations of social power reproductions via professional and therapeutic 
relationships (Taussig 1980), my anthropological pursuit to illuminate any incongruence 
between patient and clinical rationales of illness and treatment (Kleinman 1980) was 
inherently respectful of the clinical and authoritative filters granting me access. This meant a 
constant resetting of my position as a critical ethnographer studying both receivers and givers 
of clozapine treatment. My liminal position between clinic ‘colleague’ and independent 
anthropologist was also exacerbated by my previous exposures to the medical field. 
 
Although I had limited previous experience with mental health related clinics, medical 
treatment contexts and practices were not entirely new to me, which was both useful and 
another bias to manage. I was, beyond ethical requirements, situated in an ethnographic 
‘standpoit purgatorio’ (Contreras 2015:250). I was a ‘“halfie” anthropologist’ (Abu-Lughod 
1991) who had grown up privy to medical discourse in a family of medical doctors.  I had 
previously worked at a pharmacy, at a General Practice, in a public health policy department 
and had obtained a Bachelor’s degree in psychology. I did not, however, have any clinical 
experience in authoritative roles within the medical field, nor had I worked specifically 
among mental health patients. This was a disadvantage in terms of accessing my field sites 
                                                 
18 I had 29 UK patient participants, 14 Australian patient participants, 8 UK clinical caregiver participants, and 8 Australian 
clinical caregiver participants.  
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but an advantage in terms of investigating matters afresh in the field, where I had to 
simultaneously gain trust and maximise my impartiality. The process of field access and 
professional scrutiny meant I was in a provisional ‘in-group’ position with clinical caregivers. 
I only disclosed parts of my “halfie” background if asked, however it helped to minimise any 
potential ‘othering’ felt by staff when engaging in biomedical models (see Pope, Cubellis & 
Hopper 2016:518). Having half-baked medical knowledge also helped me to blend into the 
‘safety’ of the clinical world from the point of view of some patients who might not have 
trusted me otherwise. 
 
Clinical affiliations were most prominent when ‘recruiting’ patient participants and when 
discussing medical matters that prompted reproductions of clinical language and information. 
I had to discern the boundaries of confidentiality when discussing medical matters of 
potential clinical concern, especially when these concerns were otherwise deemed by staff to 
be ‘delusional.’ My reluctance to suspend seeing things clinically and detach from the people 
whose lives I came to care for, as an anthropologist, sometimes affected my relationships 
with clinical staff participants, as I later suggest in regard to time spent with Clive. I found 
myself trying to compensate for my “halfie” bias by relating to experiences of patient 
participants wherever possible.  
 
As I had to be clear about my anthropological interest in health experiences, my own 
‘healthy’ status, age, life stage and gender simultaneously facilitated and inhibited my ability 
to connect with participants. I was a young woman with no chronic health conditions. I was 
not ‘overweight’ and this put me in contrast to most patients and some clinical caregivers 
who were. I was not a smoker, excluding me from opportunities to partake more naturally in 
staff and patient smoking breaks and conversations that took place just outside the clinics 
(safeguarded enough to count as ‘clinical public space’). Having smoked occasionally as a 
teenager, however, I was glad to be able to admit this when some patients paused to ask me 
whether I could relate to their experiences at all before elaborating on why they enjoyed 
smoking. Upon entering the field, I also happened to be the average age of females who 
receive a diagnosis of schizophrenia (age 27). I had never received a diagnosis of a psychotic 
disorder, although some of my extended family had.19  
                                                 
19 Much of this was brought to my attention in doing this project. Of note is that, a few months prior to commencing 
fieldwork, my second cousin in the UK who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia some years previously, killed his 
mother (a psychiatrist and his only caregiver) during a psychotic episode whilst he was refusing medication. This gave me 
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While I could make no claims to being a fellow patient in, say, the vein that Martin (2009) 
dynamically utilised in her ethnographic enquiry into bipolar disorder, my continual 
reflexivity allowed me to become aware and humble about how porous all categories of 
health and illness are. Ways in which I found myself relating to patients’ various ‘mental 
health’ difficulties fed into my sense that schizophrenia does indeed exist along a continuum 
of human conditions. Moreover, the majority of clinical caregivers revealed to me their 
otherwise unspoken abilities to relate to patients in this way, too. As far as being able ‘to see 
things from both perspectives [that of the ethnographer and that of the participant] at once’ 
(Myerhoff 1994:41), these perspectives shifted as I interviewed and observed my participants 
at different points in time. Building understanding in the first instance was enabled by my 
liminal position – professionally and personally.  
 
I felt closer in liminal life stage to patient participants than to clinical caregivers because I 
was neither established in a career nor investing in a family of my own. The subject of having 
a family of one’s own came up more explicitly in conversation with female patients, and I felt 
relieved to not have something that some desired for themselves. Admitting that I had a 
partner sometimes made me feel guilty. Nonetheless, two UK patient participants (one male 
and one female) in my study had current long-term partners, and four UK male patient 
participants and one Australian male patient participants were fathers, albeit mostly estranged 
from their children (and grandchildren). A handful of other patients across both clinics had 
intimate and/or familial relationships with their hallucinatory presences.20 I felt comfortable 
in my ability to bond with both genders, perhaps because of my younger unestablished status. 
This was critical because the majority of patients were male.21  
 
While gendered experiences emerge throughout – especially in Chapter Three, in which I 
discuss gendered differences in respect of weight concerns, and Chapter Four, in which I 
                                                                                                                                                        
great insight into the possible ramifications of untreated psychosis. My second cousin was subsequently put on clozapine. I 
have undertaken ongoing counselling throughout my PhD to ensure that this incident had minimal impact on my research.  
20 For instance, one man felt himself to be married to a particular female celebrity with whom he would console every 
morning and night; another man considered himself a step-father to the children of a celebrity with whom he had a 
relationship that had evolved from being sexually intimate to a non-intimate companionship involving much “laughter” over 
the last twenty years. Another example was Australian patient Daisy who I describe later in this Chapter.  
21 Across patient participants there was a male: female ratio of 35: 8. The male: female ratio for people with schizophrenia, 
generally, is estimated to be 1.4: 1 (McGrath et al. 2008). While I do not have statistics for gender differences in clozapine-
treated schizophrenia, females with schizophrenia across cultures are suggested to have slightly higher ‘recovery rates’ 
(Hopper 2004:75), which may suggest that less females are put on clozapine. The male: female ratio for staff participants 
was 7:9.  
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explore gendered differences in patients’ willingness to seek extra psychotherapeutic 
supports to confront the past – I have not taken a focus specifically on gender in this thesis. I 
have favoured instead Rapport’s (2003:16) position, that individuals possess ‘capacities [that] 
can stand for the potentialities of Everyperson.’ Alongside a multiply of other factors, gender 
shapes and bends those potentialities, but I have not privileged it less it overwrite the 
attention I pay to how individuality emerged for each patient. In doing so, I have attended to 
the experiential ‘truths’ of people’s own presents and pasts, as they have privileged them 
(Weiss 2002:198, original emphasis). This is a position the feminist philosopher Gail Weiss 
regards as crucial when making analyses of people who have been socially disenfranchised, 
‘rather than reserving the ascription of truth only for those experiences that will lead to their 
emancipation in the future’ (2002:198). Weiss (2002) was writing in response to feminist 
critiques of Merleau-Ponty’s observation about how the body is formed up in experiences 
that are not wholly determinable (by gender, or indeed any other singular factor). She 
remarked, ‘people continually engage in a series of intercorporeal exchanges with their 
environments that are grounded in bodily activity, activity that is always directed toward 
environments themselves, transforming them in the process’ (Weiss 2002:196). I found that 
gender fashioned patients’ experiences of previous social influence and present 
understandings, as did experiences of sexual/physical/emotional abuse. But in the clozapine 
clinic, neither of these determined the entirety of experience, and each played an inconsistent 
and indeterminable role. Patients in the clinic hailed from all walks of life; a diversity of 
socioeconomic backgrounds was represented, as were different ethnicities and generations. I 
have noted these where they became pertinent to individual expression of health agency.  
  
I found myself drawing on both my ‘pre-academic’ and ‘academic’ backgrounds to build 
rapport with participants. While most patients were now reliant on welfare support, included 
in my study were, for instance, musicians, shop assistants, several political science students, a 
public servant, a librarian, a Doctor of biochemistry, a delivery truck driver, and martial arts 
instructors. I was thankfully able to follow conversations with vernacular references about 
street culture, drugs, music and celebrity culture, school difficulties, or else relate to 
experiences around pressures of parents, school and work, as well as share various 
intellectual, political and philosophical interests. With clinical caregivers, I also drew on 
aspects of previous social exposures, varying my language styles and the extents to which I 
concealed or highlighted my personal or professional interests. In the UK clinic where I was 
able to blend in more easily with a more cohesive ‘team’ of staff, my younger life stage and 
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childlessness nonetheless created as much difference between my personal position and that 
of clinical caregivers as my anthropological agenda did.  
 
In an effort to blend into and respect both clinical environments as much as possible, I wore 
similar clothing to the staff and students (nurses, medical and research-based): loose fitting, 
smart, neutral colours, with minimal make-up or accessories. An unspoken dress code for 
patients clinically deemed ‘less well’ were more colourful, mismatching, multiple layered 
materials. I learnt that this was a strategy to conceal or protect oneself, utilising pockets, 
wearing bold makeup or sunglasses, or else to embody a more innocent status by dressing in 
ill-fitting children’s or teenager’s attire.22 Although the clinical dress code seemed more fluid 
in the Australian clinic, I tried to be consistent with my appearance throughout the duration 
of fieldwork, mainly in respect for the clinical authorities that had granted me access and for 
the potential safety assurance this may have given patients. My attempts to blend in enough 
with my clothing, as form of ‘cultural transvestism’ (Keane 2005:6), were of course easier 
than in other ethnographic contexts. Yet, in the process of considering how, say, I should not 
wear particular nail polish shade because it might ignite fear in patients, I became somewhat 
‘hyperreflexive’ in ways that patients can be (Sass 2004).23 Moreover, as Keane (2005) 
would contend, my clothing was not only a symbol because it allowed me to be differently 
orientated to and in different worlds.  
 
While the role crafted for me was as a clinical staff member, I had to work to convince 
patients of my anthropological position. First, I reiterated to nearly every patient participant 
that, “I am primarily interested in what is important to you, not your clinician.” I told patients 
that despite my access to their medical records, there was no two-way exchange of 
information. Medical records were seldom consulted when going through my ‘data,’ and all 
data drawn on in this thesis comes directly from participants. Getting this message across 
either facilitated longer-term participation in my research or triggered further confusion about 
my role in the clinic for those who could not trust me enough to participate. My role became 
clearer once patients spoke with me and could place me as both an outsider and an insider, 
depending on their needs. Some patients were willing to talk with me straight away, while 
                                                 
22 Further, as UK patient Luke, 45, explained to me of why he wore his dark sunglasses all the time: “I just feel kind of 
more well with them on” – although he had begun to wonder, a few months into clozapine treatment, if he might take them 
off while inside the clinic. When I last interviewed him, Luke briefly took off his sunglasses to show me how he had recently 
glued them back together. He reiterated, “they make me feel better”.  
23 ‘Hyperreflexivity’ has been described as a negative symptom referring to intensified self-awareness and fixations on 
phenomena such that aspects of the ‘self’ become objectified (Sass 2004:306). 
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others expressed how “busy” they were and would come in on their non-clinic days to talk 
with me instead. This also provided freedom and flexibility for patients who decided not to 
show up at agreed times, which was more common in the Australian clinic.  
 
Participating was by no means easy, but it became predictable and we learned together 
because I was open about never having done fieldwork before. Before our second interview 
UK patient Joanne, 53, said that talking with me meant: “Straight on communication, I know 
I’ll feel very tired, sort of suffering this evening, but I’ll just keep myself quiet, and be quiet, 
and it’ll be fine.” However, Joanne insisted that talking with me was her “choice” and that, 
“it gives me a lot of good feedback, talking to you.” We established that this “feedback” was 
different from psychotherapeutic treatment, which Joanne had had in the past, because it was 
research orientated. What was more, clozapine clinic appointments otherwise did not 
comprise open-ended conversations. UK patient Gordon, 39, who was initially painfully shy 
albeit adamant to participate, told me during our last conversation when we were both more 
at ease: “You have, have… the same idea - the same ideas about, life and its meaning.” I tried 
to contain and balance the processes of gaining trust with patients by making ongoing efforts 
to distinguish myself as an anthropologist who could ‘safely’ relate by virtue of me being in 
clinical space.  
 
Porous parameters  
 
My fieldwork settings were not as demarcated as they first seemed. Contrary to 
anthropological expectations to attend to far-reaching everyday worlds, it was not ethically 
feasible for me to conduct ethnography beyond the walls of the clozapine clinic nor was it 
practical to include informal caregivers as another participant group. Further, while the 
medical environment was likely to incline participants toward expressing more medical 
complaints than they might in a home environment, I was also exploring how agency 
operates in extremis (Rapport 2003). The benefits of minimising risk and confusion for 
patients also far outweighed the limitations of biases and field boundaries.  
 
By way of the people I was working with, any additional ‘data’ may have been too much for 
me to contain, especially if I had included informal caregivers as a third participant group. 
While Corin (2007:276) has suggested a need to disentangle the elusive ‘cultural signifiers’ 
of communication used by both patients and their families in order to ‘question psychosis 
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from the perspective of people who experience it,’ it was not common for family members to 
accompany patients to the clinics. This was partly because in Western society family 
members are unlikely to be directly involved in the caregiving for people with schizophrenia 
(Luhrmann & Marrow 2016). I observed this to especially be the case for clozapine-treated 
schizophrenia patients. After interacting with some of the few parents who were occasionally 
involved in clozapine clinic visits, the high sensitivities and emotion expressed by these 
parents only affirmed the decision to exclude them from formally participating in my study. 
As a non-parent myself, I also could not have as easily related to their experiences as I could 
to their children. Further, given the frequent contact clozapine patients have with the 
healthcare system (minimum monthly check ups), it is critical to understand ways in which 
people on the ‘treating’ side of treatment registers understand their regular transactions with 
patients that uphold the biomedical imaginaries at play. 
 
The clozapine clinic spaces were compartmentalised into different treatment rooms, 
facilitating what Kleinman (2012) has ethnographically critiqued as a wider therapeutic 
discourse of focusing on one thing in isolation at any one time. Clozapine clinics in Australia 
and the UK involve treatment registers dividing ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ health provisions, via 
an administrative circuit that the patient must pass through with pathologists/ phlebotomists, 
clozapine nurse coordinators and psychiatrists comprising the minimum number of direct 
clinical contacts. In the UK clinic, blood monitoring (Chapter Two) occurred on site and so 
clinical caregivers partaking in my study included phlebotomists, pharmacists, a pharmacy 
technician serving as ‘clozapine coordinator,’ as well as a ‘physical health’ nurse, in addition 
to ‘mental health’ nurses and psychiatrists. Clive was the lead nurse with prescribing rights 
and he and George, the lead psychiatrist, shared most of the authoritative responsibilities in 
regard to clozapine treatment.  
 
Clinical caregiver roles, like my own, were simultaneously compartmentalised and blended. I 
had similar privileges that general staff did, and was witness to clinical activities, but I could 
not participate to the extent of being a clinical caregiver; I was both provided with and 
restricted from access to things and persons. The altering of clinical roles and spaces was 
particularly prominent in the Australian clozapine clinic. The Australian clinic space was 
situated within a mixed public mental health service facility, and patients were required to 
attend pathology services earlier in the week of attending the clinic. Both clinics were open 
twice per week. Compared to the UK clinic, clinical caregiver roles were more fluid, with 
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two ‘mental health’ nurses assigned as clozapine coordinator and clozapine assistant, 
covering ‘physical health’ checks too. The boundaries around clinical space were markedly 
different between the two clinics.  
 
The UK clinic was situated in a refurbished three-story Victorian-style building that blended 
into the row of houses on its street. The only times I was alone with patients for extended 
periods was during interviews, which were conducted in one of three rooms: a rarely 
occupied ground level front room; Clive’s recently acquired office next door to the front 
room, or George’s office on the first floor and main clinic level. The ground floor of the 
clinic included a front reception, patient toilets and various types of usually vacant rooms (the 
building had been used by the local NHS Trust for various day service activities over the last 
thirty years). George had assigned the front room on the ground level to me to use for 
interviews when not occupied by a separate community-run mental health group that ran on 
one morning of the clozapine clinic days. It was a large room with bay windows, a mantel 
fireplace ornamented with a non-working antique clock and two porcelain vases. The room 
had minimal items in it: several desks, crookedly fitted together, one supporting a second 
non-working clock balanced against a wall with an empty notice board of faded crepe paper. 
Here I would sit with patients on two modern fabric armchairs around a coffee table. Patients 
were not otherwise familiar with this room, like they were with George’s room. This did not 
seem to make a noticeable difference, however, in our interactions. Some patients were 
familiar with Clive’s room.  
 
Whereas the front room seemed to hold a disjointed but not discomforting history, Clive’s 
room next door had a more temporary feel. It was new to him, too, and his time was mostly 
spent elsewhere in the clinic or doing home visits. The room contained a desk, computer, 
phone, a coffee table with a few fabric armchairs, surrounded by empty walls, four empty 
bookshelves, but with plenty of daylight flooding in through a set of French doors. It could 
open right out to an overgrown garden with the hum of insects and a loud air-conditioning 
generator that was switched on at times when Clive felt that various patient body odours had 
excessively penetrated the indoor air. Other ‘clinic rooms’ toward the back of the building 
were, in contrast to the front room and Clive’s room, uncarpeted and equipped with clinical 
apparatuses, including the echocardiogram (ECG) machine and spare equipment.  
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Activities in the UK clozapine clinic mainly took place on the middle level, with two ‘blood 
rooms’ distinguished by linoleum flooring, hazardous material bins, pathology chairs, sinks, 
clinical trolleys with blood drawing utensils. The larger blood room contained the blood 
mixing machine and analyser, concealed medical supply cupboards, and a large safety box 
with the week’s clozapine supply from the hospital pharmacy. George’s consultation room, 
next door to the larger blood room, contained a desk, computer, mostly full bookshelves, 
filing cabinets, a whiteboard for teaching students, and several personalised items like a 
contemporary painting and a stylish lamp (making it feel more lived in than Clive’s). Further 
up the corridor was the ‘physical health’ room occupied by nurse participant Narelle. It too 
had linoleum flooring, a sink, several consultation chairs, multiple bodily measurement 
machines, informative posters regarding patient nutrition and bodily measurements, as well 
as a number of Narelle’s personal paintings by local artists and pot plants that she had 
brought in. Her window was often open, to the sight of what phlebotomist Sam told me was a 
“butterfly tree,” emitting sounds and smells of pollenated summer air. The clozapine clinic 
waiting room was also on this floor, with many armchairs, coffee tables with various books, 
magazines and leaflets, and pot plants. The walls were pinned with ‘health’ posters. Narelle 
was in the process of collecting items to refurbish the waiting room and corridors with non-
clinical ‘well-being’ images instead, and I contributed an Australian Indigenous art poster 
when I returned to the clinic.  
 
The waiting room was, nonetheless, a disordered space when in use. During clinic days, the 
waiting room contents (chairs, tables, reading material, plastic water cups) shifted around, 
while activity ‘inside’ it leaked elsewhere in the clinic, as different patients moved through. 
An excerpt from my field notes after clinic hours one day summed up the atmosphere that I 
sometimes found disquieting:  
 
Waiting room empty. Loud pop music playing from the radio, windows flung open, 
curtains loudly flapping. Seems chaotic. Asked [receptionist] and [phlebotomist] 
downstairs about the music and they said, “yeah, one of them must have put it on.” 
But no one seems fazed or bothered to turn it off even though it’s echoing throughout 
the 3 story-building. It’s been playing for at least 30 mins. 
 
I never tried to contain what I perceived to be ‘chaotic’ happenings in the waiting room 
space. I nonetheless found myself feeling very relieved one day when, while chatting to UK 
patient Joanne in the waiting room, Joanne found the curtain flapping intrusive enough to get 
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up and close the windows before we could continue our conversation. Doing what they 
pleased to make the waiting room suit their preferences, UK patients suggested some 
ownership over this particular clinical space.   
 
I often sat in the UK clinic waiting room with patients during spare moments, observing and 
chatting to them. I always had at least a notepad with me, as another way of suggesting my 
position as a researcher. Being in a medical setting, my taking of notes during patients’ 
clinical appointments was not an unfamiliar practice. I tried to adapt my position to the 
activities happening in each room, and my role was of course more formalised when in 
clinical consultation rooms. My participation in clinical space involved moving between the 
waiting room where I chatted to patient participants and clinical rooms where I sometimes 
assisted with basic clinical tasks (such as preparing equipment, holding blood tubes and 
placing ECG pads on patient’s bodies). Patients doing ‘follow up’ interviews with me often 
waited for me in the waiting room. I was wary of this routine fitting into the clinical one, but 
tried to balance out formalities when I could by, for instance, joking about it and then 
ensuring patients could choose where to sit when we entered the interview room (and I 
avoided sitting on the formal ‘clinician’ chairs when in clinic rooms).  
 
On the top level of the clinic was a computer/researcher room and the staff toilets. I 
interacted with various other research students doing placements at different times I was 
there, but I also valued this space to take quiet moments for myself and to catch up on field 
notes. There were plenty of opportunities for interactions with clinic staff. I usually joined the 
clinic team for lunch at a cafe over the road and I had many fruitful conversations while 
walking and driving around town with Clive in between clinic hours. Opportunities for non-
clinic time interactions were also helped by the fact that I conducted all fieldwork over four 
summer periods between the UK and Australia.  
 
The Australian clozapine clinic was quite different from the UK clinic. It was, in line with its 
operative circuit to be described in Chapter Two, unstructured and inconsistent, with little 
emphasis on clozapine patients as people per se. It ran out of a central mental health 
outpatient centre within a multi-story government health building, where psychiatrists, 
psychologists, nurses and social workers were based but few formally involved in the 
clozapine clinic.  Clozapine consultations took place in whichever rooms were available, 
often delegated at the last-minute, and there was a strict divide via a security door between 
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the general waiting room (not specific to clozapine) and the clinic itself. To improve room 
availability, the clinic was under renovation processes. By the time I finished there, the 
waiting room had been expanded and additional consultation rooms constructed, albeit not all 
fitting within the initial parameters of the clinic – the doors of rooms outside of the main 
secure area were fitted with security codes and small ‘security’ windows. The interviews I 
conducted in the Australian clinic took place both inside and outside of officially ‘secure’ 
areas, depending on room availability.24 It was hard enough for clozapine nurses to secure 
rooms to conduct clinical checks in; having me around was a further stretch to the resources. 
 
While the doctors had their own rooms, to be utilised by the other staff when vacant, most of 
the secure area was taken up by a large communal office with multiple desks, one of which I 
was initially assigned to work at. I was granted password-access to a desktop computer, and, 
despite repeatedly explaining my ‘student researcher’ status, my security clearance tag that I 
wore read ‘Consultant’ (this was arbitrary, however, with small font and the tag worn face 
down). There was little privacy either side of the security door, and overhearing very private 
conversations between case workers and their clients took some getting used to on my part. 
Staff would talk openly with each other about their clients/patients, and these conversations 
sometimes carried over into more informal discussions in the staff room. Discussions about 
clients in the UK clinic were more discrete.  
 
There was less camaraderie between clinical caregivers in the Australian clinic than in the 
UK clinic. I sometimes joined the general team for lunch, but often felt aloof and unable to 
engage easily with them. In my field notes, I wrote things like, ‘I feel like a fly on the wall’ 
(sometimes helpfully so); ‘it’s never clear what is going on but from what I can gather…’ or, 
‘feeling directionless again.’ In the Australian clinic, my seldom involvement with clinical 
activities or opportunities for fluid movement between ‘staff’ and ‘patient’ areas meant that I 
spent more time merely observing the operations around me. This, of course, was important 
within the context of a medical clinic where nonverbal and embodied articulations are often 
just as critical as information given verbally (Csordas 1994; Desjarlais 1992; Jackson 1983). 
 
                                                 
24 It was never possible to reserve a room for the day in the Australian clinic, as I had been able to in the UK clinic, partly 
because the security protocol was highly pervious. I did not want to turn away patient participants who had often come in 
specially to talk with me, so I utilised whichever room I could. 
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I experienced, however, some disenchantment that paralleled with some of the Australian 
clinical caregivers’ experiences. There was a high staff turnover and staff often took time off, 
sometimes without notifying any of the other staff, and their colleagues did not always 
notice. For instance, when I explained to Zoya one day that Australian nurse Kerry, with 
chronic health conditions of her own, was not here because she had been admitted to hospital, 
Zoya remarked to me how absurd it was that “no-one checks in on one another around here”; 
compared to what she had experienced in Africa where “everyone wants to know how each 
other are, but here - nothing.” Zoya was passionate about her work, but this quality did not 
seem to be appreciated in this particular clinical environment. During my fieldwork, Zoya 
was hospitalised following an assault by a (non-clozapine) client during a home visit. No one 
was surprised, because she was called upon last-minute, with only a trainee nurse to assist, 
and was seen by other staff, in any case, to be “too trusting”; “too warm” with clients with 
whom she might only see short-term. Australian nurse Callum, saddened by this incident, 
told me with full conviction – leg tapping, stern expression on his face and maybe even a tear 
in his eye – that he understands why clients get angry because “they all get let down”; 
because as soon as trust is built, the staff member has had to move on due to burn-out or 
getting relocated. 
 
Participant observation with clinical caregivers varied within the Australian clinic. Zoya, 
Callum, Kerry and social worker Jill were kind and receptive to my presence when they were 
around, while psychiatrist Adam took an active interest in my project. We often exchanged 
reading material. Getting to know Adam allowed me take up a degree of genuine collegial 
positionality. The support I received otherwise was patchy at best. Compared to the UK clinic 
where there were more provisions and predictability, my interview scheduling was fraught 
and unwelcomed, as the below field note suggests: 
 
Came in at 10am - earlier than clozapine clinic starting time, to interview Myles, 
who didn’t show. Left voicemail message for him to call me back. [Receptionist] 
once again said as soon as I arrived, before I had a chance to say anything, “there’s 
no room for you.” I explained that I planned to use Ramesh’s [clozapine assistant] 
room as the cloz [sic] clinic doesn’t start for another hour. She didn’t respond. Went 
and spoke to Ramesh who said he has to use meeting room today, rather than clinic 
room, so I queried him about Sandra’s [psychiatrist] room as she’s away this week 
(she’d mentioned this to me while eating lunch in the presence of everyone else last 
week), and he looked surprised. Chances are [the receptionist] doesn’t know this 
either/didn’t remember, because it wasn’t written on the whiteboard [with daily 
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room delegations]. As Myles hadn’t showed, Adam [psychiatrist], nice as ever, 
invited me to sit it on other consults to observe “the other stuff that is important.”  
 
Generally, Adam’s consultation room was the only room I did not feel like an imposition 
walking into in the Australian clinic, and we often ate our packed lunches together in there 
while debating the intersections between philosophy and psychiatry. Adam was the only 
doctor who had personalised his room, having pinned up several deconstructed Beagle dog 
calendars to cover the large noticeboard otherwise displaying dated ‘health message’ posters. 
We often ventured outside the building for coffees. Spending time with Adam, however, 
sometimes meant I missed opportunities to catch up with patients. This was largely due to the 
unpredictability of appointment timing and interview room availability – and me not being 
able to set up the same relationships with the receptionist nor lead nurse as I had benefited 
from doing in the UK clinic.  
 
Unlike in the UK clinic, appointments in the Australian clinic were not scheduled aside from 
the general day, and the receptionist and main clozapine assistant were highly irritable and 
unreceptive. I felt myself to be constantly getting in the way of their operations – exemplified 
by the receptionists’ frequent and coldly delivered remark, “there’s no room [available] for 
you.” Perhaps I was particularly sensitive to this because the UK receptionists had included 
me in all staff matters (social and clinical) and notified me of patient arrivals via text 
messages if I was elsewhere in the clinic. I did not interview receptionists in either clinic 
because finding the time to do so outside of clinic hours, within the clinic itself, would have 
been a big ask.  
 
In the Australian clinic, if no rooms were available I used the staff ‘meeting room’. Although 
very large, it had the distinct feel of a storeroom due to the dim light, no windows, an array of 
scattered furniture, dated equipment and faded posters. Aside from the lighting, this room 
sometimes felt like the waiting room in the UK clinic, insofar as I had to hold myself back 
from restoring the order of the contents. For instance, following a clozapine appointment in 
the meeting room with my recently recruited patient participant Keith, who had just 
commenced clozapine, and his caseworker, I wrote the following field note. Zoya, covering 
for Ramesh for a few months, had asked me to escort Keith and his caseworker into the room 
while she fetched something:  
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The three of us were all seated waiting for Zoya, then case worker commented that 
this was all new – they weren’t sure what was going to happen in appt [sic]. Wanting 
to be of some use, I explained the routine checks … The cotton wool with blood and 
finger prick lancing device from previous patient was still on table in front of us and 
I wanted to move it but wasn’t sure what my place was, or whether to draw attention 
to it. Keith didn’t seem to mind, however. I wonder if the slightly chaotic and run-
down nature of this room actually makes patients more comfortable. Zoya asked me 
to get Adam to write pathology request for “level 3, [pathology company]” but I 
couldn’t find him, and I missed some of the questions Zoya was asking Keith in 
meantime. 
 
Unlike Ramesh, who went so far as to stop me from helping him to plug in the blood pressure 
machine one day, Zoya welcomed any small help I could provide. Yet, to participate in clinic 
space with Zoya meant more compromise in regard to clinic time with patients. With 
Ramesh, I had to make sure I was ‘ready’ with my field folder (containing consent forms, 
notebook and recording device) each time I noticed him get up from his desk, as he rarely 
included me otherwise. He, unlike Zoya, told me that he did not like being a nurse. Ramesh 
took lunch breaks regardless of whether patients were waiting, meaning it was often a rush of 
back-to-back check-ups in the afternoon. As well as keeping patients waiting, this truncated 
the opportunities for me to interview people in between check-ups because the patients who 
were seen first were the ones I mostly interviewed. I had more opportunities with Zoya and in 
the UK clinic due to more flexible and scheduled appointment times, respectively, meaning a 
steadier flow of patients and interview times.  
 
Permeable protocols 
 
In both clinics, an ethical provision that I closely adhered to in spite of clinical shortcomings 
was the inclusion/exclusion criteria of patient participants.25 To rule out additional participant 
vulnerabilities that come with younger and older age groups, all patient participants included 
in my study were aged 18-55 years at the time of formal consent. I also only included patients 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia not schizoaffective disorder.26 Distinguishing between 
                                                 
25 Inclusion/Exclusion criteria was contained according to all three ethics protocols approved by the Australian National 
University HREC (2014/420), the NHS Health Research Authority (15/WA/0151) and ACT Health HREC (ETH.9.15.166).  
26 To be put on clozapine, patients needed to meet the criteria for ‘treatment resistant schizophrenia’ whereby they had not 
responded to at least two alternative antipsychotics (including at least one first generation and one second-generation drug) 
(Lambert 2010). All diagnoses for participation in this study met the F20 criteria for schizophrenia in the ICD-10 
classification manual (WHO 1993). I could have potentially applied for an amendment, to allow for inclusion of 
schizoaffective disorder, however by the time I realised the fluidity in diagnostics my study was already underway and, 
given adequate interest in the study already, I decided to utilise this diagnostic form of containment given to me, however 
arbitrary. 
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these diagnoses was mostly unfamiliar to nurse participants because clozapine monitoring did 
not concern diagnosis per se, and one psychiatrist even offered to change the diagnoses of 
some participants so that I could talk with them (I declined). Zoya shook her head in sadness 
one day upon checking a potential patient participants’ diagnosis: “He’d be a good participant 
for you, he definitely has schizophrenia – it’s just in this country they say schizoaffective 
because of stigma.”27 Despite my efforts to confine my research focus to that of chronic 
schizophrenia patients because this ‘group’ today receives far less attention by way of 
research enquiry, this issue elucidated for me the highly subjective and potentially negotiable 
process of psychiatric diagnostics. I later learned that, stigma aside, ‘diagnostic switches are 
common’ due to apparent symptoms providing a mere ‘snapshot’, which is subjectively 
assessed (Guloksuz & van Os 2018:237). The social influence on diagnosis is, of course, also 
a key impetus for dissolving the term schizophrenia into a ‘psychosis continuum’ (van Os et 
al. 2009). For the sake of making the most of the time I had in the clozapine clinics, however, 
I did not concern myself with the politics of diagnosis, even though such politics directly 
shaped who could participate in my research.  
 
Unfortunately, there were a number of people who wished to participate but could not due to 
these ethical and clinical filters. It was particularly frustrating to have to exclude seven 
valued participants from my formal ‘data’ set after interviewing them, upon checking patient 
records later to discover their diagnosis was listed as schizoaffective disorder or that they 
were over the age of 55. To minimise this happening after these retrospective participant 
exclusions, the nurses involved in recruitment then had to take extra time to check through 
patient records for me – another source of my indebtedness to them.  
 
Another unruly aspect of the clinical filter for recruitment was the variation in clinical 
judgements about how suitable patients were for participation in my research, and the extent 
to which staff felt a need to safeguard me as an ethnographer. I ended up with a fairly wide 
range of patient dispositions, albeit my audio-recording device likely dissuaded patients who 
felt more ‘paranoid’ (Martin 2009). Clinical caregivers in the UK clinic made a more 
concerted effort to be selective about who might be ‘appropriate’ patient participants, and  
                                                 
27 I asked how she knew this patient was not ‘schizoaffective’ and she said it was because he was on a high dose of 
clozapine and not taking mood stabilisers. Further, UK lead nurse Clive suggested that I not include the word 
‘schizophrenia’ when explaining my study to participants, because it was “too off-putting for most patients.” I contended 
that this would be evasive (as indeed Scheper-Hughes’ (2001[1979]) ethnography had been), but perhaps given the field site 
it would have been less so. In any case, I found that most patients spoke to me directly about having a diagnosis of 
‘schizophrenia.’  
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were careful to ensure I knew the safety protocols and that I was never left alone in the clinic. 
Clinical caregivers at the Australian clinic were not as obliging, and the more chaotic, time-
pressured environment made it difficult for me to clarify safety protocols. I was once 
forgotten about and left entirely alone in the Australian clinic while interviewing a patient in 
the ‘meeting room’ because staff left the premises by 5pm sharp. I finished the interview at 
5.10pm. This patient, it turned out, was on parole having committed a violent crime, which 
he himself disclosed to me in great detail during the interview. This incident prompted 
awkward apologies from staff members the next day, particularly because it had occurred 
within 24 hours of Zoya being assaulted. I was then given a more specific explanation of 
security protocols and felt less burdensome asking questions to maximise my own sense of 
safety in the clinic.  
 
The process of ‘handover’ from the clinical caregiver ‘recruiting’ and obtaining written 
consent also varied between clinics, and the limited time frames I had to work with often 
made the beginnings of interviews quite haphazard. In the UK, each consent form had to be 
signed by a clinical caregiver as well as the patient participant, to verify the appropriateness 
of recruitment.28 While this was not necessary in the Australian clinic, marking the point at 
which the interview started proved challenging when patients wanted to converse with me 
immediately. In the Australian clinic in particular, patients would divulge information more 
hastily and in minutes of starting the first interview. For instance, 55-year-old Australian 
patient Daisy, immediately after signing the consent form, started in a defiant tone, “I don’t 
think I have schizophrenia though… because I got raped you see, and I lived a hard life.”29 I 
started to ask her how old she was when- [this happened], but she intercepted quickly, “I was 
14, Mum used to lick and suck us as babies but I never worried about that, because I knew 
how much she loved us, like such a strong mother, she brought us all the way from Africa, 
moved from Africa, to England and to Australia, with my family.” Daisy’s eyes became 
dazed; she was flustered: “Can’t talk too fast,” she warned me, breathing in deeply and 
                                                 
28 Signing consent forms was only needed for the initial interview. Ramesh (the Australian clozapine assistant nurse) 
remarked to me several times, however, that “patients won’t remember you.” Upon returning to the clinic after completing 
follow-up fieldwork in the UK where all participants had remembered me, I said to Ramesh that I thought that patients in the 
Australian clinic would me remember, too, to which he responded again, “no, you’ll have to remind them of your research as 
they won’t remember talking with you.” When Ramesh was about to begin a new job during my second field visit in the 
Australian clinic, I asked if he had told the patients he was leaving and he said, “some of them but they won’t know 
anyway.” Given the subsequent unfailing recollection of all of my participants, including those who Ramesh thought were 
“not worth” approaching (other staff members suggested them and recruited them for me instead), I was sceptical of 
Ramesh’s clinical judgement around participant ‘appropriateness’ and memory capacities.  
29 The differing perceptions around diagnosis itself, while noted as a barrier in other ethnographic studies on mental illness 
(e.g. Estroff 1991) was rarely an issue in my study, perhaps due to patients having been ‘in the system’ longer and clozapine 
treatment taking away the focus of their ‘mental’ illness. 
50  
quickly and then loudly exhaling. But she kept talking, bursting with words. Given my 
anthropological position, I wanted to give patients as much chance as possible to express 
what they wanted to. Daisy was a surprise participant, whom the recruiting nurse (Ramesh) 
approached with doubt that she would be willing to talk with me. Patients like Daisy became 
much easier to talk to and to be with given some time and openness on my part.  
 
Just as I learnt to embrace the lack of structure and confronting content in conversations, 
where time also limited the amount of questions I could ask, I learnt that a sense of 
containment would always follow if I allowed patients to steer conversation. Given the dearth 
of conclusions about schizophrenia and the ongoing efforts of all people brought into the 
conversation about it, including patients’ active making of ‘sense’ as much as their making of 
‘health,’ it was valuable to concentrate my fieldwork in two particular spaces. Contrary to 
traditional ethnographic methods that aimed to lessen the subjectivity and bias of the 
ethnographer though psychoanalytic ‘hygienics’ that might ‘privilege a norm of objectivity’ 
in the ethnographer’s gaze (Rabinow 2007:99), I attempted to elicit ‘a mode through which 
interviewees [in a set place and time] could speak for themselves’ (Rabinow 2007:111). This 
‘ethnographic present’ taps into Hegel’s attention to ‘representation,’ wherein the eminence 
of what was spoken in this space and time ‘remains open’ (Rabinow 2007:113). As l discuss 
throughout this thesis, different contexts and inter-subjective dynamics brought out different 
‘sides’ to people, as would indeed be the case for anyone. Exhibiting of ‘symptoms’ seemed 
to be connected to clinical monitoring and the extent of clinical receptivity. My 
interpretations, like my positionality, involved careful scrutiny of what was revealed within 
the ‘clinical present.’  
 
Being with participants 
 
Given my provisional positionalities described above, my ethnographic receptivity during 
fieldwork is important to unpack. As Strathern (2005:10) has noted, prior to the reflexive turn 
in anthropology, ‘‘The fieldworker’ was a powerful portrayal of the single consumer or 
receptor of experience.’ The postmodern ethnographer, accountable to her own multiple 
positionality, must grapple with how, ‘the consumer’s gut, alas, in the long run turns 
everything into flesh … the image returns to the act of consumption which submits 
everything to consumerability, each event or observation being equally absorbed in that 
unifying pastiche, the capacity to experience’ (Strathern 2005:15-16). In this way, an 
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ethnographer’s receptiveness to participants can feed into their own experiences such that 
field and non-field become ultimately indistinguishable.  
 
Anthropological receptivity, unlike clinical detachment, strives to be amenable to alternative 
ways of seeing and doing, open and antithetical to power relations – albeit simultaneously 
‘absorbing’ these, too. It was entirely possible that I, limited in my inter-subjective access, 
was narcissistically only connecting with participant experiences that were already ‘open’ to 
exchanges of ideas with me. Inter-subjective projects of understanding between myself and 
my participants could not be extricated into field and non-field experiences.  
 
UK lead nurse Clive and Australian psychiatrist Adam held me accountable to my position 
and helped me to find the balance between clinical detachment and personal affect. One 
afternoon Clive announced to me, albeit somewhat fancifully, that he was “thinking about 
doing something different” from working in mental health (his career of 22 years). He added, 
“what you’re doing is very different from everyone here.” I felt assured that he understood 
my “different” position. But I received more mixed feedback from Adam. Early in my 
fieldwork I wanted to know what Adam would make of how a patient participant had 
seemingly changed before my eyes – from speaking tangentially about distressing 
phenomena to then, after me merely ‘humouring’ him for some time, becoming completely 
coherent and calm. Adam responded that I was “inevitably becoming part of the treatment 
experience,” whereby the “social contact people receive when they come in here is of course 
part of their recovery path.” I thus grew cautious that I was not distinguishing my position 
enough. I soon learned, though, that, regardless of whether I was contributing to a “recovery 
path,” not many clinicians were contributing to a unified “recovery path.” Later in my 
fieldwork, Adam expressed exasperation about the lack of attention to therapeutic 
relationships in clinical practice. He said he was tired of staff “not seeing patients as 
humans.” While I could never be entirely sure that my part in peoples’ clozapine treatment 
experiences evoked sensitivity that was markedly ‘different’ from clinical interactions, I 
certainly took care to treat patients like I would anybody. My liminal position may have been, 
however, sometimes ‘pathological’ for being so ‘open,’ and ultimately inexperienced 
compared with the clinical company I was in.  
 
As well as spending time with Clive in the UK clinic, I also spent time with UK nurse 
Narelle, who had received additional psychoanalytic training. Psychoanalytic approaches 
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crossed over nicely with some of my anthropological thinking. I spent many hours, either 
side of clinic time, talking with Narelle, sometimes extending into email conversations. She 
provided me with emotional support at times, and we ran different ideas past one another. I 
felt that we reinforced for one another that our professional ‘meaning-making’ was critical to 
supporting patients to find meaning – beyond clinical concerns.  
 
I also became aware of the ways in which some of my thinking style coincided with patients. 
There were more explicit things, such as scrutinising clinical information. One day when I 
queried Clive about the ‘symptomatic’ aspect of clozapine, he quipped, “ah, this is what the 
patients say!” Then there was the more complex matter of me embracing the contradictions 
and potentialities expressed by patients during interviews, even though they did not, later, 
upon deeper reflection, make sense to me. As Rapport (2003:30) pointed out, however, ‘the 
closure of world views and the sequentiality of narratives do not necessarily translate to 
singularity or consistency regarding the order that is construed or conveyed either within or 
between such forms.’  
 
Arguably, there is exciting potential for anthropologists to explore experiential revelations 
together with their participants, although the multiple, clinical considerations in the clozapine 
clinics came with vulnerability when venturing outside of medical frames. Enquiries into 
other bodily sensations and personal health beliefs and behaviours were sometimes very 
confusing for patient participants as they were not used to communicating these things. When 
I sensed we were on sensitively uncommon ground, I did try to bring conversations back to 
what participants had mentioned of their experiences that could be connected with previously 
established mutual understanding. As Lucas (2004:158) said of the workshopping of ideas 
between himself as an ethnographer and his participants with schizophrenia, conversational 
exchanges ‘drew on common, orchestrated understandings that were shared between 
participant and researchers because we each had a practical, working knowledge of our 
culture in some of its aspects.’ There was always an inroad, but the path ‘out’ was less clear.  
 
Part of drawing boundaries was about knowing that I already had enough data to focus on, in 
spite of many other possible themes of interest. There were vast, macro level topics that were 
continually connected but beyond the limits of my enquiry. These ‘external reference points’ 
(Strathern 2005:16), stretching far beyond what occurred in clinical space into deep socio-
political matters prompted a constant effort to ‘control’ my data (Good, Subandi & 
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DelVecchio Good 2007). For instance, the UK Referendum and the lead up to the 2017 USA 
election was far from lost on patient experiences. These happenings intensified the social 
fractures and inequities that patients sometimes spoke to me about, as integral parts of their 
delusions or else in terms of entirely warranted matters of housing security and mental health 
funding cuts. I thus sympathise with the many anthropologists who consider schizophrenia 
and its treatment by attending to social chemistries well beyond the clinic walls.  
 
My simultaneously safeguarded and open ethnographic receptivity ultimately provoked 
continual self-questioning and an experiential irreconcilability. There were ‘multiple domains 
from which understanding could equally emerge, or recede again, into “ununderstanding”’ 
(Lucas 2004:160). I found that my experience of doing ethnography aligned somewhat with 
Stevenson’s (2014) reflexive gaze of ‘uncertainty,’ when she explored the ‘ethics of care’ 
among an Inuit community in the Canadian arctic. Stevenson noted her affinity with her 
participants in accepting circumstances where, ‘the facts falter and when things (and selves) 
become, even just slightly, unhinged’; where her own ‘life’ often felt ‘beside itself’ 
(Stevenson 2014:2). Upon starting this thesis and addressing my official ‘data,’ I conceded of 
how much would still be suspended and leftover somewhere, ‘unhinged,’ or in 
incommunicable resonances that cannot be contained beyond the implicit coming together of 
certain moments. This, however, became less remarkable over time, as I learnt to embrace the 
silent applications to wider realms of social life – but once more comfortably attuned rather 
than overwhelmed or protectively detached from the experiences.  
 
Being with data 
 
The temporal-spatial underpinnings of my fieldwork were not only necessary for ethical 
safeguarding, they became instrumental to my personal and analytical boundary making. As 
Dalsgaard and Nielsen (2013:8;14) assert in regard to ‘episodic fieldwork,’ ethnographic 
insights evolve over periods of ‘being present’ long enough to become part of the field, but 
also being absent in order to account for the ‘event’ of being inside or outside the formal field 
site. Despite most of my time being spent outside the clinical setting, I of course felt 
continually immersed in my data.  
 
First, doing my fieldwork in an Australian city familiar to me meant that the boundaries 
between field and non-field felt ironically tidier due to unfamiliar versus familiar spaces and 
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experiences. While in the UK, I was living in a city I had not previously visited, and where I 
was trying to study one aspect of unfamiliarity, while attuning my ‘self’ to new and separate 
relations between and outside the one building pertaining to my field site. In both field sites, 
stories concerning particular spaces outside the clinic meant that when I walked through these 
spaces during time that was my ‘own,’ I would experience these spaces in intense contrast to 
what I had previously. This was sometimes disturbing, if physical assaults or police arrests 
had occurred in places where I was otherwise going for a peaceful walk or having a picnic 
with friends. However, the new associations became something beyond the clinic that I could 
quietly and ‘safely’ share with patients without the physical intrusion of being there with 
them. 
 
I also found that spending time with old friends and new friends outside of clinic time meant 
that I was more sensitive to unspoken crossovers into what would be clinically classified as 
‘mental illness’ or ‘lifestyle risk factors’ for metonymical ‘mental,’ ‘physical’ and ‘social’ 
manifestations of illness. Intimate disclosures from friends and family about their own 
experiences became much more common, perhaps as I became more receptive or comfortable 
with this subject matter. It was principally useful for me to consider the striking similarities 
between my research participants and people who do not carry any such diagnoses. Nearly all 
of my social experiences during fieldwork informed my ethnographic understanding in some 
way, along with my own ‘self’ understanding (Strathern 2005). This became both enriching 
and personally affecting. As Strathern (2005:27) noted,  
 
What happens ‘takes place’ because it happens somewhere, in the presence of others, 
because events become interventions, the subjectivity of different persons the issue. 
However, these interruptions to the self do not guarantee a return to the familiar. 
Rather, there is a sense of holding in one’s grasp what cannot be held – of trying to 
make the body do more than it can do – of making a connection with others in a 
partial manner. 
 
With interruptions and vague resonances everywhere, ‘partial connections’ emerged. 
Critically, my relationships with clinical staff outside of clinical operations and clinical time 
allowed me to think through my ideas in clinically relevant ways, and to eventually accept 
the practical limits of my ethnographic position and personal containment of ‘data.’ 
 
About 15 months into fieldwork, the accumulative impacts of taking in others’ lives into my 
own began to take a toll. I was noticing myself becoming more superstitious and fearful in 
55  
situations I had not otherwise been. I also became more emotional than I had felt in a long 
time, in spite of patients’ own apparent disconnection from hardships and the feeling of hope 
that persisted everywhere else. I found it difficult to separate ‘clinic time’ from my personal 
life outside of it, because I was largely processing my field experiences in non-clinic hours 
when it was more appropriate for me to do so. Of the conversations Clive and I would have 
during non-clinic hours, Clive commented, “the areas we visit when we talk leave me feeling 
like we have gone into the deeper context, but we clinicians can’t afford to go there because 
symptom management and looking after ourselves must be a priority.” I did not have such 
priorities, yet Clive was adamant that I should still reach out to him. I wrote this field note 
one evening having returned from an informal meeting with him, on a non-clinic day:  
 
I met Clive for a drink. Let myself cry as we spoke. Explained that I find it conflicting 
to reach out because he is ultimately a participant in my study too. He said this was 
“crazy” because, “it’s like saying ‘go into a war zone and you’re not allowed to join 
anyone in a team.” He reiterated that I was like his sister now and that I must call 
him to debrief about anything, any time. Very grateful.  
 
Perhaps like patients who spoke to me of their troubles only occurring outside of the 
clozapine clinic – how, for instance, their (hallucinatory) ‘voices’ would be waiting outside, 
talking or tormenting them and causing panic attacks on the walk home, while ‘chest pains’ 
would be felt in quiet moments when one was on their own –  it was mainly outside clinical 
spaces that I felt myself to be personally affected.  
 
Doing anthropology, Ingold (2014:288;389) suggested, is making an ‘ontological 
commitment’ no matter the ‘considerable existential risk’ to the anthropologist. Participant 
observation, Ingold posited, ‘is to join in correspondence with those with whom we learn or 
among whom we study, in a movement that goes forward rather than back in time’ 
(2014:390). I was, vicariously or inherently (through my methodology), exposed to some 
‘trauma’ that patient participants embodied, as well as their own attitudes that were in line 
with the ‘forward’ moving nature of ethnographic practice. I kept looking ahead, until it was 
no longer sustainable for me to do so. In leaving the field, I had to focus on what had been. 
At an academic conference around this time, a UK journalist had a word to my senior 
colleague that he should “check in” with me because I seemed “emotionally stretched.” He 
said that this was something he recognised from his journalist colleagues suffering from 
“PTSD” [post-traumatic stress disorder] who “cannot find their feet after returning from areas 
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of conflict.” I initially thought such a comparison was highly distasteful – I had not been 
working in a war zone, and I had begun to feel indulgent when any focus was taken away 
from the experiences of patients who were all surviving (and not complaining about) 
substantiated and often ill-recognised traumas of their own. But this was how many of my 
patient participants’ much more significant traumas had also been dismissed – continual 
dismissals, and guilt, over many years. I subsequently allowed myself to feel flooded in what 
I can only describe as a displaced grief. It took me many months to feel ‘in control’ of my 
‘data’ again, without the overwhelming conflict of deeply personal connections and a 
protective estrangement from it all. These experiences, however, inadvertently helped me to 
relate even further with many of my participants. 
 
Of course, the act of comparing experiences that deciphered yet blended ‘fieldwork’ and my 
respective positions before, within and beyond my being there, pertained simply to ‘one of 
the ways anthropologists create complexities for themselves, and thus their sense of having to 
get things into proportion’ (Strathern 2005:108). Although ostensibly practicing multi-sited 
ethnography situated in two specific field sites, in the end my ‘data’ was drawn from what 
Dalsgaard & Nielsen (2013:6) term ‘temporal sites’: ‘a confluence of different times and 
temporalities, [which] emerges rather as a dynamic force of becoming that shifts in intensity 
and clarity, depending on the ethnographer’s immediate position and immersion.’ Realising 
that my own experiences of containing and connecting data was a matter of incorporating the 
sense of ‘unfinishedness’ (Biehl & Locke 2010:320) that my research participants also 
illuminated for me, was critical to me ‘trying to find my feet in all sorts of places’ (Geertz 
2005:135). This ethnographic phenomenon is not unique to ethnographic studies of mental 
illness (Good, Subandi and DelViechhio Good 2007), and Jenkins (2015) attention to 
‘precarity’ rather than mere vulnerability in these contexts, was indeed a useful lens to apply. 
Yet my ethnographic observations and experiences were also not specific to my fieldwork 
context.  
 
Contemplating what it meant to try to contain and connect experiences during fieldwork left 
me, like my participants, with a sense of continual openness that need not be reduced to 
experiences of illness. Rapport (2003:66) posited that, ‘efforts at social-structural 
containment, reducing phenomena to contextualizing (and collectivizing) frameworks, have a 
fearfulness and inflexibility about them: a shying away from the original, the random, the 
limitless, the individual, and from taking creative responsibility for these.’ To take ‘creative 
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responsibility’ (Rapport 2003:66) for how ethnographic interpretations are contingent upon 
irreducible factors, meant attending to things as only temporally, partially embodied or 
connected or containable. Just as being with people who have schizophrenia can induce a 
‘praecox feeling’ (see Sass 2014) of simultaneous connection and disconnection that in 
moments did indeed feel ‘extraordinary’ (Jenkins 2015), it was also, for me, the 
commonplace experiences that stayed with me beyond the intensity of fieldwork, and from 
which I have grounded my subsequent analysis. My receding from the more sensational 
aspects enabled me to understand how clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients make their 
‘health’ in ways that are not specific to their diagnostic conditions.  
 
Health agency 
 
Individuals interpret their own oppression, just as they do their freedom. 
 – Rapport (2003:84).  
 
On the face of it, people with clozapine-treated schizophrenia face significant barriers to their 
sense of control over their lives and their ‘health.’ The clozapine clinics in this thesis only 
intended to focus on ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ aspects of patients’ health. Patients, however, 
reconnected their own social and personal meanings of health. As I have suggested above, 
ways in which patients did this became understandable to me as I embraced how 
contradictions do not forestall meaning-making. Rapport’s (2003) existential framework for 
understanding how people make their own meanings out of their circumstances builds on 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of ‘will-to-power’: 
 
For what Nietzsche wished to convey, particularly in the phrase ‘will to power,’ was 
that intrinsic to the person is the possibility, even the proclivity, of a self-becoming 
which amounted to a continuous self-overcoming. Rooted inside the individual was 
the power to create selves, and perspectives looking out from those selves upon the 
world, and to keep recreating these … Nietzsche (like Sartre after him) sought to 
portray an appreciating of individual lives as continually evolving, developing, 
growing: of the essence of identities changing even as the energy, the creativity and 
the will that was foundational of individual existence remained the same. (Rapport 
2003:35)  
 
Continuous ‘self-overcoming’ is, arguably, particularly critical for people with schizophrenia 
(Sass & Parnas 2003). Yet the sense of ‘will to power’ can easily be overlooked, because of 
what appear to be conditions of incapacity – either because of residual symptoms appearing 
to wrangle control over one’s behaviours, or clozapine side effects defining one’s livelihood. 
Indeed, Australian nurse Ramesh had very low expectations for patients’ abilities to even 
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partake in my study. Yet, ways in which patients exerted hope and control through their 
circumstances suggested a personal power to keep reformulating and prospering in very 
subtle ways.  
 
Admittedly, I was at first struck by how optimistic and resilient many patients seemed. 
Australian psychiatrist Adam also commented to me one day how patients often reported 
feeling “great” even when he observed their lives to be, “objectively, less than ideal.” 
Patients talked very casually to me about things that had occurred in their lives that, only 
later, when I was listening to interview recordings, would bring me to tears. The marker that, 
from an outsider’s perspectives, could override concerns about a patient’s ‘mental’ and 
‘physical’ health was whether or not they appeared to have ‘real’ social support.  
 
What ‘real’ social support meant, though, was ultimately up to patients. While receiving 
‘attention from others’ is critical to one’s experience of a ‘social self’ (Aylwin 1985), this 
attention just needed to be controllable to some degree.  Australian patient Daisy, mentioned 
above, spoke to me and clinical caregivers about her “eleven children,” whose existence I 
could not verify. Daisy told me that she spent most of her days “forgiving” and “praying” for 
her family and also the doctors in the clinic, even those whom she felt misunderstood her. 
Australian social worker Jill, who observed Daisy frequently brushing her hair, once tried to 
gift her some hair product, but knew she would have to pretend it was not a gift she had 
actually sought out:  
 
I said, ‘Look, I was given this as a free sample, I don’t suppose you want it do you?’ 
And she’s like, ‘ohh…errr… oh, alright then.’ She was being nice, because they 
don’t want to upset you. They’re mistrusting but at the same time they want people to 
like them, because they’ve been abused, you know, all that stuff … six or eight 
weeks later, she says, ‘Jill, I hope you don’t mind, but I’m not going to use this, or 
it’s the wrong type, or…’ She gave it back to me. Because she thought – I’m pretty 
sure, this is my surmising – that I wanted something from her. 
 
For Daisy and many other patients, the predictable social world provided by clinical 
caregivers vis-à-vis clozapine treatment was sufficient to build upon, such that to introduce 
unexpected communications could compromise their sense of control. Unspoken elements to 
interactions between patients and clinical caregivers left more room for interpretation. Jill 
Continued, 
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I’ve lived on my own a lot, and I know how dark… I suffered from depression… 
always have, [be]cause I’ve had a bit of a… childhood… that’s why I get on with… I 
understand… these people have helped me through my thing, I’ll tell you that. 
[Be]cause I’ve seen people, and think, ‘my God, that’s me’ … But loneliness is so 
normal … she [Daisy] does some crazy things just out of loneliness, not just out of 
being schizophrenic. She is desperately lonely. 
 
Daisy, meanwhile, told me that she appreciated Jill because “she doesn’t… talk about being 
better than me or be-, doing things more powerfully or living more than me, [be]cause I like 
to feel that I’m in control, that I’m not running away.” Australian nurse Ramesh, on the other 
hand, was “too powerful” for her; Daisy would often run out of appointments with him 
before he had finished going through the clinical checks. I am not convinced that patients like 
Daisy felt themselves to be ‘desperately lonely,’ so long as she was doing things to improve 
her well-being in the immediate sense (as I explain further in Chapter Three), and to shape 
social interactions on her own terms. The thread that ran throughout all patients’ sense of 
their health as part of managing specific ‘parts’ and contradictions of it was a re-construable 
‘social’ constituent – regardless of whether their ‘mental’ or ‘physical’ health was clinically 
in check.  
 
Rapport (2003:261) described how embedded in Nietzsche’s ‘will-to-power’ was the idea 
that people do things with ‘in order to’ rather than ‘because’ motives: with ‘an intentional and 
embodied consciousness in the process of meaning making’ rather than with ‘power external 
to that embodied consciousness.’ Arguably, this applies to how patients imagined their health 
and their potentiality in the world, as a person among others whose unhelpful powers could 
be overcome. People worked ‘in order to’ unite with or overcome the perceived powers of 
others – as UK patient Christopher, quoted in the opening of this chapter, indicated in his 
“striving for everyone to be on the same page.”  
 
Health agency is intrinsically tied into a sense of having a control and power to carry oneself 
forward in one’s social environment. All individuals have ‘energy and momentum’ such that 
external forces become ‘dependent upon the forcefulness with which that life was 
prosecuted’ (Rapport 2003:7). Although ‘social defeat’ is seen to be a critical cause and 
consequence of schizophrenia in Western societies (Luhrmann 2007; Luhrmann & Marrow 
2016), an all-pervasive social defeat is not what I observed in the clozapine clinic, no matter 
how much patients’ lives may have previously been defined by social defeat. The term ‘social 
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defeat’ is not symbolic or structural; it refers to an embodied, physiological defeat resulting 
from circumstances ‘when individuals have repeated social interactions in which they 
subjectively experience failure,’ from ‘another person who demeans them, humiliates them, 
subordinates them’ (Luhrmann 2007:152). Luhrmann and Marrow (2016) suggest how, for 
people with schizophrenia now registered in government mental health systems, ongoing 
social defeat can be minimised through modest non-pharmaceutical means. Namely, through 
secure housing and therapies that create meaning out of voices (if occurring), along with 
‘active social engagement’ between patient and treatment teams that is fundamentally ‘open’ 
in terms of symptom interpretation and treatment decisions (Luhrmann & Marrow 2016:217-
220). For clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients, these counteractants to social defeat are, 
to some degree, more available than in other treatment environments. While most patients 
lived in tenuous public housing that could be improved upon, no one I met was currently 
homeless (some had been in the past). Moreover, patients could make new meanings out of 
their health and their ‘social’ health that was not under demand at all. Although some patients 
like Daisy actively negotiated interactions with clinical caregivers, such that she could feel 
“in control, that I’m not running away,” some patients could also reclaim meanings for their 
own sense of social connection in the form of their residual hallucinations and delusions.  
 
Even when considering circumstances where ‘delusions’ and ‘hallucinations’ persist, I still 
found health agency to persist through a negotiating of imagined relationships.30 Delusions 
may ‘correspond to an inter-subjective situation bereft of the basic trust that could help to 
restore a consensual understanding of the situation and to co-constitute a shared, 
commonsensical reality’ (Fuchs 2015:179). Hallucinations, meanwhile, refer to more 
temporal, sensory perceptions of ‘others’ as distinct from the self. Sacks (2012:289) 
described hallucinations as the feeling that there is ‘somebody there’; a ‘presence’ and 
‘shadow person’ with ‘intentionality or agency which either raises the hair on our neck or 
produces a sweet, calm feeling of being protected, not alone.’ Lovell (2007:335) found that 
among homeless people with schizophrenia in New York City, ‘even delusional discourse 
reveals itself to be profoundly political, not simply because it condemns or reflects existing 
inequities and forms of domination and exclusion but because it projects possible moral 
worlds.’ I observed clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients to experience Lovell’s (2007) 
                                                 
30 This was not uncommon but clozapine patients rarely experience ‘florid’ psychotic states or ‘episodes’ while taking the 
drug regularly; one of the central clinical outcomes of clozapine is that patients rarely return to inpatient psychiatric wards 
(readmission to hospital is more likely to be for their ‘physical’ health). 
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notion of ‘moral agency’ in spite of their persistent ‘delusional’ and ‘hallucinatory’ 
presences. For instance, there was UK patient Alex, 48, a clinically categorized ‘clozapine 
resistant schizophrenia patient.’  
 
Alex had been “fighting off” the presence of “Suey people”31 for many years. The “Sueys” 
mainly visited Alex when he was alone. They did not to come into the clinic with him, in part 
“[be]cause they’re all American, so they’re all asleep now.” The Suey people would “come 
and go as they please,” giving a “childish” taunting of “ner ner ner, ha ha ha,” and “pushing 
and shoving” into Alex. When “walking through town, I’ll feel their fingernails,” Alex 
recounted. Of central import was that, “they cannot be trusted around children.” While sitting 
in the clinic together one day, Alex began, 
  
Alex: The Suey people have been torturing their children… I witness that. Oh, that’s 
upsetting - that makes me fuming  
JB: [cautiously] How do they torture them?  
Alex: With their fingernails, and gettin’ inside ‘em, and hurtin’ ‘em.  
JB: Do you feel powerless?  
Alex: No, I fight ‘em; if I keep fightin’ ‘em, things can only get better and better and 
better. There is, I can see, an end to it.  
[pause] 
JB: And what would that end be?  
Alex: Their destruction… their destruction.  
JB: How do you think that would be achieved?  
Alex: Doing what we’re doing now. They attack me, I fight ‘em back, hospitalise 
‘em, perhaps they won’t do it again... If you hit somebody hard enough, they’re not 
gonna hurt you again, are they?  
  
Talking about the Suey people, and being in the clinic, was another way of combatting them. 
During a later interview, when Alex and I had established more rapport, he described their 
assaults as “tantamount to sadistic paedophilia.” Alex had concerned himself with this social 
ill to focus on and “fight.” When I interviewed Alex the following year, his psychiatrist had 
taken him off an additional antipsychotic drug (aripiprazole, prescribed to augment 
clozapine), because Alex did not feel it had made any difference. Alex pointed out that, “on 
the plus side, they [the Sueys] won’t be around in future to mess up children’s lives and what 
not… if I’m saving 20 or 30 kids - it’s still a lot, you know.”  
 
                                                 
31 Suey is “the plural for pigs,” Alex explained to me.  
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While giving him grief, I believe Alex’s preoccupation with the Suey people also gave him a 
sense of ‘self-becoming’ and ‘self-overcoming’ (Rapport 2003:35). He suggested to me at 
times during our conversations, although never quite confirming it, that he had been sexually 
abused as a child. “I’ll loathe them for the rest of my life,” Alex said of the Sueys. In terms of 
dealing with them, he surmised, “I’ll have to do it on my own accord.” Alex would crinkle 
his nose and look up at me in between talking, searching for clarification if I had understood 
him. He wore thick-lensed glasses that magnified his wide-open eyes that did not seem to 
smile with his mouth, often open ajar.32 It sometimes felt like we were having conference 
meetings about what to do about the Sueys; it was all very serious to Alex and I took it 
seriously too. Alex told me, however, that “there’s nothing you can do to help… unless you 
wanna kill a couple of them”. On one occasion, he generously offered me a sip of his guava 
energy drink, which he had been gulping down quickly to refuel himself on a hot summer’s 
day (I politely declined). He dressed with hints of what he might have worn thirty or forty 
years ago mixed with what he asserted and protected himself with now: loudly coloured 
board shorts, often a patriotic Union Jack singlet, a heavy denim jacket (“because of the 
pockets” and it was “comfortable enough”), thickly soled lace up boots and a large, full 
backpack.33 I saw in him several personas: a generous child, a searching adolescent, and a 
frustrated but gracious middle-aged man, depending on the context of our conversation - and 
who else we were talking about.  
 
When I had first asked Alex what “health” meant to him, he said, “not feeling upset, cynical,” 
or “scared” toward other people. When I put his words to him a year later, Alex simply 
responded, resolutely, “I’m not frightened of them anymore … I remember throughout my 
childhood I’d been running away from them all the time because I felt frightened. It was their 
fear, up there [he pointed upwards], I wasn’t frightened at all, it was just them.” With his 
potential to “fight off the Sueys”, Alex also felt strong enough in his present and future 
capacities to deal with any ‘physical health’ concerns as they might arise.  
  
Alex enjoyed smoking cigarettes and reflected that “the foregone conclusion [of life] is 
death,” although he felt “a bit manic on the cancer front.” He conceded that he was 
                                                 
32 Many participants exhibited a loosely opened mouth, sometimes drooling, a common side effect of clozapine. 
Misleadingly, this suggested a carelessness in expression, which I found to be juxtaposed by expressions of care in regard to 
less clinical topics of conversation.  
33 Heavy shoes and jackets, along with back-packs were common accessories for patient participants, for protective layering 
and practical commuting purposes. 
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“poisoning” himself “over a long period of time” with “alcohol, tobacco.” He said that his 
throat “doesn’t feel right,” so he had been “checking” it “every day.” However, the feeling 
“just comes and goes,” so he could not be sure. He said he would only quit smoking if he got 
cancer, but his reasons for this would not have been obvious without the context of his social 
life – when I asked him how he would react if he got cancer, Alex replied, 
 
Alex: That’d scare the life out of me 
JB: Why? 
Alex: Being given 6 months to live, when the Suey people are nearly annihilated… 
[shaking his head, agitated again] 
JB: So, you want to live long enough to see the end of them? 
Alex: I want another 30 years, yeah 
JB: So, you can fight them off, completely- 
Alex: Yep 
JB: Because if you died, in the next couple of years, you wouldn’t be able to see 
them off? 
Alex: Nope.  
JB: So, in a way, they’re kind of your mission in life? 
Alex: Uhuh 
JB: Their extinction? 
Alex: Yeah, their extinction, yeah… yep, their extinction is my… task.   
 
Feeling that he could take on the Suey people to protect other children (and perhaps salvage 
his own childhood somehow), had become central to Alex’s life “task.” Defeat from an early 
death would come from not being able to outlive the Suey people, who he felt were now 
“nearly annihilated.”  
 
The pursuit of doing or fighting something towards unknowable ends, accompanied by a 
presumption that Alex, by his own means, is gradually poisoning himself but checking for 
signs of death every day, indicates a sense self-efficacy and purpose: a ‘life-project’ of sorts. 
In Rapport’s (2003:5) terms: 
 
[I]ndividuals who see their lives in terms of the pursuit of a certain life-project, who 
see the meaning of their lives significantly in terms of the achievement of a particular 
goal or goals, can succeed in giving their actions a certain robustness, power and 
independence such that they escape the influence of external forces and of other 
individuals who might have wished to direct them in other ways. ‘Control,’ I 
understand, then, as extending both the ‘objectivity’ and the ‘subjectivity’ of 
meanings or interpretations.  
 
64  
Life-projects for all clozapine patients revolved around socially oriented ‘control’ as part of 
managing their overall health. At the other end of the spectrum from Alex were ‘good 
outcomes on clozapine’ patients, such as UK patient Martin (described in the Introduction) 
and UK patient Joanne, 53.  
 
Joanne epitomised what it meant to continually strive for connections and feelings of control 
over one’s future. Joanne, despite having just ridden her bike, gone for a swim and picked up 
groceries for family or friends on the way in, was always neatly presented, with delicate 
accessories. She carried more shopping bags than seemed comfortable to manage, and this 
was analogous to her general determination to “keep going” in the face of challenges. Joanne 
now understood the “voices” she once heard, linked to her first suicide attempt, to be 
“negative thoughts” from her mother (who “found it very difficult to let go of me”) and her 
“bossy” older sister. Joanne explained, “if I don’t think I can challenge my thoughts and try 
and work with them, if I let this be voices then I’m almost, I’m giving up, I’m saying that 
there are things that I can’t control.” Having once worried that she could not think for herself, 
Joanne had continually “challenged that … in order to get stronger … get more confident in 
myself.” When Joanne experienced the thoughts that were critical of her, she reminded 
herself to: 
 
Think ‘thank you, that’s not nice’ … there’s no reason why I can’t be as good or as 
kind as anyone else who tries to be… so if they come back now, I can identify them 
as being influences from my mum and my sister … which hasn’t been positive, and 
therefore, I don’t want to think about it, thank you very much! 
 
Joanne reflected, “I think I can say I'm thankful for what's happened, I don't want to go back 
and relive it, but I'm not going to, but I have to think it's right to learn from the past, and I 
have to keep learning.” Joanne still saw her family because “we need to accept each other,” 
but surmised that so long as “there’s no kind of power dynamic” with the people she is in the 
company of (family, friends or work colleagues), she could “keep up with” those whom she 
cared about. 
 
By the time of our last interview, Joanne had decided that “it's giving up control, that's 
important,” while also “being assertive.” She said, “I've still got my basic, disposition, 
whatever, you know, I've still got schizophrenia,” but was now “having the courage to say 
something, even though it's very uncomfy” when in the presence of others whom she found 
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difficult to be with. She concluded, “People you know stay with you, and if you can keep 
those positive memories then you're lucky ... in the past I've majored on loss and relationships 
which weren't there, and now, I just don't care about those, I just live in the present, with the 
people I've got ... a framework of relationships, keeps me going forward.”  
 
While these insights were gathered inside the clinic, and mostly pertained to life outside the 
clinic, the following chapters show how the clozapine clinic regimen itself, as a biological 
and social enterprise, complemented patients’ sense of vitality; that their lives were 
‘continually evolving, developing, growing’ (Rapport 2003:35). In spite of significant 
reasons for clozapine patients to feel oppressed, I observed patients instead to embody hope 
and control in making or imagining their own health. Health agency, in sum, refers to the 
personal power felt by patients to exert a sense of control, however fleeting, that is contingent 
upon but not determined by one’s social circumstances – including how different aspects of 
health are clinically rendered and worked upon. Meanings of ‘health’ were made through a 
“framework of relationships,” as Joanne put it, commanded by patients themselves.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has mapped out my ethnographic endeavours involving my own partialities, 
partial truth-making with participants, and how I located health agency as something personal 
but also socially embedded, and orientated, despite how the lives of clozapine-treated 
schizophrenia patients might sometimes appear. There were of course contradictions, but 
these contradictions can be as useful as they are delimiting. As I expand on throughout this 
thesis, the clinical prioritising of dualistic ‘physical’/‘mental’ health matters did not preclude 
capacities for connection-making and imaginings for a more holistic experience of health.  
 
I did not observe clozapine-treated schizophrenia to be a story of oppression or defeat, even 
when clinical caregivers could only provide a baseline of physiological checks with seldom 
expectations for patients’ competency. There was a persistently hopeful power to be 
appreciated; a ‘will-to-power’ toward health. As I now turn to illuminate more specific forms 
of health agency that I found in the clozapine regimen, beginning with the blood monitoring, 
I reify a request from Rapport: ‘I ask an indulgence of the reader, then: to entertain the 
possible truth, the viability of the version of the world, which sees the individual as gaining 
control over his or her life through the composing and living-out of a certain life-project’ 
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(2003: 12, original emphasis). If we substitute ‘life’ with ‘health,’ this is what I would ask 
readers of this thesis to do also.  
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Chapter Two: Blood Work 
 
Moral activities do not restrict themselves to talk, to verbal exchanges. They also 
come in physical forms ... in the logic of care the action moves around.  
– Mol (2008: 87, 92).   
 
  External forms impinge on the individual’s life-world, but there is no necessary,  
      direct, singular or essential effect that they have within it. – Rapport (2003: 259) 
 
In further problematising notions of objective truths in clozapine-treated schizophrenia, or 
enduring compartmentalisations and connections when considering the condition 
ethnographically (Chapter One), this chapter attends to the taken-for-granted matter of 
clozapine blood work. Clozapine blood monitoring is the most clinically distinctive, 
temporally containable aspect of treatment monitoring to which the clinic and patients are 
accountable. As UK pharmacist Ros summarised, “the bleeding and the tablets” comprise the 
baseline “clozapine activities” of clozapine clinics. While clozapine tablets are prescribed by 
those with psychiatric authority, the ultimate decision to dispense them month-to-month 
depends on the entire clinical circuitry, including patients. Over the course of my fieldwork, 
it became clear to me that the significance of blood ran though not only ostensibly objective 
checkpoints, blood work often marked clinical relations, individual interpretations of 
clozapine and agentic practices.  
 
This chapter argues that, despite being the most ‘objective’ aspect of clozapine treatment, 
patients creatively manipulate the blood work they are subjected to, without merely resisting 
clinical principles in order to experience their healthy agency. Blood literally and 
symbolically circulates and connects all parties involved in clozapine treatment. Blood work, 
in every sense, legitimises the temporal prioritising of what is continually ‘at stake’ 
(Kleinman 2006). The continuation of clozapine first and foremost depends on blood levels. 
As the opening quote by Mol (2008:92) asserts, deciphering the active role of the patient 
versus that of the clinical carer in medical treatments is irreducible as it ‘moves around.’ In 
exploring ‘the logic of care’ as a question of ‘what to do and how to do it’ (Mol 2008:26), 
Mol (2008:26;95) positioned diabetes patients as ‘not a target group, but crucial members of 
the care team,’ who ‘need to actively take their care into their own hands and yet to let go of 
whatever it is they cannot tame.’ Clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients make for no 
exception to this logic of care. Just as their active participation in clinical care moves around, 
so, too, do the boundaries of what can be worked with in terms of achieving desired blood 
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test results. Further, blood ‘flow’ configurations were actively drawn on by participants to 
assert control and to emphasise the fluidity of health and illness statuses. The metaphorical 
fluidity of blood also accords with patient experiences of negotiating clozapine-treated 
schizophrenia as a continual effort to maintain livelihood. 
 
The significance of blood has not yet been ethnographically attended to in the context of 
treatments for chronic schizophrenia. Jenkins (2015:95) posited that ‘treatment that is 
primarily or exclusively biomedical, focusing on symptoms and psychotropic medications, is 
not only reductive but also counterproductive in that it fails to acknowledge and support an 
active struggle in which persons have the capacity to develop strategies for living.’ It is, she 
suggested, the combined themes of ‘bodily sensation, toxicity, clarity and velocity of thought, 
balance, control, discipline, identity, normality, and daily life,’ that depict ‘an existential 
totality weaving together interrelated levels of meaning and experience’ (Jenkins 2015:58). 
While Jenkins’ ethnography found these themes beyond the clinical setting and clozapine, I 
observed these themes happening inside the clozapine treatment setting itself.  
 
Contrary to what I might have expected, the biologically focused clozapine clinic regimen in 
my study still provided much for patients to work with. Jenkins developed an argument for 
her participants’ agency as ‘an active process of struggle’ and ‘endurance despite distress’ 
(Jenkins 2015:95). Jenkins (2015:266) footnotes that her explications for patients’ navigation 
of ‘suffering’ intends to cover ‘resiliency, resistance, creativity and agency’; to bridge ‘the 
concrete experience and raw existence of human beings with broader social, cultural, and 
political economic forces and conditions.’ What I wish to add to Jenkins’ work is the material 
available for personal refashioning during the ostensibly micro-level, objective, biomedical 
clozapine treatment monitoring itself. While the notion of agency being an ‘active process’ 
resonates considerably with my own ethnographic findings, I also found that patients 
exhibited creativity that began at the level of the blood work regimen, as patients operated 
imaginatively in between the folds of struggle or resistance to this part of their treatment. 
 
This chapter thus builds on Jenkins’ (2015:63) brief observation that the ‘interiorization of 
the clinic’ was a ‘final relational quality of medication,’ here examining how government-
funded clozapine clinic monitoring in the UK and Australia become a central relational 
aspect of treatment. Jenkins described the privately funded US clinic in her study as ‘a kind 
of societal embodiment that involved not only the ingestion of medication but also the 
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incorporation of the clinical ideology as transmitted by doctors, other services providers, and 
the myriad social actors who claim moral and working knowledge of mental illness and its 
treatment’ (2015:63). When reflecting on the notion of clozapine (and other atypical 
antipsychotics) as a ‘pharmacotherapy,’ though, Jenkins concludes:   
 
[T]he term pharmacotherapy is widely employed as if prescribing psychotropic 
medication were on a par with psychotherapy. While clearly symptoms must be 
elicited and monitored and prescriptions must be called in to pharmacies, what 
happens as a social matter of engagement when you have a “therapy” and there’s no 
one to interact with? Not much, if the pharmaceutical imaginary has been transduced 
by the social/relational quality of psychotropic medications evident in the data we 
obtained. (2015:64, original emphasis)  
 
While I agree that clozapine treatment is not comparable to psychotherapy, Jenkins’ 
observation that there is ‘not much’ that ‘happens as a matter of social engagement’ is not 
what I observed in the clozapine clinic spaces described in this thesis. What is more, 
compared to the inclusion of ‘group therapy’ in the treatment circuit available in the 
clozapine clinic included in Jenkins’ study (2015:32), the clozapine clinics I observed offered 
only biologically-focused treatment registers. Yet, to claim that ‘there’s no one to interact 
with’ during the regular monitoring undertaken with clinical staff, and that treatment 
experiences are only nested in wider cultural imageries of the drug itself misses the powerful 
relations and imageries evoked, circulated and tinkered with during even the most ‘reductive’ 
aspects of clozapine treatment monitoring: the various types of blood work.  
 
Clozapine patients require, at minimum, blood monitoring every 28 days, to check that white 
blood cell count has not been reduced by clozapine enough to make patients vulnerable to 
infections, which can become fatal. Clozapine can only be prescribed on a month-to-month 
basis for this reason. I first explore the clinical circuitries involved in blood monitoring, 
blood work as a benign social contact, and then the extensiveness of blood markers in 
clozapine treatment, before turning to how patient participants took an active and creative 
role in their blood tests that drew on rather than resisted clinical frameworks. In doing so, I 
pick up on Rapport’s (2003) claims to how all human agents can make confining 
circumstances their own. It will be seen how, just as blood symbolises life whereby the 
‘quality’ of it and the rhythm of it travelling through the body is construed to be a key 
determinant of health or illness (Scheper-Hughes & Lock 1987:18), applicable to anyone, 
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blood is also a substance that can be enacted upon beyond clinical delineations of ‘blood 
work,’ speaking to Mol’s (2008) ‘logic of care.’  
 
Clinic circuitries  
 
Clozapine treatment introduces multiple and mechanical registers to clinical psychiatry, as 
‘physical’ symptoms and bodily measurements are assessed more precisely and less 
subjectively than cognitive functions. Ironically, this corporeal focus could be looped back to 
the time when ‘mental’ illnesses were first pathologised under Hippocratic medicine’s 
attention to bodily networks of blood and nerves (Porter 2002). If schizophrenia could be 
pathologically located today, it would be via brain scans illuminated by cerebral blood flow 
and cerebrospinal fluid or via ‘biomarkers’ within blood (Rose & Abi-Rached 2013). In lieu 
of biomarkers, the blood work attached to clozapine makes it as unique as its apparent 
efficacy in alleviating psychiatric symptoms.  
 
Australian nurse and clozapine coordinator Kerry, who described clozapine as “the best drug” 
for schizophrenia because “everyone responds well,” albeit “everyone responds to clozapine 
differently,” pointed out that: “all the other antipsychotics can have the same group of side 
effects as the clozapine – the major ones being the blood disorders and cardiac problems – 
but the clozapine people are very lucky that the monitoring that goes with it watches all those 
sort of things, so that, you know, it’s the safest drug for them to be on.” This clinical 
assurance was not lost on patients. Australian patient Charlie, 35, said that when you take 
clozapine “you’re secure, and they [doctors] feel confident in you, and if you don’t take the 
medication, you don’t get all that.” The monthly blood tests and clozapine visits increase this 
confidence and also reduce the sense of dealing with bewildering medical emergencies 
otherwise experienced in psychiatry. UK psychiatrist Kate suggested she was drawn to 
chronic schizophrenia and clozapine treatment because “I just sort of realized I liked the slow 
stream,” as opposed to “acute psychiatry.” Moreover, the slow stream of clozapine treatment 
was connected only through the blood work, which extended to much wider ranging bodily 
networks as well as clinical networks that could speed up in their connections depending on 
specific needs associated with the administration of clozapine rather than with schizophrenia 
more broadly.  
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Clozapine clinics encompass a mixed treatment register of heavily regimented physiological 
monitoring of the ‘vital signs’ in the body, alongside ‘mental state examinations.’ 
Phlebotomists, pharmacy technicians, pharmacists, nurses, psychiatrists and official 
clozapine haematologists form the main orchestra of clozapine licensed clinical registries, 
while General Practitioners (GPs), cardiologists, dieticians and support workers are often 
called upon too. This assortment of treatment registers comprises the main way in which 
clinical membership is more about what it means to be a ‘clozapine patient’ rather than a 
schizophrenia patient.  
 
In the clozapine clinics involved in my study, what it meant to be a clozapine patient 
depended on the treatment register concerned at each point in the monitoring circuit. Having 
no previous exposure to anthropology, UK lead nurse Clive said that he found my 
ethnographic attention to the “whole” range of happenings within the clozapine clinic curious 
because “usually researchers are only interested in one aspect of treatment.” Meanwhile, 
Australian psychiatrist Adam reflected to me one day, “medicine is ideally about listening to 
a piece of music as a whole, while academics study the notes, but it is questionable whether 
all notes need to be studied individually.”34 Attending to matters in turn was, however, the 
clinical approach in clozapine clinics. Clive, who experienced all clinical aspects of clozapine 
(from phlebotomy to psychopharmacology to social work and ‘mental health’ assessments, 
both inside the clinic and in people’s homes) said that despite awareness of the entire 
orchestra, he deliberately kept his focus specific to one treatment area at a time - “otherwise 
I’ll be all over the place.” Clive was an exception in his ability to move from one clinical task 
to the next, but the order of tasks depended on the patient. Priorities generally depended on 
the patient, the staff member available, and while blood work was the first checkpoint in 
terms of biomedical testing, I did not observe clozapine patients being attended to according 
to a ‘biological trajectory, a linear progression’ of clinical points on a checklist (Warin 
2010:43). Checklists were neither consistent nor ordered – except for the baseline 
certification of blood counts.  
                                                 
34 Kleinman (2012:182) has noted this pressure within the practice of biomedicine, generally, and I have discussed the 
practicality of clinical compartmentalisations in Chapter One, as well as for psychiatrists involved in clozapine treatment 
(see Brown & Dennis 2017). Earlier on in my fieldwork in the UK clinic, I chatted to a psychiatric registrar about her 
research on ‘QT intervals’ in cardiac function in clozapine patients and was struck by the breadth of detail in this specific  
area of enquiry, such that when we subsequently spoke of clozapine without such a focus point the conversation opened up 
in ways that felt difficult to tame or close. During my follow up in fieldwork in the UK clinic, a visiting American 
neuroscience student spoke to me about the dilemmas of the de-contextualised ‘brain,’ remarking how neuroscientists get 
“lost” as soon as they step back from the focus point (such as a neurotransmitter receptor); prompting us both to further 
understand the difficulty in addressing matters holistically, and why people like to stick to their specialty ‘area’ rather than 
risk ‘getting lost.’  
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Even though the broader plan is to stay on clozapine as long as possible, blood monitoring 
means that patient and clinical caregivers can only afford to approach the regimen on a 
provisional basis. Blood work constitutes a more nuanced and short-term ‘treatment plan’; 
where the ‘various frames — biomedical, psychiatric, organizational, and bureaucratic — 
exist at different levels of awareness for frontline providers’ (Brodwin 2011:190). While 
Brodwin (2013:91) applied a Foucauldian lens to general community psychiatric treatment 
plans such that clients are ‘disciplined according to professional norms and set on the 
recommended path toward better health and independence,’ the clozapine clinic apparatus 
and blood work component mean that treatment ‘goals’ were highly conditional. All is 
dependent on the blood work. Brodwin (2013:95) noted that ‘the technology of treatment 
planning demands that the team distill people’s complex lives into discrete problems 
amenable to clinical tools at hand,’ which creates immediate shortfalls, however blood work 
creates micro-focus-points. What is more, perhaps because of its biomedical reducibility, the 
blood work of clozapine treatment monitoring was not a source of ‘medical futility’ insofar 
as clinical caregivers and clients did not get ‘stuck’ in what might otherwise be a dearth of 
‘objective possibilities for action’ in the ‘therapeutic time’ found in community psychiatric 
treatments settings, where the main power lies with the prescription pad (Brodwin 2011). 
Prescribing clozapine, while it did have its role (Chapter Three), it could only be done after 
blood counts were certified.  
 
Blood counts are the primary physiological markers that determine, month to month, whether 
clozapine can be continued, based on signs of infection (low white blood cell count), 
‘therapeutic’ dose certification, clozapine toxicity, and patient compliance (plasma levels as 
evidence of consumption). Blood results are entered into national online databases, which 
also distribute clozapine monitoring guidelines.35 Clozapine blood results are coded like 
traffic light colours: ‘green’ to signify safe to continue; ‘amber’ to signify the need to 
investigate (and re-test) before continuing cautiously; ‘red’ to indicate immediate cessation of 
clozapine until white blood cell counts raise to produce ‘green’ readings. Red results are not 
just the responsibility of the immediate monitoring circuit: results are handed over to an 
external authority. The clinic therefore also serves as a site for a biometric data collection, 
who hold responsibility if ‘red’ results are not redressed.  
                                                 
35 The UK database is the Denzapine Monitoring Service (DMS), while the Australian database is the Clozapine Patient 
Monitoring Service (CPMS).  
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On paper, patients become ‘data’ and seemingly devoid of agency when blood results are in 
the red range. Red results are uncommon,36 but when they occur a haematologist employed 
by the national clozapine registry is called upon as the highest authority. Concerns about the 
patient are temporarily focused wholly on blood counts and whether to restart clozapine. For 
instance, Clive emailed these instructions from the Denzapine [clozapine] Monitoring Service 
(DMS) haematologist, to the clozapine clinic staff (and me) following a ‘red’ result of a 
patient we saw:  
 
Hi – I’ve spoken to the DMS Haematologist this morning, who suggests: 
• Repeat FBC daily ([local hospital] urgent?): if WBC and neutrophils recover to 
‘green’ result quickly, he will support rechallenge to get [patient] back on clozapine 
quickly. It would be useful to get folate, B12 and blood film done too as this will help 
indicate if low counts are related to alcohol, rather than clozapine. 
• Please check whether [patient] has had any recent change in drug treatment, or 
infection, that might have affected white cells 
• Consultant Psych please to refer [patient] for review by local haematologist in 
case there is any other underlying issue causing the low counts. 
In the meantime, [patient] remains ‘red’ i.e. no clozapine – please remove any 
remaining tablets from him. If the blood recovers quickly, we may be able to restart 
him within a day or too. If not, will need to consider alternative antipsychotic.  
[Bold font in original] 
  
In between the specific checks to determine why the ‘[patient] remains ‘red’,’ the patient’s 
capacity to influence their ‘red’ status via alcohol consumption was posited alongside the 
potential roles of clozapine, ‘recent change in drug treatment, or infection.’ Nonetheless, 
responsibilities for ‘blood recover[y]’ moved to Clive, to the Consultant, to a local 
haematologist, and to those who can ‘remove any remaining tablets’ (nurses, support 
workers, informal caregivers) until further assessment and actions can be agreed upon 
collectively.  
 
Although implications for the patient’s agency were temporarily sidelined when resolving a 
                                                 
36 Pharmacist Ros recalled, “I can think of one person who was a genuine clozapine red, who’s white count dropped 
virtually to 0, and we… he was somebody who’d been on clozapine for a number of years so that was sort of quite unusual. 
He was at the monthly blood test stage, and we wanted to admit him to hospital for his physical health, [be]cause he had 
virtually no immunity… we had great difficulty persuading him to come in. So, he’s a case when clozapine was immediately 
stopped, and we ended up having to give him Filgrastim to stimulate his bone marrow, to bring the white count back. And 
he’s somebody who’d be a risk to rechallenge on clozapine. Again, he’s the only one I can think of who’s been an absolute, 
genuine, clozapine red.” 
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‘red’ result, this does not reflect the lived involvement that patients have. As Barrett 
(1988:285) remarked in regard to psychiatric patient interviews he observed, ‘the relation 
between data and conclusions was an interpretive circle’ and ‘what was circular in interaction 
was always portrayed as linear in writing.’ Record keeping, and accountability to the 
clozapine database is, as Barrett (1988:268) noted of quantitative measurements within 
psychiatric treatment situations, ‘the principle tool of supervisory control.’  
 
Just as receiving and recording any kind of qualitative and quantitative information only 
appears to alienate the patient and diffuses accountability, caregivers also need to work with 
patients to obtain qualitative information. Clive said that when he runs into patients out of 
work hours and they share medically relevant matters with him, he faces a double bind: to 
remember to update their medical notes later but at the risk of them not disclosing such things 
to him in the future. This is not the same as the ‘medical futility’ as Brodwin (2011) 
described, because there it is the potentiality rather than futility that created the conflict for 
Clive. Further, in regard to ‘mental health’ records, Clive commented how the one-way 
exchange of information, from patient (or informal caregiver) to medical files that patients 
and family members could not easily access (or decipher) can be fatal because between the 
various inputs to confidential clinic records there may have been non-quantifiable warning 
signs: “these patients, they do kill, then you go to court and the family say, ‘we’re the ones to 
say we warned you.’”37 The ‘you’ refers to every possible member of the treatment team. 
Australian Psychiatrist Adam felt frustrated by this reality, telling me about his observations 
of bureaucratic protections where most of what gets written up about patients does not get fed 
back to them, but rather provides insurance protections and a sense of job tasking for staff.  
Yet, in regard to quantitative markers like blood counts, patients and informal caregivers 
were only formally estranged from the interaction pertaining to the record. As Barrett (1988) 
suggested, records misrepresent the more circular actions taken to yield information. In 
considering the case of consult-to-record making regarding his ethnographic participant Paul, 
Barrett (1988:285) asserted: 
 
[T]he patient was constructed as passive. Paul, the intentional, unified subject – an 
                                                 
37 Australian psychiatrist Sandra agreed and used her position of authority to include family where she could: “I feel very 
passionate about looking after families and making sure they’re included and involved as much as possible, I think there’s a 
big trap that we fall into in mental health, in perhaps being anxious about it, or perhaps hiding behind this idea of patient 
confidentiality. Because at the end of the day it almost seems farcical, because at the end of the day when we’re looking after 
people we won’t disclose information to their caregivers but all of a sudden we discharge patients into their care, but we 
haven’t provided the information they need to look after their family members properly … so that’s something that a lot of 
[psychiatric] registrar’s notice – if you’re working with Sandra, there’s a lot of family meetings!”  
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agent who could exert control over his behaviour and over those around him – could 
not be described within the format of the case record. In its place emerged a 
definition of Paul as a combination of part objects, each affecting the other like 
moving components in a machine. The documentary Paul was not a person doing 
things to other people but a summation of resultants – a passive conglomerate which 
lacked agency.  
 
Insofar as the ‘summation of resultants – a passive conglomerate which lacked agency’ 
contrasts with ‘the intentional, unified subject,’ the former is still available during the 
interaction. As I elaborate below, the more involved clinical caregivers were throughout the 
process of blood work to tablet dispensing, the more potential there was for the activity of the 
patients also. The activity of blood work opened up a space for a more ‘generalised’ attention 
to the patient as a whole person.  
 
Clinical caregivers not directly involved in the ‘mental health’ aspects of treatment work to 
navigate a role that connects to the broader implications and experiences of clozapine, blood 
and the clozapine clinic. It was only in the UK clinic that patients were ‘bled’ and their blood 
processed on site, and this made for a tighter circuit of communication. UK Pharmacist Ros 
said that this allowed her “a chance to see people who are otherwise just a name on a 
prescription chart.” Having worked at the pharmacy hospital for some time meant that she 
had sometimes known people taking clozapine since they were hospital inpatients. The 
opportunity for “see[ing]” people also extended to connecting other aspects of their ‘bodily’ 
experiences when their blood was being drawn: “sometimes people might say they’re feeling 
a little bit dizzy when they stand up, or something like that, and then I’d say we need to check 
your blood pressure because that sounds like it’s dropping when you stand up… [but such 
connections are made] more in the context of if they raised something.” Ros thus inferred 
how onsite blood work opens up potential “raising” of patient assertions about what are 
otherwise clinically separate concerns – including separable blood related concerns – such as 
blood pressure “dropping.” Blood taking also provides a setting for patients to raise other 
concerns without direct clinical pressure to do so.  
 
Phlebotomist Tina, who had initially worked as a receptionist for the clinic, told me how she 
had gotten to know patients significantly more since withdrawing their blood. She noted the 
benefits of “just having a general conversation, asking ‘how’s your day been?’, ‘how have 
you been?’” She remarked, however, that “one thing I’ve noticed is that if you don’t ask, they 
76  
don’t tell you,” and that “every individual one of them is different.” The notion of all patients 
being individuals resonated with other clinical caregiver views (as I build on in Chapter 
Three). When I asked Tina if she thought they liked being asked, she replied, “yeah, I think 
that they do because they feel that someone cares.” That day she had talked to a particular 
patient about a number of “other problems” aside from clozapine and the patient said to her 
afterward, “I know you’re busy but thank you for listening.” When Tina said to let her know 
if there’s anyone else she can refer her to for more help, “she said ‘no, no, I’ve got it all under 
control,’ and she seemed to be fine.” I return to the social aspects of clozapine blood work in 
the next section of this chapter, but here I note how patients were given opportunities to 
report other general concerns that help to facilitate the connections between other nodes in 
the clinical circuitry.  
 
The clinical circuity could be connected through patient activity as well as clinical 
caregiver’s actions. UK patient participant Hannah, 33, who had initially gone to her GP for 
blood tests, found that attending the clozapine clinic was “a more convenient option.” This 
was because she no longer had to rely on a parent to collect her medication for her from the 
hospital, and she could decide for herself what was of concern to the clozapine clinic. As well 
as finding that, “they’re very good at taking the blood samples and it’s usually quite quick, 
and you also get someone to check your physical health as well,” Hannah did not mind 
liaising between her GP and the clinic. Hannah said that her GP did not check her overall 
‘physical’ health as such but rather discussed specifics, like her Irritable Bowel Syndrome. 
Hannah consulted the GP and then reported back to the clozapine clinic nurse, for their 
records. Thus, clozapine patients’ proactivity both within and beyond the immediate 
monitoring circuit could be as useful as clinical inputs in terms of how to optimise treatment 
efficacy (Mol 2008).   
 
In the Australian clinic, where the clinical network was more dilated, patients had to work 
harder to connect the clinical circuitry. Australian patient Marie, 54, had a long range of 
topics she brought up throughout our interview, which mostly concerned references to blood. 
She had been on clozapine for 5 months, which meant she was having fortnightly blood tests, 
soon to be spaced out to monthly. When we met, it was her low blood pressure that was 
concerning her, as she resolved to book in with a GP for follow-up after she had overhanging 
concerns that the nurse, Ramesh, was unable to reassure her about: 
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Marie: I s’pose I have to make an appointment next week, it might be a good idea, 
[be]cause it might not be good for my health to have it too late, my blood … 
[Ramesh] said it [was] low and last month, when I come, he was, he, he s-said it was 
low then too, so must have been low [at] least a month.  
JB: So, did he say to book an appointment with the GP? 
Marie: No, he said when are you going next but he didn’t say I should -but I think I 
probably should. He didn’t say ring, he just said next time you go maybe you should 
ask him to check your blood pressure. 
JB: Oh, okay, well look if it’s something you’re worried about, then- 
Marie: Yeah haven’t heard anything about it much but maybe it’s a sign – tw-twice 
its been low, means about a month, it’s been low, it prolly [sic] not a good idea if I 
leave it, anymore, I better tell the GP, next week.  
JB: Well, I think if you’re concerned about it- 
Marie: - [be]cause you’re not meant to have low, or high. I never had high. I better 
tell him.  
JB: I think for peace of mind it’s probably- 
Marie: I better make an appointment, I better [sounding increasingly anxious] 
JB: [reassuring tone] I’m sure Ramesh would have said something if it was 
worryingly low, but -  
Marie: He’d say you better ring. He would have, wouldn’t he? But he didn’t, I’ll 
have to do it myself – better ring.  
 
Marie had decided the most suitable course of action to take regarding her low blood 
pressure, drawing on her own concerns in spite of the nurses’ dismissal. Marie thus held 
herself accountable to seek further action by drawing on additional medical resources 
available to her (Petryna 2004). Marie then told me about her “low lymphocytes,” and that 
she was “supposed to have my blood test 12 noon or after [be]cause every time I have it in 
the morning I had to repeat the blood tests same week [be]cause the lymphocytes are low… I 
think it effect[s] my health, and the low blood pressure now.” When I asked Marie what 
clozapine felt like, she said, “I feel real sedated, in my head, like real sedated, might be 
because blood pressure’s low, low lymphocytes, not very healthy; I don’t feel very well.” 
Moreover, while Jenkins (2015:46) noted that the efficacy of clozapine could be derived from 
‘sensations of tingling and numbing both in the brain and elsewhere in one’s body such as the 
legs or bloodstream,’ patients like Marie drew quite specifically on blood imageries that 
corresponded to blood markers enlisted by treatment monitoring.  
 
As suggested earlier, the focus on blood work allowed patients to situate themselves within 
more ordinary socialities of fear and anxiety that was less about their specific psychiatric 
diagnosis. Marie disliked blood tests but saw herself as one of many: “some people don’t like 
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blood tests.” When I confided that I did not like them either, she shrugged, “it’s just the sorta 
person we are.” Of what it was that made her uncomfortable, though, Marie’s concerns were 
more personal. She explained, 
 
Marie: I’m scared [of] germs and unclean, but they clean it and… I don’t-, [be]cause 
I’m not a drug addict either, I don’t… shoot up and I’m not a drug addict.’  
JB: No (reassuringly)  
Marie: [Be]cause I feel like one with this blood business, it’s making me feel like I’m 
like a drug addict, you know like drugs… see I don’t, but the neighbours do. 
 
Marie then reasoned and reassured herself that “they clean it” (the needle used to draw blood) 
but she could not entirely dismiss the associations with drug addiction because her blood 
work experiences could not be neatly differentiated from her life experiences. Marie’s 
concerns, generally, seemed to be all connected to what she described to me as “shame” felt 
about her past, particularly around her sexuality, religious disaffiliations and unresolved 
disconnect with her deceased mother – “my mother never related to me, and she should’ve 
explained but she couldn’t … she was brought up very Catholic.” Marie said that her mother 
disapproved of her “promiscuous” behaviour and, “she was worried I’d get AIDS.” When I 
clarified whether it was “okay, though, in the end” because she had not actually contracted 
AIDS, Marie retorted, “no, but it’s left scars, someone said, it leaves scars [be]cause I 
always… [had] partners that didn’t really love me.” While the clozapine clinic could not 
provide romantic intimacy, it was a place of socio-moral redemption of sorts. Before 
returning to how Marie perceived clozapine treatment to be helping via the social contact 
made available through the monitoring, I first discuss the potential self-assurances provided 
through the blood taking ritual itself as patients began to learn how much control they had 
over the interaction – something they often did not have in other aspects of their lives and 
were not expected (or pressured) to have during clozapine monitoring.     
 
Creative care 
 
From blood work preparation through to the bleeding process, patients and clinical caregivers 
took an active role of care toward yielding the desired result. Patients were able to take a 
creative agency throughout the clozapine monitoring, once they could ‘actively take their 
care into their own hands and yet to let go of whatever it is they cannot tame’ (Mol 2008:95). 
What they could and could not tame was a moving question, however. The process of 
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‘bleeding’ people was not simply unidirectional, and patients could effectively bring its 
circulatory nature back into focus, as well as what the ritual meant to them. 
 
On the one hand, for people who knew what clozapine treatment was prescribed for but were 
still experiencing residual delusions, blood work could be felt to pronounce a patient’s 
diagnostic status in ways that may otherwise be more concealable. UK patient Hannah 
described her main concerns as, “I think I have quite a bit of stress about relationships 
mainly, and sometimes people who I meet at work – it can be colleagues or customers, I think 
they can hear my voices in their head.” This concern extended to how her walking into the 
clinic might appear to people not attending the clinic. No matter how discrete and efficient 
Hannah felt her clinic visits to be, she worried about the public implications: “I think because 
you have to go for the blood tests and, um, you have to take the medication regularly, there’s 
some issues with having to… just disguise to people that you have mental illness.” On the 
other hand, once inside the clinic, and when it came to the blood work in particular, the 
implicated role of clozapine as treating schizophrenia was diffused in the ways described 
above. Indeed, UK phlebotomist Tina told me that she “would like to know what clozapine 
actually does – whether it works on the blood cells, the brain cells?” Meanwhile, 
phlebotomist Sam, who held a Bachelor degree in psychology, said that he is continually 
mindful of patients who are “harder to bleed,” and also general anxiety issues around blood 
work.  
 
There could be a shared, embodied experience of anxiety around blood work between 
phlebotomists and patients. Sam explained, “you’ve seen these people for a long time so you 
know where the vein is, and sometimes it doesn’t work, sometimes the vein… just doesn’t 
respond [which] makes you feel deflated.” Sam reflected, though, that, “me succeeding in 
getting blood is at the very bottom end of the scale … it’s about their experience when they 
walk in through the door … to try and reinforce to them that coming here is not a negative 
thing.” This meant chatting with patients who are in the waiting room “whenever there’s a 
few spare minutes” so that “they’re not just sat there, in isolation, waiting.” I observed Sam 
chatting to, and smoking with, patients outside the clinic’s entrance, too. When it came to 
Sam’s role in bleeding patients who disliked the process:  
 
A lot of it has to do with anxiety training … to try and tell people that the best you 
can do is to sit in the chair, after you’ve had the procedure, until your anxiety comes 
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down … the idea is try and let the body adapt to that environment first … if people 
are constantly having an amber result, then all we can do is try and tell them to, um, 
drink water again… I mean we don’t really know what effects the neutrophils and 
things like that, whether it’s something that they do, like whether being dehydrated 
effects that, because the neutrophils is all part of the infection control system, and 
blood is blood at the end of the day; it needs water, so whether they’re being 
hydrated and that’s one of the causes.  
 
Sam thus suggested that both he and patients were personally involved in the ‘adapt[tion] to’ 
blood work spaces and the making of desirable blood results.  
 
In the UK clinic, patients who had become familiar with the process exercised a degree of 
control over the blood work ritual, too. Weiner (2011:473), who undertook ethnographic 
research with bipolar patients, suggested that there are ‘certain kinds of provisional or 
distributed agency’ at play with how bipolar patients ‘self-manage.’ Although Weiner (2011) 
distinguished this provisional agency from that available to schizophrenia patients, I contend 
that patients of any kind make for no exception to her observation that ‘agency resides in the 
negotiated spaces between action and inaction’ (Weiner 2011:477). For clozapine-treated 
schizophrenia patients, ‘provisional agency’ was either explicit – such as instructing the 
phlebotomists or nurses to use a butterfly clip while taking their blood or suggesting which 
vein to try, or asking for extra cotton wool and multiple layers of tape over the bleeding spot, 
or asking for water – or more subtly steering the degree of interaction with the staff. I also 
observed ongoing interest in ‘what to try next’ to yield the mutually desired outcome (Mol 
2008) of a ‘green’ blood result.  
 
As with the ‘hopeful’ potential for psychiatrists to learn more specifics about how clozapine 
actually works at a neurobiological level, while patients were more inclined to just accept its 
“magic” qualities (Chapter Four), the blood work was more flexible to interpretation than at 
first assumed. Both staff and patients could utilise the uncertainty given by a reality that, as 
Sam admitted, “we don’t really know what effects the neutrophils and things like that 
[have].” In regard to encouraging patients to increase their fluid intake before doing blood 
tests, Ros said that she was, “sometimes surprised by how many people respond like it’s the 
first time they’ve heard it.” I found, however, that patients tuned into information that was 
the most personally meaningful and drew on this information to strategise with.  
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When I first met 36-year-old Australian patient participant Max, he had only started 
clozapine three months prior and told me that he felt like “a bit of a guinea pig half the time, 
when it comes to [at first] being at the psych ward and coming here and having your bloods 
done, blood pressure and temperature done.” Even then, though, he was “accepting” of 
clozapine because, “I haven’t noticed that much difference but other people have.” After a 
year of clozapine treatment, Max echoed Rapport’s (2003) descriptions of agency when he 
described his current situation as, “having a bit of imagination, a bit of creativity, [which] can 
lead to this sort of essence.” As I observed patients like Max getting used to clozapine, their 
imagination and circumstances seemed to continue such that their sense of meaning and self-
purpose evolved.  
 
Blood work was subject to continual, personal readjustments that exemplified Rapport’s 
(2003) observations about ‘self-intensity’ and embodied ‘life projects.’ As I have previously 
written about in the case of 53-year-old UK patient Joanne (see Brown & Dennis 2017), who 
felt able to avoid ‘amber’ blood readings by swimming laps of the pool beforehand, this 
reliable regimen was instigated following a throwaway remark by a trusted pharmacy 
technician (Linda) that exercise could ensure a ‘green’ blood result. Trying this out for 
herself, Joanne had found this to be true, such that when ‘one of Joanne’s pre-holiday blood 
results came back with ‘an amber’ … [she was] initially frustrated with herself because she 
had not fitted in the time for a swim that morning, which she ‘knew’ would be consequential’ 
(Brown & Dennis 2017:374). She resolved to ‘change plans for tomorrow and Friday – I’ll 
go swimming tomorrow and Friday’ (Friday being the day of her next blood test) (Brown & 
Dennis 2017:374). Further, preparing for blood work could also mean maximising one’s 
chances of an efficient bleeding process.  
 
UK patient Hannah, 33, felt that when it came to the actual process of blood withdrawal, she 
“used to find sometimes it was difficult … and I used to think, I have to exercise the day 
before?” She said this with a quiet intonation, as though she was self-conscious of what I 
might think of this logic. Like Joanne, Hannah sought to improve her chances of 
unproblematic blood work by exercising beforehand, but then, “I was sort of exercising 
regularly anyway” (swimming once per week and doing Pilates via a DVD) and felt that 
keeping up with this routine of weekly exercise had more long-lasting impacts on her general 
circulation: “they thought it was like poor circulation, they’d like stick the needle in a few 
times and try and get it [her vein] … but it’s fine now,” thanks to her regular exercise regime. 
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Thus, rather than following instructions around fluid intake, as Sam and Ros may have 
suggested, Joanne followed Linda’s more casual advice and Hannah took on a more general 
approach to facilitating her blood circulation. Both women attended to what might work and 
stuck with strategies that have worked, finding a personal means of contributing to some 
aspect of the blood work. The active strategising around blood work is more about personal 
creativity within acquiescing to the regimen than it is about resistance to it; ‘patients can 
actively participate in the system of which they are a part to create new possibilities for 
themselves within the clinically objectified frames at hand’ (Brown & Dennis 2017:374). 
While the implications of patients attending their designated clozapine clinic for blood work 
are compliance, visibility, and a period of waiting for results that is outside of their control, 
‘the art of care’ on the part of any (general) patient is, ‘to persist while letting go’ (Mol 
2008:32).  
 
Part of persevering at the same time as compromising some control was due to the near 
impossibility of retaining all information pertaining to clozapine treatment monitoring, and 
the dearth of ‘unknowns’ (to be discussed further in Chapter Three). Part of enacting 
personally selected knowledge over repeated clinical advice may come down to the 
dissonance between blood markers and experiences of these markers, and how they can be 
potentially followed up on. For instance, dizziness and constipation were common side 
effects, especially upon starting clozapine, although patients could reimagine the confines of 
these experiences. Australian patient Keith was quick to dismiss his dizziness because it was 
“just when I get up, I’ve gotta’ hang on to something.” Marie, on the other hand, spoke to me 
of her fears about constipation: “I often freak out because for some months I hardly ever 
went, I thought I’d just get so big if I was eating, don’t go to the toilet, I get a bit… I was 
scared.” However, this was “helped” by two things: “two sachets” of a particular laxative and 
also her menstrual blood: “I think the blood acts as a laxative perhaps, in the body.” Marie 
had found a ‘personal medicine’ regime (Deegan 2005) that also happened to include blood 
imaginary, which she was otherwise conflicted by in regard to possible contaminations 
(Douglas 1966). This illustrates Marie’s authorship over blood work experiences.  
 
Clozapine blood monitoring could in some instances console patients’ personal desires rather 
than fears. While patients like Marie worked to overcome fears of blood work due to “drug 
addict” associations, other patients could productively draw on the familiar feeling of 
previous substance abuse and the methods of delivery they grew to enjoy. Australian patient 
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Charlie, 35, who had started clozapine a year ago was also taking methadone. He told me, 
“the reason I don’t like taking clozapine is, because I have to do it every day… it’s like 
methadone, it’s like a… liquid handcuffs they call it, you know - a form of control.” 
However, compared to the feeling of “itchy blood … like ants running up and down your 
veins”, when he was withdrawing from a previous drug addiction, at least the clozapine blood 
withdrawal may have complemented his “need to do an injection.” He explained, 
 
Charlie: You can’t pop a pill and think ‘Oh I’ve had an injection.’ It doesn’t work the 
same way. Just like you can give a person a nicorette tablet but they still want to 
smoke a cigarette. They’re not sweaty or messed up from the withdrawal anymore, 
but they still want to smoke their cigarette 
JB: They want the process…? 
Charlie: They want the process of what they’re doing, yeah. It has to be that 
otherwise it doesn’t satisfy the control … Anyone who’s not getting their behaviours 
needs to be consoled. They need to be consoled by their behaviours. Most people 
have sex, most people have food, you know. Other people like me do injections. It’s 
a more unnatural behavior, but it still counts the same. It works in the same way.  
 
While I did not directly discuss the blood withdrawal process with Charlie, nor get to observe 
it due to the Australian clozapine clinic set up, I suggest that Charlie might not have minded 
the bleeding as it was closer to his ‘consolation behaviour’ of doing injections. He had also 
cut his wrists numerous times, remarking to me, “not everyone can razor blade their wrists, 
some people can’t do that, but for me it was very easy.”  
 
For other patients, however, experiences of clozapine treatment may also be helped by 
clinical caregivers creating their own means of relating to patients. Australian Clozapine-
Coordinator Kerry had a number of life threatening chronic health conditions of her own, 
including Type I diabetes and Multiple Sclerosis, that required ongoing management. She 
said to me, “I can relate to my guys and the side-effects and stuff, you know, if they talk to 
me about it, I’m really sympathetic – I don’t like how some people [other staff] just dismiss 
it.” When it came to how she advised patients who were not yet comfortable with the 
clozapine regimen: 
 
At different times with patients … I will disclose that to them, and say, ‘well I inject 
myself every day,’ and particularly when I was on Interferon, you know, ‘I had this 
horrendous drug, and I can relate to the side-effect profiles of drugs, so I can relate to 
the side effects that you experience’ … to come in here for clinic, and, you know, 
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have all these silly questions thrown at you, whereas, you know, if you’re like me, 
you just want to wring people’s neck and go away! [laughs]  
 
Kerry continued, “I thought: you guys are putting up with all these shitty side effects, and it’s 
just the same as what I put up with so I sort of understand.” Kerry also reflected, “I do 
wonder what it’s like to live in a healthy body because I don’t – I don’t live in a healthy body 
… I feel like shit most days; I push myself.” “I don’t see someone with a mental health issue 
as any different to some that has a physical health issue,” Kerry said. After having been on 
sick leave for a few weeks, Kerry said to me over the phone that she herself had been feeling 
“psychotic” lately, due to a combination of a new medication she was prescribed by her 
neurologist and a steroid cream from her GP that had given her “rashes,” all culminating in 
an inability to sleep. Nonetheless, Kerry would never disclose to patients any ‘mental’ health 
troubles she was having, and her sympathies in regard to clozapine monitoring depended on 
whether patients were taking clozapine or not. Kerry liked to reinforce how some patients 
went from being “as mad as a meat axe” to people she quietly admired and could openly 
sympathise with in regard to the physiological monitoring requirements. Necessarily, this 
sympathy was limited to conversations in the ‘safe’ clozapine treatment context, and I 
observed this boundary to be of benefit to patients too.  
 
Social contact at a negotiable distance 
 
The very reducibility of monthly clozapine monitoring to matters of blood and ‘vital’ markers 
that did not require personal conversation but rather a social ‘role’ as partaking in the routine 
monitoring was productive for patients. As GH Mead (1932:184-5) posited, ‘[i]t is only by 
taking the roles of others that we have been able to come back to ourselves.’ Archer 
(2004:255;261), in her attention to the ‘social self,’ contended that ‘not everyone can succeed 
in becoming an Actor – that is in finding a role(s) in which they feel they can invest 
themselves.’ Clozapine patients were able to invest themselves as social actors through the 
clinical monitoring process. Part of this social investment was about being in a space where 
they could be ‘noticed’ (Aylwin 1985), but also because this attention was usefully limited  
such that social boundaries could be tailored to suit individual needs.  
 
Linda, a long-serving UK clozapine coordinator and pharmacy technician who said to all of 
us at the clinic that she would like to continue volunteering at the clinic after her imminent 
retirement, remarked to me: 
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You can tell when people come into the clinic for the first few weeks, you know, 
they don’t speak, and they’re very quiet, and they’re very… withdrawn. And as their 
dose goes up and they start to feel better, and more sort of at home with coming to 
the clinic, how – you know, then they’ll start talking to you, you know, they’ll 
initiate the conversation … it can be really tiny things, really tiny things … so then 
you know, after that if they go quiet again then perhaps there’s something not quite 
right.  
  
The idea that a patient, like a patients’ blood, in a different sense, is simply ‘withdrawn’ until 
the patient becomes ‘at home’ (including clozapine dose adjustment), highlights the 
importance of two-way transactions that are at once regimented and personalised. There was 
clinical leeway to allow patients to ‘initiate’ exchanges during blood work (or other clinical 
checks), for patients to work with as they became more acquainted with the processes.  
 
While the clozapine clinic constituted a private space in terms of conditions of entry, the 
space itself was shared yet discrete enough for patients to feel a part of something while also 
steering levels of intimacy. Indeed, Corin (2007:282) posited that for her Canadian 
ethnographic participants with schizophrenia, dipping in and out of publically shared spaces: 
 
[O]ffers a way for them [schizophrenia patients] to relate to others without having to 
commit themselves in personal interactions. One might say that this behavior 
provides patients with a kind of "social skin" that both contains and protects an inner 
space and mediates their relationships with the outside world. We could see it as a 
concrete metaphor of a relationship with the world that weaves a dominant 
"distancing" stance with interrelated threads. Connecting with the world 
paradoxically appears to be secondary to the ability to remain separated from it – to 
stay at a distance and introduce a kind of "blank space" into the social fabric.  
 
Clozapine blood work could be said to provide a ‘social skin,’ while keeping patients and 
staff at a safe ‘distance’ from one another. Critically, this socially “blank space” could 
provide a safe platform for patients who found it difficult to trust others. Despite many 
patients in my ethnographic study experiencing persistent paranoia and the invasiveness of 
the presences of others (real and imaginary), none reported such invasions while in the 
clinical space itself.  Take UK patient, Alice, for instance.  
 
Alice, 36, told me that she wanted “to be very private”; choosing to live alone because she 
found it “quite hard to be with people”; to “trust” them. Having experienced sexual abuse 
throughout her childhood, she would “rock” herself to sleep. “Suddenly, when I was 26,” she 
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recalled, “I stopped rocking … and that’s when I got the presence.” She described the 
presence as “someone looking after me all the time.” But Alice also experienced “bad 
hallucinations” that invaded her space, triggering “panic attacks.” Whether clozapine 
alleviated the latter experiences was never as clear to me as what participating in the 
treatment monitoring itself meant for Alice. She seemed to willingly partake in as much 
clinical activity as she could, although, like other patients, did not feel concerned about not 
being directly included during decision making processes about her treatment.  
 
In the UK clinic, I sat in on several ‘home treatment’ clozapine initiation meetings that were 
scheduled in after clinic opening hours, all of which were necessarily attended by a 
pharmacist, a consultant psychiatrist, the bureaucratic Line Manager and Lead Community 
Psychiatric Nurse (the latter who had clozapine prescribing rights). For the initiation review 
meeting for Alice, we met in George’s office, with George, Ros, the Line Manager, Clive, a 
student nurse and me present. We went through the letter from the referring psychiatrist, who 
advised that clozapine had first been discussed with Alice last year, but that Alice had 
initially declined due to the blood tests. Alice had recently heard positive reviews about 
clozapine, however, from friends (in her art group, I would later learn).  
 
There was a lot for both Alice and the clinical team to potentially dread, yet the main 
emphasis was on getting Alice started on treatment, upon her own request. The clozapine 
initiative review was slightly closer to what Brodwin (2013) described as a community 
psychiatric ‘treatment plan’ in the sense that it was more future directed than ongoing blood 
work. As Alice had already been in the clozapine database for one month since referral, Ros 
was concerned that Alice’s registration might have lapsed and that she would need to reapply, 
delaying the start-up date. The current risks discussed were a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative: her already high BMI (54; ‘morbidly obese’), delayed QT (heart rate), along with 
her history of overdosing with olanzapine – a similar drug – after she had threatened her 
mother and brother with a knife, 12 years ago. It was concluded that because her pulse had 
been ‘normal,’ weight gain was less likely to be ‘risky.’ The actions from the review were 
(formally recorded by the student nurse): 1) ECG next week or tomorrow if possible; 2) QT 
monitoring to see if it reduces because clozapine may ‘prolong’ it further; 3) to check 
medication history (it was unclear how many antipsychotics she had tried already); 4) 
psychiatric review with George the following day in order to start clozapine titration the 
following week; 5) check living company; 6) organize the spare large Blood Pressure cuff for 
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the home treatment team; 7) refer back to the psychiatrist when he returns from leave. Clive, 
the student and I then moved to Clive’s room so that he could explain QT intervals to us and 
check we were up to speed, before returning to the waiting room to discuss the titration plan 
with Narelle and Sam. Nurse Narelle at first queried whether it was necessary for Alice to be 
put on clozapine given that she seemed psychiatrically stable, but then Narrelle recalled how 
during a recent therapy group she had assisted with as part of her other job (on non-clozapine 
clinic days) Alice had shown more vulnerability when pressed about past family relations. 
Assuming that George would approve of clozapine initiation upon reviewing her the 
following day, the focus returned to the blood work: Clive, Narelle and Sam planned out the 
home-visiting schedule between them for taking Alice’s blood daily for the first 18 days of 
monitoring.38  
 
When I first met Alice in person, I wrote in my field notes that, ‘Clive explained she’d be 
seeing a lot of us if she goes on clozapine, and she seemed pleased, as though the clinic is a 
new exciting place to be.’ I still recall her smile and seemingly uplifted spirits as she looked 
back at us as she steadily made her way up the steep and narrow staircase from Clive’s room 
up to the other areas of the clinic.  Having started treatment and daily bloods, Alice reported 
feeling initially dizzy, constipated, needing to urinate frequently, drooling, but soon felt 
herself to adjust: “I feel better, though, already in the fact that it’s like… the sort of, I feel 
more motivated to do things … It’s only early days, it’s like… only day eight or something, 
but already I’ve noticed a difference.”  
 
Conveniently, Alice also lived down the road from the clinic. This made it easier for her to 
attend regularly. Despite her preference for her own company, Alice attended the clinic more 
than necessary during her treatment initiation, accompanying a fellow patient for their 
appointments, even if it meant returning an hour later to have an ECG, an interview with me, 
or drop by with biscuits to thank the clinic team for their efforts during the titration period. 
The clinical contact, no matter how bio-medically focused, seemed to be supplementing the 
company of Alice’s guardian “presence” at home. The clozapine clinic was allowing her 
intermittent contact, in ways that she seemed to trust.  
                                                 
38 Week one requires three times per day at two hours and six hours after dose: 9am dose; 11am blood observation; 3pm 
blood observation (then after-hours service takes over for the evening); Week two requires two blood tests per day, week 
three is once per day. Titration under the community treatment team (home visits instead of hospital-based) is also more 
gradual (starting on 6.25mg of clozapine rather than 12.5mg).   
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The opportunity for regular social contact was explicitly mentioned by UK patient Luke, who 
said he appreciated the “human contact” at the clinic, and Australian patient Marie. Marie 
said that connecting with people was what she felt she could gain by clozapine clinic 
treatment. “I don’t like the blood tests, I don’t like them … [but] there’s a lady there, she 
likes me … and I believe she - it’s a good thing, [be]cause maybe she feels she can help me.” 
Marie added that her attendance at the clozapine clinic came with social “care” that she felt 
she needed:  
 
The care at the clozapine clozapine, the care … they help me … metabolic 
screening… but that helped the care, [be]cause I was changing medications… and I 
wasn’t in hospital… when I’m having bloods the nurse’s nice, yeah, I did those 
courses at [the clozapine initiation clinic], so short but helping me… [be]cause I’m 
being social, because I have to be social … my mind has to be around people, my 
brain, because … the brain can’t live alone.  
 
As Marie saw it, the clozapine clinic was not as biomedically reductive as it might first 
appear. Indeed, UK patient Peter, 54, said of getting his bloods done, “people are concerned 
about me, so it makes me feel better straight away.” Clinical caregivers could provide enough 
familiarity for patients to safely rebuild their sense of having a social self with. The potential 
for mundane sociality was not unnoticed by clinical caregivers, either.  
 
When I asked Ros about the importance of “therapeutic contact” during the blood taking 
process, she said “absolutely, and for somebody like Linda, who has been with this service so 
many years, and will have known many of the patients when they were inpatients maybe 15-
20 years ago, yeah I think that is, hugely important.” Ros gave me the example of how, when 
Linda is away, “people come in and notice, ‘Oh, no Linda today.’” While Ros conceded that, 
“I don’t know if it’s actually solidarity as a clozapine patient, I think for a number of patients 
who’ve been coming here for years, there is a social element to it - not because of cloz - but 
just because they know each other … through years of their lives, and then they come here, 
and that’s reflected in conversations in the waiting room.”   
 
Patients could negotiate the degree of interactions with other patients as part of asserting how 
much time they could comfortably spend with others. UK patient Trevor, 55, said to me, “I 
do meet up with friends from the past every so often at the clozapine clinic.” Yet, like most 
patients, he insisted: 
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I like my own space, you know, I’ve got my own flat, I don’t have to share with 
anyone, I like my own space, but also like company as well from time to time. You 
know, a combination. I don’t like other people impinging on my life, you know. If 
you’re in a care home living with a group of people it’s very, very hard because you 
clash and fear with each other, you know? 
 
Arguably, the clozapine clinic stood distinctive from places that “impinge” too much on 
patients’ lives. Critically, Trevor said that when it came to the clozapine clinic’s blood work 
and physiological monitoring:  
 
I think it’s a very good idea, to keep an eye on exactly what’s happening with you 
and many aspects, you know? Because they measure various things and they can see 
what’s happening from month to month, you know, and if you’re getting any health 
problems its likely to be picked up quite quickly. Isn’t it? 
 
Patients liked being able to talk about clozapine treatment in ‘physical’ terms. I observed that 
the ‘social element’ to the clozapine clinic that Ros and Trevor had acknowledged to some 
degree was found in its emphasising of mundanity in blood work, which came with the 
familiarity of biochemical imagery, people and spaces to interact with. As such, clinic 
socialities could be compromised and resisted when the conditions and care were not 
conducive to patient sensitivities.  
 
Clinical rhythms: Blockages and flow  
 
We haven’t got that many private spaces and people are constantly kind of coming 
through. So, there’s part of me that feels like it would be really nice to manage 
everybody through their GP. And they just went and had their blood test at the GP, 
like everybody else, and they went to the chemist to pick up their tablets. On the other 
hand, I think we do catch a lot of people as they’re beginning to deteriorate because 
of the very fact that they’re coming here. – Ros, UK pharmacist  
 
As suggested in Chapter One, the boundaries of clinical space and relations in the UK clinic 
were more porous, and patients and staff both frequently passed one another when attending 
different nodes on the clinic circuit. In the UK clinic, the waiting room was specific to 
clozapine patients and thus perhaps more ‘privately shared’ insofar as treatment concerns 
went.  
 
In the Australian clinic, the blood tests, which were taken at general pathology centres on a 
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Monday or Tuesday before the clozapine clinic on Thursday or Friday, had expired by the 
time patients came in for their clozapine appointments. As such, Australian patients had their 
body temperature checked for infection as a next-best assurance of white blood cell count.39 
Australian patients had to have their blood taken earlier in the week, and, from what I 
observed, had to be reminded and chased up more often than patients attending the UK clinic 
did. One of the most distinctive differences between the UK clinic and the Australian clinic 
was that blood work was only performed on site and ‘in time’ in the UK clinic, mirroring the 
synchronous nature of clinical connections. In the UK clinic, blood was drawn, mixed and 
analysed within approximately 15 minutes, with a psychiatrist in the next room to sign off on 
the dispensary of tablets. In the Australian clinic, despite the CPMS guidelines specifying 
that a maximum 48-hour period was required in between blood withdrawal and clozapine 
dispensary, the process usually took three to four days. Blood took three hours to process at 
pathology centres, before the clozapine coordinator could proceed to make the CPMS entry, 
then request the script from a psychiatrist, none of whom worked in that particular clinic 
every day, then fax the script to the pharmacy with a 24-hour turnaround time, picking up the 
clozapine from the pharmacy, before the patient’s attendance at the clinic, assuming that the 
patient did indeed attend pathology for the blood test at the beginning of the week.  
 
There were sometimes ‘false starts’ in clozapine clinic activity flows in the Australian clinic. 
For instance, a few days before Christmas (necessitating careful renegotiating of blood work, 
clozapine supplies and appointment times for patients who were due to be seen during the 
week the clinic would be closed), no patients could be seen yet as the blood results had not 
yet been entered into the CPMS. On another occasion, a temporary clozapine coordinator 
developed a migraine but realised that her CPMS registration had expired anyway, such that 
the general clinic’s team leader had to renegotiate who would run the clinic that afternoon. 
Moreover, the continuity in care during the process of ‘bleeding’ through to ‘tablets’ was 
different between the UK and Australian clozapine clinics.  
 
In the Australian clinic, clozapine patients were also ‘outside’ the clinical spaces, sectioned 
                                                 
39 The Australian clinic was also more concerned by people exhibiting symptoms of a cold in case this would take their 
WBC into the risky range. Clozapine coordinator Kerry, elaborated, “say they get a full on cold, or a chest infection, their 
white cells go sky high because they’re fighting the infection, so, during the period when the white cells and the neutrophils 
are really high, we increase the monitoring, just like we do when they go ‘amber,’ we increase the monitoring so it’s twice 
weekly bloods until the white cells come down into the green range, but then you’d be mindful that they’ve had this 
infection and that they don’t slip right down into the ‘red’ range.” Having little access to the clinical nodes beyond the 
nurses, I never observed this extra monitoring happening in instances of patients having a cold, however that is not to say 
this protocol was not followed.  
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off by security doors that patients would pass through for their appointments with the nurse 
or psychiatrists. In regard to Ros’ point about potential privacy issues for patients if clozapine 
was mandatorily managed at a General Practice, this was more of a concern in the Australian 
clinic, which was not specific to clozapine. Before I first interviewed him, Australian patient 
Keith asserted his wish to not speak with me in the general waiting room of the clinic about 
what his participation would involve, because “no-one out there needs to know.” I wondered 
whether the UK clinic set-up may have put Keith at any more ease while he waited for his 
clozapine appointments.  
 
The UK clinic, on the one hand, could be seen as lumping all the potential ‘stresses’ together. 
While most appreciated the subtle opportunities for social interactions, a few people preferred 
to seek personal assurances more formally, elsewhere. UK patient Geoff, 53, declined to do a 
follow up interview with me because, as he told Clive, “it was too traumatic” last time. I felt 
very concerned about the ethics of this, yet Clive waved my question away and replied, “of 
course it is – even coming into the clinic can be traumatic for our guys.” Indeed, Geoff had 
told me he saw his GP “every six weeks” for a “general chat” about “whatever personal 
questions bother me at the time.” When I asked him who his main support was he said, 
“probably Dr [X], who’s a psychiatrist [not working at the clozapine clinic].” He kept his 
interactions with clinic staff to a minimum, although he still did not opt to have his blood 
work done through the private system.40 On the other hand, some patients in the UK clinic 
nominated to attend the clozapine clinic weekly just to collect their medication in between 
their monthly bloods because this had become a reliable routine for them – and, arguably, 
social contact. UK patient Trevor collected his medication from the clinic every week, and 
he, like a number of patients, often elected to come in and talk with me on ‘non-clinic’ days. 
As Corin (2007:282) suggested of the Canadian schizophrenia outpatients in her 
ethnography, patients participating in public life benefit from the ‘[r]hythm and routine,’ 
which ‘can add structure to patients' spatial and temporal worlds.’ I pick up on this point in 
Chapter Four. Arguably, clozapine clinic attendance gave patients something to plan around, 
and even dress up for – I observed many patients doing this in both clinics and some 
explicitly mentioned doing so. The clinic routine, however, operated more smoothly when 
                                                 
40 Monitoring and collecting clozapine through a GP, a psychiatrist and hospital pharmacist was an option for patients who 
could afford it, but I did not have access to knowledge about these patients. I am unclear as to whether or not this would 
have been financially feasible for Geoff.  
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there were greater expectations of accountability on the patient’s part and predictability on 
the clinical caregiver’s part.  
 
First, all patients appreciated accountability. The UK clinic had recently started an 
appointment system allocating 15-minute time slots in which patients could expect to have 
their bloods done, and the clinic opening hours moved to earlier in the morning. This was 
George’s idea to see if patients would sleep less if they had somewhere to be, and they did. 
Patients would often be waiting outside the clinic even before the staff arrived. As well as 
staff noticing the differences this made to uplifting patients’ spirits, many patients spoke to 
me about how much they appreciated this. Trevor said, “I think the appointment system’s 
working very well, you know, you know when you’ve got to arrive and when you do arrive 
you don’t have to wait very long … there’s not a huge number of people in front of you - it’s 
a lot better.” When I mentioned the possibility of earlier opening times to Australian nurse 
Ramesh, he dismissed the idea immediately and could not believe that patients in the UK 
would really wake up so early.  
 
In the Australian clinic, not only did patients have to be regularly chased up about their 
bloods and clinic attendance, there was less opportunity for consistency in interactions. When 
I asked Australian patient Daniel, 33, about how he found his clozapine clinic interactions, he 
at first said that he did not recognise other patients that came in, but then said “sometimes I’ll 
see people regularly here.” I described the UK clinic situation and how some people liked 
socialising while others kept to themselves. Daniel then asked, “and would they then socialise 
outside or?” When I said that some did, he replied,  
 
Daniel: Yeah, I don’t mind, you know, seeing the same person every month and, you 
know, talking with them, when we’re in the waiting room together or whatever. But I 
don’t socialise with them outside … I don’t put so much emphasis on being here on 
time … I mean, that, that thing in England sounds good, though! [Be]cause you go in 
- how does it work with the blood test – you have it in the morning? Like, [be]cause 
they must… 
JB: Well, they’ve got the machine on site as well so they can process the blood 
within ten minutes. 
Daniel: Wow! That sounds good, because, yeah, I have to go in on Monday… If I 
start working again, sort of once a month, I’m gonna have to, you know, sort of work 
that into my day. 
 
Daniel thus suggested a wish to be held more accountable to an earlier and more efficient 
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blood monitoring process, and potentials for the routine to better complement options for 
patients were felt able to work. Indeed, Charlie, although perhaps not minding the “injection” 
part of the blood tests, did say to me at one point that he found the clinical circuit, 
particularly the ECG, “a hassle … because it takes an hour (and I’ve got to get the slimy stuff 
on me),” but Charlie also said of coming to the clinic, “it’s not a big deal, I mean, it’s a mild 
inconvenience, but I’m not working, so.” At the UK clinic, George, who said the clinic team 
was “challenging ourselves continually, in order to improve what we do,” was in the process 
of trying to extend the clinic opening times to include a 5-7pm slot on a weeknight, “for 
people who are working – help them to engage better.” This possibility was hard to imagine 
in the Australian clinic.   
 
In the Australian clinic, the blockages in clozapine treatment monitoring were partly 
dismissed in terms of patients simply finding the treatment to be of general inconvenience.   
Despite the UK clinic being in a city with one third of the population size as the Australian 
city, the UK clinic had triple the number of clozapine patients and were keen to expand their 
services. The Australian clinic, not specific to clozapine, had a more general ‘team leader,’ 
Tony, who was not involved in clozapine directly but rather managed staff and liaison 
matters. Tony described to me the “static” uptake of clozapine clients in the service because 
“it’s an expensive drug, with the blood tests, its invasive, [be]cause you have to have blood 
tests every month, um, so that’s one thing that’s held back the service.” While Tony’s 
concerns about the blood tests being invasive were indeed an initial concern for some 
clozapine newcomers, these views were not congruent with the experiences of staff and 
longer term patients directly involved and acquainted with blood monitoring, and who all had 
roles to play. However, “expanding the [clinic’s] activity” (George’s words) via 
accountability and predictability in regard to appointment times added new levels of potential 
‘control’ for patients and staff that required careful upkeep. 
 
Clear communication was important to keep the flow of clinical interactions operating 
smoothly. When I returned to the UK for the second visit a few patients remarked, solemnly, 
that I had not returned as soon as I had said I would the previous year, as though I had let 
them down. I had to rebuild rapport in some instances before interviewing them again. One 
morning, the phlebotomy team in the UK clinic started taking bloods early because there was 
a queue of patients waiting and they thought they may as well reciprocate this commitment to 
punctuality. Unfortunately, there was a new phlebotomist joining the team who had less 
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experience using “thicker needles,” resulting in a messy blood spray and no blood being 
drawn – also delaying appointments for the other patients who had turned up early. Clive, 
who was attending to another patient, had to quickly come up and take the blood, but was 
confused about why the team had decided to start early under these circumstances. Moreover, 
when UK patient Ben, 44, arrived only a few minutes late to his 9.30am appointment slot that 
day, he quickly sought reassurance from the receptionist about whether he was late as there 
were more people waiting than usual. Ben, highly conscientious, agreed to do our interview 
while he waited but then asked me to check if he was due for the general ‘physical health’  
monitoring as well, even though the receptionist had not suggested him to be. The mix-up of 
his initial plans seemed to make him warier, during that particular interview too, and when he 
exchanged “hellos” and a “see you tonight” to a friend he passed in the corridor on the way 
back up to the waiting room, he did so more hesitantly than I had previously observed when 
the routine was more predictable.  
 
Critically, patient participants tended to open up more communication channels when they 
were ‘seen’ as autonomous individuals during clozapine appointments, as UK pharmacy 
technician Linda indicated above (upon familiarity with the regimen, “they’ll initiate the 
conversation”). The importance of patients being ‘noticed’ on individual terms (Aylwin 
1985) could be compromised by either familial or clinical neglect. First, in regard to the 
former, from what I observed patient agency that consisted of ‘struggle’ or resistance, instead 
of creative care, was more commonly expressed in the clozapine clinic when patients were 
accompanied to their appointments by informal caregivers. While psychiatrist Adam warned 
me that, “we have to remember that what we’re seeing may be an anxiety in parents that 
wasn’t there before their child’s diagnosis” and that making judgements “is a trap that young 
clinicians fall into, when what the parents really need is support,” I observed significant 
communication difficulties in the clinic when parents were present. 
 
Australian nurse Zoya told me about told about a female patient in her twenties who engages 
with treatment monitoring at a very minimal level. Zoya posited that this was largely because 
this patient’s mother insisted on attending appointments: 
 
This lady has not been given the opportunity to express herself independently of the 
mother, so the mother actually – you can see the dynamics between the client and the 
mother – she doesn’t talk when the mother is there. ‘Okay, so what about this?’ ‘Oh, 
no problem’ – that’s how she answers, but if the mother is not there, I think she’ll 
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feel freer … You just keep trying, and it depends on the family dynamics – she might 
not have access to go out. Her mother is like hovering over her, she can’t ask 
questions. You know, she says ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a question and the mother rolls her 
eyes, you know - disapproval, and then she just shuts down in that case. The first 
time I met this lady, I said ‘Why are you here?’ It was the mother that was the one 
answering the questions, and I said, ‘Excuse me, Ma’am, can she answer the 
questions?’ I saw, she doesn’t even know why she’s taking the medication, she 
doesn’t even know what time she’s taking the medication, how many milligrams of 
the medication she’s taking… and she’s an adult … You don’t want to upset the 
mother, because she’s the support person and the carer of this lady, and so you have 
to play it carefully… not to ignore the mother, and then at the same time, not to 
neglect the patient herself, of what her responsibilities are – what she needs to do. 
She has not been given a chance to have an independent life. She is not responsible 
for anything and that’s why she still looks up to her mother like a five-year-old. 
 
I asked how family involvement translated to treatment outcomes in the Australian context 
and she replied: 
 
It’s relative times two! It’s a relative thing… Some people have family support and 
they are great, they are fantastic, and they are functioning well. Some people, they 
don’t have anyone to rely on, and they’re fantastic and they’re doing very well. So, it 
depends on the dynamics that find themselves… or the situation that person finds 
themselves. 
 
There were several patients partaking in my research with residual and troubling symptoms 
who spoke to me of trying to find “independence” from their parents. I discuss this in regard 
to consumption behaviours in Chapter Three, but in terms of clinical interactions, Australian 
patient participant Trent, 24, and UK patient participant Holly, 40, were noticeably more 
anxious when attending the clinic with their parents. Both patients, of markedly middle-class 
backgrounds who always wore ‘smart’ and distinctive clothing closely matching their 
parents’ tastes, of which I observed upon meeting the parents who dressed smartly and sat 
cautiously in the waiting room amongst the patients, disinviting potential engagements with 
anyone else.  
 
During appointments with parents, patient and nurse, the consultation rooms filled with a 
palpable tension between the parents’ power over the appointments, and the patient’s own 
driving of information flow. Both Trent and Holly sputtered between appearing more 
reticent, in some moments, and brazen, in other moments, depending on who had the nurses’ 
attention.  As Trent’s father took an interest in my research and proceeded to speak of his 
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own academic career that he hoped Trent might one day follow too, Trent was hastily but 
silently picking his nails, wiping blood from his thumb, jumping on moments to contribute to 
the conversation himself, but with difficulty. Similarly, when Holly’s mother attended the 
clinic with her, Holly sat hunched over in her chair, hands between her legs, eyes to the 
ground, yet with a cheeky grin when daring to look up, responding both meekly and 
provocatively when asked by her visibly uncomfortable mother to “tell Clive what you did.” 
Holly and Trent both spoke more freely and confidently when their parents were not present. 
Moreover, these social dynamics extended to clinical caregiver inputs, which were difficult to 
balance.   
 
In the Australian clinic, staff dynamics were less reliable and this made for mixed clinician-
patient communication flows. As discussed in Chapter One, Zoya’s ‘warmer’ approach to 
patients resulted in unfortunate consequences outside of the clinic walls, when she was 
physically assaulted and subsequently judged by other staff members who were “not 
surprised” because she was “too trusting.” Inside the clinic, however, I observed Zoya’s 
warmth to go a long way. Zoya and Australian social worker Jill both occasionally hugged 
patients they had built rapport with. Zoya joked with patients and tailored ‘health’ advice to 
what she thought they might best respond to, sometimes getting up and dancing to 
demonstrate how to “get moving again.” When the main clozapine assistant nurse, Ramesh 
was away for a few weeks, I saw patients who were usually more reserved smile and even 
laugh along with Zoya, the way they sometimes did with Clive in the UK clinic. Although 
patients like Marie would still use whatever advice she received to reconnect the clinical 
circuitry for herself, Ramesh would give flippant advice to patients and admitted to me his 
dislike for his job. When I wanted to clarify what certain measurements meant in terms of 
‘changes’ for individual patients, Ramesh said dismissively, on a number of occasions, 
“we’re entering information for the records only.” While some patients were grateful despite 
Ramesh’s generic approach to them,41 thanking him profusely after each visit, others seemed 
negatively impacted. 
 
Patients who seem to be negatively impacted worked to redirect the clinical rhythms that they 
perceived to not be working for them. For instance, Australian patient Daniel generally 
                                                 
41 For instance, despite Trent trying to tell Ramesh about his one particular ‘voice,’ who also had a name: Bon Chance 
(Chapter Four), Ramesh, after checking with Trent that there was “no drugs or alcohol these days?” - when Trent had never 
taken drugs - went on to refer to “the voices” as “they.” 
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wanted to keep social exchanges to a minimum. The clozapine clinic formed a comfortable 
medium for him until the exchanges began to feel futile. He explained to me that his 
“paranoia” increased with the level of social exposure. Whereas not feeling “truly alone” 
tended to be a “constant” fear for Daniel at home, it was less so in predictable interactions 
such as attending the clinic or going to the shops. Drawing on clinical language, Daniel said 
that when he socialised, “the ability for ideations of reference via interaction with people … 
goes up.” He thus ensured that time spent in the clozapine clinic was transactional and brief. 
When interpersonal dynamics were not enough for him, Daniel experimented with them, 
because it was, he perceived, all he had to work with, as “my only routine/connection to the 
outside world”. Daniel continued, “but it is repetitive and droll … I’m not big on small talk.” 
Daniel clarified that he did not mind doing interviews with me because “I’m not the only one 
in your study and being an anonymous data point is good,” and that “this is not as annoying 
as the constant repetitive stuff.”  
 
Daniel explained that his clinical and social engagements flowed so long as the direct 
pressure was off him to converse and that he could just participate in social activities rather 
than the attention being completely centred on him: 
 
I’m not much of a social conversationalist or whatever, like, I’m really awkward in 
social settings … like, I went to a wedding about a month ago … and they sort of just 
gave me a camera and said, ‘here you go, take as many pictures as you want,’ so I 
had a ball! It was much better than socialising for me … You’ve got something to do, 
and … there was a couple of catering ladies that were doing the food, and stuff there, 
and they’d duck out back for a smoke, and I’d go out back for a smoke with them 
and a chat and what not, which was really weird because I could like talk to them … 
But yeah, I mean, no problem standing around having a smoke and talking to them, 
but just when you’re sitting at the table … it’s not so much pressure, it’s just, you 
know… feels a bit, I don’t know… boring. You’re sitting at a table with people 
you’ve never really met, you’re never going to see them again and you just talk 
about… stuff. You know… what’s the point? [laughs] 
 
Daniel had explained that, “that’s why I like smoking too… because I can just get up and go 
for a smoke, and to be polite you’ve got to, you know, go far away somewhere away from 
smelling distance so your smoke doesn’t bother them.” Moreover, Daniel told me that he 
enjoyed the sense of “control” he felt in regard to sticking to routines that he could anticipate 
and compliment with clinical expectations and clozapine consumption (Chapter Three). Yet 
these routines were switched up as soon as the “novelty” wore off. By the time I returned to 
the clinic the following year, Daniel had decided to switch up his clinical interaction routine.  
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Having not seen Daniel in six months, his preferences for sociality were epitomical of the 
pervasive ways in which sociality is utilised by the human agent. Daniel had decided to not 
participate in verbal exchanges with anyone except shopkeepers. During his clozapine 
appointment, he had written on piece of scrap paper that he had lost his voice, and thus 
simply nodded along to the “routine” questions. When the nurse asked, going through the 
clozapine checklist, whether he currently smoked cigarettes, Daniel gave a more pronounced 
nod, before then looking over at me, eyes half rolling with a small grin that we quietly shared 
while the nurse’s attention was elsewhere, and then holding up his bottle of Coke Zero for 
more ‘evidence’ of his consumptions for her to account for.42 Daniel and I had previously 
scheduled in an interview for the following week, however I received a text message from 
him when I got home from the clinic that day:  
 
I hate 2 let you down, but just don’t feel like speaking 2 anyone (except random shop 
cashiers), I don’t mind communication non-verbally, my answers will be the same 
tho. Nothing 4 me has changed since we last talked, except my place of residence. If 
u have specific questions, I’m happy to answer them. If appointment nxt wk requires 
me 2 talk, it’s prob best I cancel. Really Sorry 4 the hassle. Dan. 
 
I reassured him that it was no hassle, that I was happy to communicate non-verbally if he 
wanted, and we ended up arranging a non-verbal interview for the following day. As he 
wished, I asked Daniel questions verbally for him to respond to in writing, however he broke 
his silence a few times towards the end of the long interview to clarify things and thank me 
for allowing him to write instead of talk. My point here is that clinical rhythms need to work 
for both patient and clinical caregiver to flow and be productive, and that power and 
creativity should be fluid in this sense (Mol 2008).  
 
Finally, patients took heed of the notion that blood work did not ‘move’ beyond the clinical 
circuit and clozapine clinic database. While I was in the UK there was a public call-out to 
donate blood. Upon hearing this, a patient at the clozapine clinic asked Clive why they could 
not donate their blood after it had been analysed because that it seemed like such a “waste” 
that it was simply discarded each month. Unlike the meanings of blood circulating through 
                                                 
42 Ramesh had left the clinic by this point and this nurse was filling in as the clozapine assistant until the clinic found a 
replacement. This nurse openly told both her manager and me that she did not want to take on this tempory role as she was 
unfamiliar with the clozapine protocol, but there was no one else available as Zoya was still recovering from the assault and 
Kerry had also taken indefinite leave due to her ill-health.  
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the social body and individual donors or recipients (Erwin 2006), the social contract at play 
was a short-lived yet open-ended exchange (insofar as ‘green’ results and clozapine are 
clinically valid for 28 day cycles). Just as clinical streams were continually channeled in the 
face of unpredictability, so, too, could patients re-channel what blood work meant by 
attending closely to implications of the blood markers inside their bodies.  
 
Blood markers and wider bodily networks under clozapine 
 
Clozapine blood markers also included clozapine plasma levels, blood sugar levels, blood 
pressure and pulse and blood flow through the heart and body, which were checked and 
utilised by both staff and patients to gain reassurance and control. As I discuss further in 
Chapter Three, side effects of clozapine were, according to the UK clinic, generally more 
apparent when clozapine plasma levels are above the ‘therapeutic’ range (0.35-0.5). I 
observed that patients who were clinically regarded to be ‘higher functioning’ tended to be on 
‘sub-therapeutic’ (exhibiting plasma levels below 0.35), rather than ‘therapeutic’ doses of 
clozapine, and therefore had fewer side effects to contend with. Patients on higher doses 
tended to not only experience more side effects, they were not clinically regarded to be 
improving in psychiatric functioning.  
 
First, patients who did not comply with clozapine consumption were quickly identified by 
checking plasma levels. In the case of non-compliance, Clive hypothesised this to mean that 
patients were “stuck” somewhere between pleasing medical authorities enough to stay out of 
hospital (by attending the clozapine clinic) and taking back control by not taking their 
clozapine as they were otherwise advised. This, like in the case of parents of clinical 
caregivers being less receptive during clozapine clinic interactions, speaks to the kind of 
agency via ‘struggle’ that Jenkins (2015) posited. To unpack experiences further, though, the 
felt influence patients could have over clozapine blood plasma levels was more ambiguous 
than a push-pull between compliance and non-compliance.  
 
UK patient participant Nathanial, 36, felt himself able to negotiate the control of clozapine 
within his very blood stream, to the point where he had to be taken off clozapine for 
‘objective’ reasons of blood readings that could not be agreed upon. Nathanial told me: 
 
The second time around on the blood test he [George] said “Nathanial, you’re not 
taking the medication, I want you to come off of it,” because it’s dangerous for him 
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to prescribe something if I’m stockpiling it or not taking it. Now, I have no 
explanation why it read 0, and it, it’s kind of like a losing battle for me because I 
know I was taking it, and he says no, and I know I was, and the results showed no. 
The only thing I can think of is that I mitigated, at every situation, so I tried to 
mitigate the effects of the medication. I smoke, and it does say that if you smoke it 
lowers the content of the medication. So, if I’m taking the medication, I might have 2 
or 3 cigarettes within half an hour 45 mins to lower that stuff out of my blood stream. 
 
Drawing on clinical discourse around nicotine and clozapine and the emphasis on blood 
indicators, Nathaniel navigated the extent to which clozapine could circulate through his 
body, which he reclaimed influence over, however questionably. He had been taken off 
clozapine and when I interviewed him again a year later, he was relying on nicotine to 
remedy his self-described memory and concentration difficulties. Nathanial said to me, “our 
way of being is going through a change … what gives my life meaning is knowing that we’re 
going through this change.” While this might suggest a relapse into ‘delusional thinking’ to a 
clinician, Nathanial’s sense of agency – drawing on clinical imagery about nicotine and 
clozapine interactions – suggested to me a more ordinary means of asserting a ‘life project’ 
for himself (Rapport 2003). Blood markers are continually subject to change and finding 
equilibriums43 just as patients work toward finding ‘an extended environmental homeostasis’ 
that elicits a sense of freedom ‘within which the self continues to flourish’ (Rapport 
2003:225). 
 
Patients frequently drew on clinical discourse when explaining or predicting additional blood 
markers. Clive explained to me that, when people have “clozapine-resistant schizophrenia,” 
there are augmentation strategies to enhance the effects of clozapine if blood plasma readings 
already exceed the therapeutic dose (above 0.5) and side effects are intolerable. Such clinical 
strategies change depending on the latest research: when I was in the UK clinic, aripiprazole, 
another atypical antipsychotic, was prescribed for patients exhibiting Obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms (OCS) and/or with increased appetite.44 UK Patient participant Felix, 45, thus 
explained to Clive and me during a conversation about his OCS that it was “because 
clozapine has gone up in my blood.” Arguably, there was also an opportunist, ‘provisional 
                                                 
43 In the UK clinic, once the therapeutic level of clozapine blood plasma is ascertained, the clinical goal, too, was to start 
working towards lowering the dose of clozapine towards the ‘sub-therapeutic’ range.  
44 I discuss OCS further in Chapter Three. For patients complaining of sedation, on the other hand, amisulpride, another 
atypical antipsychotic, can be prescribed, however it raises prolactin levels – the hormone that triggers lactation. Clive 
checked for this side effect by subtly observing whether patients had raised breast tissue or wet patches on their clothing 
around the nipple area; a blood test was not necessary. 
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agency’ (Weiner 2011) here that mirrors the nexus between objective and subjective 
interpretations.  
 
Blood sugar level checking was something that required commitment on both the part of 
patient and the nurse. The Australian guidelines around additional ‘physical’ health 
monitoring were less regimented, out-of-date, from a different jurisdiction, and did not yet 
include nurses as part of the treatment circuit (but rather psychiatrists and GPs). Individual 
patient medical records were also attended to inconsistently by different members of the 
clinical circuit. It was thus often up to patients to clarify the validity of blood sugar testing. 
Blood sugar levels could not be tested unless the patient had not eaten for a number of hours, 
yet this was rarely clarified until blood readings were a cause for concern. For instance, one 
day when Australian patient Keith had a ‘diabetic’ level blood sugar reading, the nurse was 
alarmed, until Keith said he had just eaten “3 or 4 pieces of toast with jam”; when the nurse 
took the reading 20 minutes later, it had dropped to a ‘normal’ range. Another Australian 
patient, Phillip, 40, said to the nurse nearly immediately when entering the appointment: 
“I’ve just had lunch, so there’s no point in doing my blood sugar.” Patients became attuned to 
how clozapine and other consumptions could skew their blood markers, and this seemed to 
help them gain confidence in how clozapine impacted their bodily systems, generally.  
 
As I build on in chapter Three, confidence in how the act of consuming clozapine was first 
negotiated before it could be incorporated into a system of personal beneficiaries allowed 
patients to interpret the monitoring process for themselves.  During an interview with me, 
Ned said that he had at first been cynical about clozapine, thinking “I’m not gonna take this 
because it’s not gonna work … I can rough this out on my own, I can, you know, make 
myself better” but “when I first started taking it I could see myself getting better.” He added, 
“it does knock you around to begin with … I just remember sitting there and not being aware 
of what’s going on around me, and just being really sleepy … after about 2 weeks, I started 
feeling a bit better” – namely, in regard to an embodied “concentration” (to be discussed in 
Chapter Four). Like many participants, he resolved the side effect of salivating at night (“just 
gotta’ wash the pillows”) and bed-wetting (“you’ve just gotta wash [the sheets] more 
regularly”). As the bed-wetting had now stopped, I asked him what he thought this might be 
due to, to which re responded: 
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I guess, ah… I don’t know, it might have been me sub-consciously, like, going ‘okay 
this is bad,’ and now I wake up, go to the toilet, go back to sleep … put[ting] a bit 
more emphasis on it … it probably would’ve seemed like a really… bad thing to 
begin with, and that’s probably stuck in my head, so, if I even feel… I try not to 
drink water before I got to bed as well. 
 
Therefore, although Ned subscribed to clinical explications on the whole, his embodied ‘self-
intensity’ and creativity (Rapport 2003) was still apparent: he felt himself to be able to 
control the bed-wetting by both limiting water intake before bed and “sub-consciously” 
deciding that it was a “bad thing” to be mitigated by his personal “emphasis on it.” An 
individual’s agency can extend to what ebbs and flows through the body in ways that 
complement, not merely resist, implications of being on clozapine and undertaking 
physiological monitoring.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that accountability and agency over clozapine and blood work enters 
both patients and staff into a fluid contract of compliance and creativity, whereby control is 
with the patient insofar as they are willing to consume clozapine and to have blood tests. 
There are, however, circuitry blockages to navigate, both within individual bodies and 
between clinical checkpoints, which are continual but most pronounced upon clozapine 
initiation. While for some, the clozapine clinic could constitute a form of ‘struggle’ 
outweighed by ‘endurance’ (Jenkins 2015), this manifested in ways that could not be reduced 
to schizophrenia per se. Clozapine patients engaged in blood work in ways that paralleled 
Mol’s (2008) ‘logic of care,’ where their personal input was both necessary for clinical 
efficiency and their own assertions of agency throughout biological processes that are 
otherwise understood to be beyond clinical and patient reach.  
 
I observed blood work to be dynamic and relational, involving personalised interpretations 
and agentic practices. Patients were able to experience the monitoring process in ways that 
went toward fulfilling a need for ‘social contact at a distance.’ The clozapine clinic was a 
space in which patients did not feel intimately threatened the way they might otherwise feel if 
more direct social interaction is expected of them. Further, the deployment of what Rapport 
(2003) described as an embodied ‘self-intensity’ is afforded to anybody, no matter their 
circumstances, because, ‘no other knowledge matches the potential self-knowledge that the 
body possesses … the immediacy and inescapability that it can know itself – and no other can 
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know it in the same way’ (Rapport 2003:220). As Rapport’s quote at the beginning of this 
chapter posited, ‘[e]xternal forms impinge on the individual’s life-world, but there is no 
necessary, direct, singular or essential effect that they have within it’ (2003:259). In Chapter 
Three, I discuss how mind-body imageries pertaining to clozapine treatment and health were 
actively drawn on by patients to similarly complement personalised desires.  
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Chapter Three: Working with Ambiguities and Mind-Body Imaginaries 
 
UK patient Robert, 48, appeared to me significantly older than he was, and, like a number 
patients, seemed to me to have visibly aged even between my two field visits. He had been on 
clozapine for 15 years, and said that it made him “feel better in some ways, and in some 
ways, I feel worse”; “it seems to me like it works, the more you take it, the better it works, 
for me personally.” His dose was in the higher range (575 milligrams, going up to 625 
milligrams by the time we parted ways for the final time a year later). While considering 
himself to be “so happy spiritually” due to regular Jehovah’s Witness engagements, Robert 
felt less confident when it came to his “physical” and “emotional” health. As well as taking 
clozapine for schizophrenia, Robert took medications for Type II diabetes mellitus, high 
cholesterol, blood clots and constipation, and was “used to” frequent stomach pains, 
dizziness, a hernia, and chest pains – the latter of which he attributed to smoking cigarettes. 
When I asked him about his Type II diabetes, he said, “I know it’s diet controlled”; “I just 
take metformin”; “blood sugar levels are fine, so, um, nothing to worry about.” In regard to 
the “piles,” which he did associate with clozapine, he said that, relative to previous 
experiences of “quite large, ah, ruptures,” he felt that “in the last couple of years it’s been 
much better,” with “hardly any bleeding and my bowel routes are quite good.” He had 
Weetbix and laxatives every morning. Of his general diet, he reflected, “I don’t eat too badly, 
I have lots of fruit smoothies and, ah, I could eat a bit more veg to be honest … I do love 
takeaways occasionally, which aren’t very good for you, obviously, but I try and have proper 
meals when I can,” and “I have fat free and sugar free, and things to lose you weight.” Robert 
was keen to remind me, “I’m not the worst-off person in the world, am I! … I’m on 
clozapine, so – a lot of people who are on it have stomachs out here [gestures], so, um, I think 
I did quite well.” 
 
In regard to seeing a GP, Robert said, “I’m gonna have a health check soon … I think you’re 
supposed to have them once a year but I haven’t had one for quite a few years.”  Robert was 
reluctant to follow up concerns about his chest pains with the nurse. When I insisted we tell 
nurse Clive, after no action was taken by Robert over the course of a few visits to the clinic, 
he agreed and Clive offered to book him into the GP. But Robert politely brushed it off and 
said he would call the GP himself. It was a Tuesday, and when Clive asked when he would 
call the GP, Robert replied, “on Thursday.” Clive suggested sooner, “such as this afternoon” 
(it was currently still morning). They compromised on “tomorrow.” Robert thanked us all for 
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“caring.” I later asked if he thought the GP will think his health will be “okay.” He replied, 
with a nervous laugh, “not really, no.” Robert mentioned that when he had last followed up 
with a GP about his longer-term chest pains, they “thought it was, um, psychosomatic, you 
know, in my brain – but I don’t; I think it’s the smoking.” Robert’s main incentive for 
potentially quitting smoking was that “Jehovah’s witnesses believe that it pollutes your 
body.” “He [Jehovah] knows our bodies better than we do,” Robert posited, and in regard to 
what Jehovah would think of his body, “he wouldn’t be very pleased with it.”45 Although, 
Robert neutralised: “I pray to Jehovah and give him all of my problems.” As for what health 
meant, he said “healthy body, or healthy mind”; “I suppose they’re related.” Robert described 
himself as often “suffering” with ongoing “paranoia and anxiety” and “quite a lot of head 
pain.” Every day between 2pm and 6pm Robert would lie down, which he explained “rests 
my body” and alleviated his chest pains. “I find mental illness very emotionally and 
physically straining, and that’s why I need to lie down.”  
 
In continuing my explication of how patients achieve health agency through the very 
confinements that might be understood to disempower patients, this chapter turns to how the 
ambiguous impacts of clozapine and mind-body compartmentalisations are reworked and 
complimented by patients – as well as clinical caregivers – to maximise potentials for health. 
I explore how patients partake in interpreting and regulating the ways in which clozapine 
impacts their ‘minds’ and ‘bodies,’ and how these superficial dualisms become as useful as 
they are delimiting in terms of negotiating experiences of ‘health.’  
 
I argue that due to the ambiguity in clinical knowledge and how it is enacted, experiences of 
clozapine treatment yoke both ‘mind’ and ‘body’ imageries that are open to continual 
reworking by patients. While the concept of ‘mind-over-body’ did feature heavily in patients’ 
experiences, so, too, did bodily activities inform feelings of a healthy mind. In exploring the 
manifestation of health agency via clinical and experiential ambiguities, I address the public 
health questions of apparent ‘health gap’ trajectories that truncate life spans and challenge 
                                                 
45 Robert added that, “you know, Jesus didn’t smoke when he was on Earth.” I tried to keep the question open by 
responding: “well, you never know! Maybe there weren’t any cigarettes available?” Robert responded, gravely, “yeah, well, 
he wouldn’t anyway, too perfect really.” This notion of Jehovah being “perfect” was not, though, something he felt to be 
necessary for his own general well-being. Although Robert was well aware that smoking “polluted” his body, and he 
intended to quit, he had not been totally stagnant in his efforts: He had cut down his cigarette smoking from “30 or 40” to 
“20 a day” over the last few decades, and had recently purchased an “e-cigarette starter kit.” He also mentioned a card he 
had for the local community Quit service, to “maybe see if I can see if I can have a one-on-one session.” Of e-cigarettes, he 
said, “the good thing is you can smoke it just like a cigarette … except you don’t get the… you get the nicotine but you don’t 
get anything else, the tar or the chemicals.” Alas, “sometimes I just forget, and then sometimes it’s motivation … I haven’t 
used it much to be honest … will start using it again tomorrow morning.”  
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clinicians in the context of what ‘recovery’ means. In regard to antipsychotic drug use, the 
constitution of selfhood can be situated within transient meanings arising from the experience 
of ingestion and the imaginary pertaining to biological explanations (Jenkins 2010). Although 
agents may be interpreted as ‘neutered’ and deadened by the input of clozapine as the active 
(drug) agent controlling one’s insides (Jenkins 2010:29), it was the notion of patients 
themselves searching for an equilibrium or a ‘biochemical balance’ (Jenkins 2010:36) that 
was most evident in my participants’ experiences.  
 
The notion of equilibrium however can be expanded further when considering where ‘health’ 
resides and what it feels like in terms of mind-body stasis beyond clozapine. My central 
phenomenological questions to patients concerned the feelings of taking clozapine, having 
schizophrenia, and experiencing health and ill health. As discussed in Chapter Two, patient 
engagements with blood work suggested pursuits of participants’ ‘extended environmental 
homeostasis’ Rapport (2003:225). I demonstrate how, in the context of clozapine treatment, 
this homeostasis draws on personalised consumption relationships, as well as biochemical, 
and clinical imaginaries and ambiguities. 
 
Health in fluid terms  
 
Clozapine patients were able to experience and reconnect their health despite the effects of 
clozapine that suggest a totalising power adhering to a ‘mental’ stability at the expense of 
‘social’ and ‘physical’ health. Patients undertook this in ways that speak to ‘existential 
power’ (self-energy), which arises from forms of both ‘democratic violence’ and ‘nihilistic 
violence’ (Rapport 2003). ‘Democratic violence,’ Rapport (2003:250-251) explained, draws 
on Wallace’s attention to ‘equivalence structures’ and ‘contracts,’ where ‘[i]ndividuals learn 
to trust that in certain routine situations others’ behaviour is predictable, and can be 
habitually and confidently interrelated with actions of their own.’ As described in the 
previous chapter, predictability and accountability at the clozapine clinic also accords with 
Mol’s (2008) ‘logic of care.’ Rapport (2003:251) attended to the ‘individual construction of a 
diversity of possibly incompatible and mutually contradictory life-projects and world-views – 
living beneath an ambiguous surface of social-structural calm, within behavioural contracts 
that individuals continue to share.’ When opportunities for anticipatory interactions break 
down this constitutes ‘nihilistic violence.’ Yet, even in this latter case, individuals persist on 
their own terms.  
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Rapport (2003) took the case of the Jewish Holocaust survivor Primo Levi, who took it upon 
himself to write about those who did not survive the ‘Lager’ (literally meaning ‘warehouse’ 
in German and the word Levi used to describe Nazi concentration camps) who nonetheless 
did not feel totally dominated by the fate of the gas chamber closing in on them. Rapport 
(2003:248) posited that, if we think about the concentration camp as a ‘place’ where 
‘hundreds of thousands of different lives were led and lost, made up of countless experiences 
and interactions,’ then we ‘continue the Nazis’ dehumanizing process of massification.’ 
Rather, we can appreciate individuals’ imaginations of being ‘elsewhere.’ To take the 
extreme case of ‘violence beyond logic’ in the Lager, ‘it was not symbolic negotiation or 
exchange to which one (powerful) party to the interaction was interested, but physical 
obliteration’ (Rapport 2003:250). Yet, the smallest persistence of individual character can 
help people to feel free, however momentarily. Levi observed a man who, when merely 
exhibiting ‘[a] gesture of his, a word, a smile had a liberating virtue, they were a rip in the 
fabric of the Lager’ (in Rapport 2003: 255). There was still room for an individuals’ power to 
be felt. 
 
I am not saying that clozapine treatment monitoring can be assimilated with brutal and 
totalitarian regimes like that of Levi’s Lager, wherein people were ‘confined to the present by 
feelings of hunger, fatigue, cold and fear; they lived without reasoning, reflecting, observing, 
comparing, remembering, or expressing themselves’ (Rapport 2003:244). As has already 
been suggested insofar as the blood work goes, patients can express themselves within the 
monitoring regimen and creatively manipulate the physiological and clinical processes of 
which they are otherwise seen to be merely subject to. However, all clozapine patients face 
circumstances that can threaten their lives in ways that seem, from the outside, deterministic. 
If patients stop taking clozapine at regular intervals, their situations could quickly become 
fatal due to blood issues alone. In continuing to take clozapine, it could still kill patients 
(quickly or slowly). Australian patient Trent, 24, was fearful of this: “it can kill you” (Brown 
& Dennis 2017:373). Taking clozapine daily could also be accompanied by a feeling of 
confinement. In Chapter Two, Australian patient Charlie, 35, had described his daily doses of 
clozapine as “liquid handcuffs … a form of control”. Clozapine treatment became more 
mundane and ‘controllable’, however, the longer a person took the drug (Trent and Charlie 
were clozapine newcomers). The regimen thus aligned much more with ‘democratic 
violence’ than ‘nihilistic violence’. Yet because clozapine itself was understood by all to 
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represent an ongoing danger at the same time as providing security and structure, there were 
ongoing ambiguities to manage.  
 
The plethora of unknowns could be interpreted either way, and it was such flexibility in 
interpretation that became productive for both clinical caregivers and patients. Just as those 
subjected to confinement and death in the Lager all ‘lived (and died) the Lager in their own 
way’ (Rapport 2003:247), clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients found health (and 
interpreted life-threatening side effects) in their own way. This was amenable to a clinical 
rendering of patients as individual people, responding to the drug in different ways.  
 
Contrary to what one might see from the outside, Clozapine patients were able to negotiate 
what their health meant and subsequently prioritise ‘parts’ of it in their own terms, to yield a 
holistic feeling of control over their lives. While this was not the same as negotiating life in 
the Lager, patients were able to supersede clinical attempts of managing their clozapine dose 
to alleviate clozapine side effects. Patients were, in Rapport’s (2003) footings, able to steer 
the implications of clozapine side effects as being simultaneously within and beyond their 
control. An individual’s ‘power,’ Rapport (2003:82) said:  
 
[I]s an attribute of individual being – an energy, a drive – which is constant even as 
the outward form of things and relations to which it gives rise change. There is at 
once, then, a constancy to power and a diversity and fluidity concerning its effects … 
Analytically, however, one might say that all behaviour is one: embodiment of an 
existential drive to make sense and maintain individual-plus-environment.  
(original emphasis) 
 
When it came to clozapine, people exerted a certain determination to achieve a personally felt 
homeostasis in regard to the impacts of clozapine. No one could be sure of how clozapine or 
individual efforts worked or did not work in desired ways, but patients worked productively 
with this fluidity of power.  
 
Predictable clinical interactions could help this process. For instance, UK patient, Kevin, 34, 
and nurse Clive remained open minded about concerns and options during one of Kevin’s 
‘physical health’ checks.46 Kevin first mentioned that his mother had suggested he ask for a 
clozapine dose reduction, because he had been feeling drowsy. Clive said this was possible. 
                                                 
46 Clive was filling in for Narelle, who was attending a nurse training course. 
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Kevin then continued, “I’m getting a bit fat, aren’t I? I don’t know why, though – I exercise 
all the time and I eat well; I don’t snack.” Kevin always wore his “exercise gear,” attending 
the clinic in between playing golf or tennis or going to the gym. As he sat in the chair in front 
of us, he squeezed the bulge around his belly, and suggested, “it must be the clozapine – do 
you think so?” Kevin was now looking around and directing the questions to both Clive and 
me. I said nothing, while Clive nodded a few times, considering the proposition, before 
replying, “but it can be managed.” Namely, through dose reduction and/or more regimented 
diet and exercise.  
 
The idea that clozapine-associated weight gain could be managed allowed patients to decide 
for themselves how much they were willing to compromise. Clive asked Kevin to stand on 
the weight scale, with a height measure attached, and got me to go over and read out the 
measurements to him so he could type them into Kevin’s file notes and calculate his current 
Body Mass Index (BMI).47 Kevin’s BMI reading was in the ‘obese’ range. Kevin told us that 
his father had recently lost weight by cutting down his portion size, and asked Clive if he 
should try this too. Clive suggested that he instead try to substitute more of the foods on his 
plate for vegetables.  
 
When I interviewed Kevin a month later, he did not recall the advice about portion size, but 
had decided that he would like to “try” getting his clozapine dose lowered. He felt fearful of 
this resulting in “relapse,” but after consulting further with clinical staff, including his 
psychiatrist, Kate, it was decided that it was worth trying because he was, relatively, 
‘mentally’ stable. Besides, Kevin was on a higher dose of clozapine, yielding higher plasma 
levels, and Clive had said to me during another conversation, “from what we’ve observed 
here, those patients with weight gain that is shooting up, when you check the plasma levels, 
they’re really up there, you see, even if they’re not out of the range, but they’re always, like, 
hmmm…” Then again, altering Kevin’s clozapine dose did not simply translate to weight 
loss. The apparent and embodied effects of clozapine were once again open to Kevin’s 
remaking.  
 
Experimenting with Kevin’s dose did not reduce the ambiguity nor expectations about 
                                                 
47 Body Mass Index ‘is calculated by dividing your weight (in kilograms) by your height (in metres squared)’ and places 
people in categories ranging from ‘underweight’ to ‘obese’, indicating chronic disease risk factors (Heart Foundation 2018). 
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clozapine. The situational ‘logic’ ensuring a clear ‘democratic’ rather than ‘nihilistic 
violence’ slipped, but the ‘diversity of individually created meanings’ pertaining to a 
‘democratic violence’ was still available (Rapport 2003:253). By the time I interviewed him a 
year later, Kevin had asked to have his clozapine dose reduced slightly further so he would 
have more energy to exercise, but this was for his ‘mental’ rather than ‘physical’ health. 
Kevin had not noticed any changes in his ‘mental’ state since lowering the dose so far, yet 
was nonetheless cautious in asking for further reduction just in case this resulted in more 
“paranoid thoughts.” Contrary to clinical expectations, Kevin had put on some more weight 
and recalled a recent bout of what he described as “physical problems,” which amounted to 
being “very tired … I just lost all my energy,” such that he could not exercise for a month. 
Kevin told me that he pursued sports for “a combination of keeping busy, and I just enjoy it.” 
Playing golf, in particular, “is good for my frame of mind,” and “if I’m concentrating on my 
sports I’m not concentrating on myself … I don’t worry about mental illness, not in my focus; 
sports are in my focus.”48 I thus assumed that, for Kevin, exercising improved his ‘mental’ 
rather than ‘physical’ health.  
 
Yet, as Rapport (2003:43) posited, ‘human beings refuse to take conceptual absolutes too 
seriously … irony represents an endemic reaction against [what philosopher Richard Rorty 
referred to as] ‘final vocabularies’’. When I asked if not exercising had therefore impacted 
Kevin’s “mental health,” he replied, “I don’t think so.” I said that I wondered about the 
impact of exercise on mood. He shrugged, “my mum always says exercise makes you feel 
happier but I don’t notice anything.”49 This was despite him saying earlier that he enjoyed 
sport. Rapport (2003:54) distinguishes between ‘because’ and ‘in-order-to’ reasoning that 
people make, the former hinging on external determinants and the latter referring to 
‘individuals’ infinite and ever-vital imaginations exist[ing] on their own terms, beyond the 
sway of the intentions of others.’ While Kevin had been taking on board ‘because motives,’ 
his experiences of health aligned more with ‘in-order-to motives’ in terms his personal 
reasoning. Kevin had taken on board clinical advice (such as not eating in between meals and 
trying to eat “well,” such as eating more vegetables), and had been eating more “salads” to 
try to lose weight. He was also contemplating a caloric restriction diet on his mother’s 
                                                 
48 This theme of ‘focus’ in regard to the notion of ‘flow’ is discussed in Chapter Four. 
49 Very few patients did experience this endorphin rush, and when I spoke with psychiatrists about it they were curious but 
unclear whether this was another side effect of clozapine or something to do with the individual, as I explain later in this 
section. 
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recommendation.50 Alas, he said, “the problem is that, I enjoy my food so much, I’m not sure 
I wanna starve myself … I might have a little extra weight on my hands but I don’t wanna 
change my eating habits”. He reiterated, “my main pleasures are probably golf, playing 
tennis, having a nice meal.”51 This is not unique to how anybody might reason their ‘health’ 
behaviours should they have to explain them. Further, Kevin persisted with sports primarily 
because it helped his “frame of mind” – his chief concern, and although not quite fitting the 
clinical imaginary, ‘mental’ health was also the clozapine clinic’s chief concern. Clive’s 
suggestion that Kevin’s weight gain “can be managed” translated to Kevin’s sense of being 
able to choose for himself.  
 
Being able to choose for oneself extended to reclaiming different ‘parts’ of one’s health, to 
produce a dominant sense of agency over the impacts of clozapine. Australian patient Angus, 
39, who had been taking clozapine for over ten years, said of his ‘health’ experiences, while 
pushing firmly down at his large stomach, “it’d depend on what it’s about – I’ve got bad 
parts, like, I’m gaining weight, but also my mental state is alright… [ex]cept for, other things 
that happen,” such as, “I get this problem with my brain, I feel gravity, it’s, I feel like I’m 
being pulled towards the centre of the earth … I just feel like a drop.” He attributed this to 
clozapine. Angus had also associated the drug with his ongoing constipation, which became 
“really uncomfortable” when his bowel “presses up” on the metal plates in his pelvis (a 
consequence of one of several pre-clozapine suicide attempts). Angus described how the 
properties of clozapine tablets were problematic for him insofar as “they don’t have lactose,” 
making them “very dry” – “I think they said the milk makes it easier to digest into you … 
maybe it’s [a clozapine tablet] not passing through you as well.”52 Angus preferred not to 
take his prescribed laxative every day (“I’d rather just take it when I need it”), and had 
recently started drinking a probiotic drink, which “actually really helps with the insides, so 
that’s one good thing; it’s what I’ll use now.” He said he used to rely on cannabis to help 
with his bowel movements but this had compromised his ‘mental’ health too much. Personal 
compatibility was important to Angus: Clozapine had “a power about it” because he 
understood it to be “from the UK, and that’s where I’m from.” Angus was negotiating his 
weight gain on his own terms as well: 
                                                 
50 Namely, Michael Mosley’s popular 5:2 diet, where you limit your caloric intake to 500-600 calories per day on two days 
each week and eat normally for the other five days (Mosely & Spencer 2015). 
51 Kevin also played golf and tennis for “social reasons.”  
52 Angus also suspected clozapine made him “allergic to cow’s milk,” as when he had since tried other medications with 
lactose they had not been “working properly.”  
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I’m sort of doing exercise everyday – just crunches and walking every day, some 
weights as well … I don’t wanna keep getting bigger and bigger, and I’ve seen 
people on this medication die from it, what I perceive as they did die from it … heart 
attack, or brain problem, strokes … sometimes I feel this dropping feeling is like a 
stroke … I’ve been on blood pressure medication, but now I’ve stopped taking that, 
it’s gone back to normal, but that’s from a lot of work, just trying to walk every day.  
 
Although making particular efforts to exercise, in regard to his diet Angus remarked: “I know 
what’s right to eat and what’s not, I just eat too much, it’s like just being hungry all the time, 
and that’s what makes you hungrier as well.” Angus had previously quit smoking due to a 
“partially collapsed lung.” “I’ve swapped from unhealthy cigarettes to unhealthy eating,” he 
reflected. He now enjoyed eating because his ability to taste food had returned, such that he 
found food “addictive.” Angus had dreams about smoking and contemplated starting up 
again, “to lose weight” by suppressing his appetite, but had resolved that, “it’s good just to 
live every day, and enjoy every day.” He liked to eat “both healthy and unhealthy foods,” and 
would do one big shop on pension day to cover this range – although it was usually the 
“vegies” that were eaten last, toward the end of the fortnight. Angus drank “not much soft 
drink anymore,” and found that “cranberry juice helps” because it is “full of vitamin C.” 
Angus, like Robert and many others, felt an ordinary sense of well-being: “we’ve all got 
things going on with us … there’s people overseas that have it a lot worse than I have.” He 
made of his situation and knowledge about clozapine what he could, yielding agency and a 
sense of relative ‘health’ in light of his past experiences, what he had yielded to be presently 
reliable, and how he imagined the situations of others. Furthermore, patients decided for 
themselves how particular consumption practices impacted them, combining experiential and 
clinical knowledge.  
 
Cleansing consumptions  
 
Patients spoke to me of certain health consumption behaviours they did persist with, to ensure 
some kind of health with, in spite of other consumptions. I have observed people in all walks 
of life to draw on various kinds of information in deciding on their consumption practices, 
imagining how these practices will or will not mitigate potential ill-health. Indeed, I myself 
have several daily food remedies that I have adopted over the years. Some reflect common 
health imaginary, like eating muesli every morning, while other remedies are a little more 
personalised. For instance, to ward off feelings of being run down during fieldwork, I started 
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to make an ‘anti-inflammatory’ and ‘cleansing’ homemade drink consisting of turmeric, 
black pepper and apple cider vinegar. This recipe is based on information that I have heard 
about these ingredients, along with positive experiential feedback. In continuing to consume 
it each day, I feel like I am protecting my health. There is no certainty in this remedy, but it 
informs my health agency and has become reliable in my lived experience.  
 
This phenomenon is vividly reflected in what Warin (2010) found with her ethnographic 
participants with anorexia, whose conditions she de-spectaluarised. By drawing on wider 
discourse that one has “read somewhere” (or heard somewhere), and the ‘embodied effects’ 
of consumption, people can work toward minimising the ‘indeterminacy’ of what ‘ingestion’ 
might result in (Warin 2010:117). Warin observed that, ‘[a]norexia was a practice that 
removed the threat of abjection’ in regard to food (2010: 127). Warin (2010:112) situated the 
experiential ‘abject’ between the structuralist, ‘semantics’ approach of Douglas (1966) and 
the psychoanalytic, ‘subjectivity’ approach of Kristeva (1982), to explicate the consumption 
experiences of ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ foods for her ethnographic participants. Arguably, like I do 
with my turmeric drink, clozapine patients felt able to negate ‘dirty’ health experiences 
through a process of counter-balancing with ‘clean’ consumptions.  
 
While feelings of health efficacy via consumption was mostly through making daily efforts to 
eat something consistently perceived to be “healthy,” in spite of other “unhealthy” cravings 
or consumptions, it should first be acknowledged that some patients engaged in more 
imaginative means of expelling “unhealthy” consumptions. For instance, Australian patient 
Liam, 38, said to me when we started talking about body weight, “I’m a bit obese.” He then 
described taking religious steps to expel unhealthy elements from his food and drink, 
explaining how he ate:  
 
Liam: Lean meals – low fat, low sugar. When I eat and drink a lot of fat and sugar, I 
do a prayer to God and he takes away the fat and sugar and leaves all the protein and 
the vitamins and minerals and the complex carbohydrates and all of that. It’s like I’ve 
eaten less fat. 
JB: Wow! So that works to eliminate-? 
Liam: Yeah, the fat and sugar. I’ve lost weight recently because I’ve been drinking 
sugar free energy drinks and sugar free cola. 
 
While I could not discern whether or not Liam had recently switched to “sugar free” drinks, 
Liam reasoned that praying to God eliminated fat and sugar from his body in the same way 
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that drinking sugar-free drinks and eating “lean meals” would. While he attributed weight 
loss to the latter, praying made him feel “like I’ve eaten less fat”, when he had actually 
consumed “a lot of fat.” Liam’s intention was to mitigate “fat and sugar,” aligning with 
clinical advice he had been given but not always subscribing to it in ways that would be 
appreciated by the clinic. During one of Liam’s appointments with nurse Ramesh, Liam 
posited: “I’ve lost weight … how much weight have I lost?” Ramesh did not respond as he 
was entering Liam’s current weight into the computer. When Liam left, I asked Ramesh 
whether Liam had indeed lost weight and Ramesh responded, “I don’t think he’s lost; he may 
have gained.” He then checked for me: “he was 111.8, now he’s 111 – might have been the 
keys [during the previous weigh in].” Ramesh sighed, “I don’t bother.”  
 
Just as health professionals in Warin’s study tended to assume that people with anorexia ‘take 
everyday, common-sense dietary guidelines to the extreme’ (2010:105), clozapine clinical 
caregivers sometimes assumed that greater awareness of strategies to overcome weight gain 
would result in greater uptake of ‘health’ behaviours. UK Pharmacist Ros commented: “we 
tend to assume that there’s so much stuff in the media generally that people are aware of the 
benefits of exercise, or that switching from sugar in your tea to sweeteners in your tea can 
mean that you can have a fairly painless reduction in your dietary intake, but I’m sometimes 
surprised by how little our patients seem to be aware of that.” I found, however, that patients’ 
reasoning for sugar intake, in particular, was about a reapplication of information for one’s 
own purposes rather than a dismissing of this information altogether.  
 
Arguably, the abandonment of a singular imaginary for one consumption behavior across 
different contexts helped to produce a non-confinable sense of well-being through feelings of 
infinite potentiality. As Kapferer (2003) and Dennis (2016) posited, the way in which 
contradictory practices can be understood may not concern a means of compensation (a 
functionalist understanding), but rather by considering such logics as a means of innovative 
praxis. Herein, context-specific health logics become powerful tools of self-assertion.  
 
Patients worked within the logics that suited their needs at hand, and a central motif for sugar 
consumption was premised on the intention to generate energy even if patients were 
otherwise living with Type II diabetes that they also associated with sugar. When taking 
clozapine at a time of day when they did not want to fall asleep, patients looked to preserve 
their ‘mental’ energy by consuming highly caffeinated or sugar-based foods and drinks. UK 
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patient Luke, 45, said of energy drinks, “I need the energy don’t I, to motivate myself, sort of 
pick me up … I need to pick myself up to feel positive.” UK participant Alan, 43, addressed 
his clozapine-induced Type II diabetes by “cut[ting] out about 60 per cent of my sucrose 
intake.” Alan, however, explained to me that he also deliberately consumed sugar to counter-
act drowsiness, which he felt to be an ephemeral and negotiable side-effect of clozapine: 
 
Well, I take my dose of clozaril [a brand name of clozapine], between half 3 and half 
4, and have been, and it has a very sedative, soporific effect - what I mean by that is 
that it can knock you… into being sort of like a, very tired, very dizzy, ah, but what I 
do about that is, after I take my clozaril, is perk myself up a bit with a snack. Like I 
take some fructose or, or sugar or, you know, ‘couple of biscuits.   
 
Alan was more concerned by the immediate impacts, and momentum he could build. He was 
aware of the different forms of sugar available to him and consumed it in a selective way to 
mitigate the “soporific effect” of clozapine. Consuming sugar after consuming clozapine 
became quite a separate matter from his diabetes concerns. Alan took separate pieces of 
information about sugar: that, a) he needed to “cut out” his “sucrose” as it contributed to his 
diabetes, a longer- term side effect of clozapine; and that, b) “fructose” or general “sugar” 
(such as “biscuits”) could be useful when it came to countering the more immediately 
undesired side effect of clozapine. The two (contradictory) associations were irrelevant to one 
another when it comes to feelings of fatigue and the desire for feeling more in control in the 
moment.  
 
Sugar could also be felt to alleviate ‘mental’ health symptoms. UK patient Christopher, who 
also had Type II diabetes, supplemented clozapine with sugar-based foods. Christopher 
explained to me, “when the voices are worse, I have to eat more.” He said, “they’ve used that 
appetite to their own advantage, really, so, that’s how the voices and the thoughts pick up on 
things - you’ve got the true hunger in your appetite, but they pick up on these appetites and 
they use them in a different way.” Christopher continued, 
 
There is a big link between eating and how much the brain is working, really. It’s all 
linked together. Food, stress, concentration, medicine, and all this stuff … I’m trying 
to eat better. When I’m hungry, and I need to eat something fast … It’s hard to 
cook… cooking with a numb mind isn’t the best thing, burning things, making big 
messes that you’ve got clean up and all that kind of stuff. It’s kind of off-putting 
when you’re hungry and you’re able to cook Bolognese and there’s all these different 
things to do. 
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Christopher reasoned, “it’s just sugar, really, because I got diabetes as well - my blood sugar 
can go quite low and get kind of hypo type thing.” He – unlike some patients – did directly 
link his diabetes to clozapine, explaining, “when I was first in the hospital on clozapine, I was 
eating about six bowls of cereal with sugar on it every morning - basically, that’s the rituals 
you have there: food, medicines, cups of tea, cigarettes.” Yet Christopher’s needs for sugar 
were, at the same time, normalised: 
 
Different situations take more sugar. In a supermarket, sometimes it’s a bit of a weird 
place for me. Sometimes I feel that there’s something going on in there. It’s like the 
Savannah, it’s like the watering hole, where everyone goes to drink water and 
replenish their supplies and everything like that, and, um, so yeah. You’ve got 
different kinds of animals, some predators, some not, some birds, some can fly away 
and things like that. So, I go there and find it quite stressful. So, getting a bit stressed, 
then realizing ‘oh, yeah, I’m stressed, what’s happening there?’- ‘oh, right, eat 
something.’ And it brings the sugar back up and it brings you back to a level 
where… I don’t fully understand it, but yeah. 
 
Christopher saw his needs for sugar and food as context dependent but ultimately something 
that brought him back to an environmental homeostasis (Rapport 2003). He also held out 
potentiality for overcoming stress altogether: “at the end of the day, I think that the virtuous 
things will win out, but there’s a lot of pain along the way.” He felt he just needed to “keep 
trotting on, keep my brain safe, trying to do what’s right.”  
 
Patients’ intentions were very much toward improving their health, and specific foods were 
seen as a source of ‘mental’ nourishment. UK patient, Ian, 40, commented, “the food I 
consume makes me feel good - it stops, um, mental illness.” Ian was conscientious of what he 
ate and planned his mealtimes:  
 
In the evening, I’ll have bolognaise or chicken, I buy weight watchers. In the 
afternoon, I have a lunch time meal, I might have a small portion of food, yeah, like a 
few portions of fruits, and a drink, that’s all I have, yeah. If I’m hungry I’ll have a 
sandwich, a toasted cheese sandwich … then in the morning, Alpine Porridge or 
breakfast cereal … food, makes me feel good yeah.  
 
When I asked Ian in what ways these foods made him feel better, he replied, “I don’t know, 
just makes me feel good, yeah?” I asked if there were any other particular foods, and he 
replied: 
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Ian: Bolognaise, bolognaise, yeah 
JB: And describe to me how you feel after you’ve had the bolognaise? 
Ian: I just feel much happier yeah? Yeah  
JB: So, is it a mood thing or physically do you feel better? 
Ian: Not sure, not sure, I don’t know. 
 
Somewhat similarly to Ian’s desire for foods that give simple ‘happiness,’ Australian patient 
Daisy, 51, had said to me before an interview that she wanted some “hot chips” and that, “I 
need my sugar hit” – proudly showing me her “special” blood orange soft drink bottle. She 
later said of what the term health meant, “my tummy, when it’s happy.” I asked Daisy if she 
was happy now, and she said, “very happy, because I’m eating chips now.” She was not 
actually eating chips yet, but the imaginary of eating them after our interview seemed to be 
enough. I asked if there were any other foods that made her and her tummy happy and she 
replied (with a cheeky laugh), “chocolate coated ice-creams!”  
 
Some patients did not imagine a direct relationship between clozapine and their weight gain, 
and weight gain was sometimes felt to be a “healthy” thing based on initial positive feedback 
they had received about their appetites during the medical treatments. UK patient Hugo, 25, 
said, “I’ve put on some weight in the last couple of years … my Mum reckons it’s [be]cause 
of the clozapine, but I’m not sure.” UK patient Josh, 48, had developed Type II diabetes that 
he said was brought on from eating “too much sugar” but not because of clozapine per se. 
When I asked him about what health meant he said, “if you’re healthy you have to eat food, 
don’t ya? Sometimes if you eat too less it’s unhealthy innit?” Josh told me that he had 
inadvertently lost weight some time ago while living in supported housing, and “they made 
me go see the GP and he took some blood, and he said that my blood’s very good - you 
know, the [caregivers at the] house said I must eat well.” The former advice gave Josh 
reassurance and hope for his health while the latter advice gave him reason to eat more (not 
less, despite his weight loss not yielding worrying blood results). Moreover, when Australian 
patient Max, 36, said that one of the factors that made him feel in control was “eating well,” 
he elaborated that this meant “good food! Something that’s yummy, hearty, filling.” 
Appetites on clozapine could be seen as health-giving rather than health-destroying.  
 
The meaning of ‘healthy food’ primarily pertained to notions of ‘hearty meals’ and were 
associated with the nourishment first experienced in hospital. Many patients told me how the 
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weight gain began in hospital as a part of being cared for (such that eating anything at all felt 
like a step toward health). For instance, UK patient Robert, who described hospital as a 
“refuge” said: “I had meals, you know three or four times a day, cooked for me, nice meals, 
tasty meals.” UK patient Alice, 36, who was ‘morbidly obese’ by clinic measurements, said 
to me that she used to be “underweight if anything” when she first went into hospital some 
ten years earlier, recalling that “the nurses would watch” her “to make sure I ate every meal.”  
 
Another aspect to consuming food in conjunction with clozapine was about healthful feelings 
of freedom to choose for oneself what to make of one’s circumstances, as distinct from being 
in hospital where patients often had little or no freedom to choose their food. As suggested 
above, grocery shopping constituted an important structure in many patients’ fortnightly 
routines. UK patient Holly, 40, recalled, 
 
Holly: The day I was put on clozapine, I asked them, ‘can I go to the supermarket?’ 
and they said yes, and I bought loads of chocolate! 
JB: So, do you get particular cravings because of the clozapine, or?  
Holly: Yeah, I do. Certain things, like I think of a jam tart or if, like, I see like a cake 
on television, like a carrot cake, I’d have to have that specific thing. 
 
Holly enjoyed being able to satiate her desire for a “specific thing.” Australian patient Ned, 
27, also said, “I get cravings all the time, like you get cravings to eat fast food … when you 
first start taking clozapine you just eat, eat whatever, like you’ll be going through Mars Bars 
and noodles and takeaways.” 
 
Patients who had lost weight – after initially gaining it during clozapine treatment – did so by 
feeling able to find a balance themselves. UK patient Tom, 54, said that he would advise 
clozapine newcomers to “be careful of the high dosage, and then also to do some researching 
on the internet maybe, and watch your weight – [be]cause you’re gonna get that, you’re 
gonna get fatigued, you’re not gonna be able to have so much energy… you’re gonna get 
drowsiness in the morning and you’re gonna put the weight on – do you want that?” When I 
asked if there was a way, then, to “prevent” weight gain despite higher doses, Tom answered, 
“yeah probably, yeah, I don’t know, I don’t know if I would’ve stopped if someone had told 
me what I know now – would I have grasped it, would I have understood it, which is – so 
easy if you can get something to relieve the… schizophrenia … but now I’ve got the happy 
balance, so it’s alright now.” 
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Tom was now on a sub-therapeutic dose of clozapine and engaging in intensive and regular 
martial arts exercises such that he was back to his original weight of 11 stone, having initially 
gone “up to 15 and a half.” UK patient Joanne had similarly “come down in stages from 14 
stone” to “11-ish” stone, although while staying on a ‘therapeutic’ clozapine dose. Rather, 
she had sought help from a local weight loss support group: “people have kind of challenged 
me a bit, and I’ve sort of decided to run with it.”53 Joanne had first begun to strategise while 
in hospital when she ate bread because, “it’s less sugary, so I was trying to be sensible and 
not to have a lot of sugar, but at the same time my body was telling me [to eat it].” She 
recalled how she “used to go to the [hospital] kitchen and I used to have just bread and butter, 
and more bread and butter, and more bread and butter ... I guess it is sugar number one, and 
otherwise kind of filling up your tummy.” Joanne tried to go with the latter, allowing herself 
a certain number of “carbs” recommended by the weight loss program. She said, “I wanna 
keep on being in charge of my weight, you know, and sometimes I do graze and sometimes 
… the next couple of days I'll have to watch it - so, I go up and down a bit” and “you've 
got to keep a sense of humour and keep proportion, so, you know, ‘I'm in charge of it,’ that's 
what I like to say, I feel I'm in charge.”  
 
Patients also actively experimented with how much they relied on consumptions. I asked UK 
patient Steve, 21 – who often attended the clinic with a large bottle of soft drink – whether 
there was anything in particular that quenches his thirst. After some initial clarification of 
what I meant, “I dunno,’ not really… it’s like I chill out, and then like, feel alright, and then 
it’s like okay … it’s like when I’m relaxed I feel more fulfilled, more relaxed in my head.” In 
other words, while he knew he could achieve the feeling of being “relaxed” in his “head,” 
Steve still felt the need to “have a drink”. Joanne also spoke of how “you might find that you 
get to the end of your line and you end up going into a cafe, and having two cups of tea and a 
nice pastry or something! Because you’ll feel better after it or be able to go on, and proceed.”   
 
Like Warin (2010) found in her ethnographic study with anorexia patients, there were a range 
of personal preferences for particular foods, leading to particular relationships with those 
foods, that made the concept of cravings more personal than a biochemical framework would 
                                                 
53 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to comment on the effectiveness of weight loss support programs that were not tied to 
the clozapine clinic however perhaps because Joanne and Tom were seen as neither clozapine patients nor as schizophrenia 
patients by their respective weight loss program or martial arts group, and thus treated like any member of the community, 
this may have helped them to build even more confidence in themselves.  
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allow. Australian patient Daniel said that, “when I was on a higher dose of clozapine I went 
right up to 120, 125[kg],” and found that clozapine “definitely increased your appetite too, or 
lowered my ability to discipline myself.” Daniel, like Joanne, said that with his dose 
reduction and lower weight, he liked to “challenge myself.” As well as going through 
“phases” of eating the same food type for days on end (cheese sandwiches for a week, then 
crisps, then fun size chocolates), Daniel said that “ideally for me I only like to eat once a day, 
yeah, I like to have one real tasty good meal a day.” He would also “see how long I can 
starve myself, just like to see how disciplined I could be … I just, I do [be]cause its fun too, 
[be]cause being hungry, um, for a prolonged period of time, that can give you a buzz.” He 
told me this enthusiastically and then laughed, “I have no discipline at the moment, um, and I 
just… I eat, I eat fast food, I eat, you know, Chinese food … I eat too much of it, [be]cause I 
love to just sit down in front of the telly and gorge myself.” Such behaviours made different 
impressions on clinical caregivers. UK Phlebotomist Tina felt that, rather than clozapine 
cravings, “with most of them it’s comfort eating, like [out] of boredom.” But patients did not 
mention to me navigating boredom; patients rather created new potentials for themselves 
around what their consumptions would mean.  
 
Inconsistencies between registers of meaning may dissolve in the presence of novel feelings 
of productivity, no matter how ephemeral. In regard to understanding witchcraft, Kapferer 
(2003:22) suggests that ‘it is a process at the moment of fusing or crossing different registers 
of meaning and reasoning.’ Further, Dennis (2016:92), in her ethnographic research on 
cigarette smoking in the context of heavy public health deterrence, illuminated how pregnant 
mothers who smoked cigarettes confidently reasoned that they did not abuse additional 
substances readily available them. Dennis’ participants felt as though, given the multiply of 
risk-ridden opportunities at hand, the proactive choice to only smoke works to represent 
‘something good, positive and healthful for their unborn babies’ (2016:92). The suspending 
of judgement around what a consumption practice means, under the guise of health warnings, 
suggests that internally redressed knowledge, however tenuous, may project beyond holistic 
health imaginaries. 
 
While Kapferer (2003) and Dennis (2016) suggest that incongruent ideas may, in lived 
experience, be ‘fused’ together to open up new potentialities, lived consumption meanings in 
the context of clozapine treatment may also reinforce what is clinically kept apart, and out of 
clinical reach. When I asked Daniel if he experienced cravings for coke, he responded, “no, I 
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just like to drink it because when I drink it, it sort of um, I’m not sure if the word is, um, sat-
i-ates, or?” To try to cut down on how much he drank, Daniel smoked cigarettes to contribute 
the feeling of satiation. Because he could essentially substitute what he consumed to achieve 
a level of satiation, the notion of craving did not qualify. In this way, he felt he could control 
the quantities and substance he consumed.  
 
Ownership over the time of consumption was also important to patients, as it was to Warin’s 
(2010:59) ethnographic participants with anorexia. Daniel, who had begun smoking “to stay 
awake” while working as a taxi driver, said that: “I used to smoke, in my down time while 
driving cabs and then at home, and then when I was psychotic and I was in hospital a lot, my 
smoking just sky-rocketed.” To remedy this loss of control over when he smoked, Daniel 
now tried to smoke at regular intervals and only a specific amount: “its basically my main 
daily routine, is every half an hour I go out back and… depending on where I’m at, 
sometimes I’ll think ‘ah I’m gonna quit now’ so what I’ll do is, I’ll still go out back every 30 
minutes, on the dot, for a cigarette, but I’ll just smoke ah 3 or 4 puffs and then put it out.” 
Daniel elaborated that clinic staff “always say, you know, if you wanna quit we can give you 
patches, we can help you with that” and while, he said, “I appreciate the offers and the 
suggestions … I’m pretty stubborn, I think, um, if I wanna quit, I’ll quit.”  
 
Certain elements to cigarettes, like ‘clean foods’ (Warin 2010) could similarly constitute a 
sense of well-being and relative consumption ‘purity’ (Douglas 1966). Australian patient 
Charlie, 35, said he lived for smoking cigarettes; that it was “probably one of my favourite 
things to do” (see Brown 2018). He explained: 
 
I smoke rollie cigarettes so they’re just really fresh and nice. They don’t have as 
many chemicals in them. Yeah, it’s just nice to have a cigarette… yeah. If you’re 
addicted to cigarettes, you wanna have cigarettes … but I don’t need to smoke 
cigarettes … It’s almost a control. There are some behaviours that can be almost a 
control, but not quite. 
 
Charlie felt a sense of choice to smoke hand rolled cigarettes that he believed to be relatively 
“really fresh and nice” without “as many chemicals”. Further, during my fieldwork UK 
patient Alan took up clinical advice to vape electronic cigarettes instead of smoking tobacco, 
viewing them also as “cleaner.” Both smoking and vaping allowed Alan to “prep” himself for 
activities, with ambitions to keep improving his health (Brown 2018:163). Alan also felt 
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efficacy in being able to manage his Type II diabetes, and intended to “get some exercise, 
and it will be perfectly manageable with the metformin [diabetes medication].” He also 
hypothesized that “a little bit of exercise might even improve the clozoril function a little bit, 
maybe.” There was thus scope for incremental improvements in the same way that little 
details in personal health imaginaries revealed agency over experiences that might otherwise 
be viewed as broadly ‘unhealthy.’ Moreover, the uncertainties about clozapine facilitated the 
ways in which people felt efficacious.  
 
Tipping points 
 
I don’t see how increasing clozapine will help me stop worrying about the fate of 
humanity every time I wake up in the morning! – Donna, 40, Australian patient 
 
Building a narrative around what oneself was experiencing in regard to the ambiguous 
influence of clozapine – particularly in regard to dietary appetites and remedies for side 
effects – was empowering for patients. As suggested in regard to the blockages and flows in 
regard to bloodwork in Chapter Two, there was potential to overcome physiological 
‘blockages’ pertaining to bodily experiences. Whether this was by taking laxatives or fluids, 
satiating cravings or consuming particular foods or beverages that provided self-assurance of 
‘health,’ patients were able to work toward finding their own sense of balance from the 
ambiguous experiences and knowledge of clozapine, and which side effects were negotiable. 
 
As indicated above, patients did not see their weight gain on clozapine as entirely 
unmanageable; there was a ‘will-to-power’ over the way it might impact their bodies 
(Nietzsche in Rapport 2003:82). Australian patient Donna said, “I would really like to try 
another medication, because I’m so sick of being overweight, I’m sick of being fat, I used to 
be really trim before I went on clozapine,” but reclaimed some control back by persisting 
with a “healthy diet.” She began her day with “Weetbix with banana, or muesli with 
yoghurt,” and felt able to manage cravings: “I don’t eat a lot of rubbish … I like to have a 
milo after dinner, that’s as far as those sweet things go.”  Donna experienced ongoing anxiety 
and said that, “sometimes I just can’t cope … Like I’ll go to a social function or a lecture or 
something, I’ll turn up and everybody… I feel like everyone knows who I am and that I’ve 
entered the building! You know that feeling of being famous, and watched, and monitored?” 
Her remedy for this was drinking alcohol, “3-6 standard drinks,” every night. As I discuss 
later, this had become a reasonable remedy according to her social worker too. What was 
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more, Donna qualified her general diet as “healthy.” She explained she would “only eat meat 
once or twice a week,” and she enjoyed cooking “mostly Italian I suppose, like pasta and 
risotto, and stir-fry.” Similarly, UK patient Gary, 27, commented that “it [clozapine] makes 
me hungry all the time … I try to be as strict as I can so I start losing weight, [be]cause I need 
to lose weight.” Gary explained how he “put on 2 stone in 2 weeks” during his hospital 
admission and clozapine titration; “all of a sudden I got fat.” While the vast majority of 
patients gained some weight on clozapine, not all did (and some, as we saw above in the 
cases of Tom and Joanne, felt able to control it).  
 
The inconsistency in weight gain between individuals on clozapine gave clinical caregivers 
reason to question the role of clozapine per se. Australian nurse Zoya noted, “not everybody 
has weight gain with clozapine, not everyone - some people stabilize, some people lose 
weight and gain weight, even though the medication is the same.” Further, some clinicians 
had their own theories and knowledge to imagine different outcomes through.  
 
As Meyers (2013:90) observed in his ethnography on adolescents being pharmacologically 
treated or ceasing to be treated for opioid dependencies, for those who are both clinical 
caregivers and researchers, they ‘can only “hope” that the results of the research study align 
with the realities of treatment and care.’ Yet, as (Meyers 2013:90) posited, ‘even more 
revealing is how these “things” fail to find proper grammar in the research narrative, turning 
the realities of day-to-day medical care into abstractions’ such that ‘the “clinical” (as the 
event of treatment) is held apart from the aims of research science.’ In talking with UK 
neuropsychiatrist George about whether more could be done to help patients with weight 
gain, he said: 
 
With the hat on as a researcher, there are a few things. We are doing a meta-analysis. 
Some evidence suggests that adding metformin [Type II diabetes medication] to 
people who are on clozapine, even if they are not diabetic, that helps to reduce 
weight, so it’s something we should be doing … we need to understand a bit better 
why people put on weight … you may have seen at the clinic, a lot of our patients 
gain weight but not all of them, and I have had patients with 800 milligrams per day, 
which is a massive dose and not even smokers, and they were slim … there are 
different metabolic weights that we need to study.  
 
On the other hand, Australian psychiatrist Adam, not as involved in the neuropsychiatric 
research world, imagined that weight gain was an “appetite thing” attributed to clozapine and 
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patients not recognising when they had eaten enough food: “it’s not about looking for the 
reward”; rather “for reasons that we don’t quite understand these people don’t experience 
satiety – they just know that they’re hungry all the time ... These people simply don’t know 
that they’re not hungry.” Patients felt their appetites to be at least associated with, if not 
directly caused by, clozapine. UK patient Steve, 21, commented in regard to his appetite, 
“I’ve thought that there’s something missing”; “and I sit there, like, playing the PlayStation 
or something, and I feel like something’s missing, like, I don’t feel full, like I could use 
something, so I drink, or something like that. It doesn’t always completely work.” As 
discussed above, Steve found that being “relaxed” allowed him to “feel more fulfilled.” 
Moreover, the flux of clozapine’s experiential impacts and the personal means for negotiating 
feelings like cravings were helped by lack of specificity when it came to the biochemical 
efficacy and impacts of clozapine.  
 
There is no clear threshold when it comes to prescribing or consuming, and thus the degree of 
accountability in terms of how clozapine interacts with individuals consuming it, and what 
can be done about side effects problematises who and what is to blame when patients are 
experiencing a clinically questionable quality of life. Australian psychiatrist Sandra 
commented, 
 
It’s always a balancing act with prescribing, there comes a tipping point, you might 
be chasing an improvement, a reduction in certain symptoms, but you’re actually – 
the side effect burden is just going exponentially and you think … we have to dial 
this back a little bit … sometimes you can become, um, a bit too blinkered in your 
treatment, you know, you think I must control the voices or, this person’s delusions 
must go away, but I’m not sure that necessarily translates into quality of life, or 
function.  
 
Of her professional role in clozapine treatment, Sandra said, “clozapine is a very special 
thing”; that “it’s unique to tertiary psychiatry”; “it’s the only treatment that only we do, you 
know, other doctors don’t really know about it, and they don’t understand the unique 
qualities of this drug, and the unique challenges.” But on the limits of such particular 
medication-based solutions, she acknowledged how one can become “a bit too blinkered” in 
chasing the alleviation of psychotic phenomena, at the possible expense of a patient’s overall 
“quality of life, or function.” Sandra, who initially thought that psychiatry was too “woolly” 
in practice, ended up pursing it because, “I was really bored with internal medicine” and 
“wasn’t interested in their physiology, I was interested in their person.” An awareness for 
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personal, social and familial factors cemented this decision when her own brother fell ill with 
schizophrenia during her medical training.54 Sandra noted that her and her colleagues, can 
both hold “control” and lose it. Uncertainty, and striving for control, concerned finding an 
appropriate clozapine dose.  
 
There were plenty of constructive ‘unknowns’ in regard to clozapine dosage. While clinicians 
in the UK aimed to reduce the clozapine dose as soon as patients were stable, in belief that 
side effects were largely caused by therapeutic and toxic doses of clozapine, as opposed to 
sub-therapeutic doses, I did not observe this approach to be enacted in the Australian clinic 
(despite clinicians suggesting a degree of agreement with the UK approach). UK prescribing 
nurse Clive confirmed that “we’ve got quite a few patients on sub-therapeutic doses.” As well 
suggesting UK patient Kevin’s weight gain to be attributable to his clozapine dose, there 
were also other side effects that Clive linked directly with clozapine, such as symptoms of 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (Fernandez-Egea et al. 2018). Clive explained, “once 
you see that it’s so severe, there are high chances that when you check plasma levels, hm, 
plasma levels are so high … OCD should not be there, not unless plasma levels are high. 
[but] there are systems that can be affected quite quicker than others.” 
 
Meanwhile, Australian psychiatrist Adam said that although “a lot of the side effects are dose 
related”, that “we wouldn’t dose according to just blood level.” On the one hand, he agreed 
that, “it’s always worth a trial of dose reduction”. On the other hand, he said, “I don’t think 
there really is a therapeutic level” to be ascertained. In contrast to the UK clinic, Adam 
remarked that sub-therapeutic doses of clozapine were “uncommon” in the Australian clinic, 
and that plasma levels were “arbitrary” – especially when compared to drugs like lithium. He 
furthered, “clozapine levels are more about, ‘am I giving them an insufficient dose, that’s 
why they’re still unwell’ rather than, ‘they’re well, let’s see how I’ve done with a really low 
level.” Yet, conceded, “we’re using smaller doses accepting that when you have higher doses 
what are you really doing, apart from exposing people to side effects.” Australian nurse 
Kerry said, “the dose isn’t related to how unwell they are or how well they get, the dose is 
irrelevant, it’s customized to them personally,” while Australian clozapine assistant Ramesh 
echoed this view and perceived patients to be receptive to it: 
                                                 
54 He was subsequently put on clozapine, which he took for ten years before ceasing treatment a year before I met Sandra: 
“it’s been a huge saga since then … I have one patient who really reminds me of my little brother, and I have to kind of 
monitor that, and think ‘well, it’s not my little brother,’ but it just tugs at the heart strings at little bit more.” 
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I’ve seen a lot of patients who are on the same dose for many years and they don’t 
like to reduce that, because they think that’s optimal dose for them, and the doctors 
don’t try to reduce it for them, [be]cause… I’m not sure whether it’s appropriate to 
reduce the dose right away just because they have drooling or weight gain or sedation 
– not very life threatening. 
 
The primacy of psychiatric stability over side effects prevailed more strongly in the 
Australian clinic. Adam suggested that dosage changes were also more to do with the ‘type’ 
of schizophrenia being treated:  
 
It kind of makes sense that if someone has primarily a paranoid illness – they’ve got 
delusions and hallucinations – they tend to be more sensitive to treatment with 
antipsychotic medication, so you may see an improvement on a particular dose, as 
opposed to someone who’s got a disorganised illness, who doesn’t have as wonderful 
response, so you are more tempted to push the dose. It’s just the way we practice 
medicine.  
 
There was, however, reluctance from some patients to accept a higher clozapine dose. Donna, 
who felt that her weight gain was caused by clozapine, rejected her psychiatrist’s offer to 
raise the dose further also because: “I don’t see how increasing clozapine will help me stop 
worrying about the fate of humanity every time I wake up in the morning!” Donna’s 
‘paranoid schizophrenia’ had not responded to clozapine in the ways expected by Adam, and 
Donna, like other female patients in my study, found it hard to accept weight gain.  
 
UK pharmacist Ros acknowledged the differing role of personal ‘acceptance’ when it came to 
the impact of clozapine on a person: 
 
The perfect situation would be the person who can just get on with their life … and 
not having their quality of life compromised by side effects, whether that be weight 
gain … getting very breathless because they’re out of condition and they’re very 
sedated, and not getting side effects like hyper-salivation or constipation … it is 
interesting in terms of how much people differ in terms of what they’re prepared to 
accept. 
 
Further, clinicians were left to deduce what they could from their own experiences, too. UK 
psychiatrist George imagined that although he was “not probably aware because I haven’t put 
on 10-15 kg, yet, but I’ve got the impression that has a massive impact on your ability to 
move, on your ability to feel energetic,” and “you have all illness that is effecting your 
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cognitive levels, you have a medication that is causing you sedation and probably slowing 
even more your cognitive levels, on top of this you need to manage 10-15 kilos more than 
usual, that’s a huge task.”   
 
The entirety of ‘physical’ side effects of clozapine were difficult to account for, between both 
health professionals and patients. Adam commented,  
 
Sometimes people will come in with something they believe is a side effect, and we 
can’t really know what all the side effects are. And as a clinician you may just wanna 
go ‘nup, we don’t see that,’ which never goes down well. A better approach would be 
to say ‘oh, I’ve never heard of that. How bad is it? Is it worth living with?’ So, 
negotiate with the patient whether it’s severe or not. And if the patient is really 
convinced that it’s a side effect, and you’re ignoring it, the patient will not take the 
medication. So, you’re much better off being honest!  
 
Patients were particularly aware of the incomplete clinical knowledge about the ‘cognitive’ 
side effects of clozapine and symptoms schizophrenia. For instance, UK patient Christopher, 
39, explained to me, “sometimes I’m not on the ball - so, the doctor said it may be the 
schizophrenia, positive or negative symptoms or something like that, or it may be the things 
that the medicine might be doing.” I asked: 
 
JB: With the concentration and focus, did you find that it was okay when you were 
unwell? 
Christopher: I don’t know, because I’ve been on this clozapine … nearly twenty 
years now. I never really had to use the stuff [cognitive skills], but now that I’m 
finding I have to use it – kind of remembering things, now that I’m having to use it, 
I’m kind of finding deficits in those areas. It’s a bit… if I wasn’t on these drugs, 
would I be better? 
 
By the time I returned the following year, Christopher had become increasingly worried 
about losing his part-time paid and voluntary jobs due to his memory difficulties, so asked for 
a dose reduction: “I’m trying to see if I can cut down on medicine a little bit, because it’s 
these things like, having to carry this around, and remembering things, and conversations, 
and trying to take in the information and stuff, so… I’m hoping that maybe if I cut down on 
clozapine, some of these things will go away.” 
 
Another ‘unknown’ tipping point in regard to clozapine interactions concerned the potential 
for ‘reward’ during exercise. Having been told by a psychiatrist registrar I met with in the 
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preparation for my fieldwork that clozapine patients do not experience “the same endorphin 
rush that we do” during exercise, the neurochemical interactions became a side-curiosity that 
I never got a clear answer for. When I asked George about this, he said it was “conceptually 
very interesting” – albeit “simplistic” – but that it “would be a very nice study to be done, 
honestly.” Adam, however, said that as a barrier to exercise, people with schizophrenia are 
not entirely unique in their experiences: 
 
When you think about the level of exercise in the general population, it’s not that 
fantastic anyhow, but it is far more reduced in a population of people with 
schizophrenia. I mean, when you think about getting the buzz from exercise… I think 
it’s real [exercise] junkies that get that, but on the whole most people don’t really get 
it. 
 
As to what did motivate people to exercise, I found that the vast majority of patients who 
exercised echoed Kevin’s reasoning (earlier in the chapter) about exercise being enjoyable 
but not quite constituting a ‘mental’ reward. However, a few patients who had exercised in 
their youth and were thus perhaps more inclined to pick up exercise again, described feeling 
some kind of ‘buzz.’ Joanne described it as: “I come back and I feel fresh and tingly, and less 
in my thoughts, I suppose, less prey to my thoughts or my anxieties, and worries, and it’s a 
nice place, it’s a nice feeling, it’s good”.  
 
As well as elusive positive experiences that may or may not have been impacted by clozapine 
according to open clinical judgements, there were also personally perceived clozapine side 
effects that could provide authorship over uncomfortable experiences. UK patient Bradley 
described, “dry eyes, floaters in the eyes which make you go blind, basically, you can’t see 
properly.” I clarified the cause and he said, “that’s from clozapine,” and elaborated:  
 
If I miss a dose I get diarrhoea, I get headaches… I get chest pains, head pains, have 
seizures in the night – well not seizures but I have seizures where I can’t, I cannot 
control my arm and my leg, so I’m just, my leg is just jerking away, I just can’t 
control it. The more I try to control it the more, the worse it gets and then… that’s 
clozapine. That’s what clozapine does to me. 
 
Just as the ‘psychiatric’ withdrawal effects of stopping clozapine could not be assured, the 
longer term ‘physical’ impacts could not be assured either. This was in part because patients 
had not only previously tried other anti-psychotics, many patients were still on combinations 
of other drugs. 
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Australian patient Max, who was participating in a Narcotics Anonymous (NA) program 
alongside starting clozapine, said that he had “read a little bit about it on the information 
sheet that they handed us” and “we’ve researched it at the [NA] centre, like researched the 
side effects.” He experienced the feeling of “razor blades” and “we [at the NA centre] think it 
must just be some kind of side effect.” I asked how he thought clozapine was causing the 
razor blade feeling and he replied, “I don’t know. It’s like um, itchiness, like some sort of 
tactile hallucination.” Max, who was adamant that despite these ‘physical’ effects, that he 
would “rather be on the drug than not,” also reported experiencing “phantom sweats” from 
clozapine (“it feels like I’ve just stepped out of the shower, but when I go to dry myself off 
there’s nothing there”). A few other patients reported sweating as an ongoing side effect, if 
not as part of what it meant to be carrying extra body weight. As Adam had said, it was 
important to “be honest” and “negotiate” when possible. He continued that, “It’s a rather 
nebulous idea, quality of life... I guess I think about it in terms of dignity.” Just as patients 
differed in their experiences of clozapine side effects, implicating what they were willing to 
‘accept’, providing dignity was also about the limits to prescribing clozapine. 
 
Psychiatrists are most accountable insofar as what clozapine dosage is prescribed, but there 
are uncertainties as to where their role should end. UK psychiatrist Kate said, “I prescribe, so 
that’s my responsibility.” She then added, “I need to make sure that it’s monitored carefully – 
not just the FBCs [Full Blood Counts] but the weight, the cardiac, the metabolic side effects.” 
Australian psychiatrist Adam more cynically reified the reality of his obligation to prescribe 
first and foremost when he told me, 
 
It’s unfortunate that over the years psychiatry has kind of descended into this thing 
about owning a prescription pad. There’s a lot more that would be nice to provide 
people with – sophisticated clinical management, very active community activities. 
And part of the job is to see what is there for the patient as well, not just writing 
prescriptions. Um, but, at the end of the day, medical treatment is essentially what 
psychiatrists are essentially in public clinics for.  
 
Psychiatrists in my research were cognisant of the contradictions in terms of clinical 
priorities. At first, Kate simplified the situation when she described one of her female 
patients: “she would always say that she doesn’t like clozapine because it’s sedating and it’s 
made her fat, but it’s given her life back.” Kate described schizophrenia under the biological 
narrative of a “brain disease; it’s very, very debilitating … and many of them don’t achieve 
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very much because of the negative symptoms.” Like patients, doctors could maximise hope 
from the ‘unknowns.’ Kate at first suggested that negative symptoms might be treatable with 
“aspirin” according to some recent research she had heard about, but on further reflection, 
she spoke of the importance of social support. When asked about whether she had noticed 
any changes in the prevalence of negative symptoms in the last twenty years of community-
based care (deinstitutionalisation), Kate paused, and then stated: “I think it’s got much worse. 
Because there’s a silent… ah, yeah, those people are not recognised, they’ve fallen off the 
radar, they might be living in supported accommodation with no social contact, no 
meaningful engagement with society.”  
 
These reflections on the impacts of deinstitutionalisation provided another vessel for clinical 
caregivers to channel potential for greater social engagement for their patients into. Clive told 
me one day: 
 
If I could meet with David Cameron [then UK Prime Minister] I would take him with 
me on one of my home visits. I’d say, ‘Dave, man, come and see this.’ If he could 
just see it for himself, there would be no more cuts and a transport allowance would 
be brought back… Some of my guys that I visit out in the villages haven’t seen a 
single person since my last visit… Back when there were institutions, patients would 
have to get up every morning, shower, have their medication and breakfast, a bus 
would come and pick them up to take them to work - a factory job that suited their 
interests as much as possible, spend their money on socialising opportunities like 
lunch with other patients, a bus would bring them back and everyone would have 
dinner, be brought their meds… the voices didn’t bother people as much; people 
were occupied. The patients you see today complain of voices bothering them when 
they’re alone, not when they’re out doing things.  
 
As I discuss later, the notion that symptoms can be managed through activities as well as 
clozapine was a key theme for patients, too. Yet, medication management, following the 
blood work, provided a means of providing potential further assistance to patients in lieu of 
limited formal support options. There were, however, further and differing clinical 
interpretations that also contributed to ‘health’ being held open to patients’ reclamation. 
 
I was able to discern at least three further lines of clinical reasoning for cardio-metabolic 
associations with clozapine, which allowed for a fluid management of clinical and patient 
concerns and accountabilities. Rapport (2003) described how circumstances appear one way 
from the outside but different perspectives are held by those who are actually living them; so, 
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too, when these three rationales are taken together they provide a pallet of interchanging 
personal and professional liabilities for clinical caregivers and patients to canvas. These 
clinical explanations came up during an interview with UK neuropsychiatrist George, and 
simultaneously matched and contradicted what I heard from other clinical caregivers. Despite 
being such a specialised treatment regimen with physiological consequences, these varying 
interpretations ultimately provided a wider scope for clozapine imaginaries. The three 
interpretations yielding incomplete knowledge included: the role of schizophrenia symptoms; 
lagging holistic healthcare and questions of ‘habit’; and matters of individual motivation. I 
discuss each of these in turn, before building on the last and most politically contentious 
interpretation in the remainder of this chapter.  
 
Interpreting and managing symptoms, and ‘body care’ 
 
The unclear role of clinical symptoms in light of ‘bodily’ appearances during clozapine 
treatment meant a minimising of the potential clinical reach when it came to patients’ 
contributing ‘lifestyle’ behaviours. Some phenomenological and psychoanalytic explorations 
of schizophrenia assert that the condition begins as a disturbance of the basic sense of being a 
body, leading to a traumatic interruption of the experience of being a self: patients may feel 
dis-embodied (Laing 1965; Fuchs, 2005). This can also be applied to a neurological 
framework of ‘neglect.’ UK neuropsychiatrist George remarked, “they know they are putting 
on weight but they are not as concerned, or they tend to ignore this part, or neglect in the 
sense of neurological neglect, so not ‘I don’t care,’ but ‘I don’t notice.’ Australian social 
worker Jill, when commenting on the messiness of some patients’ houses, similarly said, 
“they don’t seem to see it… and the personal hygiene, it doesn’t seem to bother them because 
they’re dealing with all this stuff in their head - that’s how I can see it, you know, they just 
have a different perception of themselves and the world.” Yet, UK psychiatrist Kate refuted 
this idea of not ‘noticing,’ instead flipping the issue back to patients not ‘caring’: “Nobody 
who is overweight has ever denied that they’re overweight. I suppose some of them just 
seem, not too bothered about it … [but] some of them take great care of themselves – they’re 
immaculately dressed, wear make-up, the latest fashion, have nice hair – so, they clearly do 
care about their appearance.”  
 
I observed, too, that patients were aware of their appearance but in very particular ways that 
did not necessarily observe concerns about bodily shape but rather how one prepared one’s 
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body. For instance, UK patient Robert was quite conscious of his appearance and particularly 
body hygiene, sometimes styling his hair and once apologising to me for body odour that I 
had not actually noticed: “Sorry I might whiff a bit today, I had a quick wash the other day 
but… it’s the hot weather, it makes you smell a bit.” On one occasion Robert said to me, “I 
was going to change into some clean clothes because I remembered I was seeing you today, 
but then I ran out of time.” This was an uncomfortable realisation for me that patients felt 
such judgement, but it affirmed that they did indeed ‘care.’  
 
UK phlebotomist Tina commented that patients were “very aware” of having a “very, very, 
um, lack of hygiene.” While George said that in regard to schizophrenia and health 
behaviours, “you cannot plan very much in your head,” it was nonetheless imperative that 
patients took their ‘body care’ at their own pace. Tina gave an example of a patient who had 
not been able to catch a taxi home from the clinic one day because: 
 
Quite a few taxis refuse to take them … I asked him personally, myself, how come 
you’re still here  … he said ‘my taxi didn’t pick me up. He drove straight past when 
he saw me,’ and I asked him why? And he said, ‘it’s because I smell, and I stink,’ and 
I said … ‘do you feel that you stink?’ And he said, ‘yes, yes, I haven’t had a bath for 
months’ …  I said, ‘why do you not have a bath,’ and he said, ‘I can’t be bothered’ 
… And I said, ‘do you want someone to help you … and he said, ‘no, I’ll have one, 
next couple of months, I’ll think about it’ … I reckon that’s the initial illness from 
the beginning, that’s what stops them for some reason.  
 
What is more critical to note is how, from patients’ point of views that I was privy to, patients 
had never let go of the possibility of taking action and there was not outright ‘neglect’ nor 
lack of ‘care,’ in terms of perception or actions taken toward negotiating one’s bodily 
presence. George said that in regard to whether ‘action’ was taken, “that’s part of the illness 
itself isn’t it …. They complain sometimes more about sedation, about the ability to do some 
stuff [rather than weight gain per se] - we forget about the symptoms, and some of the 
symptoms are lack of motivation.” When I asked UK patient Dylan, 33 – who had minimal 
psychotic symptoms but a stockier build – about the ‘physical’ side effects of clozapine such 
as weight gain, he replied, “well, I’ve never experienced that, so.” He said of clozapine, 
“there are no side effects, which is really good.” Then again, this may have just been relative 
to previous antipsychotics such that, “one I was like that [gestured shriveling up into a 
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paralysis], and I couldn’t move – yeah, locked up, like that.”55 Dylan said that health “means 
a lot to me, [be]cause it’s my health” – specifically, “healthy eating, walking a lot.” He said 
that he walked “at least 5 miles a day.” When it came to his overall situation, he said “there 
are loads of things I could change but I don’t like talking about it.” Thus, while Dylan was 
not in a position of ‘neglecting’ high risk weight gain, he dismissed side effects because, 
relative to other experiences, they did not weigh in and he was walking every day with the 
intention of maintaining ‘health.’ What as more, he felt there were “loads of things I could 
change”; he felt it was up to him. 
 
The combination of symptoms, side effects and circumstances left interpretations open. 
Australian psychiatrist Sandra reflected, “my father used to complain endlessly that my 
brother was lazy, and I thought, ‘I’m not sure that he’s lazy, I think he’s got profound 
negative symptoms, and he’s heavily sedated, and his life is also pretty empty’… this was on 
clozapine.” Australian psychiatrist Adam noted both ‘negative’ and ‘paranoid’ symptoms to 
be responsible: “With a lot of people with schizophrenia it’s hard to motivate them, to do 
anything at all,” but “there can be a lot of [diagnosis related] reasons why someone might not 
exercise, from the very extreme – having very severe negative symptoms right through to ‘if I 
leave the house they’re going to be talking about me and someone’s going to hurt me.’” 
Indeed, UK patient Alice spoke of how she experienced “panic attacks” while walking 
outside so exercise had to be in her own space, using an exercise bike. When we last spoke 
she said she had been trying to cycle for twenty minutes per day, and she so far had not had 
any panic attacks “because no one is there [for me] to worry what they think.” Further, 
people’s past experiences and ongoing delusions also meant that meanings of bodily health 
were – perhaps to one’s benefit – protected from holistic view.  
 
Rather than all bodily associations being experienced together, they could be usefully 
dissociated and thus controlled by patients. Australian patient Daisy, who experienced health 
when her “tummy [was] happy,” had an otherwise complicated relationship with her body 
due to previous experiences of sexual abuse. The happiness she felt manifested through the 
imaginary of foods in her stomach was held apart from other experiences of her body – 
reinforcing the innovative and flexible praxis purported by both Kapferer (2003) and Dennis 
                                                 
55 Dylan conceded that clozapine made him “very tired,” and he slept 12 hours per night and napped for a few hours each 
afternoon, but he did not mind this, on the whole, because, “it’s lucky I’m still alive” and “when I don’t sleep I just get 
really, really bad.” 
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(2016), discussed earlier. Within minutes of commencing our interview, Daisy declared, 
unprompted, “if someone rapes me again I don’t care what happens to my body, [be]cause I 
have the power of prayer – it’s solved it all.” She continued, “the medication takes, took, 
away the memory of the rape … they took my… my right, of my life away with rape, and I 
tried to tell Dr [name], he should’ve talked to me, and talked to me, instead of staring at me – 
then I got raped.” When attending her clozapine appointments, though, Daisy squeezed her 
stomach and called herself “fat.” She would rarely, however, allow clinical caregivers, 
particularly males, to conduct any physical measurements. She also drew a controlled kind of 
attention to her body by, on the one hand, dressing up elaborately for her clozapine clinic 
appointments (alternating between complete sets of colour-coordinated clothing, accessories 
and carefully crafted make-up shades), and on the other hand, deflecting attention from her 
efforts. The first time I complemented her on her outfit she responded as though I was talking 
about her estranged sister, who Daisy said was “a fashion designer.” On another occasion 
when I told her she looked nice during a clinical check-up, she turned to nurse Zoya and said, 
“she does, doesn’t she,” looking Zoya up and down with a big smile. Daisy felt able to 
negotiate the attention given to her body, and thus expressed ‘care’ at the same time as saying 
that she did not care about what “happens” to it: It was her perception and steering of 
interactions that counted. Some patients, however, did not feel constant autonomy over their 
‘bodily’ states. Although at face value ongoing ‘delusions’ might suggest a lack of agency, 
the awareness patients had for the consequences of what was happening to their bodies 
persisted. 
 
Some patients construed their bodily health to be partly the result of the physical presence of 
someone else controlling their ‘lifestyle’ behaviours. While Cartesian dualisms dominate the 
clinical discourse of schizophrenia such that the ‘broken brain’ or 'cancer of the mind' stands 
in relation to the ‘often absent body’ (Warin 2000:116), the ‘bodily’ manifestations could be 
just as powerfully felt by my participants, as previous ethnographic evidence from Australia 
has also suggested (Warin 2000; Lucas 2004). UK patient Holly experienced “thoughts” 
instructing and daring her to do various inappropriate behaviours, which she said she “felt 
free” while doing regardless of the consequences. As well as daring her to do things with her 
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body that made her neighbors uncomfortable,56 Holly experienced “voices” that told her to 
eat specific foods that made her gain weight. She elaborated, 
 
Holly: The problem is that I have voices in my head which go, um, you need to eat, 
like chocolate, and that sort of thing. Um. So, I find that really difficult, yeah. 
JB: Yeah, I can understand that, so do you ever get voices telling you to eat other 
kinds of foods or is it mainly- 
Holly: No, it’s mainly chocolate and crisps, and cakes  
JB: And… do you always follow up on their advice? 
Holly: Yeah, I do, yeah 
JB: And do you feel better afterwards or? 
Holly: I enjoy the food, the taste of it, so yeah… I don’t feel guilty or anything, no.  
 
The enjoyment of food can be effectively dissociated from the consequences. Holly 
frequently vomited up her food during the night: “I have, um, this dust bin bag at my bedside 
table and, so, so like, if I need to be sick, I’ll go there, and it’s quite handy [be]cause 
otherwise I wouldn’t get to the bathroom in time.” Clinically, Holly may have been seen to 
be experiencing intrusive thoughts as a side effect of clozapine, or a ‘psychotic’ symptom of 
schizophrenia, or else ‘negative’ symptoms (for not caring about consequences like 
vomiting). She could also be understood as experiencing the ambiguous neurochemical 
appetite stimulation or dopamine regulation from clozapine, or else rebelling against her 
anorexic sister and highly weight-conscious mother, who tried to control what Holly ate as 
much as possible (and spent most of her time with Holly watching cooking shows with her). 
What is critical is how Holly sided with the voice telling her to eat certain foods, and in this 
way superseded the notion that the voices had complete control over her behaviour.  
 
Patients could reconnect compartments of health on their own terms, especially when it came 
to the ‘social’ aspect not addressed by clozapine. Australian patient Trent, 24, understood his 
health situation as a “social problem.” He told me that his illness started with a “paralysis 
breakdown” during college: “I sort of got paralysed in my head to the extent that I couldn’t 
even think, which is, my grades went down from As to Bs and Cs … I lost conscious effort in 
my mind, like I just, I wasn’t able to move, I wasn’t able to be myself.” This paralysis was 
now associated with the felt presence of a young woman, who would make him have 
“aggressive outbursts” and “make me talk to myself in public,” until Trent agreed to take 
                                                 
56 On one occasion, we had a meeting with the police because Holly had reached out to touch her male neighbour’s genital 
region in their hallway apartment without invitation.  
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clozapine. Further, Trent said, “she can control my hand and, well, she can rule my body … 
she won’t let me do any exercise, she won’t let me do anything except for a couple of things 
a day.” As I discuss in Chapter Four, Trent’s female presence was helping him as much as 
hindering him – suggesting what Lavis (2013) has described in the context of the ‘presence’ 
of anorexia offering companionship to individuals. Similarly, but more ambiguously, 
Australian patient Myles, 41, attributed his weight gain to both clozapine and the felt 
coercion of a woman whose behaviours he felt himself to then embody. He explained, 
 
I’m eatin’ less and puttin’ more weight on. I mean, I eat healthy … I’ve lived really 
healthy all me life. I know I drink, I know I smoke… but that’s the only two 
unhealthy things I ever do … And she’s the sorta person that, and she takes me, and 
then goes and eats all this junk food … So, she’s livin’ her life as me, and makin’ me 
be unhealthy, as her … She would get up in the mornin’ and smoke cigarettes, 
smokin’ me … Now I have to take all the unfit problems, which were never caused 
by me.  
 
Myles’s experiences – which outside of our interview exchange would have been clinically 
regarded as residual ‘delusions,’ non-responsive to clozapine and thus out of clinical reach – 
were tenuously still containable insofar as Myles could provisionally resolve the 
contradiction between his “healthy” intentions and “unfit” bodily outcomes. Myles was able 
to suspend certainty about the additional ‘unhealthy’ state he felt subjected to – mostly by 
this woman, but also by clozapine (although he blamed clozapine less frequently). During 
other conversations with Myles, he suggested that it was he who was consuming ‘unhealthy’ 
things.  
 
The prominence of little details in what contributed toward health, also discussed earlier in 
regard to cleansing consumption practices, were indeed recognised by some clinical 
caregivers as well. For instance, Australian nurse Zoya noted that, “Some people are very 
health conscious!” When talking with UK psychiatrist Kate about body image concerns in the 
context of clozapine treatment, I clarified whether she had noticed changes from before and 
after clozapine, to which she responded, “No, I don’t think so, no, don’t think so… But I’m 
not sure it’s not something I’ve really asked.” When I asked Zoya the same question, she 
replied, “I’m not sure about that, you know, some people will tell you their story, ‘Oh no, I 
don’t usually take laxatives, I usually take prunes, I’m health conscious’,” as though they had 
always had these strategies.  
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Donna’s drinking as a way of managing her symptoms was objectively ‘unhealthy’, but her 
social worker Jill was sympathetic: 
 
It’s the paranoia she lives with. She wakes up in the morning feeling dizzy and sick, 
and sometimes she actually throws up. She drinks alcohol to escape that because it 
just has enough effect on the frontal lobe, doesn’t it, alcohol, and it just seems to take 
that problem away for her. Sometimes she drinks one or two in the morning, but 
mainly in the evening and she’ll have four or five. And what I say to her is, ‘You’re 
not an alcoholic are you? You’re not an alcoholic, and it does help you over that 
really difficult time.’ I don’t see a problem in that. I think she should keep an eye on 
how many she’s drinking… if that helps her over that really difficult time, and if 
she’s not drinking more and more each day, you know, I don’t know what she would 
do if she didn’t have that. 
 
Jill had a similar view when it came to patients’ choices to keep smoking. She told me that 
she recently went to visit two schizophrenia clients with a nurse, and both clients were 
smoking. The nurse asked the clients about how many cigarettes they were smoking and if 
they had considered quitting, which appalled Jill: 
 
I thought, ‘what are you doing?’ … keeping the rapport is more important than trying 
to get them to quit. They will never ever quit … what have they got in life, you 
know? It’s one thing they can do … If you said to them, ‘maybe if you smoked less, 
you wouldn’t cough so much, and you’d be able to do that.’ But there’s nothing else 
in their life they seem to want. I suppose I’m thinking of the people I know that are 
just content with what they’ve got and they just don’t want anything else. They don’t 
want to change, they’ve just accepted it all.  
 
While this may at first be seen as Jill being resigned to somewhat inevitable ‘reality’ rather 
than these health behaviours being potentially ‘controllable,’ Jill also highlighted how 
patients in these situations were “just content with what they’ve got” and that this was their 
prerogative: “They don’t want to change.” This therefore takes the emphasis away from the 
illness per se and places the agency back on them.   
 
It was clear that many patients were – in more ordinary ways than not – ‘body conscious,’ 
despite ongoing schizophrenia symptoms or attributions to clozapine. Patients’ awareness 
around body weight and how it may have changed since taking clozapine was noted by other 
staff members. When I asked UK pharmacist Ros about whether she thought patients were 
self-conscious about weight gain, she rebutted, “Yes… I don’t know why they’d be different 
from anyone else.” UK phlebotomist Tina furthered, “I feel that they are quite self-
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conscious,” and gave an example of how, “some patients that come in with difficult veins, or 
deep veins, and people say ‘it’s maybe because I’m fat, that’s why you can’t find my veins,’ 
which is not, true … then they’ll say ‘well I wasn’t fat’; ‘I used to be this and that’; ‘I used to 
be active, I used to be sporty, but since being on clozapine this is how its changed me.’” 
Australian nurse Ramesh suggested that, “they’ll be very concerned about their body, like 
they’ll tell me, ‘look I’m gaining a lot of weight, the medication is causing me to gain a lot of 
weight.” 
 
A final and more deterministic clinical view was in regard to how schizophrenia interacted 
with socioeconomic barriers. Australian nurse Team Leader Tony surmised of the main 
‘health barriers’: 
 
With the clozapine therapy, you’re looking at the diagnosis of schizophrenia which 
is… it causes disability, a loss of function. That’s one of the major effects of the 
illness. So, with the declining function means declining earning capacity. You’re 
mainly on the pension … your choices on buying capacity are reduced. So, you will 
buy foods that are cheap or readily available and often those cheaper foods are higher 
in sugar and fat and not as good for you. 
 
The narrative around ‘physical health’ outcomes for clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients 
could not neatly be differentiated into individual, biochemical or social factors. Like with the 
blood work, people worked with what they were given and their fates were never clear.  
 
More could be done 
 
We need to be aware of the kind of things that can happen, and we need to know 
where to refer people to, to get these things addressed, and maybe we need to know 
how to treat them ourselves. But, um, changing clinical hats can be very difficult … 
The Royal guidelines say that that’s what we ought to be doing, but the Royal 
guidelines say to make sure that our patients have GPs and we’re giving them good 
instructions about what to look out for. It’s… one of those things that falls through 
the cracks, all too often. – Adam, Australian psychiatrist  
 
For clinical caregivers, hope for more holistic health prospects were partly helped along by 
the idea that psychiatry and primary care had not reached its full potential in providing 
adequate communications and support for patients. The strained relationship between 
psychiatry and other healthcare supports, particularly with GPs, meant that there was always 
potentiality for more to be done. All four psychiatrists, George (UK), Kate (UK), Sandra 
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(Australia) and Adam (Australia) were wary of systemic shortfalls when it came to 
addressing the ‘physical health’ of patients. George commented, “I don’t think as 
psychiatrists that we should just pass all the responsibility of physical health to the GPs; I 
think we should be holding a lot.”  
 
There was an assumption that patients could achieve weight loss via health activities if they 
were only given greater assistance in doing so. When it came to potential courses of action 
when clozapine patients put on excess body weight, George said that, as a clinician, it was 
critical to provide “advice about diet, asking them to increase their physical activities, 
promoting the access to physical activity, involving more the social workers, from people in 
the team.” He said that it was important to “teach [patients] how to do this”; “it’s having 
someone to help them to move on, to access all these activities.” Similarly, when I asked UK 
psychiatrist Kate, she responded, 
 
There’s lots that can be done, but we don’t have the infrastructure, or the time. So, 
you could increase their activity, you could support their smoking cessation, but that 
requires staff and we don’t have enough staff to facilitate that. But, yes, there’s lots 
that could be done. And I’m unaware of any third sector organisations. 
 
When I asked Australian psychiatrist Sandra, she responded, quite eagerly, “Oh, absolutely! I 
have this dream, this day dream, I’d love to do it.” She continued, “every now and then you 
see the [local government] advertising health promotion grants for organisations, and I think, 
you know what we could do, we could get a personal trainer, who would be here, a couple 
days a week.” Sandra thought that it would make a difference insofar as: “actually having a 
person who could make contact with people, get them out of the house … Because I think in 
all these diet and lifestyle coaching things and a personal trainer approach, they work because 
you have to be accountable to another person, you’ve got an enthusiastic, kind of bouncy 
person encouraging you to come along with them.” 
 
Another potential solution was to shift more responsibility to GPs. When I asked of the role 
of the GP here, Adam said, 
 
We want to believe that patients have GPs, that when we’re not here the GPs will 
pick up the slack, we want to believe that the GPs are confident, and have the skills 
required to do that. Um, and this isn’t always the case. People are scared of 
psychiatry, people are scared of psychotic illnesses, if they don’t have a lot of 
exposure to them … people with psychotic illnesses I guess don’t see GPs often 
140  
enough for the GPs to feel comfortable or confident ... But, psychiatry itself has kind 
of shot itself in the foot here. I think as a whole we’re not very good at 
communicating with GPs, we’re not very good at sending them back 
recommendations for what treatment ought to be, we’re more likely to send back a 
latter saying ‘and I’ll see the patient in three months.’ Um, rather than letting the GP 
take carriage of what happens next. 
 
Beyond Primary Care options, George also suggested that a referral to a surgeon was also 
feasible to deal with extra weight gain: “One of the things we don’t tend to do, and that’s our 
fault, is that people over 35 of Body Mass Index in this country are eligible [covered by 
NHS] for bariatric surgery, and we are never referring people to do that, and we will probably 
have at least 10-15 people who should be referred – why not?” It was difficult to know 
whether it should be the psychiatrist or the GP that makes these further referrals. In all, it 
seemed there was a reluctance to pass the buck any further for patients who were already at 
the ‘end of the line’ in terms of treatment options.  
 
Part of this reluctance may have been due to lack of consensus about underlying causes of 
weight gain: schizophrenia, clozapine, social circumstances, or the person and their habits. 
UK psychiatrist George related to his patients’ difficulties in changing habits that were 
overhauled, to a certain extent by events beyond one’s control:  
 
If there’s something really complicated in this world, it’s to change your diet, we are 
so embedded in our habits of eating … if there’s all of a sudden there’s such an 
enormous imbalance between what you eat and what you spend as – can you imagine 
you’re suddenly actively, floridly psychotic, very unwell, and you’re admitted to 
hospital so your movements are completely restricted, and also instead of sleeping 7 
hours per day, 8 hours, you’re sleeping 10 hours per day, the imbalance it causes you 
is absolutely brutal, and you will not change all of a sudden how you eat … you need 
to have a very strong will to change it. 
 
Before turning to the question of “a very strong will to change” a habit, it is important to 
unpack the matter of ‘habit’ on its own terms. In the first instance, this could be explained 
along the lines of habitus, whereby, in this instance, one’s reflexive and even sub-conscious 
bodily dispositions become entwined with what it means to be a clozapine patient.57 This 
includes the way of being when attending the clinic itself. Tina noted that even when patients 
                                                 
57 ‘Habitus’ as Bourdieu described it, ‘is an infinite capacity for generating products – thoughts, perceptions, expressions 
and actions – whose limits are set by the historically and socially situations conditions of its production, [such that] the 
conditioned and conditional freedom it provides is as remote from creation of unpredictable novelty as it is from simple 
mechanical reproduction of the original conditioning’ (in Weiss 2008:229). 
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complain that they do not want their bloods taken, they simultaneously sit in the blood chair 
and put their arms out in anticipation, as though their ‘body’ is overriding their ‘mind.’ 
Further, there was also the cognitive ‘habits’ associated with schizophrenia. For instance, UK 
patient Tom conceded that, in regard to his “mindfulness” practices (discussed in Chapter 
Four), “sometimes, [be]cause of the habit, I slip back into the old way of watching the 
people,” which, would “drain,” “confuse” and “scare” him, triggering “the voices” again. 
 
Patients experimented with their current habits and enabling change through gradual 
alterations rather than conclusive overhauls. This was partly about appreciating ‘relative’ 
stability in ways that many people take for granted, and partly about enjoying things that feel 
good as a key incentive for the behaviour. As Pedwell (2017) argued in critique of ‘nudge’ 
behavioral economic theory, to change one’s habits is more complicated than shifting from 
something perceived as ‘bad’ in the present to something perceived as ‘good’ for the future. 
Insofar as ‘freedom and power are to be found in and through the constitution of habits, not 
through their elimination’ (Sullivan in Pedwell 2011:76) – while ‘docility’ is ‘power to 
remake old habits, to re-create’ (Dewey in Pedwell 2011:83) – it is the personal experientials 
of ‘current tendencies’ that matter (Pedwell 2011:87). In support of Pedwell’s (2017) 
suggestions, patients could feel empowered in the short-term sense to change so long as the 
change was neither absolute in terms of others’ guidance nor a total overhaul of current 
habits.  
 
Like with regular consumption of clozapine, there were then ‘habits’ around other 
consumptions taken into the body with familiar associations. For instance, UK patient Kevin, 
said that he still went through “patches” of losing weight but that he would, ultimately, 
“always slip back into old habits” – consisting of eating “takeaways, having cream and 
cheese, having snacks” because when it came down to it, “I don’t wanna change my eating 
habits.” UK patient Alice recalled to me one day, while looking at the nutrition label on her 
diet Pepsi bottle, that as a kid playing sport she used to drink a lot of soft drink, but always 
found coke too strong and preferred diet drinks because they were “more watery.” Arguably, 
her ongoing desire for diet soft drinks was not just a matter of compromising on her appetite; 
this had been a part of her appetite since childhood.  
 
As suggested earlier, patients tweaked current behaviours such that there were elements of 
novelty – but only so long as there was also familiarity. UK patient Martin, 51, said he was 
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often tempted to sample Belgian beer at the pub, but instead “I try to restrict myself to the 
draft ales.” However, he continued, “I like to try different ones, [be]cause they have different 
ones.” When I suggested that he was not, then, “a creature of habit,” he replied, that he did 
prefer the “same table, usually the same meal – I normally have the burger, I used to have the 
pie but it’s more wintery I think.” Strategies for changing habits could also align with 
clozapine clinic efforts to persuade patients to experiment with changes in their habits, as 
long as they addressed and allowed for patients’ desires.  
 
The clinical suggestion could at least temporarily shift some patients’ dietary habits, so long 
as the process had a personal reward attached. UK patient Holly, 40, was pressed by her 
parents to lose weight with a promise of taking her out to her favourite restaurant as a reward. 
Holly recalled Clive’s advice to keep a ‘food diary,’ meaning that she simply just noted down 
what she was eating. For three weeks, she stopped herself from eating her usual “crisps and 
chocolate.” She kept drinking soft drink however, so as to not change things up entirely: “All 
I’ve had, which is okay, I suppose, is diet coke, um… but my parents say, ‘oh you shouldn’t 
be drinking diet coke!’” Interestingly, Holly did not tell her mother (who had previously gone 
so far as to confiscate chocolate from her while on a recent family holiday) about any 
changes that she had made. Moreover, when I commented that her mother must have been 
pleased, Holly was dismissive and said she did not feel the need to tell her. She had reclaimed 
the change in such a way that she was personally accountable to herself in terms of how she 
lost weight. Holly was much keener to tell me how, “me and Dad, we weigh each other at the 
gym, and I’ve lost something like two kilos, which is great, in the past week!” She was, 
however, most of all looking forward to indulging in the restaurant dinner promised to her. 
Holly was willing to change her eating habits in the short term so long as doing so did not 
interfere with her enduring desires.  
 
There were also habits around energy out-take that patients were proactive about 
experimenting with. As George said, weight gain is likely “if there’s all of a sudden such an 
enormous imbalance between what you eat and what you spend.” UK patient Alice said to 
me the last time I interviewed her that she was “still over-eating, I still find it hard to be 
disciplined about that … I’ve got into a pattern … I’ve got used to eating too much.” When 
we talked about short-term versus long-term goals when it came to exercising, Alice said that 
she had thus far, since her diagnosis, only been able to keep up exercise for up to 6 months at 
a time – “then the bad habits come back.” These habits pertained to being sedentary since her 
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time in hospital, while upholding her lifelong appetite for diet soft drinks. UK patient Robert 
also reflected how in hospital: “I used to sit a lot on my own and smoke there and think about 
things and try and get well.”  
 
On the one hand, the habit of smoking was seen by patients to be straight forward. UK patient 
Hugo, 25, who had “always smoked since I was about 17,” felt that it was now “just normal, 
just a habit.” Contrary to other patients, when I asked him if it provided any relief, he replied, 
“no, just a habit.” UK patient Trevor, who contentedly smoked for a range of reasons, 
including the notion that cigarettes have “anti-psychotic properties” (Brown & Dennis 2017) 
said that when it came to viewing smoking as an “addiction” it was more multi-faceted: 
“there’s more than one aspect of addiction to smoking, it’s not just the drug, it’s the… taste, 
the action of doing things, getting into the habit of doing it.” 
 
Finally, agency was apparent in a patient’s intentionality to find one’s own meaning for 
‘lifestyle’ habits, which may be understood by clinical staff as part of a patient’s 
‘personality.’ Australian Nurse Zoya normalised weight gain as “not because of the 
medication really… it’s because they have a sweet tooth!” She laughed. I asked if she 
thought the medication had anything to do with the sweet tooth, and she said she did not 
think so, “because people – because of their habits themselves before initiation of clozapine, 
they are used to that.” I asked if clozapine amplified current habits and she said “only one 
person just told me that ‘when I wake up, I feel hungry because I’ve slept so late in the 
afternoon, I just want to grab something, you know, something sweet … But other people just 
have normal meals … but that will be their personality before the initiation of clozapine.”  
Moreover, all patients were quick to point out things that they were doing, however 
incrementally, and that relative to previous ‘psychotic’ states or the extent of lifestyle ‘habits’ 
(many mentioned how much they had cut down smoking or sugar, even if not ‘quit’), that 
they felt “not too bad” or even “healthy.”  
 
Just like the decision to stay alive, there is an immediate utilisation of finding personal peace 
within current situations and habits relative to past experiences. I asked Alice if she felt 
potential to “control” her lifestyle habits, and she replied: “Control? I think it fluctuates 
sometimes … I know it probably sounds quite lazy but I’m quite happy just sitting in front of 
the TV … I just want a quiet life basically, you know, I’ve been through a lot of drama. It’s 
like, with my family, it just seems to be one thing after another, you know.” Moreover, the 
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question of individual motivation had – from a clinical perspective – the most and the least 
ambiguous accountability. 
 
Motivation: “Everyone’s different”  
 
Understanding a combination of individual differences and ‘external’ determinants is critical 
to affording people their health agency. Allowing for individual differences can at first seem 
distasteful. As Kowal (2015) suggested in the context of the Australian Indigenous health 
‘gaps,’ professional ‘White anti-racist’ health workers can find it difficult to think beyond the 
structural determinants of health of Australian Indigenous people’s health in fear of 
implications around ‘victim blaming.’ Kowal (2015:42) observed that, ‘[W]hen a White anti-
racist feels uncomfortable about the idea that Indigenous people might smoke despite 
knowing better than other Australians that it is bad for you, they are uncomfortable that 
Indigenous agency might play a role in ill health,’ and ‘beliefs about Indigenous people 
assume instead that Indigenous disadvantage is wholly due to structural factors.’ Herein, 
Kowal (2015:46) continues, ‘[t]he full spectrum of Indigenous social life cannot be admitted 
– only the part of it that is congruent with remediable difference.’ Intervention is construed 
‘as tinkering with the structural factors that determine health’ in order to avoid notions of 
‘social engineering’ (Kowal 2015:46). In the case of clozapine-treated schizophrenia, 
clozapine and its side effects may be seen to constitute the structural factors, although the 
biochemical knowledge limitations, along with incomplete knowledge about schizophrenia, 
give clinical caregivers a certain opening to bring in contradictory rationales about patient 
health outcomes. Moreover, appreciating different values of health, given all the ambiguities 
is a useful way of thinking about the extent of individual accountability. The health ‘gaps’ 
that coincide with clozapine-treated schizophrenia can therefore be interpreted as caused by 
both, rather than either/or.  
 
Some clinical caregivers without medical school training (phlebotomists, nurses, social 
workers) took the stance that patients who did not seek to change their lifestyle habits under 
clozapine might simply be “lazy.” UK phlebotomist Tina reflected, “everyone’s different ... I 
do motivate them, I say ‘have you tried doing this, have you tried doing that, if you beat your 
laziness you can do it,’ but I’m not a lazy person”. Implicit in this statement is that patients 
have a choice. Tina also said to me in regard to whether patients listened to advice given 
about their ‘physical’ health, “it all depends if they take any notice, if they take action, 
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[be]cause you cannot force them, everything has to be done by them; their own will … a few 
of them have been advised and they are going away and doing and they’ll come back and say, 
‘I’ve been going to spinning classes.” She then brought the question back to her own 
experiences of exercising four to five times per week: “If I don’t go to the gym then I’ll feel 
guilty if I eat!” This resonated with UK patient’s Joanne’s admission mentioned earlier that, 
“sometimes I do graze and sometimes … the next couple of days I'll have to watch it.”  
 
Arguably, the notion that clozapine patients can have agency in the matter of being 
psychiatrically stable and able to challenge weight gain highlights their ‘normalcy’ rather 
than ‘madness.’ A confluence of ‘structural’ factors weigh in to yield situations where 
individuals interpret their situations not so much in terms of a different sort of agency, as 
Kowal (2015) suggests could be the case for Indigenous Australians, but rather in terms 
indistinguishable from the general population. Jenkins (2010:9) suggested that possibilities of 
side effects from antipsychotic drugs that are considered under socio-political renderings of 
‘choice’ to render patients ‘“crazy” or fat, sexless, and genderless’ may, in contradiction, 
exacerbate ‘madness’ for the patient. Yet Ned, 27, challenged his constant food consumption 
cravings by explaining, like anybody might, 
 
You just gotta stay away from it, you’ve gotta think what’s best for you … you 
know, craving a cigarette, and you’ve gotta think ‘I don’t really need it,’ because 
you’ve got other options. There are other options that you can go with. So, you’ve 
just gotta choose another healthy option. So, I guess it’s like, taking the stairs or 
walking up the escalator, you know… you’ve just gotta do it.  
 
Ned was also motived by financial factors, saying, “it’s expensive as well to eat like that, you 
can’t have takeaways all the time.” Further, he had developed his own reasoning for 
countering the appetite he perceived to be caused by clozapine: 
 
Everyone’s different, but for me, it’s another reason I take my medication before I go 
to bed, because like I don’t wake up feeling hungry, it doesn’t make me want food 
during the night or anything, so. It’s only if I take it, if I take it a 12 o’clock or 
something, then yeah, I’ll be hungry and I’ll wanna eat, so yeah. 
 
The negotiation of clozapine and appetite was indeed partly to do with the time of day that 
clozapine was consumed. This aligned with clinical rationale, too, at least insofar as other 
immediately felt side effects were concerned. For instance, UK psychiatrist Kate said, “you 
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can combat the sedation by taking it all at night, but most people take it in the morning and a 
larger dose at night.” For patients like Ned, though, personal values were important.  
 
Personal values are a further point at which clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients could be 
said to not differ from the general population. The ‘new health morality’ (Becker in Conrad 
1994:387) that has been promulgated through public discourse about what makes a ‘healthy 
body,’ can lead to ‘motivation’ insofar as seeking ‘a moral balance between the bad and the 
good’ (Conrad 1994:394). Yet, as Conrad (1994:397) suggested, ‘independent of the results, 
merely engaging in wellness activities is a virtuous activity.’ While Conrad noted this to be a 
phenomenon of the ‘middle class’ Americans in his ethnography, in that ‘wellness-seeking 
becomes a vehicle for setting oneself among the righteous’ (1994:398), patients in my study 
make for no exception to different aspirational goals of eating depending on socioeconomic 
factors – as Australian nurse Tony suggested earlier. Those who did not have family or a job 
to assist in their everyday living costs were generally not as selective about what they ate as 
choice was limited. Those who were in paid employment and/or family support tended to be 
inclined toward particular dietary regimens that could be planned ahead.  
 
As for anybody, values and motivations could also shift. Australian nurse Zoya commented: 
“The way you want to perceive ‘am I getting fat?’ Everyone is concerned in this society here 
… As normal people, everybody wants to watch what they eat … One thing is that we just 
keep on, keep on giving the advice, until such time they make up their mind”. The notion that 
people can “make up their mind” or take time to adjust to the drug, before engaging in 
regulations of side effects, was suggested by most clinical caregivers. Australian clozapine 
coordinator Kerry suggested of motivations to “change” habits after stabilising on clozapine, 
“it can take a year or two … once this [clozapine] has settled down, they look at themselves 
and think, well, I better get some clothes, better have a shower, better get my hair cut… for 
some reason, somewhere along the way, it’s clicked.”  
 
While the present-centred temporalities of clozapine will be discussed in Chapter Four, I note 
here that the longitudinal impacts of clozapine and the imaginings of time needed before 
decisions around ‘health’ could be made, weighed into both clinical and patient perceptions 
of how clozapine worked. For instance, UK patients Tom and Joanne, now in their fifties, 
both spoke of how the initial weight gain they experienced upon commencing clozapine 
treatment took much effort to be able to “shift” (as Tom said of his eventual weight loss and 
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energy gain). Tom, who had also developed Type II diabetes, asked to have his dose reduced, 
started practicing tai-chi, quit smoking cigarettes and followed a stricter diet. Joanne, while 
not wanting to reduce her dose to a ‘sub-therapeutic’ range like Tom’s, instead worked at 
challenging her midnight food cravings, attended a weight watchers program, and started 
exercising regularly. Both described hitting a particularly miserable stage first. Moreover, 
Australian psychiatrist Sandra noted of lifestyle changes: 
 
For a couple of patients I’ve seen, it was a couple of years down the track, so they 
kind of had the chaos of their early years with psychosis, then it’s almost like a 
period where they grind to a halt. And that might be a number of things, like being 
on the clozapine initially being a bit more of a blow to your system, perhaps the dose 
being higher than they need it to be. I think there’s also a phenomenon where people 
go from being very psychotic to actually becoming quite depressed for a period … 
then it’s like they kind of emerge from that … roughly 2 and 5 years after starting 
clozapine having this upswing in function? … Perhaps having your illness controlled 
for enough time gives you space to build, you know.  
 
Other factors such as gender, engagement in workplace, community and recreational 
activities may also play a role here too. When I asked Sandra about the “physical health” of 
the “high level public servant,” she replied, “not great!”; “he was overweight, and inactive, 
he was a cigarette smoker, he drank too much! … then I’ve had particularly young women do 
a good job.” Tina said, “the ones I know that work, I don’t see that they’re overweight.” She 
recalled, nonetheless, a female patient who had recently started working and, “she’s a little 
bit overweight and sometimes she’s concerned about that.” “But,” Tina continued, “she says 
she feels better, that she’s working, that… I don’t think her weight has changed but maybe 
it’s because she’s out there, she’s doing something for herself … she’s acting … if you know 
that you feel active then you kind of work around your weight, then you’re happy with what 
you are.” This reinforced the notion of people finding their ‘happy’ medium. Tina continued, 
“it all depends on how you are, because any medication, it depends on your body and how 
you take it.”  
 
Because the determinants of ‘health’ in the course of clozapine treatment were irreducible to 
one cause or another, they were ultimately different for each individual. UK patient 
Christopher described himself as doing “virtuous things,” contingent on what he consumed as 
supplementary to clozapine to alleviate the voices, which he said could “get stuck on my 
frequency” unless he kept actively recreating his “coping strategies.” Both clinical caregivers 
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and patients agreed that the notion of health was intrinsically about ‘doing’ what one wanted 
to be doing, which other aspects of one’s health could result by proxy of. After all, UK 
patient Kevin had started exercising upon being discharged from hospital because “it was 
something to do.”  
 
Health as a verb 
 
I like to keep myself busy, and that’s what keeps me sane … I found it’s better if I 
keep myself busy, if I’m occupied with things like golf and tennis I’m not so bad; it’s 
when you’re not doing anything, there’s nothing to distract you, that’s when I 
struggle, which is, I guess, that’s probably the reason I do so much, you know, it 
keeps me… well, I guess. – Kevin, UK patient  
When one is wholly devoted to something and ‘really’ busies oneself with it, one does 
not do so just alongside the work itself … A specific kind of forgetting is essential for 
the temporality that is constitutive for letting something be involved.  
– Heidegger (1962[1927]:H354) 
 
To iterate, I have observed health and agency as interrelated and active rather than fixed 
states, and clozapine patients drew from their social contexts to exhibit power (Archer 2004; 
Rapport 2003). UK patient Kevin could only feel one step ahead of his voices while “keeping 
busy.” Thus, to clinically frame his thoughts in terms of OCD or delusional ideas undermines 
his ordinary human tendency to keep himself occupied within an awareness of what worked 
for him. What ‘worked’ was a combination of social influences and personal interpretations. 
UK patient Geoff described himself as “healthy” because of his “healthy eating, exercise, 
getting out and meeting people, finding activities to do in the flat – I find, also, I enjoy 
reading the paper and listening to the radio.” UK patient Bradley, 29, had astutely described 
health as, most simply, a matter of “being alive.” When I asked him whether there was 
anything else describing what “healthy” meant, he replied: “Could be anything - healthy 
relationships, healthy lifestyle, ah, healthy output of life, healthy input of life, healthy 
thoughts of life, you know healthy could be a range of different forms.” Even when 
describing healthy as coming in “different forms,” there was an underlying theme of moving 
from one form to another and being absorbed in the process of doing so.  
The notion of health through action, does not, once again, stand in opposition to general 
population ideals about the means rather than the ends of ‘wellness’ and ‘virtuosity’ (Conrad 
1994), nor does it stand in absolute opposition to clinical ideas. UK patient Joanne reflected,  
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I used to think about what the doctor once said to me, the first time, like, ‘a rolling 
stone gathers no moss’ … I think if you carry on doing things that gives you positive 
feedback, into your life, and it might be a bit chaotic, and people might wish you 
were a bit more laid back sometimes but, that positive feedback of things has a 
knock-on effect and, I mean it helps you to be healthier.  
 
Like with her blood test swimming ritual (Chapter Two), Joanne acquiesced to a doctor’s 
remark that “a rolling stone gathers no moss.” UK nurse Narelle resounded the views of 
many participants (clinical caregivers and patients) when she remarked that the optimal 
situation for a clozapine patient was “being able to do what you want to do in your life … 
people feeling like there’s something they’d like to do and being able to do it.”  
 
The will to keep moving was therefore also about agency, as ‘the capability, the power, to be 
the source and originator of acts’ (Rapport & Overing 2000:1). UK patient Martin reiterated 
that health was not only about “the absence of illness” but also about “being okay enough 
to… carry on.” The ongoing process of “carrying on” – like a “rolling stone” – exemplified 
another way in which patients persisted (rather than resisted, or merely complied with) their 
situations in order to keep up a sense of agency over their experiences of health (and the 
metonymical compartments of it that I explore shortly). Like clozapine treatment that 
required ongoing certifications, patients continually tried to keep themselves ‘on track,’ in 
conjunction with clozapine keeping them “on the straight and narrow” (as UK patients Martin 
and Dylan both described). Patients were continually reassessing situations and being wary of 
the need for new strategies to work in sync with clozapine. 
 
Patients’ knowledge that stable experiences were provisional contributed to their sense of 
their own input and a will to avoid “not doing anything,” in order to keep feelings of illness at 
bay. Indeed, as Heidegger (1962[1927]:H354) posited, temporal suspension and self 
‘forgetting’ happens when one wholly engages in a task at hand. Kevin, who had been taking 
clozapine for 15 years, said that “a big thing in my life is worrying about people hearing my 
thoughts” – namely the “strange thoughts, slightly perverse thoughts.” Clinically, these were 
understood as Obsessive-compulsive symptoms (OCS). Despite clinical attempts with drug 
augmentations, I did not come across any cases of OCS disappearing entirely. Rather, what 
seemed to alleviate the feeling of thoughts spontaneously popping in or out, and giving 
patients a sense of being “well,” were when patients were “occupied with things,” as Kevin 
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explained.  
 
When I asked Kevin if he felt that I could hear his thoughts during our conversation, he 
explained, “[be]cause we’re talking and keeping myself busy, I haven’t really got the 
opportunity to think so, no, you couldn’t hear it, but if were sitting here in silence, I’d have 
thoughts and you would hear them.” While this might have been clinically regarded to be 
simply as ‘delusional’ rather than OCS, Kevin’s thoughts seemed to be a non-negotiable 
reality for him and, despite trying alternative medications to alleviate the invasive thoughts 
and talking to “many therapists” about alternative strategies, “we kind of get stuck there.” 
The only strategy that helped was based on his own experience of having things to do, which 
yielded further benefits: Kevin said, “I think gym was something to fill that... something to 
do.”  
 
For Kevin and many patients, having “something to do” that took away “the opportunity to 
think” was the experience that could be relied upon most to move forward with. Thus, while 
Jenkins’ ethnographic evidence has highlighted the role of clozapine as the primary perceived 
agent of ‘control’ that ‘keeps the person stable … busy and active, out of hospital … from 
hearing voices, from being crazy’ (2015:51), my participants suggested that intentionality in 
‘keeping’ illness at bay can also surpass the activity of clozapine. As I suggest in Chapter 
Four, taking clozapine in the more immediate sense was more about the countering of activity 
rather than a triggering of activity.  
 
Arguably, what Myers (2015;2016) suggested as constituting ‘moral agency’ contingent on 
integration into a wider community can be experienced, to some degree, through more 
immediate aspects of the treatment regimen in ways that can serve purpose and social 
connections, too. When I first met UK participant Luke, only a few weeks after he 
commenced clozapine, he described his clozapine-treated-schizophrenia to me as “a pursuit 
race,” whereby “getting ahead is about staying ahead.” He explained: 
 
You constantly have on your mind what should I take today, what should I do … 
constantly looking after your health, constantly touching base … constantly thinking 
could I do that better … who could I meet who would be better for me … it’s all 
about eking out an existence, isn’t it?58  
                                                 
58 Part of this quote is cited in Brown (2018:161). 
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This was synonymous with a moral notion of “recovery,” which he said involved “constantly 
thinking ‘could I do that better?’” The process of “constantly touching base” and imagining 
what one “could do better” indicated a process of engaging in the ongoing process of 
navigation towards a better future that could not be quite assured but was nonetheless worth 
pursuing. Luke was largely isolated; his contact with the clinic and care-workers were his 
only social contacts. Yet, a certain degree of continuous socio-moral commitment to self-
improvement was suggested in his accountability to the clozapine regimen. I observed that 
people continually combined external directives about ‘betterment,’ both small and larger 
scale, with what they experienced for themselves as necessary in order to move forward. 
Returning to how Conrad (1994) constituted ‘wellness’ as means of striving to be ‘virtuous,’ 
repeating activities that one felt yielded feelings of well-being was critical.  
 
Feelings of health were temporally connected to the activity patients could rely upon, and the 
subsequent feeling of assurance they felt. Australian patient James, 32, told me that he could 
tell if he was “well” or not by the ability to “focus” on “reading for prolonged periods of 
time” and if he could “just keep doing and doing and doing things.” UK patient Alan said to 
Narelle during a clinical check up one day, “I need to keep busy, otherwise it’ll be like 
psychiatric rehab, just staring at the wall smoking cigarettes.” Moreover, while ways in 
which patients kept themselves moving forward differed (some felt that smoking was a way 
to keep occupied rather than something to prompt further activity), there was a general 
emphasis on “keeping up” with feelings of health. Keeping ahead of threats of illness meant 
that patients could only be temporally assured that they had moved away from illness; to stay 
“not actively ill,” as Joanne put it. 
 
Even planning to do things gave a feeling of control, also fitting Conrad’s (1994) explication 
for well-being via virtuosity. UK patient Hannah said, “I feel in control when I’m planning 
things to do, planning my day.” This was because she knew that, “sometimes if I have some 
time where I don’t have to do anything, that can make me on edge.” She added that the 
meaning of health was “about being at your best.” For Hannah, this was when she was 
“active and helpful, calm and organised - I think it helps to do things to keep you healthy, to 
exercise, do something creative, do some relaxation.” 
 
Once patients knew what activities they could return to, it was a matter of keeping going with 
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them. Having particular activities that patients could rely upon to feel level while doing was 
important, as would be the case for anyone. UK patient Ian, 40, posited that being “busy” and 
“happy” were not mutually exclusive states: “The reason I’m busy, the reason I’m happy, is 
[be]cause I’m busy, you see; I get happy [be]cause I’m busy.” As well as eating (described 
above), Ian kept himself busy by playing the piano and reading books. The notion of keeping 
busy to distract oneself from uncomfortable interferences seemed to be more about avoiding 
self- concerns than engaging in self-concerned things.  
 
Although keeping oneself busy suggests a consuming of time such that it is not consciously 
accounted for, keeping oneself busy seemed to primarily keep patients afloat and distracted, 
rather than detaching from concerns as one might when actively ‘letting go’ and allowing the 
self to not only remain stable but to find peace (as I elaborate in Chapter Four). This was 
perhaps most clear in the case of UK patient Trevor, who would often tell me how “busy” 
and “energetic” he was.59 In regard to his schizophrenia Trevor said, “well it’s amazing how 
the mind can be disrupted and how it can recover and come back to normal isn’t it? It’s 
absolutely amazing … you can’t tell me from any normal person now, can you?” His only 
recurrent symptom or clozapine side-effect, he felt, was “maybe worrying; I’m a bit 
obsessive – double-checking things”. Further, “I carry on smoking,” he said, not only because 
“it helps me deal with my symptoms of schizophrenia,” “it’s a way of killing time as well, 
isn’t it?” Another UK patient, Josh, smoked also because, “it feels quite good and it’s 
something to do.” Trevor reported smoking, “about 40 a day, it depends how busy I am, you 
know, often I’m very busy and I’ve got to take breaks between smoking and I catch up later 
then I take breaks again.” 
 
Trevor conceded however that “it’s quite good being busy because it actually cuts my 
smoking down.” As this contradicted his commitment to smoking for managing his 
symptoms, I asked him if he would indeed like to cut down, to which he responded, “I enjoy 
smoking, so, not really, I just want to leave things as they are - it hasn’t seriously damaged 
my health so far.” In all, Trevor could reassure himself in the sense of day-to-day busy-ness, 
which involved his go-to strategy of smoking, so long as his health continued as was. Just as 
he planned to stay on clozapine, Trevor was adamant that, “you don’t want to change things 
                                                 
59 Trevor said, “I haven’t any major health problems, nothing’s going seriously wrong with me” - despite a number of 
clinical concerns that came to my attention otherwise. He said of the clozapine side effects he contended with, “dribbling, 
low blood pressure possibly, high cholesterol, sugar levels, compulsive repetitive behaviour, umm… and that’s about it I 
think.” 
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if what you’re on is working… because you don’t know with anything else, exactly what’s 
gonna happen.” The notion of keeping on with what works was thus also about avoiding 
tipping points, discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
Lastly, notions of health as a verb were apparent in patients’ ideas about who they knew to be 
healthy – as being able to give and not merely receive energies. This again taps into 
Rapport’s (2003) supposition of agency through an ‘extended homeostasis.’ Many responses 
concerned people who had cared for them – from clinical caregivers in the hospital to parents 
who were perceived to lead a social life, to spiritual figures who supported them. At a more 
fundamental level, though, ideals of health tended to concern the capacity for patients to 
carry out tasks that would have knock-on effects, from carrying the shopping, cooking, to 
more extensively looking after others. When I asked UK patient Josh, 43, if he could think of 
anyone in an optimal state of health, he said his friend living below him in his flat, “because, 
I s’pose, he goes out to town nearly every, nearly every day to buy something, he does.” Josh 
had similarly described clozapine as something that “keeps you fit” – “moving around … 
doing more.” When I asked him when he felt most in control he said it was while “diving into 
the pool” and “listening to music.” I confirmed what health meant, to which he said, “going 
swimming” - an embodied action. Connecting the ‘mind’ and ‘body’ on one’s own terms was 
critical to patients.  
 
Kevin had told me that the term health “means two things - it means mental health and 
physical health.”  By physical health he meant “fitness and endurance,” and by mental health 
he meant, “not being paranoid.” Kevin’s worries were not continuous: “If I have a good day I 
don’t feel at all that way.” He continued, “I guess it’s finding that balance, I find if I do too 
much then I struggle, if I do too little I struggle; it’s finding that middle ground, keeps me 
well – doing enough but not overdo[ing] it.” Moreover, “doing enough” to achieve feelings 
of “balance” often involved imageries of shifting between mind and body states.  
 
Shifting between ‘mind’ and ‘body’ states 
 
Building on the notion of health as a verb, patients drew on metonymical dichotomies 
afforded by clozapine treatment to reallocate and ‘negotiate’ relationships between separated 
aspects of their health, and what counted towards a personally constituted ‘homeostasis’ 
(Rapport 2003; Brown & Dennis 2017). Notions of mind and body compartmentalisations 
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were productive for patients to work with, in conjunction with imaginaries of how clozapine 
was acting on both. As I have suggested, clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients were not 
heavily confined by their circumstances and clinical subjectification involving multiple 
somatic levels of attention. Rather, these biomedical narratives were reworked both within 
and beyond the neoliberal guise of ‘choosing’ for, and acting on, oneself – in the terms of 
Rose & Abi-Rached (2013). Indeed, some of Lucas’ (2004:150) ethnographic participants 
with schizophrenia ‘sought to measure bodily “vibrations,” monitor “hormones,” or 
manipulate sensory and physical inputs’. The potential to attend to bodily processes, whether 
perceived to be part of the self or externally inflicted, therefore needs more consideration in 
the context of clinical monitoring and the pathologically validated unhinging of physiological 
processes. Despite biomedical provisions that subject patients to multiple aspects of their 
‘bodily’ being, people can understand themselves, however inconsistently, as more partially 
embodied, as Lyon and Barbalet (1994:56) assert in their notion of the ‘social body’ that is 
‘inter-communicative and active.’ Just as blood imagery and clinical circuitries described in 
Chapter Two reflected literal and metaphorical meanings regarding blockages and flow, so, 
too, was it important for interconnections between mind and body to be continually enacted.  
 
I began my fieldwork exposed to the idea that a tight focusing of present attention to the 
unseen or habitually unattended regions or actions of the body, and its ostensible divisions 
into ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ experiences, might raise self-awareness of one’s own bodily 
systems and parts of the body. Sass (2004:313) had observed that, in regard to specific body 
‘parts’ holding attention in schizophrenia, 
 
[O]ne would expect profound transformations in the felt quality of the affective life. 
Rather than serving as an attitude toward the world, certain emotional configurations 
would instead be experienced at a subjective distance, almost as objects in 
themselves, while others might simply fail to coalesce at all…such a person is likely 
to hold herself back – thereby to become aware of, and, at the same time, detached 
from habits of bodily being and affective response as well as cognitive framework 
assumptions that might otherwise function invisibly. 
 
Sass suggested that this can result in ‘radical scrutiny and remaking’ of the body as object 
(2004:319). Having to attend to a dominant biological presence of the body has also been 
suggested to constitute a form of agency for other medical patients (Braidotti 2007; Lundin 
1999). Lundin (1999) suggested that the opportunity to attend to the workings of the body 
and its ‘physical’ processes can elicit feelings of agentic potential rather than weakening. For 
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organ transplant recipients in Lundin’s ethnography (1999), paying reflexive attention to the 
present body could result in feelings of personal ownership over the replaced organs and 
unfamiliar biological responses to them.  
 
Of course, the notion of foreign contents in the body could indeed be felt by patients 
experiencing delusions, but it was also, arguably, tied into the feeling of constipation as well 
as personally existing fears. UK patient Geoff, who had been taking clozapine for nearly 
eight years, once experienced the feeling of a snake inside his stomach, at which time he 
admitted himself to hospital. He explained, “I thought I had a snake in my stomach, so I went 
into hospital and ended up on a… on the psychiatric ward … it’s just very frightening … I 
think it was just stuck inside, yeah… I think I was a bit paranoid about having snakes in the 
garden… umm… and having snakes in the bedroom, and, yeah!” Geoff was a keen gardener 
but had only seen a snake at a “Reptile Centre” before. When I naively tried to joke that he 
probably should not visit Australia, then, his returning laugh was singular, his eyes looking 
slightly alarmed. I asked what made the snake go away in the end and he replied, “I think 
going into hospital and talking about it.” At the clozapine clinic, talking about bodily 
experiences was normative.  
 
Just as intersubjective assurances between people were important to release fixations and 
bodily blockages, so, too, were the release of ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ blockages via the 
movement of the body. UK patient Tom “connected” his “mind and body” through self-
prescribed “mindfulness” and exercise techniques, whereby he was able to “clean my system 
out” (Brown & Dennis 2017:375). Through exercise and martial arts, Tom explained that he 
would “sweat a couple of times a week” to “get the blood flowing” and “get the toxins out.” 
Patient experiences suggested that a ‘calmer’ disposition could be induced by focusing one’s 
attention from the ‘mind’ to the ‘body,’ while ‘bodily’ commotions could also be conceived 
as inhibiting the ‘mind.’  
 
A number of patients reported anxiety and panic attacks that could be resolved via a 
negotiation of one’s physical positioning. UK patient Robert, quoted in the introduction to 
this chapter, said his “mental illness” was “taking it out of me, physically and emotionally, 
zapping my emotions”. His chest pains also prompted him to keep within the ‘physical’ realm 
and lie down, because: “If I sit up and do things, they just get progressively worse.” Robert’s 
habit of resting for a few hours each afternoon was one he may have developed from his time 
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in hospital, where he had appreciated the freedom to “rest” when he wanted to. Another UK 
patient, Blake, 45, described how he, “used to walk around [the hospital] grounds, and then 
suddenly [clicking fingers], whoosh! I would think, wrongly, about everything, paranoid, 
everything, and I couldn’t cope, and I had to come back and lay on the bed in the [hospital].” 
Blake left the hospital before he felt ready to, and still experienced this every few weeks or 
so, and described how, “I’ve gotta rush to get home to try and get rid of it … if I talk to my 
mum long enough it will… get better.”60  
 
While Blake called his mother for assurance, most patients did not have (or desire) such 
immediate emotional supports, and would instead, like Robert, “lie down” until such feelings 
of disease passed. Joanne described how if she was at home when “panic” set in, “I take 
myself over to the bed, to lie down on the bed, and tell myself ‘you’re just a bit tired, let time 
pass, it’s okay’.” She would repeat this mantra, “and just through breathing, laying myself 
there on the bed I knew that it would pass.” Patients were informed of such techniques by 
attending to therapeutic information given during the course of their treatments. UK patient 
Felix described how, when he has a panic attack, he “remember[s] what it says in the ‘mind 
booklet,’ and ah, I sit and play the keyboard, try, try, and make myself fall asleep.” Felix had 
thus personalised the technique in regard to playing the keyboard. UK patient Alice, who 
reported feeling panicked when she walked for exercise, had been told by a social worker that 
it was “because I was overweight, and sweating”; “they said to me it’s just because you’re 
fat, I thought it was that, so I’d sort of go on, trying to do faddy diets but they never really 
worked.” Alice then learnt later from a psychologist that these were “panic attacks,” and 
subsequently read in an information booklet that bodily “symptoms” of “sweating” and 
“aches” may have contributed to the panic attacks. She now attended to the triggers – namely, 
“going to the supermarket” and new social settings. Alice said that “on the way here, I didn’t 
have a full panic attack, I just felt very breathless, it’s just walking down the road, but they do 
fluctuate – I think it’s because I’m anxious about taking the medication, but I’m hoping 
they’ll get better when things settle down a bit.” She was giving herself time to adjust to her 
new context.  
 
Personalised assurances and adjustment could also be about overcoming a static ‘physical’ 
state. Tom, for instance, described how he would still occasionally, when walking in public, 
                                                 
60 When I asked Blake if he found it “helpful” being back at home with his parents after returning from hospital, he replied, 
“no, because they kept going out and leaving me on my own in the house and that wasn’t very good for me.”  
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experience moments of “panic” where he would “freeze and think, if I move one of my legs 
again, something evil’s gonna happen.” But, he elaborated, “now I can just flick it off, you 
know, if I have it I can just [clicked his fingers]” (Brown & Dennis 2018:375). Blake was, in 
contrast, less secure in the process of challenging his fears – of falling onto the train tracks 
once a week when he had to travel to work at a voluntary job he enjoyed. He currently felt he 
could not work more often, “because sometimes when I get up, I don’t feel so well, you 
know, I just feel a bit weird sometimes when I wake up … I get worried about when I have to 
step off the train, with the gap, you know.” Blake spoke of having to negotiate feelings of 
having a “numb head” following recent medication reduction. On the one hand, this was 
attributed to bodily adjustment beyond his direct control: “Once the body gets used to the 
lower dose of these ones then I’m sure it’ll level out, in the end.” On the other hand, when I 
asked Blake, “how did your body feel throughout this?” He replied, “well, I used to lean on 
the table and not get a numb head, and when I went like that [demonstrating pulling his body 
upright] it was numb head.” I queried, “so lying down would help?” and he replied, with a 
firm “yes, yeah it did.”   
  
The experiences of both clozapine and other enactments in the external world could also 
work to rebalance mind and body. UK patient Ian, 40, said that the main benefit of clozapine 
was that “it stops… it alleviates pain in experience.” This meant, “clozapine stopped 
headaches” and the “stinging pain along my backside”, which “was similar to needles.” Ian 
could not, however, be sure of the role of clozapine. At other times, he explained to me that 
the pain, “went away by chance,” or that playing the piano “stops me [being] upset … about 
physical pain, the past … like I was saying, the needles.” The action of interacting with the 
external environment could relieve his pain. What is more, the capacities that make up the 
experiences of being a mind inside a body inside a world, with self-experienced intakes and 
outtakes, point to an intentionality toward finding ‘essence’ in one’s ‘extended homeostasis’ 
(Rapport 2003).  
 
When ‘health’ was described along the lines of compartments of “physical” and “mental,” it 
was about continually reconciling these. UK patient Tom, 54, posited, “if you haven’t got the 
motivation, the energy, the awareness, the compassion, the drive in your mind, you’re not 
gonna have it in your body, ‘cause mind and body are connected … I can’t ignore my body” 
(Brown & Dennis 2017:375-376). Tom’s experience of panic as making him “freeze” thus 
manifested in a ‘physical’ paralysis, that he then negotiated with his ‘mind,’ just as Trent had 
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to negotiate with his “voice” to be able to do things. As Lyon (1997:96) noted, ‘particular 
respiratory patterns are part of the embodiment of emotion’ and ‘bodily aspects of emotion 
cannot be separated out from social action more generally because they particularly constitute 
that action, and this action is part of what constitutes emotion’ (Lyon 1997:96). From panic 
attacks to chest pains prompting patients to lie their bodies down and rest to experiences of 
physical ‘paralysis,’ the point was that people wanted to do something about it, to regulate 
their eating or their breathing or their exercise or their smoking for themselves, drawing on 
the imaginary of mind and body (and other) as separate parts to be reckoned with.  
 
The agentic feelings patients experienced were in regard to inhibition or energies that they 
could level out or move from one compartment to the other. Resonating with UK patient 
Kevin, Australian patient James, 32, remarked that in regard to his “auditory hallucinations,” 
“when I do exercise … I’m able to just push that aside … exercise is probably the most 
important factor for me, exercise and healthy eating” (Brown & Dennis 2017:376). 
Australian patient Donna also said that exercise was “the best thing for my mood – remember 
how I told you I wake up feeling awful? – Going for a walk always makes me feel better.” I 
asked how she motivated herself when she was tired and she said, “I just eventually get up 
and go!” She had faith in what worked for her. Further, James commented that if he does not 
“use” the “energy” then “it just whirls around upstairs” (Brown & Dennis 2017:377).  
 
Patients could also draw on their imaginations to evoke the impact of shifting energies 
between mind and body. Joanne described how, while swimming, “kicking my legs I just 
imagine that it’s helping my ligaments, muscles, making them stronger.”61 Joanne’s 
swimming regimen also helped her to reallocate her “emotional” energies when “tired”: 
“Even if you’re tired, you go swimming, you come out … and now you’ve got the physical 
tiredness … Your muscles are kind of relaxed and that sort of goes with a relaxed mind 
somehow, or a relaxed way of thinking and seeing things.” She continued,  
 
It’s difficult to get yourself above, the worried level, sometimes, and I find that even 
if you’re tired you go swimming, you come out, and yes, you’re tired but you’ve, 
you’ve made the step and look at yourself and you’ve become physically tired and 
that is, has a good feedback … now you’ve got the physical tiredness. 
 
                                                 
61 When I said that another patient had attributed a feeling of “muscle weakness” to clozapine, Joanne agreed: “yeah, I can 
relate to that.” She was thus working to mitigate this as much as reallocate her energies.  
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Joanne was, like James, able to redirect her ‘mental’ energies into ‘physical’ energies.  
 
Such projects ultimately acquiesced as much as personalised how energies circulated inside 
one’s body and intermittently impacted patients sense of health agency. During a consultation 
in the Australian clinic, when psychiatrist Adam asked 27-year-old patient Ned to clarify 
whether he knew that he had an “illness,” Ned nodded agreeably. Adam asked what he 
thought caused the illness and Ned said, “changes in my brain chemistry” and “a dopamine 
overload.” Ned effectively utilised the ‘pharmaceutical imaginary’ (Jenkins 2010) that would 
ensure an unproblematic clozapine review, although added his own interpretations in a way 
that complemented clinical ambiguities.62 Like how other patients selectively ate sugar, Ned 
told us that he could avoid feelings of fatigue attributed to clozapine by exercising 
immediately after consumption (by walking or doing push-ups). Ned also suspected, though, 
that the fatigue could be due to “the pH in my stomach” or “foods” he consumed in addition 
to clozapine. Adam assured Ned that this was a common experience of clozapine, although it 
was not clear whether he was just referring to the fatigue, as Adam did not comment on 
Ned’s alternative explanations for it. Either way, Ned asserted both his clinical ‘know-how’ 
(Petryna 2004) and his own personal interpretation and resolving of the issue. It could not be 
determined whether clozapine, or his stomach environment, or his food choice caused the 
fatigue. This ambiguity gave Ned a sense of being able to try to counteract it by his own 
means of exercising after taking clozapine, paralleling with Joanne and Hannah’s actions 
around blood work results (Chapter Two).  
 
On the face of it, the biomedical emphasis on eradicating all ostensibly mind-based 
symptoms can resound in patient ideas of recovery and cloud interpretations of any 
“acceptable” mind-associated experiences that happen in between. For instance, Adam 
suggested that when it came to clozapine treatment, “as a best-case scenario you can expect 
complete remission of psychotic symptoms with some actually developing true insight into 
the fact that they’ve had a psychotic illness.” A quantitative study I wrote up with researchers 
at the UK clinic suggested that, when symptoms of schizophrenia and side effects of 
clozapine are compared by patients in regard to what predicts their subjective well-being 
                                                 
62 Chatting to Adam on another occasion when he had just returned from a home visit on a “suicidal” patient, Adam 
commented how mental health workers can, when focusing on behaviour as the symptom, see “suicidal” behaviour as sign 
of non-compliance to medication and deliberate action against doctors, “rather than seeing it as part of the illness, i.e., why 
do we treat mental illness!” He said that a caseworker had asked him, on the way back from the home visit, “why aren’t they 
on medication?” Adam lamented that suicide is not so predictable or controllable, especially in regard to medication. 
Moreover, Ned’s adoption of ‘biochemical imbalance’ clinical imaginaries (Jenkins 2010) still allowed room for dual 
explanations so long as the baseline of him being treated for an “illness” could be agreed upon.  
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(using a clinical scale), it was the ‘positive symptoms’ (hallucinations and delusions) that 
were found to be statistically significant (Brown, Mezquida & Fernandez-Egea 2016). This 
finding also correlated with some comments I received from patients in my own study. For 
instance, Kevin said when I asked him if the voices he still heard were all negative: “I guess 
some are okay, yeah, some are acceptable… but just having a thought, just the fact that 
someone can hear you having a thought, whether it’s positive or negative is a bad thing.” UK 
patient Tom had also stated that, “mind is the main health” (Brown & Dennis 2017:375).  
 
The assumption that a more ‘motivated’ mind will result in improved ‘bodily’ health is 
incomplete, though. Another study conducted at the UK clinic found that, contrary to clinical 
expectations, reduced ‘negative symptoms’ (blunted affect and motivation levels) correlated 
with higher Body Mass Index – weight gain was found to be more likely in patients 
exhibiting more emotion and motivation (Mezquida et al. 2017). In light of some of my 
ethnographic findings, this was less surprising. The degree to which one symptom becomes 
manageable is not the same as the degree to which one symptom or side effect determines 
another. While patients like Kevin and Tom at first conceptualised their experiences of health 
in this way, the more I spoke with them and other patients about when they actually 
experienced health, it became a matter of active engagements with things that elicit or shift 
energy states. In the manner of ‘precarity,’ rather than ‘vulnerability,’ when understanding 
lived experiences of mental illness (Jenkins 2015:14), experiences and compartmentalisations 
of illness and wellness become usefully insecure. The precariousness of wellness, just like 
blood counts, can be creatively harnessed to bring livelihoods otherwise taken for granted if 
one’s exposure to ‘mental’ instability is mitigated. Moreover, patients could rework the 
mind-body dichotomies by utilising consumption tools available to them as well as potential 
bodily outputs of energy in order to experientially ‘level out’ their own clozapine levels. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that clozapine patients actively rework imaginaries of clozapine, the 
mind, and the body, with energy inputs and outputs, to find a personalised homeostasis that 
resound their health agency. This health agency is enabled through the ambiguities of clinical 
knowledge in regard to clozapine that leave plenty of room for personal construing of 
clozapine’s effects and what individuals can do themselves to enact or deactivate these 
effects. Clozapine treatments may be positioned somewhere between what Rapport (2003) 
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described as ‘democratic violence’ and ‘nihilistic violence,’ tilting mostly toward the former, 
and patients had to work with the everyday logics and experiences to find meaning and 
control. Different explanations were drawn on at different times by different individuals, 
alleviating responsibility for clinical caregivers at the same time as leaving interpretations 
more open for patients to work with. There is no clear tipping point when it comes to 
prescribing or consumption effects, and thus the degree of accountability in terms of how 
clozapine interacts with individuals, and what can be done about side effects, problematises 
who and what is to blame when patients are experiencing a clinically questionable quality of 
life.  
 
In light of incomplete medical knowledge, as well as evidence of some patients being able to 
overcome biochemical limitations and symptoms in ways that are not separable from general 
population experiences, there was plenty for patients to reclaim for themselves. When people 
with co-morbidities are given a host of information about risk-ridden consumption habits, 
these habits can become very rational under context-specific health priorities. Patients 
nonetheless worked to find energy stasis through consuming substances that balance out the 
sedative impact of clozapine, and also engaged in at least one personal ‘health’ ritual, such as 
a specific food believed to protect them or counter-act ‘unhealthy’ consumptions (Warin 
2010). Moreover, quantitative findings that suggest people taking clozapine might put on 
weight in conjunction with appearing more enthusiastic toward their lives (as opposed to 
appearing detached or nihilistic) (Mezuida et al. 2016) make sense if we attend to the ways in 
which patients continue to consume clozapine and other consumables in order to harness 
embodied energy potentialities. There was always a sense that more could be done, that 
‘health’ was in sight if not already felt. Patients cared and health was a moving project, 
requiring continual regulation and upkeep by patients themselves. I now turn to the temporal 
frameworks of clozapine treatment that patients worked with.  
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Chapter Four: Clozapine Temporalities and The Focused, Insatiable Self  
 
Kung fu … feels good, I’ve done lots of martial arts but kung fu and tai-chi, it gets 
your whole body moving, gets your joints and your ligaments and your bones, and 
your muscle structure and your brain and your mind and your soul and your 
imagination, it just… enables you to focus on discipline, and stillness and emptying 
yourself of all the madness that… you know, all the worries, not just myself but 
people in society, with all the anxieties like work and study and bills, and, when I do 
martial arts, it’s like it provides me, just a temporary relief from not just 
schizophrenia – that aside – just from all the frustrations of life in general, and when 
I do martial arts it’s not there. And when it is there, it just doesn’t appeal to me.  
– James, 32, Australian patient  
 
By taking up a present, I draw together and transform my past, altering its 
significance, freeing and detaching myself from it. But I do so only by committing 
myself somewhere else. – Merleau-Ponty 2002[1962]:528) 
 
Ways in which experiencing what Australian patient James described as an embodied sense 
of “focus” and “temporary relief” from “frustrations of life in general,” were critical to 
experiences of self-reclamation for clozapine patients. This mirrors ways in which 
psychological well-being movements in Western society are now geared toward a will to 
‘live in the present’ (Boniwell & Zimbardo 2003). Following my attention to how patients 
actively work with ambiguities and mind-body imaginaries pertaining to clozapine treatment 
and other consumptions in Chapter Three, I here turn to temporal experiences of embodied 
unification and concurrent health agency. James’ description of “your joints and your 
ligaments and your bones” through to “your imagination” working in synthesis evokes 
Sartre’s positioning of imagination as constituting a ‘surpassing and nullifying power’ (in 
Rapport 2000:4). Similar to James’ concerns shifting while doing martial arts, Merleau-Ponty 
(2002[1962]:528;530) remarked, ‘taking up a present’ temporally frees the agent from their 
past, and ‘choice and action alone cut us loose from our anchorage.’ As explored in Chapter 
Three, for the duration in which one is ‘doing something,’ a sense of health and proactivity is 
felt.  
 
This chapter argues that patients express health agency by formulating their own present-
centred rituals, complementing the clozapine regimen, to enable them to deal with stress and 
uncertainty about their past at the same time as keeping their futures open. The strategies that 
patients deploy to focus on the present include clozapine, routines, and meditative pursuits 
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that allow temporal focus and freedoms. Part of this story is about clozapine as a drug that 
slows people down, and part of it is about what patients do in conjunction with the 
temporalities brought on by treatment, their medical conditions, and their personal drives to 
move through – and suspend – linear time. Whereas phenomenological explications of 
schizophrenia emphasise how patients suffer from ‘disturbances in feeling self-present and 
feeling anchored in the world among others’ (Stephenson & Parnas 2017), I suggest that 
clozapine-treated patients can, even in spite of persistent clinical symptoms, experience 
embodied or ‘enminded’ subjectivity that anchors them both temporally and socially.  
 
In beginning my argument about how agents optimise their well-being vis-à-vis keeping 
present-focused potentiality ahead of undesirable pasts and futures, the first section of this 
chapter explicates the temporalities induced by clozapine treatment. Patients experience these 
situations at a minimum, setting the pace for managing day-to-day and longer-term concerns. 
The relief and self ‘re-setting’ provided by sleep, as a baseline, will be a theme running 
throughout this chapter. Many patients look toward ‘doing things’ to keep well and occupy 
their time in between the solace of sleep. Whereas in Chapter Three I suggested that health 
itself pertained to activity, here I discuss how harnessing attention and finding ‘focus’ in 
present-time allowed patients to detach from existential ambiguities and to temporally 
transcend fear and uncertainty. As Simone de Beauvoir (2000[1948]:157) described of 
experiences of managing self-doubt, we feel ‘certitude’ only through our ‘drive’ to do things, 
and in this way become temporally self-assured. As psychiatric stability is largely defined by 
being able to doubt rather than fixate on ideas about how things are (Rhodes & Gipps 2008), 
I explore how for patients, tentatively stable on clozapine, temporal drives can lead to 
attainable, self-driven levels of productivity and imagined futures beyond being a clozapine-
treated schizophrenia patient.  
 
I explore how achieving present-state awareness translates to states of well-being comparable 
to pursuits of meditation and ‘mindfulness’ to overcome trauma. I consider emotion and 
stress management, and how ‘flow’ experiences (Csikszentmihalyi 1990) may be applicable 
to clozapine patients’ experiences. I suggest how patients – both deliberately and by proxy of 
focusing on the present – were able to develop rituals for themselves, informing their sense of 
health agency. I build on the notion of ‘flow’ to consider how patients express self-growth 
beyond self-fragmentation. I return to Rapport’s (2003) notion of ‘self-intensity’ and 
‘essence,’ to explain how temporal self-reclamation was achieved through engaging in 
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attention absorbing activities that are challenging and ‘novel.’ I then expand on how temporal 
creativities and potentialities enabled through concentration and activity contradict more 
fixed clinical perceptions. Ultimately, patient experiences cannot be differentiated from 
phenomenological notions of existential freedom or Heideggerarian ‘dwelling’ or ‘ecstatic 
temporality’ (Heidegger 1962[1927]). Further, I explore how clinical observations of 
‘negative symptoms,’ ‘attention deficits’ and ‘working memory’ are highly contextual and 
often heightened in clinic interactions with a clinical focus and time demands.  
 
Clozapine as a provisional “shield”  
 
Clozapine is somehow keeping me alive … like an exoskeleton frame, and it feels like 
this frame might all collapse on me if I stop taking it. – Mark, 52, UK patient 
 
Clozapine supplies patients with a basic structure and potential future, with increased agency 
over their health. Consumption and monitoring enters patients into a mode of provisional 
adjourning of concerns, bringing either feelings of solace or limitation, depending on whether 
patients feel they have been able to navigate the effects. For most patients in my study, 
clozapine provided “a shield” of sorts – as Australian patient Keith, 55, put it. UK patient 
Mark, 52, said that clozapine treatment was “like an exoskeleton frame” because it “feels like 
it’s holding me together in some way.” This distinctive ‘pharmaceutical imaginary’ (Jenkins 
2010) was temporal. Mark said he experienced a feeling of being “a bit woolly … you feel 
clouded,” but that one of the “main benefits” of taking clozapine was that it made him feel 
“subdued, a bit numb.” This stood in contrast to “a great deal of anxiety and confusion” he 
had experienced in the lead up to starting clozapine 25 years earlier. Similarly, UK patient 
Geoff, 53, explained, “when I was initially put on clozapine it was as though it 
psychologically … conquered me … I was less able to think.” I clarified, “and has it helped?” 
To which he responded, “I think it has, yeah … staying well, um, not being too anxious or 
frightened … yeah, being able to live a near-normal life.” Clozapine provided temporal 
protections from dose-to-dose.  
 
Respite from consuming clozapine in the immediate sense of swallowing the tablet meant a 
temporal “stopping” of discomforts. Australian patient Angus, 38, said that clozapine simply 
“turns things off.” UK patient Kevin, 34, had supplemented clozapine with other activities 
but said that he “would love for my thoughts to stop, you know, all of them” (Chapter Three). 
The experience of clozapine tended to involve at the very least a sense that “time slows,” if 
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not “stopping” discomfort in its track (or eliciting feelings of “thought suppression” as UK 
patient Nathanial, 36, reported). These experiences were in stark contrast to how “everything 
happens so quickly” during psychosis – as UK patient Gordon, 39, explained. UK patient 
Dylan, 34, iterated that, since taking clozapine, “I’ve really slowed down.” Present-time 
stability was prioritised over potential future concerns.   
 
Clozapine was described by many patients as a provisional protection that, in conjunction 
with what had come before, could give rise to feelings of survival. Australian patient Liam, 
38, with recurrent psychotic symptoms said, “sometimes I feel like I’ve lost track of time, I 
feel like I’ve been on the toilet for three days.” Liam feared going to the toilet due to “panic 
attacks” (more below), but clozapine helped to alleviate these at times. I asked him what the 
benefits of clozapine were and he replied, “it works fast; I’ve done really well.” He felt that 
clozapine was one of four “magic pills” that had worked in conjunction with his prayers to 
God. Whereas he felt he “was just getting poisoned” on illicit substances, he viewed 
pharmaceutical drugs differently. He said, “sometimes when I’m so desperate I just take my 
meds at 5[pm] instead of 9[pm].” Liam would also “pray” during this time that just one 
would work initially, as to not quite send him to sleep yet, “then the rest will kick in at 9pm, 
to send me to sleep.” Liam thus felt an agency over the biochemical process. When I asked 
Liam what “wellness” meant, he said, “when I feel 100 per cent.” When I asked him when he 
last felt this way, he said, “this morning.” 
 
The experience of taking clozapine seemed to be about how the restful pause facilitated in a 
predictable fashion by clozapine suited patients’ desires for more agency. It especially suited 
patients who were more cognisant of, and exhausted by, more recent psychotic episodes – 
often pertaining to trauma, whereby ‘the intentional structure [of the self] collapses 
immediately’ as opposed to ‘at will’ (Ataria 2018:52). Being on the clozapine regimen and 
having additional caregivers like parents around in between clinical care (not common but 
more likely for younger patients) facilitated the temporal respite to keep specific agendas out 
of the picture.  
 
Patients could find their own ways of ‘re-setting’ their lives with clozapine, and it often took 
time, often years, to adjust to clozapine. As stated in Chapter Three, Australian psychiatrist 
Sandra suggested that, “perhaps having your illness controlled for enough time gives you 
space to build,” while UK patient Alice who had recently started taking clozapine 
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commented, “I just want a quiet life basically, you know, I’ve been through a lot of drama.” 
Australian patient Charlie, 35, recently put on clozapine but exhibiting what clinicians would 
call the ‘negative symptom’ of ‘anhedonia,’ was relieved to be feeling care-free since taking 
clozapine. He went so far as to tell me that after all he had been through, “now I wouldn’t 
care if I died” (Brown 2018:159). He elaborated, “I’ve had no sexual idea or pleasure or 
anything for four or five years now, just too much suicide compulsions – that’s what did it.” I 
asked, 
 
JB: So, you just feel… spent? 
Charlie: Yeah, I’m all spent … it’s like being in a war. You know, have you seen the 
Deer Hunter? With Robert Di Niro? He comes back from war and he gets into bed 
and says ‘Goodnight’ and goes to sleep. You know, they don’t think like that 
anymore, they’ve been too badly traumatized by what’s happened to them … What 
happened to me with that suicide compulsion was it was like being in a war. Every 
day I thought I was gonna die, for sure ... [now] I’m happy the way I am though. I 
don’t have sex as a behaviour anymore, that’s all that happened. I’m not sexual 
anymore. I still have other behaviours. … It’s taken a lot to get to this point but 
things are pretty good as they are.  
 
The feeling of being “happy the way I am,” by way of relating one’s experiences to a wider 
social discourse (ideas in the film Deer Hunter) reiterated Charlie’s sense of how, “you just 
feel normal” on clozapine. While Charlie at first said to me, “I haven’t really achieved much 
in my life,” he later said, “I’ve just done everything I’ve wanted to do,” and then added that 
he had aspirations to pursue his interests in writing and making music. Thus, while life on 
clozapine, like life with schizophrenia, might be analytically construed as a 
phenomenological minimising of ‘sudden changes’ or creating a ‘substitute of inner 
continuity’ (Fuchs 2007:234), patients also reclaimed experiences as relative renewals of life, 
and as-yet unwritten futures. There is a temporal orderliness implicit in clozapine treatment, 
focusing on immediate concerns only.  
 
The intended remedial aspect of clozapine does not include confrontations with patients’ 
pasts nor specific plans beyond the imminent future. For some, including older patients, 
clozapine kept emotional life within bounds – as UK patient Martin, 51, said, “it keeps me on 
the straight and narrow … the main thing is stability.” Martin told me that no health 
professional he had seen throughout his treatment had talked to him about his past; “it’s more 
focused on current, current needs.” When I asked him if he thought this helped, he said he 
was “not sure,” because: “I’m a bit sceptical about these people you see, psychiatrists, getting 
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them to relive their childhood traumas … you are who you are anyway, and you’ve got to 
make the most of it.” As discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, Martin, like many 
patients, revealed to me very casually in conversation several events in his life that sounded 
traumatic to me but he dismissed as not significant.63 I observed a relationship between 
participants’ attitudes to traumatic past experiences and their gender. Seven out of eight 
female patient participants had told me about how they had sought various kinds of 
counselling, leading to a clearer narrative about how past family relationships had affected 
their experiences.64 Nevertheless, the need for present-time stability was particularly 
important when it came to addressing uncomfortable experiences either side of consuming 
clozapine.   
 
The routine of taking clozapine was a central part of a patient’s day. For instance, UK patient 
Peter, 54, told me that he could only face each day after taking clozapine, having a cup of tea 
and smoking a cigarette (see Brown 2018:161). When I asked UK patient Geoff, 52, how he 
kept himself “well,” he said:   
 
I have routines, in the morning and night time … In the morning, I get up, I take my 
medication, feed the cat, wash, dress, have breakfast and then… in the past I’ve been 
napping in the morning after breakfast but I’m trying not to do that, I’m trying to 
change that… [in the evening] I lock the front door, take medication, change into my 
pyjamas, brush my teeth, check the appliances in the flat and then go to bed. 
 
While these behaviours were clinically regarded to be Obsessive-Compulsive, they were also 
critical to maintaining a sense of orderliness from day-to-day.  
 
As suggested in Chapter One and Two, the truncated time concerns of clozapine were also 
observed by clinical caregivers. Just like each dose of clozapine bought 12-24 hours for 
patients, each clinic appointment suspended concerns that might stretch beyond the clinic 
time window. In terms of treatment monitoring concerns, UK nurse Narelle explained that 
each appointment presented her with a momentary “opportunity” to try to “connect” health 
concerns more “holistically.” Clinical prioritising, however, was inevitable due to the 
                                                 
63 Namely, his older brother committing suicide when Martin was a child, his parent’s divorce and subsequent re-marrying, 
adding step-family, his mother dying of Alzheimer’s Disease and not remembering him at a time when he was failing 
university course and having employment difficulties.  
64 This can also be understood as a form of ‘autobiographical power’ (Myers & Ziv 2016). As noted in Chapter One, a 
discussion about gender differences is not within the scope of this thesis and in any case not central to patients’ experiences 
of health agency in relation to temporality.  
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“curtailed” appointment times from government “cuts” to resources (across all services). 
Regardless of how much she could fit in during the time allocated, and between her wider 
community health work and her two days at the clozapine clinic, she felt she “could fill a 
week with this clinic work, easily.” She surmised, “you live with a different level of-, you 
know, it’s always the case that you go home and something will pop into your mind … but 
the kinds of things that pop into your mind now, make me gasp a bit!” It was “just really a 
bare fact,” that “somebody will pop into your mind [after work hours, and] … It’s all risk 
stuff, all risk.”65  
 
The phenomenon of particular “kinds” of worrisome thoughts coming and going was a large 
part of patient experiences, too, notwithstanding the effects of clozapine. As UK patient 
Kevin posited in Chapter Three about how the feeling of being “occupied” soon recedes 
again such that “perverse thoughts,” which “pop into my head” as soon as “there’s nothing to 
distract you.” For some patients, this served as a reminder of otherwise dormant illness. UK 
patient Joanne said, “it’s hard to describe when you don’t feel at all ill, and something will 
happen and you’ll think ‘oh, yes, I have schizophrenia’.” Similar to sets of ocean waves, 
whatever was missed during time spent riding a present wave did not necessarily stay missing 
from subsequent waves of experience.   
 
Insofar as filling present-time frames could only conditionally keep out future concerns that 
might “pop” back into clinical caregivers’ and patients’ minds later, experiences of clozapine 
being able to “stop” and “slow” linear time sequences were again impermanent. Although 
UK patient Dylan, 33, had said to me that when he first took clozapine – “it took away all my 
thoughts, and I was like, wow, this is brilliant!” – the feeling was conditional. When I asked 
what kinds of thoughts he meant he responded, quietly, “just… weird thoughts” and 
“mistakes”, from when he was “younger.” Clozapine’s temporal assurance needed to be 
replenished, and this could create a feeling of what UK patient Peter described as a “need for 
it … [be]cause I never wanna go back to how I felt when I was without it.” Again, the solace 
of sleep as another temporal stopping and slowing was critical to patient experiences.  
 
                                                 
65 Narelle was looking to formally integrate her psychotherapy skills when performing ‘physical’ check-ups with patients, 
which, depending on supervisory approval and funding, would also give her more time with patients to think beyond 
immediate ‘risk’ management. 
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Temporal orders 
 
Depending on whether we are sleeping or awake ‘and whether the body had approximately 
the right amount of time in the previous mode’ (sleep or waking life), we experience different 
‘tempos’ or temporal orders (Jowsey 2016:1097). Most patients were grateful for being able 
to sleep better since taking clozapine, as it was both an opportunity for restoration and an 
escape from discomforts. UK patient Tom, explained, “if you’ve got schizophrenia it’s not 
very good to have nights where you can’t sleep [be]cause it brings out the…  psychotic 
things.” UK patient Luke said, “I do sleep as much as I can,” because “it helps me to relax, to 
get positive thoughts in my head,” and – drawing on medical imagery – “I achieve the alpha 
state when I’m asleep … that’s what I look forward to.” UK patient Alex, 48, told me that his 
hallucinatory presence of the “Suey people” (Chapter One) “don’t hurt me when I’m asleep.” 
Australian patient Keith elaborated that, “it’s [taking clozapine] like having a couple of 
bongs, not on the same level, but it’s good, it is - puts me to sleep.”66 Having recently started 
taking clozapine, Keith noted that he liked “going to sleep early, you know, having a good 
sleep.”67 UK patient Martin also appreciated clozapine’s “effect of tiring me … I take 
advantage of this – I work in the afternoons; get up a bit later than most people.”  
 
The provisional time of clozapine was also associated with self-prescribed temporal orders. 
The regularity of taking clozapine at certain times as well as time spent sleeping, speaks to 
both the temporal structures of ‘clocked time’ and ‘inner time and rhythms’ (based on 
experiential, bodily cycles) associated with general chronic illness experiences (Jowsey 
2016). While clozapine needs to be consumed at particular times such that a restraint on 
freedoms to do other things at those times might be assumed, I did not find that patients 
needed to negotiate tensions between ‘clock time’ and experiential ‘inner time and rhythms’ 
(Jowsey 2016:1098). This was largely because patients felt able to ensure that the effects of 
clozapine consumption suited their personal interests, particularly around sleep. Once 
adjusted to how clozapine worked for personal preferences, there was also the knock-on 
effect of building momentum toward the future. As UK patient Blake, 45, who only took 
clozapine in the evenings, said, “you have to give it about 45 minutes before you stop 
thinking funny.” Blake reported relatively high feelings of well-being (an “eight” out of ten) 
                                                 
66 Keith continued to smoke marijuana, too, to assist him in getting to sleep, but could not single out whether it was 
clozapine or marijuana that was most critical in this process. Again, implementing complementary strategies were important 
to exerting agency.  
67 A critical point I will return to in the last section of this chapter is that many participants did not mind going to sleep early 
if they had “nothing else to do.” 
170  
because he “went to bed early, got up early, came here,” which had become his reliable 
strategy for having a good day. UK patient Luke said of recently starting clozapine that he 
felt, “less stressed… I enjoy sleeping … but there’s more things to do isn’t there! You’ve 
gotta kind of keep organised, and keep focused, and optimistic and… push on.” This 
suggested an intentionality to keep protecting himself in the present.  
 
Sleep as a suspension of time and conscious concerns sometimes needed to be reconciled 
with waking life, and this prompted reflection. For instance, Australian patient Myles 
remarked how, “when I am asleep, you can’t wake me up … but I can’t work out howda’… 
deal with, the side effects of this drug, I mean you go to sleep, you wake up in the mornin,’ 
the whole pillow’s covered in drool, saliva from - it makes you drool all night.”68 The 
pockets of time that were suspended from other realities either through clozapine “numbing,” 
sleep or activities (discussed below) was an underlying theme for patients. While clozapine 
itself could be seen as providing a ‘knowing presence’ or ‘arbiter of reality’ (Jenkins 
2015:60) – such as how Myles described: “It’s sorta like it’s someone in me head that talks to 
this person, so I don’t have to” – the experiences of unaccounted for time were also powerful 
because they were short-lived but familiar enough to provide a common thread through 
patient experiences.  
 
Over time, the shorter-term temporal bearings associated with clozapine treatment could 
provide enough security for patients to build upon. UK patient Felix, 45, said he had “been 
continually making progress since 1998” (when he started clozapine). When I asked him of 
the changes he had experienced he said, “I don’t know really, it’s just that… I always take it, 
you know, morning and night – sometimes I take the night time dose a bit early, if I feel 
panicky.” As Felix had suggested of his cigarette smoking habit, which he said, “helps me 
with panic attacks,” feelings of “making progress” could be grounded more in maintaining 
present stability rather than in clear changes from the point at which patients found their 
reliable sources of stability.69 Moreover, the temporal cost is also present, with the 
knowledge of both positive and negative immediate futures suggested through the 
personalised management of threats to stability.  
 
                                                 
68 Myles also chose to continue smoking marijuana as well as taking clozapine because “it actually solves my mental 
problems” and “makes me sleep”; facilitating temporal alleviations. 
69 Felix felt that ceasing smoking would be “a problem either way because if you do give up the withdrawal symptoms will 
give you a panic attack”. 
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Temporal upkeeps 
  
Arguably, clozapine facilitated ‘Fordist’ aspirations of ‘regularity, task-specific duties, and 
mechanical rhythms’ (Ferzacca 2000:35). As Adam (2008:113) suggested, ‘the more 
intensely progress is pursued, the less the future becomes predictable.’ Australian patient 
Liam identified that it was important to him to be able to follow routines, as this helped to 
establish some measures of predictability in his immediate future. Yet this predictability was 
a double-edged sword when it signalled unfavourable futures. For example, the process of 
showering, as well as going to the toilet, tended to bring on “panic attacks” because “I might 
get the routine wrong.”70 Liam explained, “I don’t know if I should tell you this but I have a 
curse – straight after the shower, I wet myself.” Clinically, Liam’s experiences could be 
interpreted as the clozapine side effects of incontinence and/or Obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms (his superstitious rituals of prayer and particular routines). Liam nonetheless 
suggested a willingness to persist and strive for experiences of feeling “100 per cent” and to 
maximise a sense of control over time. 
 
There was space to fit in new possibilities for health alongside the provisions of clozapine, in 
line with how people in modern society take ‘the future to be subject to our own will’ (Adam 
2008:113). UK patient Christopher, 39, understood his experiences in terms of 
“neuroplasticity,” which he described in relation to time: “The paint hasn’t dried.” He felt 
himself to be “waking up” and negotiating with the “negative” voices he still heard. 
Christopher continued, “what I say about schizophrenia is it’s like the light goes on and 
you’re blinded by it but, yeah, after a while … my eyes are slowly adjusting.” Many patients 
who had been on clozapine for a longer time described a process of adjustment and 
acceptance before they could think beyond their current appreciation for mere stability.  
 
Of course, the years spent in liminal time appreciating stability, to not do anything in 
particular yet, could be highly consequential to patients’ longer-term prospects at social 
integration. Patients might not ever ‘catch up’ with their expectant life stage had they not 
been diagnosed with schizophrenia. UK phlebotomist Sam commented to me one day that 
                                                 
70 This routine consisted of “rinse off, shampoo, lathering for five or ten minutes, rinse.” Panic attacks also prevented him 
from going to the toilet: “sometimes when I have a bad panic attack I dread the thought of going to the toilet. I go eventually 
but I wait a while.” He also suggested, “When I get home I need to brush my teeth. I haven’t brushed my teeth in weeks, I’ve 
been too slack” – this did not relate specifically to the panic attacks but Liam mentioned it in the context of them. Critically, 
Liam was determined to keep trying: “I was going to have a shower yesterday but then a panic attack came on and I couldn’t 
do it, so I’m going have a shower again tomorrow, have another attempt.” Many patients told me about ‘tomorrow’ 
aspirations.  
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patients were now able to enjoy their lives without having to take responsibility yet, 
particularly younger patients in their thirties who were “catching up on what they missed in 
their twenties,” or even earlier. Sam had observed how patients enjoyed “sitting around 
together eating pizza and playing video games,” like they might have done a decade or two 
earlier. A number of patients in my research who became unwell toward the end of their 
schooling or university years were retaking school or university subjects again, often telling 
me how ‘studying’ textbooks had become a part of their daily routine, albeit toward no 
particular end-point. Clozapine was helping to keep their futures open. 
 
It may seem that clozapine enters patients into an all pervasive ‘provisional time’ whereby 
patients cannot escape a parental regime imposed on them because they are not afforded time 
without the impacts of clozapine. One could say that clozapine treatment enters patients into 
situations of ‘chronic time,’ wherein ‘chronic time is an intruder who forces life into a kind of 
lock-down that interferes with improvising temporality’ (Morris 2008:415). Clozapine 
patients, however, could effectively escape this ‘chronic time’ using strategies to temporally 
evade existential uncertainties that come with illness or otherwise. Heidegger (1962[1927]) 
suggested that our sense of ‘Being’ is fluid and ultimately ‘to-Be.’ It is simultaneously 
available and unavailable, ‘throwing’ and ‘projecting’ us toward what is contextually 
meaningful. He described such temporality as ‘ecstatic’ in the sense that it stands, ‘outside-
of-itself’ and ‘in and for itself’, whereby there are continually opening horizons of ‘ecstases’: 
The ‘having been;’ ‘the Present;’ and the indeterminable future (Heidegger 
1962[1927]:H329). Thus, while our lives might be retrospectively pieced together along 
pinpoints of time, while time is ‘happening’ we improvise our way through a multiple, non-
linear and ‘ecstatic temporality’ that is behind, alongside and ahead of itself (Heidegger 
1962[1927]). Taking the case of children with Type I diabetes, David Morris (2008:419) 
argued that to suit the conditional demands of bodily functions and monitoring, ‘the future is 
already eaten up by the next dosage, the next test, the next thing to eat,’ yielding only 
‘chronic time’ – and no ecstatic temporality.  
 
Social norms, conventions, habits and practices driven by our individual circumstances are 
the sources of domestic and bodily regimes that provide an underlying beat to our lives. For 
clozapine patients, ‘chronic time’ strengthens this beat through patients continual and vital 
engagement with their medication regimens. Yet, as the locus of these provisions, the body 
also becomes the platform for possible feelings of freedom (Morris 2008:417). Morris 
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(2008:419;418) observed that when diabetic children do not concord with their insulin 
regimen, they were grasping for the only means of ecstatic temporality, otherwise granted in 
adulthood, that they might ever experience. Herein, Morris (2008:419) posited, these children 
have not yet had any time to be themselves (“I have not even had time to be me”). The 
existential framework of rebelling against chronic time and reclaiming ecstatic temporality 
via any openings for non-concordance is worth considering in the case of adult, clozapine-
treated schizophrenia patients.  
 
Ways in which patients resolved to carrying out tasks one at a time suggested that they did 
not take their personal experiences of focusing on these tasks for granted. In overcoming 
initial stress one day when she had had to change her plans because she had woken up to a 
leaking roof requiring a workman to come around when she was hoping to be somewhere 
else, Joanne said to me, resolutely, “you can only focus on what you can do.” Joanne said of 
her schizophrenia, “I have to be a bit more focused than another person who’s doing little 
jobs through the house, who perhaps do it with the radio on while they’re singing or 
something – I mean I could do that as well but otherwise I’m focusing on doing this, then I’m 
going to do that.”  
 
The veneer of feeling “too busy” to take on more was common amongst patients and 
suggested a kind of buffering of time to deal with uncertainties. For instance, UK patient 
Felix, who worked in a voluntary job twice a week, felt “busy” and reflected that, “on the one 
hand, I kind of think it would be good to be in a full-time job, on the other hand if I was 
then… I wouldn’t be able to sort out other things like having the electrician come around and 
fix the light, on the balcony, or…answer the phone.” Being able to do these tasks may be 
indicative of Felix’s fears about what it might mean to trade his time spent doing “not very 
much.” It also resonated with the impression that most patients gave me, that although most 
knew that they did not have a huge array of commitments they felt busy, and thus they were 
reluctant to take the risk of adding in more activities, partly in fear of relapse, partly in not 
wanting to plan too far into the future, and partly in keeping “in control” and focusing in 
present time.  
 
Picking up on my previous point, the future was kept open for clozapine patients in regard to 
present time options being continually savoured. UK phlebotomist Sam remarked that 
patients have “some dreams, but they don’t really know yet ‘what I want to do’,” especially if 
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there is no sense of “urgency,” or “when parents are still taking care of things for them.” The 
latter scenario could apply to UK patient Holly, whose ‘impulsive’ behaviours (clinically 
defined) along with her cautious experimentations with rebellious consumptions (trying 
alcohol for the first time at age 40 by drinking one bottle of cider, and then trying cigarettes 
by vaping an e-cigarette), could be viewed differently had she been a child or adolescent and 
not highly pre-occupied by her parents (dis-)approval of her. On the one hand, the 
decelerating of time in terms of curtailed expectations toward self-reliance might render her 
as not being able to fulfil long term independence from others (Morris 2008). The majority of 
patients were not as financially supported by their families as Holly was, and prospects for 
gaining independent housing arrangements and the stretching of time in between was critical. 
UK nurse Narelle remarked: 
 
They come out of hospital and think, you know, “I just want my own flat,” and don’t 
we all want that, isn’t it good to aspire to that? But people are told “well, yes, but 
that’s down the line. Before you can have that, you have to do this and this … 
because that’s the process to get to there, that we say! And of course, when they get 
in the first place, once they’re in there … they’ll wait two years for a vacancy in the 
next one, I mean, people’s twenties are taken up by that kind of decision.  
 
On the other hand, while being largely dependent on parents or an inefficient social welfare 
system can exacerbate the slowing of time while on clozapine, attention to present-centred 
concerns seemed to suit patients who did not have intimately therapeutic relationships 
available to safely attend to their past or future.  
 
Patients appreciated the ‘provisional time’ in part because it was still flexible. Living in the 
present meant utilising clozapine to provide restful pause when it was wanted.  Although the 
half-life effects of the drug seemed to facilitate an energy to “do things” beyond being 
‘sedated’ by the drug, the sedentary effects upon first consuming clozapine were of course 
welcomed before bedtime. UK patient Steve, 21, who had been on clozapine for “probably 
two years,” which felt like a “long time” to him, liked to make music and socialise with 
friends later in the day, and felt that clozapine was “alright” now that he could predict and 
work around its sedentary effects. He elaborated, “every time I take it, it knocks me out for 
about 12 hours.” Steve said that if he had to get up early, “I’ll only take half a dose, [be]cause 
otherwise I won’t be able to do anything.” UK patient Alan, 43, said that once the clozapine 
“wears off … I perk back up again a bit, so I’m alright.”  
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Critically, clozapine regimens did not quite reflect ‘chronic time’ because once domesticated, 
time could be re-ordered. When UK patient Tom, 54, started clozapine treatment ten years 
ago, he entered a cycle of taking clozapine, feeling “drowsy,” having “nightmares” 
throughout the day and night, and “chain smoking” to “relax” in between clozapine doses. 
His appetite increased, and, being sedentary, he put on 29kg (40 percent of his initial body 
weight).  Before long he was diagnosed with Type II diabetes, prompting him to quit 
smoking. But the nightmares persisted and continued to torment him, so, five and a half years 
into his treatment, he asked for his clozapine dose to be reduced. As suggested in Chapter 
Three, when I met Tom (in 2015), he was down to one seventh of his original dose, had lost 
weight, reversed his diabetes, his “energy” had returned, and he was practicing tai-chi at least 
once a day to “focus.” Tom smiled softly, “at least I know [that] it’s not the end for people 
with schizophrenia.” When I returned to the UK the following year, however, Tom was no 
longer attending the clozapine clinic. Staff told me that Tom’s cat had died, causing him 
much distress. Subsequently, he stopped taking his clozapine altogether. He quickly became 
psychotic again, and was readmitted to hospital. He agreed to go back on clozapine, provided 
he could move away to another the town, to start again, and attend a different clozapine 
clinic. The temporal respite brought on by clozapine was a central ingredient in finding order, 
but patients saw themselves as individuals negotiating the ‘chronic time’ of clozapine for 
themselves.  
 
Often feelings of cognitive sharpness were experienced with a lower, sub-therapeutic dose of 
clozapine, as recent clinical evidence also suggests (Mezquida et al. 2018). UK patient 
Christopher, who had been working with his psychiatrist to lower his clozapine dose over the 
last five years (reducing from 600 to 475 milligrams so far), but declined supplementary 
medications for ongoing ‘psychotic’ symptoms, said, “some people get dragged into it, the 
mind-numbing cycle, and before you know it you can’t change yourself.” UK patient 
Nathanial, who actively smoked while taking the clozapine to try to combat “a general 
feeling of weakness,” found that in coming off clozapine treatment (Chapter Two) his 
experience of “consciousness” returned such that he felt “more coherent”, at least initially.  
 
While progress in terms of ongoing ‘stability’ could be appreciated, the emphasis was more 
on continuing to seek out activities and assurances that could maintain a sense of security. 
UK patient, Trevor, described himself to be “in a good state of well-being at the moment … 
I’ve been out of hospital a very long time; I’ve been stable a very long time.” He wanted to 
176  
“leave things as they are,” which meant “to enjoy life really, forgetting about the past, coping 
with the current situation … minimising stress – I don’t want to put myself in very stressful 
situations because, you know, it’ll make me ill;” “I need to feel secure.” As Christopher 
pointed out, feeling secure was part of what he recognised as “Maslow’s Pyramid of 
needs”:71 
 
So, you’ve got to have your food, you’ve got to have your clothes, you’ve got to 
have your shelter… it’s difficult, because I worry about things like losing my job, 
and if I lose that… If I lost everything and bombed out, it would… poverty, being 
locked in poverty; you’ve got to do things. 
 
This resonates with previous ethnographic evidence about the significance of basic housing 
and financial support on outcomes for schizophrenia patients across cultures (Luhrmann & 
Marrow 2016).  
 
Unfortunately for patients in public housing, feeling secure was difficult, yet they 
compensated by implementing their own sense of order and predictability in their lives. For 
instance, Australian patient Daniel said that finding a “focused frame of mind” did not always 
feel “feasible” due to his public housing situation. His neighbours were frequently “climbing 
up” over his balcony to access the apartments above, and there were continual break-ins. 
Thankfully, clozapine allowed Daniel to “keep a constant sleep, [be]cause otherwise I’ll just 
try and keep myself up for ages,” “trying to be hyper-vigilant … not wanting to sleep … 
‘cause you’re worried about people breaking in your door.”  
 
When patients could find safety in their surroundings and minimise stress triggers, on the 
other hand, the difference was significant enough to not be able to distinguish between the 
impact of clozapine and the changed surroundings. UK patient Kevin said, “my mind’s a bit 
calmer… I think I’m less paranoid,” but that he was not sure whether this was because he no 
longer exposed himself to “clubs and pubs” or because of clozapine: “I’m definitely better 
but I don’t know why … am I just in situations that don’t stress me out as much?” He 
conceded, however, that, “clozapine dulls down your feelings”, and that he was reluctant to 
reduce his dose because “I don’t wanna end up back where I was ten years ago.”  “I try to 
live in the present, I don’t like looking too far back or too far forward,” UK patient Alice 
                                                 
71 Maslows’s Hierarchy of Needs is an established psychological theory that prioritises human needs in the following order 
(highest to lowest): Physiological, safety, social, self-esteem, self-actualisation (see Block 2011).  
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stated. Furthermore, having a sense of provisional security and temporal order could bring 
patients to a place of “focusing” in and on present time. This could also reflect a return to the 
rhythms of sleep and wakefulness that characterise a desirable present, keeping the past and 
future at bay. Together, these everyday rhythms constituted a present worth having.   
 
Focusing in time; suspending uncertainty  
 
Tom: I think there are people out there who are… fairly focused, should we say, and 
they don’t suffer from schizophrenia, yet, and maybe they never will, if they’re lucky, 
but they might have marital problems, relationship problems, work problems… you 
don’t suffer from schizophrenia, Dr [George] doesn’t, are you 100 per cent happy?! 
JB: Well, no, I don’t think there’s-, this is why I’m interested in exploring it, but not 
even just happiness- 
Tom: Health? 
JB: This idea of health, yeah, what does it really mean? 
Tom: Yeah, I’ll go back to what I was saying about connecting with your body and 
mind, working on that, that’s all anyone can do – yoga, tai-chi, meditation, ballet or 
whatever, anything … that’s gonna get you so you can FO-CUS 
  
Patients engaged in activities that provided immediate embodied connection and 
concentration; activities were not pursued for the longer-term reward. Post-modern analysts 
have rendered this inclination to focus on the present a reflection of ‘late capitalism,’ such 
that schizophrenia patients can be understood as ‘the product of a schizoid culture which 
seems to aspire to the collapse of linear meaning into the compressed time of a perpetual 
present’ (Currie in Woods 2011:196). In this context, the schizophrenia patient is somewhat 
constituted as ‘disembodied and deprived of agency … a spectre of depthlessness that 
perhaps says more about the pessimism of cultural theory’ (Woods 2011:199). Further, while 
Fuchs (2007:234;235) has suggested that ‘the outward similarity of succeeding moments 
creates something like a substitute of inner continuity, an artificial steadiness of one’s 
experience’ –  such that ‘schizophrenic patients try to avoid sudden changes as far as 
possible’ and ‘in its extreme the immobilization or ‘freezing of time’ may lead to catatonic 
stupor’ – I found patient experiences to align with a wider means of managing existential 
anxiety in Western culture. For clozapine patients, being able to “focus” enough to ground 
oneself in present awareness was, as Tom suggested, tied into a connection with the world. 
Feeling “focused” and “doing things,” yielded a temporal sense of self-efficacy in the world.  
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Several patients reported knowing they were well if they could focus enough to read. When I 
asked Australian patient James whether there was anything other than eating fresh fruits that 
he did to keep his health on track, he responded, “reading, that’s pretty much how I evaluate 
am I sick or well, am I well or unwell, regarding mental illness, is can I focus on reading, for 
prolonged periods of time.” He furthered, “If I’m really well, I can sit there for 5 hours and 
read a book; if I’m unwell, I can probably read for about 5 minutes and then be distracted.” 
This qualified his ability to move through other activities. 
 
Patients found ways to divert their focus when faced with undesirable possibilities within 
their present time commitments.  For instance, Martin explained that he did puzzles at work 
to “distract” himself from “work appraisals” and “add-on things” that “coincide with my lack 
of self-esteem issues.” In regard to how he occupied himself in times that he would otherwise 
be alone, he always had a book “on the go” to read in bed, after watching television, and in 
regard to the hours between work and late-night hours, he said, with a shy but cheerful laugh, 
  
I guess I’ve got, what with the croquet, and… snooker, backgammon and the bridge, 
I’ve got… some of my colleagues will say, ‘oh you’ve got this, oh you’re a social 
butterfly, you’re always doing something,’ and I’ll say ‘well you’ve got a husband or 
a wife and when you go home they welcome you in and they chat with you, and I 
haven’t got that, so I need to, I need to go out.’ 
  
Martin preferred his own company if he was engaged in an activity, or planning for one that 
would involve other people. He said that he enjoyed “getting through” the process of 
organising croquet tournaments or helping customers at work. Moreover, as well as ‘health 
mentors’ pertaining to people that were able to “do things” (particularly in the realm of caring 
for others), some patients also mentioned caregivers (clinical and informal) who simply had it 
“together.” UK patient Garry, 29, told me that his Dad represented “health” because “he 
seems quite well all the time, like with it … focused.” Feeling focused tied into being 
occupied enough to suspend other concerns.  
 
Arguably, clozapine patients, while facing treatment provisions subjecting them to ‘chronic 
time’ (Morris 2008), are domesticated enough by the regimen to experience a more ordinary 
freedom – and to reclaim themselves in focusing on an open future. We might assume that 
the more extensive the health provisions, the more one’s ability to improvise toward 
imagined freedoms might stall. However, the health agency described in the previous 
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chapters along with the ongoing non-compliance to health advice during clozapine treatment 
(at the same time as complying with taking tablets and have bloods taken) suggests a 
persistence of ecstatic temporality that may be critical to self-efficacy and pursuits of 
phenomenological authenticity.  
 
Existential and phenomenological theories emphasise the human capacity to find ephemeral 
freedoms from uncertainties and doubts that may surface when one reflects extensively on the 
meaning of one’s experiences. Ontological insecurities are thought to be a large part of 
schizophrenia (Fuchs 2007; Sass & Parnas 2003), and psychotic ‘delusions’ are thought to 
involve a switch into inflexible ‘certainty,’ whereupon alternative perceptions appear 
unreasonable (Rhodes & Gipps 2008). When acute psychotic symptoms are alleviated on 
clozapine, I observed that the experience of greater ontological security to deal with both 
ordinary and extreme uncertainties opens up.72 This could be ordinary in the sense that, as 
Merleau-Ponty (2002[1962]:401) wrote, ‘[t]he percept is and remains, despite all critical 
education, on the hither side of doubt and demonstration.’ That is, everything is still yet to be 
proven. As suggested in Chapter Three, part of being a clozapine patient is about continual 
management of uncertainties, and this happens within the predictable stability provided by 
the medication regimen. 
  
Finding focus to fulfil present time and suspend doubt was not taken for granted. When I 
asked Steve, 21, whether he remembered what it felt like to be “well” before getting his 
diagnosis, he said, after a long pause, “I had more concentration, I could focus on 
something.” Australian patient Trent, 24, also felt that his illness was indeed largely a matter 
of resolving his concentration - but this was something that was he was still negotiating with 
his female presence/voice, called Bon Chance. When I asked Trent what part of his treatment 
had helped him the most he said that it was when his doctor had agreed with him and Bon 
Chance that his concentration was “the main issue … holding me back in my life”: 
 
He [Trent’s doctor] established that the concentration was actually part of my illness 
and that was important to me because, um, to me, that’s true as well, it’s quite an 
accurate distinction … But Bon Chance says she’ll leave having fixed that, and we 
can fix that, but it’s a social thing … Bonnie says that she’ll resolve my 
                                                 
72 This may or may not be linked to Obsessive-compulsive symptoms; it is beyond the scope of this thesis to comment but I 
note that UK psychiatrist George suggested to me that he would hypothesise that part of the reason patients experience OCS 
is due to patients not wanting to let go of delusions and hence becoming obsessively superstitious is another ‘cognitive’ 
avenue for their concerns (my paraphrasing).  
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concentration before she leaves, and if I take enough clozapine she’ll leave altogether 
… I’m hopefully on a good trend, really. 
  
Trent wished to find freedom to focus so long as it was with both clozapine and Bon 
Chance’s support. He told me he would miss her if she disappeared entirely, thus creating 
ambivalence about her leaving altogether. As Lavis (2013:48) has described in the case of her 
ethnographic informants’ ‘friendship’ with anorexia, there is a ‘dialectical engagement 
between – and multiple temporalities of – processually reproducing something that you 
already have, whilst knowing that it too produces and constrains you in ways both valued and 
unwanted.’ Trent said that Bon Chance “says ridiculous things that make me laugh, like 
every day.” “She won’t let me do anything except for a couple of things a day” – “she’ll let 
me go on a long walk, and she’ll let me play games and play music” – “but she won’t let me 
do anything, like, hard.” I highlight the importance of having challenging activities for 
‘optimal’ well-being later in the chapter, but here I note the importance of finding focus by 
being able to engage with basic activities for enjoyment – as Trent perceived Bonnie to be 
helping him to do, as a first step. 
 
The baseline experience that was not taken for granted was the capacity to move through 
present engagements without losing concentration. Finding activities to focus on in the 
present alleviated external pressures often experienced in the past. UK patient Dylan, 33, had 
observed that, “if I’m going fishing or watching a film or something like that, I’ll 
concentrate.” When I asked him about when he could not concentrate he replied, “well, I 
went to college, I found it hard, especially when you don’t understand something.” Dylan 
said that teachers were not sympathetic and this exacerbated his difficulties. This was 
something that resonated with other patients’ experiences. Thankfully, attending the clinic 
was something patients could focus on doing as a socially affirmed competence.  When I 
asked patients how they were feeling (0-10; 0 being the worst they have felt; 10 being the 
best) during our interviews at the clinic, the answer tended to be on the higher end of the 
scale. The listed contributors to this subjective scoring usually concerned simply getting up 
and making it into the clinic.  
  
Even when things were not perceived to be going that well, patients were still able to find 
solace in living from day-to-day rather than letting themselves be limited by linear timeline 
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concerns such as the potential consequences of clozapine and other consumables. For 
instance, Australian patient Angus, 38, said of managing his appetite: 
  
It’s like, everything’s against you and you’re trying to battle up a wall, and you can’t 
get over… it’s nice just to live every day. I used to look forward to pension day 
[be]cause it’s the time I had the most money, but, no, it’s good just to live every day, 
and enjoy every day … Otherwise I’m just stuck here in this time, this perceived 
timeline and, history. 
  
Not getting “stuck” meant finding focus with present-time concerns and a will to extend 
present time as much as possible. Health agency was experienced as a process by which 
temporal freedoms are lived in present potentialities, no matter the future unknown 
consequence. Further, abilities to find agentic freedoms through temporal focus that suspend 
uncertainties suggested an ordinary human capacity.  
 
How patients dealt with uncertainties by occupying themselves with meaningful activities 
and finding personal rituals for coping with residual symptoms are part of what it means to be 
human. As de Beauvior (2000[1948]:156-157) remarked of how we surpass uncertainty when 
feeling ontologically insecure:  
  
One does not exist without doing something … Regardless of the staggering 
dimensions of the world about us, the density of our ignorance, the risks of 
catastrophes to come, and our individual weakness within the immense collectivity, 
the fact remains that we are absolutely free today if we choose to will our existence 
in its finiteness, a finiteness which is open on the infinite. And in fact, any man who 
has known real loves, real revolts, real desires, and real will knows quite well that he 
has no need of any outside guarantee to be sure of his goals; their certitude comes 
from his own drive. 
  
Two points in de Beauvoir’s statement resonate with lived experiences of clozapine-treated 
schizophrenia. First, there is the observation that existence involves ‘doing something.’ As 
discussed, this seemed to be a post-psychosis freedom that clozapine patients did not take for 
granted. Faint recollections of psychosis were mostly described along the lines of sudden, 
frantic feelings out of one’s control – “I couldn’t concentrate” (Steve, 21); “a very confusing 
time” (Mark, 52); “thinking such God-awful things … I came to a complete full stop in a 
psychosis, but I was still in a psychosis” (Alan, 43); “my life just kind of stopped” (Kevin, 
34); “it was kind of a beautiful thing but it kind of snapped on [finger click]” (Christopher, 
39); and “everything just flies off sideways and goes onto a different track” (UK nurse 
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Narelle observed of her patients). Whereas psychosis could be described as chaotic 
happenings and halts, once patients were on the clozapine ‘track,’ experiences were more 
about coherently ‘doing something.’ What is more, ‘we are absolutely free today if we 
choose to will our existence’ (de Beauvoir 2000[1948]:157). Clozapine-treated schizophrenia 
patients pursued life with at least some sense of potentiality to overcome unknowns.  
  
Second, de Beauvoir’s (2000[1948]:157) assertion that the ‘finiteness’ of living (and doing) 
‘is open on the infinite’ wherein man’s ‘certitude comes from his own drive,’ was critical to 
patients appending their existential fears and doubts. That is, moments of certitude were not 
tangible and taking hold like they would in psychosis, but instead were part of a temporal 
uptake of self-efficaciousness towards a not-yet-known future. In Chapter Three, I considered 
how patients efficaciously work between compartmentalisations of health, utilising 
imaginaries of consumption intakes and expenditures to embolden their active remaking of 
their health. As Tom suggested, in the opening quote to this section, working on embodied 
“connections” and “focus,” wherein all psychic and bodily energy was temporally integrated, 
allowed agentic investments in present-centred potentialities. Of course, these ephemeral 
certainties and suspensions of uncertainties mirrored the underlying premises of clozapine 
treatment itself: to keep patients alive.  
 
The personal resourcefulness of patients to keep on with life was critical to their livelihoods. 
Larson (2004:462) suggested that Levi-Strauss’ notion of ‘bricolage’ not only describes the 
‘constant (re-)negotiation in a situation of existential crisis’ for people recovering from 
psychotic illness, but also the ‘attribute of human creativity in life and a proof of individual 
analytic and theory-generating capabilities.’73 While Larson’s (2004:466) ethnographic study 
concerned how patients made sense of their situations in the wake of first-episode psychosis, 
rather than chronic schizophrenia, his emphasis on ongoing ‘conceptual work to appropriate 
and combine different explanations’ can be carried over into the ongoing, creative salvaging 
of selfhood and personal drives experienced by clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients.  
 
                                                 
73 Levi-Strauss (1966:24) described ‘bricolage’ as evident in human problem solving insofar as: ‘The choice of one solution 
involves a modification of the result to which another solution would have led, and the observer is in effect presented with 
general picture of these permutations at the same time as the particular solution offered. He is thereby transformed into an 
active participant without even being aware of it. Merely by contemplating it he is, as it were, put in possession of other 
possible forms of the same work; and in a confused way, he feels himself to be their creator.’ 
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As explored throughout this thesis, what it means to live as a clozapine patient is hinged on 
both biological and social factors that patients reclaim their sense of self through. UK patient 
Bradley distilled the term ‘health’ to mean, at a minimum, “being alive.” Given the plethora 
of unknowns when it comes to the embodied interactions of clozapine, the blood work and 
checking for ‘vital signs’ during treatment monitoring provisioned against imminent threats 
to life, may indeed render one, at least relatively and clinically, “healthy.” Further, the very 
experience of breathing, Lyon (1997:92) illustrated, is a process that is both autonomic and 
open to subjective regulation, and also communicative of ‘feeling states.’ Similarly, Fuchs 
(2012:154) pointed to ‘the homeodynamic regulation between brain and body,’ hinging on 
two relations. First, there are experiences of ‘vitality’ (‘mood’ and ‘attunement’), which are 
most verifiable in the absences of harmonious bodily states (Fuchs 2012:153).  
 
Second, there is ‘conation’ – experiencing ‘drive, instinct or urge’ to interact with the 
environment (Fuchs 2012:156). Fuchs (2012:163) summarised that a ‘continuous ‘resonance’ 
between the brain, the nervous system and the entire organism is the precondition for 
conscious experience,’ reminding us, then, that the ‘living body is necessarily subjective.’ 
The body ‘is a self because it constantly transcends itself through its boundaries and relates to 
the environment by assigning meaning to it’ (Fuchs 2012:163). The phenomenological trope 
that we cannot separate bodily experiences from consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 2002[1962]; 
Csordas 1994), along with findings that experiences of self can both usefully and more 
problematically dissolve under certain circumstances, thus brings me to consider health 
agency in regard to meditative pursuits.  
 
Meditative pursuits  
 
What this guy, Aristotle, said is that the mark of a educated mind is to entertain a 
thought without accepting it. So, Mindfulness does that a little bit, and the peaceful 
thing kind of does that as well … Nothing’s perfect, it doesn’t work all the time … 
When I do these things, it’s kind of like a magic spell or something like that … I don’t 
want to call it casting spells because I don’t believe in witchcraft or anything like 
that, but that’s the best way to explain it … It’s like, ‘right, you’re in the present 
moment now, don’t judge that, just let it happen’ … you cast these spells that 
discredit the voices, and things like that … If you can hold that meditation, and hold 
it for a while, then the voices are less there … you’re quieting the mind down, really. 
And some of the spiritual things like having peace. Meditating on peace would do the 
same thing, but the link between them is the breath, because in Mindfulness, the 
breath is the anchor of bringing it back. – Christopher, 39, UK patient 
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Agency over well-being was also available through meditative pursuits that dissolve linear 
time and past and future experiences of ‘self.’ Recent ethnographic evidence suggests that it 
is important to distinguish between experiences of ‘self’ during trauma and during meditative 
states. On the one hand, ‘mindfulness meditation’ can result in a ‘loss of agency’ because, as 
one of Ataria’s (2018:49) ethnographic participants suggested, they “didn’t need a controller, 
I wasn’t in charge.” On the other hand, during trauma agency can be lost because ‘one loses 
the ability to control one’s actions’ (Ataria 2018:49). Ataria (2018:50-51) underscored how 
both experiences result in experiencing a loss of time, along with Damasio’s notion of ‘the 
autobiographical self’ (1999), and feelings of ‘deadness.’ Sensory ‘depravation/low arousal’ 
during meditation and ‘overload/hyper arousal’ during trauma ‘can result in similar 
experiences’ insofar as ‘the subject-object structure … may collapse’ (Ataria 2018:51). The 
critical differences, however, come down to experiences of ‘will’; ‘guidance’; and that during 
trauma, ‘the intentional structure collapses immediately,’ such that people meditating feel 
‘protected,’ while those experiencing trauma feel ‘helplessness’ (Atarai 2018:52). Although 
‘the relationship between dissociation and psychosis has now become one the most vexed 
questions in the study of psychosis and spirituality’ (Luhrmann 2016:9-10), ‘mindfulness-
based interventions’ have gained little traction in schizophrenia research (Tabak, Horan & 
Green 2015), and meditation more generally is considered dangerous. None of these 
techniques were part of the clinical tool kit in the clozapine clinics where I was based.  
 
Despite formal meditation classes often excluding people with psychotic illnesses, a number 
of patients in my research adopted strategies that aligned with meditative practices. I reiterate 
that clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients actively repurpose knowledge and experiences 
to express their health agency. UK patient Christopher first adopted “mindfulness” 
techniques during a course at ‘recovery college.’74 He initially just “used” these “around 
sundown time, to relax for the evening,” and also to “help” him “in a shopping queue in 
Tesco and it’s all busy-busy, and you’re stressed, so you can kind of take a few breaths 
there.” Christopher lived with his mother but said that he found it hard when “she has the TV 
on all the time” (his mother knew this: “She’ll say ‘you’re getting fed up with me, aren’t 
you?’ So, she’ll go and stay with my brother”). He clarified, “when I’m in my own space, I 
                                                 
74 In contrast to ‘mindlessness’ – when action feels automated and ‘the perception of control is not possible’ – 
‘mindfulness’, by formal definition, refers to the attentional ‘process of drawing novel distinctions’ that yield ’a heightened 
sense of involvement and wakefulness or being in the present’ (Langer & Moldoveanu 2000: 1-2). 
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feel quite better” because “I’m able to do more mindfulness things, and I’m able to study the 
Bible more.” For Christopher, his religious spirituality was, in his words, the “constitution” in 
which he built his life around, and he incorporated concepts of mindfulness into this.  
 
The notion of things being impermanent gave him “hope.” He was at first self-conscious 
about what I might think about his use of the description “magic spells,” laughing at himself 
at one point for using the term. Ultimately, though, Christopher’s meditative pursuits were 
tied into a desire for societal change that transcended beyond himself:  
 
Conversations I’m having with you, sometimes, if I talk to regular people they can 
use it as a knife and turn it around and stab me with it … If I was saying ‘oh, the 
system’s fucked up’ and this that and the other, there are certain people out there that 
they say, ‘oh we’ve got a brilliant system’ … It’s like, I can’t, I can’t… it’s hard to 
talk to … Hopefully this will help your anthropology thing. 
 
Sometimes our conversations led to contemplations about how he might indeed start to talk 
about his experiences with mindfulness and spirituality more often: “I’ve got a lot more 
words and I’ve got a lot of context and I’ve got a lot of spells now, so I’m thinking that if I 
came off my medicine I might have a chance to make it through – when you do get these 
heightened senses of realities and things like that… I think that’s the place where you can 
actually make the most change, but it’s never a permanent thing.”  
 
This impermanence was just as much about him being able to assert changes over the process 
of his mindfulness as it was about making it more “compatible” with his “spirituality.” A 
year after we had first met, Christopher clarified that in regard to his mindfulness techniques: 
 
I’ve modified it now. It’s, you know, it’s coming back to breath. But I’ve added the 
fact… it’s like labelling thoughts and things that are going on in your head. So, you 
have this mindfulness, which has a structure for the names of the words, for the 
things that are going on… breathing, paying attention in the moment, and stuff like 
that … Basically, I do a mindful meditation, but I’ve changed the words that kind of 
maybe mean the same thing but they’re compatible with my spirituality 
 
He conceded, “I’m still in a lot of pain, but spiritual type pain … but you can’t do anything 
else but move on.” Previous ethnographic evidence suggests that practices of meditation can 
transform pain because the process of being present with pain, which often defies language, 
allows an ‘exposure’ to it that, ‘is accomplished through silence and relies on one’s own 
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ability to accept their experience alone’ (Myers, Lewis & Dutton 2015:499;500). Christopher 
was one of four participants in my research who had explicitly drawn on and tailored 
‘mindfulness’ strategies. UK patient Hannah was the only patient in my research that linked 
her experiences of mindfulness to clozapine: “I’m trying a mindfulness course and that kind 
of helps with the voices – I don’t know if the clozapine helps in the same way or if it just 
takes the edge off the… makes sure you don’t have suicidal thoughts, or too much stress 
building and making your mood low, and these kind of crisis things.”  
 
For the other patients who mentioned it, mindfulness had become an add-on to taking 
clozapine. Before coming off his sub-therapeutic dose of clozapine following the death of his 
pet cat, UK patient Tom had re-purposed non-clinical knowledge that he could now articulate 
after reading a book he had recently bought himself, titled ‘Mindfulness’ (which he had 
pulled out from his bag to show me). On days when he found himself “getting all confused” 
at home, he now had vocabulary for how attending to his pet cat would bring him “back to 
the world.” While walking the streets, he tried to focus on his natural surroundings, 
describing to me with much enthusiasm the birds he now admired and felt connected to: 
“you’re going along and they’re going along and you connect with them; you watch them, 
it’s brilliant.” To supplement the temporal stability that a sub-therapeutic dose of clozapine, 
tai-chi and the calming presence of his cat granted him, Tom actively pursued “mindfulness” 
techniques he had read about, to “centre” himself in the present and “flick off” the voices he 
experienced (Brown & Dennis 2017:375). Tom reasoned that, “we’re conditioned … by 
suggestions in our culture and society, and our brain accepts them and believes them, and 
then that’s where the voices start, with a commentary through our lives … [but] now I know 
they are just thoughts, and they are meaningless.”  
 
Personalised meditation rituals were adapted from cultural exposures patients had had. When 
I last met with Australian patient James, quoted at the opening of this Chapter, I asked him 
whether there was something that helped him to “focus” best (to see how the answer 
compared to notions of feeling “in control”), he responded, 
  
I meditate. I enjoy meditating … I don’t know if I do anything in particular, I sit in a 
Shinto’s stance – Japanese kneeling position … and another one where I sit in this 
kind of Chinese, Kung fu Buddhist position, that’s my two … I allow my mind to 
run, in whatever way it wants to run, through meditation I try to, figure out which is 
which… bring things together, rather than being… thinking this, this, this and this, 
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bring it all together and sort it out … I like meditating at the beach, I really enjoy that 
… meditation when you’re outdoors … it’s so cool, you know, it feels good. 
  
Despite the fact that his diagnosis had excluded him from participating in formal lessons on 
how to meditate, James had pursued his own practice of it instead, enabling him to “bring 
things together” and “sort it out.” This happened to reflect my own experience after 
participating in a formal Transcendental Meditation course, where I had signed a form to 
certify the only condition of entry: that I did not have a psychotic disorder. The only tangible 
difference between James and my experiences of meditation beyond the ‘training’ aspect was 
the frequency in which we did it – while James practiced martial arts three to four times per 
week, he was proud to meditate “at least once a week.” I was told that I should meditate 
twice a day (like James, however, I do what suits me, which is once a day at most).  
 
While most patients did not conceive of their tendency toward engaging in temporal pause as 
‘mindfulness’ or ‘meditation,’ as Tom, Christopher and James had come to do, they 
suggested (even more) informal means of achieving similar states of embodied awareness. 
Echoing the words of patients, Myers, Lewis and Dutton (2015:492) posited, ‘meditation is 
an exercise in temporality: learning to stay in the present moment.’ Myers, Lewis and Dutton 
(2015:488;489) conducted ethnographic research with ‘American women who use 
meditation-based contemplative practice as a therapeutic for trauma,’ exploring Pagis’ notion 
of ‘somatic reflexivity’ and how meditation can even substitute for psychotherapy in so far as 
there is ‘a feedback loop between one’s self and one’s body, and a strong or repeated 
stimulus and response.’ They argued that meditation can be deployed ‘to silently – and very 
privately – accept a self they often perceived as a source of danger, pain, and disappointment’ 
(2015:503). Indeed, Tom had found that with this newfound “awareness,” “I’m experiencing 
my emotions a little bit more,” and he felt more “conscious of the sadness in the world.” 
“People are suffering needlessly, especially in Western society … I don’t want to listen to 
that voice in my head,” and if, “in another culture and that voice is saying nice things … 
they’re probably gonna be conscious of it.” Moreover, the concept of ‘mindfulness’ in its 
bridging of Eastern and Western ideas of the self and self-transcendence, potentially provides 
scope for psychotherapeutic interventions that might challenge the ‘self-disorder’ part of 
schizophrenia rather than dealing with possibilities of multiple selves (Kirmayer 2007).  
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Personalised practices of meditation may be not only more effective in assisting patients in 
their sense of asserting agency, but also further still by allowing the ‘self’ to be involved 
elsewhere. Like Christopher, who partook in several extracurricular community-building 
activities and volunteered regularly at his local church, Australian patient Donna, 40, was 
concerned with making bigger changes beyond her own self-management. Donna, had 
become unwell while studying at university. She had now returned to university, as a 
postgraduate student, and was finding a balance between her passions and what culminated in 
a schizophrenia diagnosis. Of the time she became unwell, she remarked, “I felt like the 
whole weight of the world was on my shoulders … just looking at the devastation that 
humans have brought on this planet, and feeling like… nobody’s doing anything about it and 
I have to, kind of like…. Why doesn’t everyone care about it the way I do?” I asked Donna if 
she still felt like this, and she replied: 
 
I do, yeah… I often wake up now, feeling like Humanity’s on a knife edge, that 
we’re in dangerous waters, in terms of our future and the future of life on earth … 
climate change, pollution, resource depletion … keeping Aboriginal people out of the 
criminal justice system. 
 
Donna said that her “dream job” would be to work for “The Australia Institute; a green think 
tank.” She was also one of the few Australian patients in my study doing voluntary work, 
which she said she was “getting satisfaction” from.  
 
As we saw in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, well-being is partly about experiencing 
“novelty,” as Australian patient Daniel called it, or insatiable and multiple “appetites,” as 
Christopher put it. Christopher hypothesised that his “coping strategies,” paralleling with 
“mindfulness,” still “fizzle away … maybe because I become complacent.” There was thus a 
need to keep developing strategies for oneself. As I elaborate below, these experiences of 
chasing novelty and challenging oneself also speak to the notion of ‘flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi 
1990). When I asked James how he was currently feeling in regard to being able to ‘focus’ on 
reading, he responded, “pretty good” because “everything’s on track, I’m reading, writing, I 
play chess as well - part of a chess club as well.”  
 
It is not that patients were not cognisant of potentially undesirable consequences of primarily 
focusing on present preoccupations; patients actively chose to utilise this focus. A number of 
patients played or listened to music. For instance, UK patient Alan described how integral 
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listening to and playing music was – “I’ve always listened to music, you know, I – that’s 
what got me through it all, was ah, music lessons, music appreciation.” Alan similarly also 
commented of his theatre improvisation workshops:  
 
You know once I can disengage from talking to myself, to engage in concentrating in 
the drama group, I think will get that, that sense of achievement that I’ve been 
lacking … the actual piece of theatre itself was improvisation … then you sit back 
when you’re not in the scene and watch it and you think ‘ow this is really good.’ And 
the spin-off is, I watch TV out of the wall again now.  
 
Alan’s pursuits had led him to engage in other activities that he once felt “paranoid” about 
doing.  
 
Patients absorbed themselves in activities to connect with worldly phenomena and reaffirm 
their abilities. According to Heidegger (1962[1927]: H354), ‘the Self must forget itself if, lost 
in the world of equipment, it is to be able to ‘actually’ go to work and manipulate something.’ 
This may now also be referred to as ‘immersion’ (Snodgrass at al 2011) or ‘absorption’ – ‘the 
profound narrowing or concentration of attention and focused deployment of cognitive 
resources; the absorbed individual becomes unaware of the external environment, self-
awareness and critical thought are suspended and time perception may become distorted’ 
(Seligman and Kirmayer in Snodgrass et al. 2011:29). Further, as anthropologists have 
explored in the contexts of ‘trance’ rituals, the experience of ‘dissociation’ can be deeply 
healing – if it is controlled and anticipated – or profoundly traumatic if the experience is not 
sought out (Snodgrass et al. 2011; Ataria 2018).  
  
People, generally, also immerse themselves in activities wherein they became ‘enminded’, as 
opposed to embodied. In regard to everyday practices of regulating ‘mental’ attention, 
Snodgrass and colleagues (2011:31;44) explored the ‘absorption-dissociation’ states of 
people who play computer games, whereby the self is transferred to videogame characters 
and worlds such that, ‘individuals forsake real-life roles and obligations, rather than 
confronting them directly,’ finding ‘positive therapeutics of online gaming, which function 
through a combined promoting of relaxation alternating with mildly stress-inducing flow 
states.’ As Heidegger (1962[1927]) said, when immersing themselves in tasks-at-hand, 
people transcend their sense of self (otherwise fragile) and are able to put their energies into 
something else. Heidegger (1962[1927]:H410) also remarked that, ‘[b]usily losing himself in 
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the object of his concern, he loses his time in it too … the temporality of resoluteness has, 
with relation to its Present, the character of a moment of vision.’  Further, ‘[o]ne’s existence 
in the moment of vision temporalizes itself as something that has been stretched along in a 
way which is fatefully whole in the sense of the authentic historical constancy of the Self’ 
(Heidegger 1962[1927]:H410). Thus, while the self ‘forgets itself’ during the activity, the 
feeling of ‘resoluteness’ and ‘vision’ stands for a holistic and creative reclamation.  
 
Arguably, the ‘moment of vision’ Heidegger described aligns with the psychological concept 
of ‘flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi 1990). The feeling of ‘flow’ is described as the ‘optimal state of 
wellbeing,’ marked by an engagement in an activity that does not have a clear temporal end. 
The ‘soporific’ or ‘heaviness’ effects of clozapine are temporally forgotten during activities 
whereby one can engage all energies and attention. Critically, experiences of ‘[f]low helps to 
integrate the self because in that state of deep concentration consciousness is unusually well 
ordered’ (Csikszentmihalyi 1990:41). ‘Paradoxically, it is when we act freely, for the sake of 
the action itself rather than for ulterior motives, that we learn to become more than what we 
were … once we have tasted this joy, we will redouble our efforts to taste it again’ and ‘[t]his 
is how the self grows’, posited Csikszentmihalyi (1990:42). What is more, ‘by far the 
overwhelming proportion of optimal experiences are reported to occur within sequences of 
activities that are goal-directed and bounded by rules,’ such as reading and playing games 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1990:49).  
 
Many patients spent time engaged in such ‘flow’ activities. As mentioned above, UK patient 
Martin enjoyed reading and playing croquet, which allowed him to challenge himself within 
both safe and uncertain confines. In describing a recent book he had read, he said to me, 
“there was this fantasy, fantasy type world, there were dream-makers, shadows… it was all a 
bit weird, you’re not sure how those two worlds meshed… it wasn’t really clear by the end of 
the book to be honest,” but, he laughed cheerfully, “I loved it because, yeah, it wasn’t normal 
in any way.” He said of his croquet, “I care too much, so when I’m on the verge of winning 
… I throw it all; I think ‘oh I can win’!”  
 
Having a sense of working on something accomplishable were important to achieving states 
of flow. Living in his own flat and being able to take things “slowly,” Luke described in 
detail how he was able to assemble a new bed over a period of “six to eight weeks,” in the 
end getting bricks to prop things up while he worked on various parts. He said that it was a 
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matter of “having the energy to have a go at it”, and overcoming his feeling of being too 
“nervous” about how to do it. I asked him whether there was a time in which he felt “most in 
control” and he said, “when I put my bed together, or when I put my chair together!” He 
added, “I had to feel more positive, and I had to, feel like it was a surmountable problem, a 
problem I could deal with.” 
 
Csikszentmihalyi (1990:84) noted that due to the negative symptoms of schizophrenia, there 
is a ‘stimulus overinclusion’ whereby ‘schizophrenics are condemned to notice irrelevant 
stimuli, to process information whether they like it or not … Unable to concentrate, attending 
indiscriminately to everything patients who suffer from this disease not surprisingly end up 
unable to enjoy themselves,’ which ‘probably has to do with innate genetic causes’ because 
‘[s]ome people are just temperamentally less able to concentrate their psychic energy than 
others.’ ‘When a person cannot control psychic energy, neither learning nor true enjoyment is 
possible,’ Csikszentmihalyi (1990:84) concluded. To the contrary, I observed that even 
patients with intermittent (but clinically static) negative symptoms, could find means of 
enjoyment – whether or not these might be sometimes regarded as obsessive compulsions, or 
else clinically unaccounted for as such activities never make it into clinical conversations.  
 
While finding states of ‘flow’ is a personal matter for patients, there are more formal 
engagements around the fringes of clinical treatments that might help.  For example, there is 
evidence to suggest that when schizophrenia patients participate in ‘Dance and Movement 
Therapy’ or ‘Body Psychotherapy,’ they can significantly lower negative symptoms (Martin 
et al. 2016). Moreover, the benefits of being immersed in an embodied activity was relatable 
to clinical caregivers themselves. For instance, Australian psychiatrist Adam spoke to me of 
his need to engage himself on a particular activity when facing stress. Whenever a patient he 
knew took their own life, he put himself to task to make a piece of furniture. It was his way 
of refocusing himself, channelling grief, and challenging himself to make something new 
rather than dwelling on things he could not control.  
 
While UK patient Christopher, 39, said to me, “I wonder if there’ll come a time where I don’t 
have to struggle along,” he was also continually “searching for something” and “striving for 
everyone to be on the same page” (Chapter One), and spoke to me of eliciting “coping 
strategies” that needed to be renewed. He described a “tug-of-war” between “bottomless 
appetites,” which he worked to “cast spells” over.  “You’ve got to keep doing the positive 
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thing and re-plugging these connections so they don’t disappear.” Christopher, like a few 
patients (such as Tom), was cynical about the ways society pervaded his consciousness. He 
gave me an example of “bottomless appetites that are less desirable for him: “You watch TV 
and you see a Man[chester] United t-shirt, and you think, right, I want this Man-United t-shirt 
… that will wear away, and you’ve got buy a new one,” and then “the subscription to your 
mobile phone will wear away, you’ve got to buy a new one, so it’s… I feel a lot of people are 
being kept hungry, to keep them, to keep them travelling on.” I suggested, in supporting his 
attention to contradictions (Chapter One): 
  
JB: Well, maybe that’s the contradiction isn’t it, we’ve kind of got to feel like we’re 
searching for things all the time? 
Christopher: Yeah 
JB: [Be]cause maybe to be on the same page, it’s not enough… I don’t know? 
Christopher: There is contentment, it’s, yeah… there are-, there will be-, there are 
ways … I’m just hoping I can keep it together and keep on the right track. Because if 
some, if negative coping strategies are with the bottomless pit, then the positive ones 
are climbing the mountains. 
  
Further, what Christopher had also described as a “bottomless appetite,” to keep up with and 
continually strive to resolve, feeling that ‘there is contentment’ available, parallels with 
notions of ‘flow.’ I asked Christopher, 
 
JB: I’m wondering whether it’s ever satiable, if there’s ever a feeling of being… at 
peace? 
Christopher: Well, you’ve got some of these guys … yogis in India … I’d like to 
keep that thought that it can happen, like utopia, searching for utopia – if you say, 
‘right I’m not never gonna get there’ and you don’t walk down a path you’re not 
gonna get closer to it really, so that’s one of my things.  
 
Patients were able to not only ‘be present,’ they suggested to me experiences aligning with 
Fuchs’s (2012:155-156) notion ‘conation’: The ‘energetic’ parts of lived experience, 
pertaining to ‘spontaneity, activity, affective directedness and tenacious pursuit of goals’; a 
‘“being-after-something” that is directed toward the environment.’ While clinical 
expectations were that patient concerns were largely part of their illness, I saw efficacy in 
their present-focused activities that were otherwise overlooked because of the associations 
with illness. 
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Potentiality and symptom evasion 
 
As with everything else, finding one’s ‘extended homeostasis’ (Rapport 2003) was an 
ephemeral experience, but enough to surpass symptoms and give hope for further resolve into 
the future. Just as UK patient Joanne had described herself as “not actively ill,” Felix, despite 
having ongoing symptoms unlike Joanne, said to me, “I’m passed the point of having 
schizophrenia but I’m still on the medication.” Patients, however transiently, were able to 
feel free of their symptoms, even while acknowledging that clozapine was part of this feeling.  
As described above, patients were able to temporally manage their anxiety, which is 
associated with both schizophrenia and a side effect of clozapine, as they lived through many 
irresolvable pasts and future trepidations. The apparent flatness of emotion in schizophrenia, 
often associated with trauma, has been the hardest ‘symptom’ to treat under biomedical 
paradigms. Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987:28-29) posited that emotions are the ‘’missing 
link’ capable of bridging mind and body, individual, society, and body politic.’ In then 
considering medical implications for Mauss’ ‘techniques of the body,’ which problematised 
the notion that the ‘mind’ does not simply determine bodily action, but rather bodily actions 
become ‘ensembles’ to be ordered socially, Lyon (1997:90) asserted that ‘[a]ctive bodies are 
emotional bodies.’ Meanwhile, previous ethnographic research on present-cantered 
‘meditative’ practices amongst people in Western culture suggest benefits equivalent to that 
of interpersonal psychotherapy to heal trauma and establish ‘somatic awareness’ (Myers, 
Lewis & Dutton 2015). Centring oneself in the present through activities or meditative states 
could also temporally awaken emotional states - as UK patient Tom said of feeling his 
“emotions a little bit more” since practicing mindfulness techniques.  
 
Patients who were clinically described as having ‘blunted affect’ and working memory 
difficulties were able to transcend these states given some inter-personal freedom to do so. I 
frequently observed patients change in apparent levels of concentration, coherence and 
motivation right before my eyes when our conversations turned to non-clinical matters that 
occupied their time around clozapine treatment. This opening up of the self may also accord 
with Rapport’s (2003) notion of embodied ‘self-intensity.’ Likewise, Merleau-Ponty 
(2002[1962]:529) posited:  
 
It is by being unrestrictedly and unreservedly what I am at present that I have a 
chance of moving forward; it is by living my time that I am able to understand other 
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times, by plunging into the present and the world, by taking on deliberately what I 
am fortuitously, by willing what I will and doing what I do, that I can go further.  
 
The tendency to fixate on details or try to solve problems gave patients a sense of livelihood 
and connection to the world. As discussed, there was an intentionality to minimise 
ambivalence by continually restoring poise through action in the present, if not through 
‘mindful’ or ‘meditative’ pursuits. Indeed, the phenomenological notion of intentionality 
encompasses an ‘operative intentionality … which produces the natural and antepredicative 
unity of the world and of our life, being apparent in our desires, our evaluations and in the 
landscape we see, more clearly than in objective knowledge’ (Merleau-Ponty 
2002[1962]:xx).75 At the same time as drawing on clinical imagery in regard to alleviating 
uncomfortable thoughts, keeping busy allowed patients to distract themselves enough to at 
least begin to transcend self-dominated concerns or insecurities residual to clozapine’s 
workings or their experiences of illness.  
 
Due to contradictions in experience, patients were not always aware of their abilities to 
transcend the side effects of clozapine. When I first interviewed UK patient Luke, he had just 
commenced clozapine and was still adjusting to the side effects. By the time I met him again 
the following year, despite seeming to me more able to stick to the same thread of 
conversation, he commented that since taking clozapine, “my attention span has reduced, I 
find that I can’t focus on a thought for more than 30 seconds … my concentration’s gone.”76 
This phenomenon was not dissimilar from other patients who described how clozapine dulled 
their sense of control too much. Yet, Luke, like many patients, seemed able to concentrate for 
extensive periods if the topic of conversation or a task-at-hand was engaging enough and the 
pressure was taken off (like building furniture at his own pace). The realities of his patient-
hood were not otherwise easily worked through, however. 
 
Even if symptoms were only temporally evaded, the sense of self-overcoming (Rapport 2003) 
was powerful. Luke described in detail, with a trembling and abashed voice, a recent 
                                                 
75 This quote is from the Preface to Merleau-Ponty’s (2002[1962]) Phenomenology and Perception – hence the page 
number being in Roman Numerals.  
76 When I first met Luke, he was much more erratic in conversation thread. Even two weeks after treatment commencement, 
he seemed to be more coherent and able to engage - he spent the first half of our second interview telling me about various 
social issues he had been hearing about on the radio, and he generally seemed more able to concentrate during our 
conversation and engage. By the time I interviewed him the following year, although putting on significant weight around 
his middle, he was much the same in terms of coherence. 
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experience of “a problem” he had where, “I had to go out and get some food, and that was 
tough,” particularly knowing which type of check-out to use, working out how to use his 
bank card, whether or not he was getting the best deals and if he can manage with “carrying it 
home,” and whether or not he’ll get a sympathetic bus driver (“the older drivers are less 
fussy”). Nonetheless, he said, “I think I sorted that out.” Narelle, who was Luke’s 
Community Psychiatric Nurse beyond the clozapine clinic, said that she had been trying to 
get him to slowly open up and talk, but “he has become detached from his past, because it is 
so painful, and he therefore finds it difficult to concentrate on the tasks at hand.” Luke 
showed me the diary Narelle had given him to keep track of appointments, and suggested that 
having two appointments lined up for that week was stressful for him. He said the 
anticipation of an appointment kept him awake the night before. Yet, when I asked him how 
he was feeling he said an “eight” because of “coming here, getting my clozapine, meeting 
nice people, talking with the nurses, it’s always nice… It’s nice to have human contact, make 
some friends, I get out the door too fast, I think, that’s my problem, I should be more sociable 
with people, without being pushy.” Having a consistent schedule (like attending the clozapine 
clinic) was much more manageable than non-regular commitments – the novelty factor had to 
belong to time in the present. Further, what worked best for Luke was focusing on simpler 
tasks at hand, on his own terms, like putting his new bed together.   
 
Context and lack of pressure from others was critical to patients finding enough focus to 
evade their symptoms and clozapine side effects. UK patient Robert felt most “in control” 
while “at home, by myself” and “during the mornings, playing chess.” I asked if he found he 
was able to “focus” while playing chess and watching Jehovah’s Witness videos online 
(which he reported doing for “four or five hours a day”), to which he replied, “yes I do 
actually, yeah.” I asked, “Do you find that you feel at all anxious or paranoid while doing 
them?” He responded, “not too bad, actually.” Robert also had aspirations for the future. 
Namely, “to be baptised as a Brother” (and, ideally, “to meet one of the Sisters, you know, to 
have a relationship together with one of the Sisters”), and to “start doing some Witness 
working.” “If I became a Brother I would probably see the paradise,” he added: 
 
When paradise comes, Julia, there’ll be no more mental illness, no more sickness … 
when you go to die you don’t actually go to heaven … the paradise comes when 
there’s a true relation, where the government will turn against all the churches – this 
is not my paranoia – a true relation where the UN and the governments turn against 
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false religion, and after that there’s Armageddon … after Armageddon, that’s when 
paradise comes … when the earth is cleansed of crime, poverty.  
 
I asked Robert if he could imagine getting baptised, and he replied, “I try to, yeah.” When I 
asked when, he responded: “As soon as I give up smoking … The only thing stopping me is 
the smoking, that’s the only thing”. When describing how he was feeling towards the end of 
an interview, Robert, said “about an eight” (out of ten) because we were “talking about the 
Bible, I don’t get much chance, so it’s great to talk about it!” UK patient, Gordon, 39, also 
told me he was feeling like a “seven or eight” (out of ten) toward the end of a conversation 
about his beliefs in Christianity, because: “Considering… all these great ideas and, talking 
about them, just thinking about the things, helps you to know the presence of, presence of the 
spirit, Holy spirit.” During another conversation with Robert when we were not talking about 
Jehovah, Robert said, “if I talk too much it makes me feel nauseous; I’m not used to talking a 
lot.” Moreover, when attending a Jehovah’s Witness Convention, Robert’s lethargy “wasn’t 
too bad, no, I was alright … I felt quite well,” although he did still experience dizziness and 
nausea, along with the chest pains that he attributed to smoking. During our last meeting, I 
asked Robert about why he did not feel his usual need to lie down (Chapter Three) during the 
afternoon he was at the Convention, and he replied,  
 
I think the main reason was because I was with all the Brothers and Sisters, you 
know, everyone’s… there’s no trouble … beautiful day … also when I go to [church] 
as well, I feel okay, I feel fine, so. Except the last time I was there, on Sunday, I had 
to come home early. I was feeling a bit rough so… I stayed for an hour and 15 
minutes. 
 
There were no certainties that difficulties could be entirely alleviated, but, based on 
experience and imagination, there was enough potentiality for patients to move forward with. 
As Gordon commented when I asked him if he felt like he was living the life he wanted to: 
“Yeah, because… we’re not static, I don’t think we’re static. I think it’s possible to change 
your- change one’s ways … Christians talk about the resurrection, which is a…a great hope 
really.”  
 
There was, of course, a clinical caution expressed about the risk of getting too caught up in 
these potential evasions of symptoms. For instance, Australian patient Donna attended 
weekly and monthly meetings for a number of different local non-for-profit organisations. 
She told me, however, that her social worker, Jill, had: 
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Said I should steer clear of things, like policy areas that make me anxious, so it’s a 
quandary really, whether to, like, remove myself from thinking about things like that, 
or embracing them, and sharing them, and I’m thinking… you know, I always feel 
better when I’ve been around people who care, and I’m fortunate enough to know a 
lot of people in a lot of different circles who do care, and they, they know me, and 
they like me, I think, so I feel like the burden’s not all mine. 
 
Donna continued, self-consciously, “I enjoy writing about these things, and thinking and 
doing some research and things, and I so enjoy going to the meetings as well.” Donna’s 
previous states of illness had involved paranoid delusions about the very topics that also gave 
her purpose and connection to others in life. It was thus a delicate balance for her to try to 
find, but caring about these topics nonetheless gave her momentum and hope in the 
meantime.  
 
Australian patient Daniel was in a similar situation with his taxi-driving work, which kept 
him well at the same time as making him vulnerable to psychosis. Daniel’s feelings of being 
watched by others exacerbated when he started driving taxis, just before he was diagnosed. 
He reasoned, “I’ve known people who are hackers and can hack and stuff like that and … 
because the computers in the cabs are all linked in to the taxi base, I sort of got a little 
paranoid that someone might have hacked in and that’s how they were getting sort of footage 
of me at work.” Daniel liked driving taxis, though, because it made him feel in control when 
he was “back behind the wheel” and it helped him to not sleep in. He said, “I sort of need that 
imperative to work in order to get up on time.” When I asked him at a later date how he had 
been in the month since I last saw him, he explained that he had worked two shifts, which 
where were, “good – I enjoyed doing them,” however, “I’m still sort of worried about these 
ideations of reference”. His paranoia had not yet returned but he was cautious that it might, 
although this caution was not enough to stop him working altogether; it was something he felt 
he could potentially overcome.  
 
Once patients got to know the types of strategies that would work to help them move through 
discomforts and symptoms, they were able to imagine how future activity would keep their 
discomforts at bay. Feelings of health and self-stability constituted an active process, to keep 
busy and feel proactive; experiences of what UK patient Luke described as being free from 
“run-away thoughts.” As UK patient Alan said when I asked him about what health meant, 
“well, when I was well, before the age of 21, I had a lot of freedom and I did rather a lot. I 
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was a bit limited financially but I was, I was a sales rep, I was playing bass in my mate’s 
rock-band.” Arguably, Alan’s recent reuptake of playing the guitar had given him a renewed 
sense of freedom that had begun to open up further potentialities.  
 
Alan, who felt himself to be benefiting from playing the guitar again, participating in a 
writing group and most recently a mental health drama group, remarked, “once I can 
disengage from talking to myself, to engage in concentrating in the drama group, I think I 
will get that, that sense of achievement that I’ve been lacking.” He was concerned by “intake 
not outtake”; “doing things little by little, adding more to routine as I go” (Brown 2018:164). 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, Alan had replaced cigarettes with electronic cigarettes. He 
told me that he needed to actively inhale something for “mental preparation” – “to get in the 
bath and wash my hair”; “before getting on the bus”; “before going to my drama group.” 
Vaping was now giving him new momentum: Alan said to me after one of his drama 
performances that he had invited me to: “I feel like I’m just getting started!” (Brown 
2018:164).77 He later reflected that, “I was relying on cigarettes to get me through my 
psychosis,” as it was “a bit like slowly disengaging … but in the long term it had me sitting 
on the chair getting very unhealthy.”  
 
Alan said in our final interview that he felt “busier”, but that “it’s not so much as not 
squandering my time as getting on with little things that help you along a bit.” He had several 
plans for the future, including that, “in four years’ time, I could be free of medication, 
maybe.” Whereas when I first interviewed Alan he had described himself as a “borderline 
alcoholic” who had not had a drink in “15 years,” when I spoke to him the following year he 
said that, alongside his new vaping habit, he was having “the odd glass of whiskey once or 
twice a week” because “it’s more a case of later in life if I decide to booze a bit I possibly can 
… saving it for later.” He also had recently got a new job, which he was looking forward to 
so he could come home afterwards and relax; enjoy the day’s accomplishment. Moreover, 
UK patient Trevor said to me when we last spoke, “I’m doing pretty well aren’t I - I’m 56 
now, so getting old; in another 20 years, I’ll be really old.” He added, with a gentle smile, 
“it’s a shame we all have to die.” He said that he does not like to think about reincarnation, 
because “I don’t’ think the next life will be as good as this one.” 
 
                                                 
77 This was the only occasion that I met with a patient participant outside of the clozapine clinic and I did so because it was 
at a public theatre, in the presence of Alan’s community-run mental health group.  
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Conclusion 
 
Clozapine treatment helped patients in my research to ‘live in the present’ and keep an open 
future, no matter how paradoxical or at times provisional this future was. Once patients were 
domesticated to the clozapine regimen, they were able to find new ways to focus themselves.  
While using routines to inform their sense of health agency, these routines needed to be 
worked upon. Patients recognised the risks and dangers associated with undesirable potential 
futures, which could compromise their routines that society and the clinic might deem 
appropriate. Finding a sense of focus allowed a transcendence of self-concerns and linear 
time. This temporal focus, granted initially by clozapine, allowed patients to reclaim a sense 
of improvising rather than being tied to their illness chronicity.  Patients were temporally able 
to ‘let go’ of whatever stood outside moments of freedom, if not living with the past and 
present harmoniously. Pursuing present-centred practices and finding connectedness to others 
synthesized to produce temporal stabilities and agentic freedoms from what were otherwise 
delimiting circumstances.  
 
Feeling like there was always more to work on gave patients a sense of hope and purpose. 
Having a sense of purpose from moment-to-moment also contributed to patients’ sense of self 
efficacy and self-transcendence. This again highlights how patients are active rather than 
passive participants in their making of their health. Being an active participant also gave 
scope to autonomy beyond their diagnostic ‘fate’ and clinical expectations. While on the one 
hand this chapter supports previous ethnographic evidence that has posited ‘instances [where] 
people struggled to situate themselves existentially within the complex constellation 
constituted by whether one can control and discipline oneself’ (Jenkins 2015:52), I have also 
suggested how experiences of clozapine allowed a safe base for patients to move from, and 
temporally free themselves from ‘struggles’ in ways that align with the pursuits of persons 
without schizophrenia. Personalised meditative pursuits, embodied or ‘enminded,’ also 
moved beyond merely keeping busy or distracted with tasks at hand. They suggested 
experiences of ‘flow’; an epitome of well-being. An existential freedom was made available 
through patients’ drives to keep moving forward while also appreciating the personal power 
of time in the present to experience symptom evasion and the potentiality for even greater 
health.  
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Conclusion  
 
Man lives by those propositions whose validity is a function of his belief in them.  
                                                              – Bateson (1951 in Rapport 2003:27) 
 
To return to the underpinnings of this thesis, as put forward in the Introduction, I set out to 
demonstrate how agency and hope play out in the extreme life conditions of clozapine-treated 
schizophrenia. I sought to show how such agency and hope need not be specific to these 
conditions, just as these conditions do not preclude agency and hope. I have endeavoured to 
demonstrate how people express their ‘health agency’ – defined here as one’s means of 
making and working for their own health out of what is given, consumed and monitored in 
the clozapine treatment regimen – by exerting personal power and potentiality over one’s 
otherwise confining illness states. I have suggested that clozapine-treated schizophrenia 
patients are not operating under an assumption of static illness conditions.  
 
As Bateson observed, we contribute our own imaginations toward our understandings of the 
world, including that of our own ‘health.’ We live by these imaginings to reclaim the 
potentiality of our lives. While those with schizophrenia may have remarkable imaginations, 
resilience and life challenges, their abilities to feel health agency need not be spectacularised, 
although those of us without schizophrenia can learn a lot from people with schizophrenia 
(Jenkins & Barrett 2004; Jenkins 2015). Patients illuminated for me – through my making of 
‘partial connections’ (Strathern 2005) with participants and ideas through anthropological 
enquiry – how the process of simply ‘doing things’ in present time can bring powerful 
feelings of control over and meaning to “being alive” (as UK patient Bradley put it in 
Chapter Four). This feeling of control-through-doing propelled my participants onward 
toward an unknown future.  
 
I found that the philosophy of phenomenology came into its own during my field work. 
Being with my participants opened up my thinking about not only what it means to try to sift 
through endless questions and contradictions, but also how ephemeral clarities can be enough 
to spur instinctive self-drive and hopefulness in life.  While I am ‘maintaining an acute 
awareness of the inevitable incompleteness of our theories’ (Biehl & Locke 2010:320), in 
anthropology or otherwise, it has been critical to approach my data with ‘a view of culture as 
open and emergent,’ something ‘to be discovered,’ via means that pertain to ‘everyday lives 
in local worlds of meaning’ (Lucas 2004:148). This is why, I suspect, anthropologists who 
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have looked at schizophrenia beyond the more mundane clinic activities, such as Jenkins 
(2004; 2015), highlight the ‘extraordinary’ nature of the disorder. Life-worlds beyond the 
clinic are bound to be even more elusive. While my clinic-based, ‘episodic fieldwork’ 
(Dalsgaard & Nielsen 2013) was, comparatively, limited in its cultural scope, it was perhaps 
by containing my focus in this way that I was able to unpack the most taken for granted 
aspects of my participants’ experiences. Given previous ethnographic evidence on the 
detriments of reductionist, biomedical treatments in private mental health clinics in America 
(Luhrmann 2000; Jenkins 2015), it was interesting to observe how, in the publically funded 
UK and Australian clozapine clinic worlds I entered, the more impersonal social structures 
provided by the clinic became useful for patients. Clozapine-treated schizophrenia was not 
the life sentence it first appeared to be, because the clinic environments created conditions for 
patients to experience health agency.  
 
I found that the intensive clozapine treatment regimen fed into patients’ sense of health 
agency because it was part of their active pursuit for an ‘extended homeostasis: the 
maintenance of a set of life-conditions within which the self continues to flourish and has its 
objectives met’ (Rapport 2003:225). In Chapter One, I laid out my ethnographic and 
conceptual frameworks for appreciating health agency as something personal and hopeful, 
persisting through contradictions and contingent on connectedness to others. In Chapter Two, 
I showed how physiological clozapine monitoring becomes a productive enterprise for agents 
to manipulate while becoming part of a wider circulation of care.  In Chapter Three, I 
suggested how clinical caregivers and patients utilise the ambiguities of clozapine and mind-
body imaginaries to individualise what they can and cannot control, through personalised 
health behaviours. In Chapter Four, I examined what clozapine has to do with how people 
imagine their past, present, and future, demonstrating how the self-efficacy patients 
experience in focusing their energies in present time complement the treatment premises and 
provisions of clozapine. In this Conclusion, I consider the implications for my ethnographic 
findings regarding how schizophrenia and its treatment are conceptualised, then, in terms of 
patients’ agency, their ability to lead a so-called ‘contributing life’ (Lourey, Holland & Green 
2012), and how clinical caregivers help and/or hinder these processes. I also posit future 
directions for anthropologists and public health policy makers in this field.   
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Personal power 
 
Personally, I feel any method or dialogue I could have with another person, I could 
confront within myself, and try – to use an old cliché – battle my own demons by 
trying to ignore them, knowing they are real and exist. But I feel it’s a process I can 
do, maybe feel more comfortable doing by myself … To quote the Chuang Tzu, ‘a 
pheasant in a cage, although it may be treated really well, would still rather be free 
and without the cage’s luxuries.’ It’s a hard problem to resolve, but if there were a 
med or therapy that could help me not, or make me not, bothered by ‘the cage,’ I 
would take it. To change my capacity for, to be able to perform socially. 
 – Australian patient Daniel, 33 
 
Like anybody, Daniel felt simultaneously independent of and dependent on external 
structures in his life. What Daniel did not acknowledge, in his above statement, was the 
freedom he already exerted in feeling able to work things out for himself and in taking his 
self-competence seriously – at the same time as accepting he was in some kind of social 
‘cage’ with ‘luxuries.’ He desired more fluency in his inter-personal interactions within this 
cage, consisting of clozapine treatment and ongoing challenges to this health, but he was 
more comfortable working in what did feel like his own space. Daniel worked for feelings of 
“novelty” and “control” in his life and exercised this during clozapine clinic check-ups 
(Chapter Two). This also applied to his consumption habits: Daniel went through “phases” of 
“discipline” by eating certain foods until the novelty wore off; he smoked cigarettes to “stay 
awake”; “focus” and “distract” himself, as his “main daily routine,” and felt able to quit if he 
wanted to (Chapter Three). He did not yet feel “safe and secure” and was negotiating 
sleeping habits around clozapine, residual delusions and a desire to maintain his taxi driving 
licence (Chapter Four). He spoke to me of his previous feelings of “suicidality,” but he was – 
during the time that I knew him for – committed to creating new daily interests for himself. 
Daniel, moreover, was still figuring things out. He was open to new ideas (or medications or 
therapies) for change, and was, in the meantime, choosing to live by as many of his own 
terms as his could. What is more, as Rapport (2003:81) posited, ‘only as a self, active in the 
world in an ongoing accruing of meaning and identity, does an individual construe otherness 
and relate, consciously or intentionally, to other things-in-the-world.’ Daniel was looking for 
ways to most productively be in, and connect with, the world and he maintained a sense of 
personal power.  
 
I observed all of the clozapine patients in my research to hold this personal power, which 
may also be described as an ‘existential power,’ that they exhibited in their contexts, 
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influencing those contexts. To recap, Rapport (2003:90) described existential power as a 
‘self-intensity’ (‘Machtegefuhl’); ‘an energy or force originating in and manifested through 
physical, individual bodies, and by its use individuals may be found pursuing a life-project in 
an environment that represents an extension of their sensoria, their subjective 
phenomenologies, beyond their apparent bodily integuments.’ We can substitute ‘life-project’ 
with ‘health’ and understand ‘environment’ as what patients make for themselves with 
clozapine treatment – its effects and individualised potentialities. When it came to their 
health, clozapine patients, like anybody, were ‘not forced into particular meanings or 
motivations; these remain[ed] a personal preserve’ (Rapport 2003:261). Further, ‘the act of 
making meaning can transcend and hence willfully alter or subvert any existing limits or 
conventions surrounding the language or system of which the symbolic forms a part’ 
(Rapport 2003:57). How patients’ personal power fits into previous theories of schizophrenia 
and its treatment deserves careful consideration.  
 
First, experiences of clozapine-treated schizophrenia do not merely reflect a ‘self-disorder.’ 
The ‘self-disorder’ aspect of schizophrenia is generally conceptualised around an experiential 
‘collapse’ of the dichotomy between self and other, ‘or the most foundational sense of 
existing as a distinct subject of experience’ (Sass 2014:8).78 Insofar as they exhibited their 
personal power to construe their circumstances, clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients did 
not seem to be experiencing an unbounded or ‘fragmented’ self, although some temporal 
disconnections were evident (Laing 1965; Sass 1992; Sass & Parnas 2003; Fuchs 2007). Any 
temporal disconnections complemented the clinical regimen patients were on – prompting 
them to ‘live in the present’ (Chapter Four) – and, therefore, patients were resonating with 
clinical aspirations as much as protecting themselves from painful pasts. Many patients were, 
in more ordinary ways than not, also ‘body conscious,’ despite ongoing schizophrenia 
symptoms or attributions to clozapine (Chapter Three). Further, patients – both symptomatic 
and asymptomatic – found agency and meaning through socially affirmable goals.  
 
Clozapine treatment provided a social world in which patients could engage with the system 
of which they were a part, ‘in a ‘viable’ manner, a manner that might feasibly become routine 
and long-term,’ such that ‘one’s experience can be described as self-authored – however 
                                                 
78 Notably, ‘feelings of passivity and alienation or fading or self and world’ are found in experiences of ‘depersonalization 
and introspection as well as schizophrenia,’ and are therefore ‘perhaps not inconsistent with the paradoxical nature of the 
normal self or subject’ à la Kant’s ‘transcendental ego,’ or Sartre’s framework of subjectivity as ‘nothingness’ (Sass 2014:8).  
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seemingly oppressive’ (Rapport 2003:85). Clozapine patients were also able to exhibit a 
‘social self’ (Aylwin 1985:115). Further, as Merleau-Ponty (2005[1962]:347) said of self-
experience, ‘I am not concealed from myself because I have a world’. To reiterate the 
phenomenological theories of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, Zahavi (2005:167) 
posited, ‘since the structure of this world contains essential references to others, subjectivity 
cannot be understood except as inhabiting a world that it necessarily shares with others.’ 
Clozapine patients were grounded as individuals in their worlds because they felt themselves 
to be witnessing and moving toward resolving problems that always involved other people 
and things external to them – thus reiterating their sense of self and ‘other.’ What was more, 
patients’ competence and hope in this social world, no matter how defined by ‘precarity’ 
(Jenkins 2015), such as what Daniel was reflecting, problematises the notion that patients 
might live on with a sense of loss when it comes to social power.   
 
As discussed in Chapter One, experiences of clozapine-treated schizophrenia do not suggest 
social oppression. Although ‘psychotic experience and subjectivity take form at the most 
personal juncture between the subject, his/her biology, and local regimes of normalcy and 
power’ (Biehl, Good & Kleinman 2007:241), the ‘local regimes of normalcy and power’ in 
the clozapine clinic lend to a renewed focus on physiological health rather than acute 
experiences of schizophrenia as a psychiatric condition. Throughout this thesis, I have 
demonstrated how patients, despite not having psychotherapeutic supports, were able to 
socially engage in their treatment regimens perhaps in part because treatments of this kind 
were less stigma-inducing. Jenkins and Carpenter-Song (2007) have evidenced the problem 
of ‘stigma despite recovery’ in Western society’s treatment of schizophrenia. In the clozapine 
clinics in this thesis, however, we have a situation where stigma persisted when considering 
some clinical caregivers’ views on psychiatric statuses, yet ‘recovery’ was more contingent 
on the upkeep of physiological stability. Of course, human potential cannot be entirely 
realised or dominated by State systems of support (Beihl 2010; Beihl & Locke 2010), and it 
was perhaps the way in which clozapine treatment gave patients “space to build” (Australian 
psychiatrist Sandra, Chapter Three) that was most critical.  
 
My ethnographic findings thus suggest that ‘social defeat’ (Luhrmann 2007; Luhrmann & 
Marrow) – pertaining to ‘repeated social interactions in which they [people with 
schizophrenia] subjectively experience failure’ (Luhrmann 2007:152) – may be somewhat 
alleviated by the clozapine clinic treatment regimen. While social defeat in patients’ pasts of 
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course informed their present identities to some degree, there were also new social assurances 
available. These assurances were enacted through the clinical regimens of care wherein 
patients could be of use to clinical caregivers as much as to themselves (Chapter Two); and 
also through patients being able to work with or reconnect their ‘minds’ and their ‘bodies’ 
where clinical care could not but could nonetheless appreciate (Chapter Three). Further, the 
will to ‘live in the present’ (Chapter Four) yielded principles of well-being that stretched well 
beyond what it means to find ‘health’ while living with schizophrenia. Insofar as the 
treatment regimen provided patients with temporal and social structures that minimise 
criticisms of patients’ situations, in part due to the ambiguities and dangers of clozapine, 
patients could not be described as experiencing ongoing social defeat. After all, patients were 
no longer suicidal; they had hope and their personal power to keep functioning in ways that 
socially contributed to rather than detracted from their environments.  
 
Labour 
 
As discussed in my thesis Introduction, schizophrenia was first characterised as a defiance of 
‘Western selfhood,’ a ‘resistance to labour’ and ‘a resistance to the labour of self 
improvement’ (Woods 2011:42-43). I have shown, however, how clozapine patients, while 
more often than not experiencing ongoing symptoms of schizophrenia and being unemployed 
and state welfare dependent, still worked hard to secure for themselves what they could in 
present time. Those who were engaged in paid or voluntary work enjoyed doing so when they 
were in supportive work environments where hours were flexible. All patients, meanwhile, 
worked creatively with the clozapine treatment regimen and around it to maintain their 
stability and secure individual freedoms toward the future. These might be described as acts 
of neoliberal ‘self-labour.’ As UK patient Joanne said of worrying that she could not think for 
herself, “I challenged that … in order to get stronger … get more confident in myself” 
(Chapter One). This was not just about using her imagination, it was about working with 
external influences too. Patients, like anybody, appreciated having structures in their life and 
contributed to these as much as allowing for clinical inputs and routines.   
 
Patients appreciated routines. Working with clozapine treatment rhythms was a key 
manifestation of what Jenkins (2010; 2015) described as ‘pharmaceutical imaginary,’ 
whereby the cultural confines of expectation and possibilities given membership of a clinical 
population, shapes subjectivity. As discussed in Chapter Four, clozapine patients enter into 
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conditions that are highly provisioned by clozapine consumption and monitoring, at the same 
time as allowing for improvisations that temporally free people from what Morris (2008) 
described as ‘chronic time.’ Time on clozapine is structured around the present, which 
patients then work with in terms of “keeping busy” and even achieving optimum well-being 
states of embodied or enminded ‘flow’ while engaging in activities (Chapter Four).  Like 
anybody, patients work to alleviate stress for themselves by proactively keeping afloat, rather 
than merely treading water and struggling significantly as they had done in the past. Life on 
clozapine could be said to complement neoliberal, ‘Fordist’ hopes of ‘regularity, task-specific 
duties, and mechanical rhythms’ (Ferzacca 2000:35). Yet, as Rapport (2003:68) pointed out, 
‘when the routine takes the form of socio-cultural institutions, there is no stability in the latter 
beyond their ongoing recognition and continuing employment by individual interpreters.’ 
Patients supported rather than resisted these temporal regimens that enabled their ongoing 
labour. 
 
Patients also advanced themselves by way of manipulating aspects of the regimen otherwise 
considered to be out of their reach, through the blood work (Chapter Two), and by way of 
exploiting the opportunities that come with clinical uncertainties around clozapine (Chapter 
Three).  In regard to blood monitoring, blood flow and blockages also present as a metaphor 
for fluid self-constitutions, with blood work marking the stop-start nature of these 
constitutions. As we saw in Chapter Two, patients like Joanne resolved to rearrange plans 
and buttress their routines when goals were not achieved the first time around. Whereas 
psychotic experiences are thought to involve experiences of certainty after periods of 
experiencing extreme doubt (Rhodes & Gipps 2008), clozapine patients managed their 
recurrent anxiety (clinically framed as either a side effect of clozapine or symptom of 
schizophrenia) through more ordinary means pertaining to Western culture. As de Beauvoir 
(2000[1948]:157) described, we all feel a phenomenological ‘certitude’ only through our 
‘drive’ to do things, and this becomes a means of temporal self-assurance. Moreover, through 
enacting a combination of ‘self-labour’ and clozapine, patients found meaning in their lives.  
 
While all patients worked for self-assurance, it was perhaps more available to older patients, 
in line with general population expectations. As UK patient Trevor, aged 56 by the time we 
parted ways, told me: “It’s a shame we all have to die” because “I don’t’ think the next life 
will be as good as this one” (Chapter Four). Trevor felt himself to be “doing pretty well” but 
also “getting old.” A recent qualitative study of patients with schizophrenia over the age of 
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sixty suggested that managing health at this stage of life makes patients feel ‘just like 
everyone else’ because of lowered employment pressures, normalised chronic health 
concerns and opportunities for creative pursuits that tend to present themselves during 
‘retirement’ (Mushkin, Band-Winterstein & Avieli 2018). While this thesis cannot speak 
directly to these findings as I was unable to interview people in this demographic, I note that 
patients in my research did experience newfound freedoms because they felt to have lived 
more demanding lives prior to clozapine treatment. UK patient Alice, 36, had said, “I just 
want a quiet life basically, you know, I’ve been through a lot of drama” (Chapter Three). 
Further, the extent to which patients felt their ways of life to be reflecting moral expectations 
that might relate them to wider society was something that this thesis only begins to touch on. 
 
I suggested in Chapter Three that patients who were otherwise socially isolated with many 
residual psychiatric symptoms, still looked to ‘better’ themselves in ways that begin to 
suggest a ‘moral agency’ (Myers 2015; 2016), contingent on integration into a wider social 
world.  I add here that patients such as UK patient Luke – who said that his experiences were 
about “constantly looking after your health, constantly touching base”; “constantly thinking 
could I do that better? Who could I meet who would be better for me?” – went further than 
exhibiting the kind of ‘moral agency’ described by Lovell (2007). While patients such as 
Alex (Chapter One) said that his life’s “task” had become “fighting” his hallucinatory 
presences and protecting other children from abuse, thus echoing Lovell’s (2007:335) idea of 
‘moral agency’ as ‘project[ing] possible moral worlds,’ Alex was also checking for signs of 
cancer from his smoking habit, and could thus be seen to be keeping a foot in the clinical 
world of which he had become a part as well.   
 
While the clinical world of reciprocities might not be quite enough to see patients clearly 
‘contributing’ their moral labour to social life beyond it, this sense of participation was still 
something that patients could begin to feel moral agency through in the sense that they were, 
in their minds, making socio-moral efforts that could be continually improved upon. The 
question is to what extent these labours could be acknowledged by a wider society. As 
Joanne had said of why she benefited from her current relationships, including those at her 
part-time job and voluntary work, “there’s no kind of power dynamic” (Chapter One). 
Managing oneself and the expectations of others can be contradictory for people with 
schizophrenia (Lucas 2001), and therefore evidence of the kind of ‘moral agency’ Myers 
(2015; 2016) spoke of is difficult to affirm here as I did not have access to peoples’ worlds 
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beyond what they told me in the clinic. I have suggested, however, that clozapine-treated 
schizophrenia patients exhibit aspects of, and hope for, this kind of moral agency in their 
endeavours that were more immediately relatable.   
 
Everyday efficacy 
 
To improvise is to follow the ways of the world, as they open up, rather than to 
recover a chain of connections, from an end point to a starting point, on a route 
already travelled … Lives are bound up in the tangle, but are not bound by it, since 
there is no enframing, no external boundary. Thus the self is not fashioned on the 
rebound but undergoes continual generation along a line of growth. 
 – Ingold (2011:216;221). 
 
Clozapine patients were efficacious in their abilities to improvise through life, and ‘along a 
line of growth’ (Ingold 2011:221). As Ingold (2011) posited, people make their way as they 
go, recreating their sense of self. As discussed in Chapter Four, patients lived according to 
temporal frameworks that many ‘ordinary’ people in neoliberal societies might strive toward 
in terms of achieving ‘well-being.’ In this way, they exhibited the ‘extraordinary’ human 
qualities that Jenkins (2015) has attached to schizophrenia. Many of these strategies, 
however, could also be appreciated in their mundanity. Patients navigated stress by keeping 
themselves occupied and absorbing themselves in activities at hand, like reading books, 
consuming food or cigarettes, or doing exercise to discharge experiential energies.  
 
The daily rhythms of clozapine, as well as daily activities, contributed to patients having a 
sense of everyday momentum to keep improvising with. As Kleinman (2006:221) has said of 
‘what really matters’ in life, it comes down to ‘simultaneously what is most optimistic and 
what is most ominous.’ Patients in this thesis were presented with plenty of things to 
potentially fear, but also plenty of hope, and a relatively functional life to proceed with in the 
interim. Once patients became acquainted with clozapine, their creativities seemed to keep 
evolving. Moreover, as some patients suggested of their spiritual beliefs, practicing these 
beliefs facilitated health agency, hope and daily rituals that superseded symptoms of their 
illness.  
 
Improvisation and illness remedies extended to clinical care, too. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, opportunities for reciprocity in the clozapine clinic were taken up by patients in terms 
of communication control and also blood monitoring activities. I noted that in the Australian 
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clinic, patients had to work harder to reshape clinical rhythms according to their personal 
needs. My suggestion that a ‘logic of care’ (Mol 2008) was available to clozapine-treated 
schizophrenia patients in ways that did not, from my understanding, remarkably differ from 
what has been described in non-mental health treatment settings further suggests the everyday 
nature of improvisation and health care strategies deployed by patients in this thesis. 
 
I have also suggested that psychiatric symptoms and clozapine side effects are, to some 
degree, dependent on context and perhaps become more prominent in clinical interactions 
that do not look for everyday efficacies. As well as the clozapine clinic settings discussed in 
this thesis de-emphasising the diagnosis of schizophrenia, the clinical setting became a form 
of what Rapport (2003) described as ‘democratic violence,’ that was on the edge of ‘nihilistic 
violence.’ So long as clozapine and clinical experiences were predictable enough to 
improvise with, patients felt interactions to be manageable in everyday ways. As Jenkins 
(2015:263) noted of ethnographic ‘access’ to these observations, ‘[i]t might be 
overwhelming, threatening, or simply too taxing for persons in the absence of 
anthropological sensibilities to suspend judgment to enter into unfamiliar extraordinary 
terrain.’ Whether or not the more ‘ordinary’ aspects of schizophrenia patients’ everyday 
efficacies will be observed in future research is yet to be seen. 
 
Future directions 
 
This thesis, as well as arguing for health agency in a context where it is not expected to be 
activated, has problematised both biomedical and anthropological approaches to 
schizophrenia. As discussed above, ways in which I came to understand the experiences of 
clozapine-treated schizophrenia patients did not add weight to arguments for patients being 
outstandingly different from anybody else. This view comes with the risk of down-playing 
the remarkable ways in which people with schizophrenia do suffer, under their conditions and 
under clinical approaches. I met people in the aftermath of acute suffering, and came to see 
how they made their lives and their ‘health’ workable without merely complying or resisting 
to the clozapine treatment regimen.  
 
This thesis is not intended to endorse clozapine treatment for schizophrenia. It is intended to 
shed light on how people undertaking clozapine treatment for chronic schizophrenia make 
meaning and health out of a combination of clozapine, schizophrenia and their personal 
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power. It is intended to show that agency persists in lives that have been re-given and 
confined. It is intended to also show how an anthropological approach to situations like these 
is useful. Further, my ethnographic experience was that most ‘opposition’ to biomedical 
approaches were also apparent in the views of clinicians, alongside the rhetoric that peddled 
firm biomedical rationalisations. My collaborations with a neuropsychiatrist, who was for the 
first time allowing an anthropologist into what would be described as an otherwise 
biomedical research domain, was as much a ‘catalyst for change’ (Whitely 2014:506) as the 
‘critique’ and ‘context’ (Whitely 2014) evident in my ethnographic data.  
 
In terms of implications for public health policy approaches around inequities and how to 
better assist patients live a more ‘contributing life,’ in the socioeconomic independence 
sense, I have suggested that patients are not as far away from this notion as they may seem. 
Their expressions of health agency are geared toward Western ideals of self-improvement 
and working on something, in the most basic sense and in ways that are easily overlooked. 
Drawing on cross-cultural evidence, Luhrmann and Marrow (2016:220;221) suggest that, 
‘when people who meet criteria for schizophrenia understand themselves primarily as persons 
with schizophrenia, they imagine themselves as inherently incompetent and without the 
capacity to live a normal human life,’ and more favourable outcomes occur when one can 
‘identify oneself as someone who can be productive and effective, rather than to identify 
oneself by a diagnosis.’ Further, the ‘illness trajectory is more benign when a psychiatric 
model of schizophrenia is not all encompassing, and when sufferers are integrated into family 
and community … the way we treat the person may be as important as anything drugs do for 
that person’s brain’ (Luhrmann & Marrow 2016:222). Contrary to expectations, the 
biologically reductive and mundanely social and temporal structures of the clozapine 
treatment regimen went some way in diluting the oppression patients might have felt in the 
past.  
 
Patients appreciated simple accountabilities and shows of faith. The UK clinic’s appointment 
system was valued by patients, as it was a show of faith that they could get up early if they 
had somewhere to be. When I mentioned to Australian nurse Ramesh that patients in the UK 
would even come in early and queue up at the door, he could not believe this because he 
doubted their general competence. When I told Australian patient Daniel about the UK 
appointment system, his face lit up with enthusiasm (“Wow! That sounds good” – Chapter 
Two). As I have discussed in greater detail elsewhere (Brown 2018), the offering up of 
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clinical compromises like electronic cigarettes also helped patients to build confidence and 
socially orientated care. Moreover, just as Jenkins (2004) has encouraged anthropologists to 
consider the particular areas of the self, emotion and social engagement as central areas of 
research into schizophrenia, I would add that these areas can be studied within the most 
seemingly dispassionate of clinical worlds, too. We can find discreet and personal ways in 
which agency prospers by examining life in the very depths and confines of powerful 
structures.  
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